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At his rally in Phoenix on Tuesday night, Donald Trump remarked, of his decision to take on the Presidency, Most people think Im crazy to have done this. And I think theyre right.

A strange consensus does appear to be forming around Trumps mental state. Following Trumps unhinged Phoenix speech, James Clapper, the former director of national intelligence, said on CNN, I really question his fitness to be in this office, describing the address as scary and disturbing and characterizing Trump as a complete intellectual, moral, and ethical void. Last week, following Trumps doubling-down on blaming many sides for white-supremacist violence in Charlottesville, Senator Bob Corker, a Republican of Tennessee, said that the President has not yet been able to demonstrate the stability, nor some of the competence, that he needs to lead the country. Last Friday, Representative Zoe Lofgren, a Democrat of California, introduced a resolution urging a medical and psychiatric evaluation of the President, pointing to an alarming pattern of behavior and speech causing concern that a mental disorder may have rendered him unfit and unable to fulfill his Constitutional duties. Lofgren asked, in a press release, Does the President suffer from early stage dementia? Has the stress of office aggravated a mental illness crippling impulse control? Has emotional disorder so impaired the President that he is unable to discharge his duties? Is the President mentally and emotionally stable?

The class of professionals best equipped to answer these questions has largely abstained from speaking publicly about the Presidents mental health. The principle known as the Goldwater rule prohibits psychiatrists from giving professional opinions about public figures without personally conducting an examination, as Jane Mayer wrote in this magazine in May . After losing the 1964 Presidential election, Senator Barry Goldwater successfully sued Fact magazine for defamation after it published a special issue in which psychiatrists declared him severely paranoid and unfit for the Presidency. For a public figure to prevail in a defamation suit, he must demonstrate that the defendant acted with actual malice; a key piece of evidence in the Goldwater case was Facts disregard of a letter from the American Psychiatric Association warning that any survey of psychiatrists who hadnt clinically examined Goldwater was invalid.

The Supreme Court denied Facts cert petition, which hoped to vindicate First Amendment rights to free speech and a free press. But Justice Hugo Black, joined by William O. Douglas, dissented, writing, The public has an unqualified right to have the character and fitness of anyone who aspires to the Presidency held up for the closest scrutiny. Extravagant, reckless statements and even claims which may not be true seem to me an inevitable and perhaps essential part of the process by which the voting public informs itself of the qualities of a man who would be President.

These statements, of course, resonate today. President Trump has unsuccessfully pursued many defamation lawsuits over the years, leading him to vow during the 2016 campaign to open up our libel laws so when they write purposely negative and horrible and false articles, we can sue them and win lots of money. (One of his most recent suits, dismissed in 2016, concerned a Univision executives social-media posting of side-by-side photos of Trump and Dylann Roof, the white supremacist who murdered nine black churchgoers in Charleston, South Carolina, in 2015; Trump alleged that the posting falsely accused him of inciting similar acts.)

The left-leaning psychiatric community was shamed by the Fact episode for having confused political objection and medical judgment, and came under pressure from the American Medical Association, whose members had largely supported Goldwater over Lyndon Johnson. The A.P.A. adopted the Goldwater rule in 1973; Dr. Alan Stone, my colleague at Harvard Law School, was at the time the only member of the A.P.A.s board to oppose the rule, as a denial of free speech and of every psychiatrist's God-given right to make a fool of himself or herself. Stone, who has served on the A.P.A.s appeals board, told me that a few members over the years have been sanctioned or warned for Goldwater-rule violations, but that the A.P.A. eventually gave up enforcing it, because of the difficulty of providing due process to the accused.

The psychoanalyst Justin Frank, a clinical professor at George Washington University, simply resigned from the A.P.A. in 2003 before publishing his book Bush on the Couch. He went on to write Obama on the Couch, and is now at work on Trump on the Couch. Frank says that the Goldwater rule forces psychiatrists to neglect a duty to share their knowledge with fellow-citizens. I think its fear of being shunned by colleagues, he told me. Its not about ethics. Had he examined Trump, of course, he would be bound by confidentiality not to speak about him. But Frank believes that restraining psychiatrists from speaking about a President based on publicly available information is like telling economists not to speak about the economy, or keeping lawyers from commenting on legal cases in the public eye.

