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I have blogged a few times about a pending 3rd Circuit case on the Fifth Amendment standard for compelling the decryption of a hard drive. As I explained, the case presents an opportunity to weigh in on the 11th Circuits standard in a similar case that I think was erroneous. The 3rd Circuit handed down its decision this morning, United States v. Apple Mac Pro Computer. The court ruled for the government without resolving which standard applies. In a footnote, however, the court hinted that it disagreed with the 11th Circuit and would have adopted the standard that I think is right if it had to choose. Its just dicta, but its pretty strongly worded dicta.

I explained the legal issue in glorious detail in my prior post, but heres a quick overview. If the foregone conclusion doctrine applies, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination doesnt bar the act of compelling entering in a password. The question is: What does the government need to show to establish a foregone conclusion? The 11th Circuit had held in its prior case that the government needs to show that the government knows with reasonable particularity what files are on the encrypted device. In my view, thats wrong. The foregone conclusion doctrine applies if the government can show that it knows that the subject knows the passcode.

The 3rd Circuit held that the Fifth Amendment issue was not preserved below, but that even if it should be reached it would not be plain error to say that there was no Fifth Amendment privilege:

Even if we could assess the Fifth Amendment decision of the Magistrate Judge, our review would be limited to plain error. See United States v. Schwartz, 446 F.2d 571, 576 (3d Cir. 1971) (applying plain error review to unpreserved claim of violation of privilege against self-incrimination). Does arguments fail under this deferential standard of review.

The 11th Circuits ruling was distinguishable on its facts:

Unlike [the 11th Circuits case], the Government has provided evidence to show both that files exist on the encrypted portions of the devices and that Doe can access them. . . . Based on these facts, the Magistrate Judge found that, for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment, any testimonial component of the production of decrypted devices added little or nothing to the information already obtained by the Government. The Magistrate Judge determined that any testimonial component would be a foregone conclusion. The Magistrate Judge did not commit a clear or obvious error in his application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.

The 3rd Circuit then dropped this very intriguing footnote, with a paragraph break added by me:

It is important to note that we are not concluding that the Governments knowledge of the content of the devices is necessarily the correct focus of the foregone conclusion inquiry in the context of a compelled decryption order. Instead, a very sound argument can be made that the foregone conclusion doctrine properly focuses on whether the Government already knows the testimony that is implicit in the act of production. In this case, the fact known to the government that is implicit in the act of providing the password for the devices is I, John Doe, know the password for these devices. Based upon the testimony presented at the contempt proceeding, that fact is a foregone conclusion.

However, because our review is limited to plain error, and no plain error was committed by the District Court in finding that the Government established that the contents of the encrypted hard drives are known to it, we need not decide here that the inquiry can be limited to the question of whether Does knowledge of the password itself is sufficient to support application of the foregone conclusion doctrine.

Theres a lot in that footnote that the government can use in future cases. Its dicta, but its very strong dicta. The issue will live for another day without a circuit split. But given that I think the footnote is correct, I hope it will be followed in future cases.

More here:
Third Circuit doesn't resolve standard for forced decryption under the ... - Washington Post

Thomas Trutschel/Getty Images

On Monday, a US federal appeals court sided against a former Philadelphia police officer who has been in jail 17 months because he invoked his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. He had refused to comply with a court order commanding him to unlock two hard drives the authorities say contain child porn.

Francis Rawls

The 3-0 decision(PDF) by the 3rd US Circuit Court of Appealsmeans that the suspect, Francis Rawls, likely will remain jailed indefinitely or until theorder (PDF) finding him in contempt of court is lifted or overturned. However, he still can comply with the order and unlock two FileVault encrypted drives connected to his Apple Mac Pro. Using a warrant, authorities seized those drives from his residence in 2015. While Rawls could get out from under the contempt order by unlocking those drives, doing so might expose him to other legal troubles.

In deciding against Rawls, the court of appeals found that the constitutional rights against being compelled to testify against oneself were not being breached. That's becausethe appeals court, like the police, agreed that the presence of child porn on his drives was a "foregone conclusion." The Fifth Amendment, at its most basic level, protects suspects from being forced to disclose incriminating evidence. In this instance, however, the authorities said they already knowthere's child porn on the drives, so Rawls' constitutional rights aren't compromised.