The A.P.A. reaffirmed and arguably expanded the Goldwater rule in March, stating that it applies not only to a diagnosis but also to an opinion about the affect, behavior, speech, or other presentation of an individual that draws on the skills, training, expertise, and/or knowledge inherent in the practice of psychiatry. The upshot is the attempted removal of more than thirty-seven thousand A.P.A. members from a key public conversation, during a moment when their knowledge and authority might aid the public in responsibly assessing the President. The other major mental-health professional organization, the American Psychological Association, with double the membership, also reconfirmed its version of the Goldwater rule. The much smaller American Psychoanalytic Association told its more than three thousand members last month to feel free to comment about political figuresa reprieve more symbolic than practical, since many members concurrently belong to the American Psychiatric Association.

Some assume that simply opting out of voluntary membership in a professional organization frees a person to speak. But versions of the Goldwater rule exist in state licensing-board standards for psychologists and physicians. Some states adopt wholesale the American Psychological Associations ethical principles as their standard of conduct for licensed psychologists, or have provisions warning that physicians can face disciplinary action for violating a professional medical associations code of ethics. Dr. Leonard Glass, who practices in one such state, Massachusetts, observed last month, in the Boston Globe , that even if nobody has actually lost his or her license for violating the Goldwater rule, it is not trivial to be reported to your licensing board for an ethics violation. This restraint on speech may violate the First Amendment, because, by speaking, practitioners stand to attract state censure, not just disapproval by private organizations. (Disclosure: As a lawyer, I have considered a potential lawsuit based on this First Amendment claim.) It is especially odd to see a muzzling of speech about political figures and elected officials when it is routine for mental-health experts in legal cases to offer opinions based on information from files, without an in-person examinationfor example, to help assess how dangerous a person is.

A congressional bill introduced in April proposes establishing a commission to oversee Presidential capacity, laying down a path that the Twenty-fifth Amendment allows for involuntary removal of a President. Section 4 of that Amendment provides that a congressionally appointed body can determine that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Psychiatrists participation in this constitutional process will depend on their appetite for professional opprobrium.

After Trumps fire and fury remarks about North Korea, earlier this month, Dr. Bandy Lee, a professor of psychiatry at Yale Medical School, sent her second letter about Trump to all members of Congress, warning that his severe emotional impediments pose a grave threat to international security. Four colleagues joined her this time, but, she told me, In the beginning, I was trying to write letters to Congress members and I couldnt get anyone to sign on, even though nobody disagreed. Her book, The Dangerous Case of Donald Trump, forthcoming in October, collects essays by more than a dozen mental-health experts and makes the case that the Trump Presidency is an emergency that not only allows but may even require psychiatrists to depart from the Goldwater rule. Seeking contributors, Dr. Lee was mindful that most colleagues would be nervous walking the tightrope, so she approached prominent writers who might have enough stature to withstand criticism, including Philip Zimbardo, Judith Herman, Robert Jay Lifton, and Gail Sheehy. (Next month, Dr. Lee will have a closed meeting with several as-yet-unnamed lawmakers to advise them on how Congress might convene mental-health professionals to review the Presidents state of mind.)

Many Presidents in our history appear to have served while managing various forms of mental illness, including depression, anxiety, social phobia, and bipolar disorder. President Ronald Reagans staff, for example, worried about signs of dementia. Concerned about Richard Nixons paranoia and heavy drinking in his last days in office, his Defense Secretary is claimed to have told the Joint Chiefs to disregard any White House military orders. But Trump is the only President to be the subject of sustained public discussion about his mental competence and fitness for office.

The Constitution contemplates, by virtue of the First Amendment, that we may freely raise concerns about elected officials, and also that in the extreme circumstance envisioned in the Twenty-fifth Amendment, medical professionals would be free to help us understand whether the President can fulfill his duties. If those who know most are the least free to speak, neither Amendment can function properly. The Goldwater rule was an overreaction to psychiatrists wielding their professional badge to do politics. Today, the profession risks protecting itself from the taint of politics by withholding expertise from a vital public debatea situation that seems no less irresponsible.

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Will Trump Be the Death of the Goldwater Rule? - The New Yorker

BELOIT - Advocates of the proposed Wisconsin Victims of Crime Amendment, known as Marsy's Law, say it would provide crime victims more rights.

Protections would include the opportunity for victims to speak more during court proceedings. Currently, victims have the right to speak at disposition, or the end of the court case. Marsy's Law for Wisconsin would allow them to speak up during release, plea, sentencing, disposition, parole, revocation, expungement or pardon proceedings, according to Brian Reisinger, a spokesman for Marsy's Law of Wisconsin.

Written by Rep. Todd Novak of Dodgeville and Sen. Van Wanggaard of Racine, Reisinger said the new protections expand upon those already in the state constitution. For example, victims could have the right to have records that might be used to locate them or other confidential information kept private.

Although the state constitution says victims have the right to be free from delay, Marsy's Law for Wisconsin would add that victims be free from "unreasonable" delays.

"When someone is accused of a crime, he or she has a right to a speedy trial. We also think that when someone becomes the victim of a crime, the victim ought to have a right to be free of unreasonable delay because the court process can be a painful and terrifying one. Victims can be concerned about their safety. Having a long drawn-out court process is something victims ought to have protections against, just as the accused have protections," Reisinger said.

Criminals can opt at any time to not talk to the authorities as part of their Fifth Amendment rights, and Marsy's Law for Wisconsin would afford victims similar rights when dealing with the defense in a pre-trial setting.

All material that is subject to a criminal investigation would still be fully available to both the prosecution and defense. The defendant would still have the constitutional right to confront the accuser in court, and could still petition the judge if they disagree with the victim on whether information should be made available during pre-trial discovery.

"Victims deserve to have rights that are equal to those who attacked them, and that's what Marsy's Law for Wisconsin does - nothing more, nothing less. A victim of sexual assault shouldn't have her diary read by her rapist if it's not related to the crime. Under our proposal, all information that is part of a criminal investigation will still be available to the accused," Reisinger said.

Wisconsin was the first state to adopt a "Crime Victims Bill of Rights" in state statute. Wisconsin also passed a constitutional amendment to the state constitution in 1993, adding victims' rights.

"This is an issue Wisconsin has been a leader on and we are talking about continuing that leadership by updating our state constitution to make rights equal for victims of crime," Reisinger said.

Marsy's Law of Wisconsin is working with Novak, Wanggaard and a statewide coalition to pass the legislation. The legislation has 40 co-sponsors who are both Republican and Democrat.

The legislature will have to pass the measure twice before a statewide referendum can be scheduled. The legislation could be on the ballot in 2019.

Marsy's Law is named after Marsalee "Marsy" Nichola, who was stalked and killed by an ex-boyfriend in 1983.

Although Marsy's Law is picking up momentum, it does have its critics such as attorneys working in criminal defense.

Jeff Livingston, an attorney who does criminal defense with Bolgrien, Koepke, Kimes and Livingston in Beloit, said he's concerned that Marsy's Law could prevent a person accused of a crime from getting information that could prove his or her innocence.

"If someone is accused of a crime, our constitution says he or she gets a fair trial and access to information to defend oneself," he said. "If both sides can't have access to the information, you aren't going to get to the truth and will have people who are innocent get convicted."

Livingston said he'd rather have nine guilty people go free than one innocent person be convicted.

Livingston said everyone has the same rights under the constitution and Wisconsin has a bill of rights for victims with 49 provisions in state statute 950.04 in addition to resources devoted to police, prosecution and a victim-witness office.

"Marsy's Law doesn't allow victims to direct the prosecution, or terminate the prosecution. Marsy's law only gives powers the statutes already grant victims," Livingston said.

Victims are already notified of all court appearances, are given the right to discuss their case with the district attorney handling it and get their say at sentencing.

Livingston said the statutes have a provision which holds any public official accountable for adhering to victims' rights, and makes them subject to a forfeiture of up to $1,000. Adding to the existing 49 rights could become more cumbersome for the prosecution.

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What the proposal mandates, and what critics have to say - Beloit Daily News

This article first appeared on Just Security.

There are many allegations against Donald Trump that may give rise some day to either criminal prosecution or congressional sanction.

But what precisely are the available options for the special counsel and for members of Congress? What is in their respective tool kits?

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Donald Trump walks toward Marine One on the South Lawn at the White House, on August 14, 2017 in Washington, DC. Mark Wilson/Getty

In this article, we explain a range of options (and the legal issues each raises): including indictment and prosecution, a grand jury statement of wrongdoing, impeachment, censure, and, for the sake of completeness, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.

In light of reports that Special Counsel Robert Mueller is investigating Trump personally for obstruction of justice, an obvious issue is whether Mueller could ultimately seek to indict and prosecute the president.

The question whether a sitting president can be indicted has vexed generations of constitutional lawyers. The Constitution is silent on the subject and the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed the question.

Within the government, the issue has been considered on five occasions: twice by the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), by the Solicitor General in the Watergate era, by the Watergate special prosecutor, and then again by the Office of the Independent Counsel in the Clinton era.

A split emerged in those opinions. In general terms, it is fair to say that the presidents immunity from indictment is an open question. The OLCs 2000 opinion, however, is presumably still the prevailing view at least for the Department of Justice.

It holds that a President cannot be indicted or prosecuted while in office, but that temporary immunity, the OLC states, would not preclude such prosecution once the Presidents term is over or he is otherwise removed from office by resignation or impeachment.

Perhaps the most widely held view, adopted by the OLC in memos from 1973 and 2000 and then-Solicitor General Robert Bork in a 1973 brief, is that the president is not susceptible to indictment and prosecution while in office. Broadly, the reasons supporting that position are twofold.

First, looking at the Constitutions text, some suggest that the impeachment procedure must precede an indictment. Article I, section 3 states:

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment, and Punishment, according to Law.

Some have argued that this language appearing to contemplate an indictment after an impeachment means that this is the only proper constitutional sequence. This reading has been abandoned for other offices including judges, vice presidents and cabinet officials, watering down its persuasiveness in the presidential context. The 1973 OLC memo didnt rely on it, but Nixon did in his briefs to the Supreme Court the next year.

The stronger argument is based on the unique position of the president in the constitutional structure. The president alone holds all federal executive power, including control of the army and navy, foreign affairs powers, control of executive departments, and the responsibility to execute laws. If the president were indicted, he could potentially be arrested, put on trial, convicted, and incarcerated.

Even if he were eventually acquitted, simply dealing with these processes would demand substantial attention. The OLC opinions in support of constitutional immunity reason that to subject the president to the criminal process would hopelessly handicap him from exercising his power.

That result would implicate the separation of powers by giving the judiciary the power to cripple the executive branch something the Supreme Court cautioned against when considering Nixons immunity from civil suit in Nixon v. Fitzgerald .

There, the Court stated that a president has absolute immunity from civil suit for official acts although that may not include other actions of a president while in office, or actions beforehand as the Supreme Court made clear in Clinton v. Jones .

(Note that Just Security s Ryan Goodman has recently published an analysis of Nixon v. Fitzgerald , arguing that a majority of justices suggested that a president is not immune from criminal prosecution during his term.)

The Bork briefwhich was substantially about the power to indict a vice president, but also considered the same issue vis-a-vis the president also points to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which establishes the succession of the presidency and a mechanism for replacing him if he is incapacitated.

[I]t is noteworthy that the President is the only officer of government for whose temporary disability the Constitution provides procedures to qualify a replacement, Bork wrote. This is recognition that the President is the only officer whose temporary disability while in office incapacitates an entire branch of government.

A related point, relied on in the OLC memos and the Bork brief, is that the president controls much of the apparatus surrounding criminal justice: prosecutions; evidence (through the power of executive privilege), and the pardon power. All of this means the common sense approach is to impeach and remove a president (and deprive him of the pardon power), and then prosecute him.

Thats the majority view, but the issue is not settled. Its a somewhat uncomfortable conclusion, running counter to the idea that nobody is above the law and giving the president a king-like immunity even for acts committed totally outside his official duties. Important legal figures have disagreed with it.

Notably, Watergate special prosecutor Leon Jaworski argued against presidential immunity from prosecution in a 1974 Supreme Court brief, following a memo from his staff.

In addition, a 1998 memo written for Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr by constitutional law professor Ronald Rotunda, mounts a strident case for the constitutionality of indicting a sitting president.

Savage calls this the most thorough government-commissioned analysis rejecting a generally held view that presidents are immune from prosecution while in office. At the very least, the 56-page memo is a testament to the debatability of the issue.

One note, though: Rotunda limited his advice to the context of Starrs investigation, whose powers and responsibilities were regulated by statute. That law is no longer in effect, and Robert Muellers position was created by Justice Department regulations instead of directly by congressional statute.

Its this contextual difference that led Rotunda to argue, in a recent op-ed, that while Starr could have indicted Clinton, Mueller cannot indict Trump.

In his Supreme Court brief, Jaworski argued that constitutional and public policy considerations actually cut both ways. The importance of the administration of criminal justice and the principle that under our system no person, no matter what his station, is above the law weigh against presidential immunity.

The Supreme Court took into account similar considerations when finding that Clinton could be sued for acts falling outside his official duties, in Clinton v. Jones . Speaking for the court, Justice Stevens wrote that neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.

The precise scope of the presidents civil immunity is still unclear, and would likely inform a courts evaluation of the scope of criminal immunity while in office.

On top of that, both Jaworski and Rotunda argue that the Constitution provides an explicit immunity for members of Congress, showing the framers turned their minds to the question, but none for the president.

Finally, Jaworski argued, impeachment can only follow high crimes and misdemeanors, which doesnt run the full gamut of criminal offenses. If impeachment had to precede indictment, this would leave a number of crimes which could go entirely unpunished.

Rotunda, in his memo for Starr, adds that impeachable offenses dont have to be violations of criminal statute, demonstrating that they are two different categories of acts.

Rotundas memo makes a couple of further points. First, he suggests that while a president can be indicted, it may be that any imprisonment would have to be deferred until after he leaves office.

He also offers a response to Borks Twenty-Fifth Amendment argument, suggesting that the amendment actually weighs against an immunity because it means there is a structural solution to the incapacitation of the executive branch that an indictment could engender. The vice president could temporarily replace the president if the the latter is disabled.

In the end, neither Jaworski nor Starr attempted to indict the presidents they were investigating. If Mueller were to attempt it, hed be breaking new ground.

But Muellers hands may be tied. The regulations governing his position specify that he must comply with the rules, regulations, procedures, practices and policies of the Department of Justice.

Which raises another contested legal question whether that phrase includes the previous OLC opinions concluding that prosecuting a sitting president is out of bounds.

If so, it wont be for Mueller to make up his own mind on the constitutionality question; hell just have to follow the conclusions expressed in the opinions. (Its for this reason that Rotunda concluded in his recent op-ed that Mueller cannot indict, while Starr could have.)

Whatever constitutional position is ultimately correct, we shouldnt assume the uncertainty necessarily means Mueller wont seek to indict him. As Professor Andrew Crespo points out, it hardly means he cannot be prosecuted.

On the contrary, a lawyers job is often to assess the relevant facts and legal arguments under conditions of uncertainty such as theseand then to make a judgment about how best to proceed. In this instance, that lawyers name is Robert Mueller. should he decide to take us down the road to United States v. Trump, he would be acting well within the law, the norms of the profession, and the reasonable bounds of the discretion with which he has been entrusted.

But he would also be acting professionally if he like Starr decided impeachment were the more appropriate course to pursue.

In the event that Mueller concludes that he cannot indict a sitting president, or that he has insufficient to support criminal liability, but his investigation still turns up evidence of wrongdoing, the grand jury has alternatives.

As Ryan Goodman and Alex Whiting unpack here and here, there are three other possible options. Congress can subpoena the grand jury evidence for the purpose of considering impeachment, which might then become public. The grand jury might also consider presentment, an official declaration that it would have indicted the president were it not for his current official position.

Goodman and Whiting write that this option is not necessarily precluded by any Justice Department legal opinion. Thirdly, the grand jury can use a special procedural device to produce a public report. Of course, none of these mechanisms are really punishment in themselves, but would enhance the presidents accountability.

Impeachment presents no such constitutional issues. Of course, politically its another matter because of the Republican-controlled Congress but there is no question that Congress is empowered to impeach a president.

Article II, section 4 of the Constitution provides that:

The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

A president can be removed when the House passes articles of impeachment specifying the basis of the impeachment (akin to an indictment) with a simple majority of those members present and voting once quorum requirements are met, and after a trial presided over by the Chief Justice, the Senate can convict with a two-thirds majority of the members present.

The Constitution says that impeachment can follow a presidents high crimes and misdemeanors, but it doesnt define that phrase. That means its in effect for the Congress to interpret, making it more of a political determination than a legal one.

Theres a good argument that several of the main allegations against Trump could justify an impeachment even without connection to an indictable crime. One boundary question is whether a president could be impeached for actions the person took before assuming federal office.

If those actions involved matters related to how the individual got elected, there is a stronger argument for them counting. A 2010 case will be relevant here: the situation of Judge Thomas Porteous, who was impeached and then removed from the bench.

One of the articles of impeachment cited conduct pre-dating his appointment, making false statements to the Senate and FBI in connection with his nomination and confirmation to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. He was convicted on that article.

Bill Clinton and Andrew Johnson (back in 1868) were impeached by the House. Nixon resigned ahead of his near-certain impeachment.

A measure short of impeachment that Congress could pursue is censure . It is notable that censure can come from either chamber of Congress, and does not require a super-majority of the Senate as with impeachment.

While constitutional questions have been raised about the practicewhich is not explicitly provided for in the Constitutionit is probably lawful. However, censure is seldom deployed and without legal effect. For more, read our deep dive into the scope and history of censure here.

A more outlandish proposal floating around is using a combination of legislation, a congressional commission, and the Constitutions Twenty-Fifth Amendment to oust President Trump.

Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-Md.) is sponsoring a bill designed to create a congressional oversight commission that could declare Trump incapacitated and have him removed under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment the provision introduced in the wake of Kennedys assassination to kick in when a president can no longer fulfil his duties.

Section 4 of the Amendment allows the Vice-President and a Cabinet majority to declare that the president is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, handing the reins over to the VP.

But the section also says a majority of such other body as Congress may by law provide can make the same declaration with the VP and its such an other body that Raskin is trying to create.

The plan would be to create an Oversight Commission on Presidential Capacity, staff it up with four physicians, four psychiatrists and three others (like former presidents) and direct it to examine the president to determine whether the president is incapacitated, either mentally or physically.

This kind of scheme is constitutionally possible, of course, but runs into political problems. Raskin needs to find enough votes not only to pass the legislation but to override the certain presidential veto.

Then, under the Amendment, if Trump challenged the finding and demanded to be reinstated, a two-thirds majority of both houses would need to block that challenge to sustain removal.

On top of that, Mike Pence would need to agree that the president was incapacitated in the first place. All of that seems incredibly unlikely. Even impeachment is simpler.

No president has ever been removed by impeachment. No president has ever been indicted. No president has been censured since 1860. And the Twenty-Fifth Amendment has never been invoked.

Each item on the menu of options laid out in this article has its own flaws and difficulties, and thats why they are so seldom used: indictment is constitutionally questionable, censure is on surer footing but lacks real bite, impeachment requires great political will, and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment requires political will and there are serious questions about its applicability.

Yet this has been a very unusual presidency, and many norms have fallen by the wayside in the wake of Trump. There may be more breaks with convention to come.

Hannah Ryan is a Junior Research Scholar at Just Security.

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Dumping Trump. All You Need to Know About How He Could ... - Newsweek

Transgender people deserve to stay in the military, and we hope that a federal lawsuit filed last week affords them that protection in the face of President Donald Trumps intention to boot them out.

The suit was filed in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia by the GLBTQ Legal Advocates & Defenders and the National Center for Lesbian Rights on behalf of five active service members identified as Jane Does. It alleges equal protection and due process rights violations under the Constitutions Fifth Amendment.

Its necessary because there are thousands of transgender service members who notified their command of the fact that they are transgender when the military announced in June of 2016 that they could openly serve, says Jennifer Levi, the plaintiffs lead attorney and co-director of the Center for Transgender and Sexuality Studies at Western New England University in Springfield.

These plaintiffs have been in the military from between three years and 20 years. They have bravely and courageously served our country and dont deserve the slap in the face that Donald Trump is giving them.

In three tweets on July 26, Trump announced, After consultation with my Generals and military experts, please be advised that the United States Government will not accept or allow Transgender individuals to serve in any capacity in the U.S. Military. Our military must be focused on decisive and overwhelming victory and cannot be burdened with the tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail. Thank you.

Military officials were surprised by Trumps intention to reverse the policy enacted by the Obama administration last year when it ended the ban on transgender troops. Under that policy, those already serving could come out, and openly transgender people could join the military next year.

Many transgender people have hormone therapy or surgery as they transition to the gender with which they identify. However, studies dispute Trumps contention that those serving in the military would incur tremendous medical costs.

A RAND Corp. study commissioned by the Department of Defense last year concluded that the additional cost of gender transition-related health care treatment was relatively low between $2.4 million and $8.4 million a year. Thats far less than the aapproximately $6 billion spent annually on medical expenses for active-duty personnel, according to the report.

The Palm Center, an independent research institute in San Francisco, released a study this month concluding that if 12,800 transgender service members were kicked out of the military, it would cost $960 million to train their replacements.

Estimates vary about the number of transgender people currently serving. Using the RAND studys lowestestimate of 1,320 transgender troops, the cost of replacing them would be $99 million.

Trumps argument that transgender people disrupt the military has been used in the past to argue unsuccessfully against allowing blacks to serve, women in combat and openly gay troops. Experts point out there is no evidence to support Trumps contention that transgender people disrupt military readiness, since they have been allowed to serve openly for the past year without incident.

Sen. John McCain, R-Arizona, a former Navy pilot and prisoner of war who now chairs the Senate Armed Services Committee, says any American who meets current medical and readiness standards should be allowed to continue serving. There is no reason to force service members who are able to fight, train and deploy to leave the military, regardless of their gender identity.

The Pentagon is still waiting for a formal directive from the president before it takes any action to change the policy on transgender troops.

Nevertheless, says Levi, the lawsuit is necessary because Trumps tweets already have resulted in immediate, concrete injury to Plaintiffs by unsettling and destabilizing plaintiffs reasonable expectation of continued service.

Its important for the country as a whole because what the president is seeking to do weakens the military. This is a time when everyone who is capable of serving and wants to serve needs to be able to do so.

There are plenty of military issues that need the presidents attention, most notably de-escalating tensions with North Korea. Getting rid of transgender people who are proudly serving their country is not among them.Beyond that, it insults a group of Americans who have pledged themselves to serve this nation, and who deserve respect in return.

See the original post here:
Editorial: Transgender service members should remain in military - GazetteNET

In 2012, various properties in Van Buren County, Michigan became subject to foreclosure for property tax delinquencies. In 2014, the properties were subject to an order of foreclosure and were auctioned off to satisfy the delinquencies. Wayside Church owed $16,750 in back taxes on a parcel it used as a youth camp. When the property was sold for $206,000, Van Buren County kept the $189,250 in surplus as required by Michigans General Property Tax Act. Other taxpayers were similarly situated. For example, Myron Stahl and Henderson Hodgens had their properties auctioned for $68,750 to pay a $25,000 debt and $47,750 to pay a $5,900 debt, respectively.

Michigan law doesnt recognize a right to surplus proceeds from tax sales, so the property owners sued in federal court, alleging that the county violated the Fifth Amendments Takings Clause when it kept the surplus proceeds from the sale of their properties. The district court dismissed the suit, precisely because Michigan law doesnt recognize a right to surplus proceeds in such cases. On appeal, a divided Sixth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Citing the Supreme Courts ruling in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City (1985), the court held that plaintiffs failure to first pursue avenues of relief in state court barred the door to federal court.

Wayside Church and the other property owners filed a petition asking the Supreme Court to take the case and clarify takings law. Along with the National Federation of Independent Business, Southeastern Legal Foundation, and Prof. Ilya Somin, Cato has filed an amicus brief supporting that petition. We argue that this case provides an excellent opportunity to preferably overrule, but at least reconsider, Williamson Countys requirement that a property owner must first sue in state court to ripen a federal takings claim.

The reality is that Williamson Countys state-remedies requirement results in constitutional absurdity: the very state court decision that a property owner must receive in order to ripen their claim simultaneously bars the owner from (re)litigating the issue in federal court. The Williamson County rule has also proven to be a potent weapon in the hands of manipulative defendants. Since the Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that a takings claim filed in state court could be removed to federal court (because of the federal constitutional issue), governmental defendants have removed claims to federal court, and then argued that they should be dismissed as unripe!

The state-remedies rule has no doctrinal basis and is antithetical to the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified to secure constitutional rights against the states and was seen as necessary to curb state government abuses. Fearing state courts could not be trusted to enforce the U.S. Constitution against their own state governments, a federal civil rights law 42 U.S.C. 1983 was then enacted to ensure a federal forum for vindicating federal rights. Yet Williamson County has effectively gutted the protections of both of these Reconstruction-era reforms.

Before Williamson County, there was no rule that required a property owner to resort to litigation in order to ripen a takings claim, and nothing in the text of the Fifth Amendment suggests that litigation in state court is necessary to ripen a takings claim. Instead, the text should be read to recognize a ripened claim the moment property is taken if there isnt a readily available administrative procedure for obtaining just compensation.

The Supreme Court will decide this fall whether to take upWayside Church v. Van Buren County.

See more here:
You Should Be Able to Vindicate Federal Property Rights in Federal Court - Cato Institute (blog)