The Philadelphia-based appeals court ruled:

Forensic examination also disclosed that Doe [Rawls] had downloaded thousands of files known by their "hash" values to be child pornography. The files, however, were not on the Mac Pro, but instead had been stored on the encrypted external hard drives. Accordingly, the files themselves could not be accessed.

The court also noted that the authorities "found [on the Mac Book Pro] one image depicting a pubescent girl in a sexually suggestive position and logs that suggested the user had visited groups with titles common in child exploitation." They also said the man's sister had "reported" that her brother showed him hundreds of pictures and videos of child pornography. All of this, according to the appeals court, meant that the lower court lawfully ordered Rawls to unlock the drives.

"The Magistrate Judge did not commit a clear or obvious error in his application of the foregone conclusion doctrine," the court ruled. "In this regard, the Magistrate Judge rested his decision rejecting the Fifth Amendment challenge on factual findings that are amply supported by the record."

The suspect's attorney, Federal Public Defender Keith Donoghue, was disappointed by the ruling.

"The fact remains that the government has not brought charges," Donoghue said in a telephone interview. "Our client has now been in custody for almost 18 months based on his assertion of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination."

A child-porn investigation focused on Rawls when the authorities were monitoring the online network, Freenet.

The decision from the appeals court comes as encryption is becoming more common on mobile phones and computers. What's more, encryption has seemingly become part of the national political discussion concerning whether governments should demand that companies bake backdoors into their encrypted products so that authorities can access content on encrypted devices.

The Supreme Court has never ruled on the forced decryption issue. A different federal appeals court, the 10th US Circuit Court of Appeals based in Denver, ruled in 2012 that a bank-fraud defendant must decrypt her laptop. The order wasn't enforced, however, as the authorities eventually accessed the laptop without her assistance.

The contempt-of-court order against Rawls was obtained by authorities citing the 1789 All Writs Act. The All Writs Act was the same law the Justice Department asserted in its legal battle with Apple, in which a magistrate judge ordered Apple to produce code to enable the FBI to decrypt the iPhone used by one of two shooters who killed 14 people at a San Bernardino County government building. The government dropped the case when authorities paid a reported $1 million for a hack.

"Unless the suspect unlocks the drives or a court unwinds the order, he will remain jailed," Marc Rumold, an Electronic Frontier Foundation staff attorney who filed a friend-of-the-court brief in the case, said in a telephone interview.

In that brief, the EFF said "compelled decryption is inherently testimonial because it compels a suspect to use the contents of their mind to translate unintelligible evidence into a form that can be used against them. The Fifth Amendment provides an absolute privilege against such self-incriminating compelled decryption."

The authorities, however, said no testimony was needed from Rawls. Rather, they said, (PDF) "he can keep his passwords to himself" and "produce his computer and hard drives in an unencrypted state."

Read the rest here:
Man jailed indefinitely for refusing to decrypt hard drives loses appeal - Ars Technica

WASHINGTON -- This week, the Senate Judiciary Committee will question Neil Gorsuch about the judiciary's role. Herewith some pertinent questions:

-- Lincoln's greatness began with his recoil from the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, which empowered residents of those territories to decide whether to have slavery. The act's premise was that "popular sovereignty" -- majorities' rights -- is the essence of the American project. Is it, or is liberty?

-- Justice Robert Jackson wrote, "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to ... place [certain subjects] beyond the reach of majorities." Was that not also the purpose of the 14th Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause? It says: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Was this amendment's purpose to ensure that the natural rights of all citizens would be protected from abridgement by their states?

-- If so, was the court wrong in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases? It essentially erased the Privileges and Immunities Clause, holding that it did not secure natural rights (e.g., the right to enter contracts and earn a living), for the protection of which, the Declaration of Independence says, governments are instituted.

-- Chief Justice John Roberts says the doctrine of stare decisis -- previous court decisions are owed respect -- is not an "inexorable command." The ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), upholding racial segregation in separate but equal facilities, has been undone. Should the Slaughterhouse Cases ruling be revisited?

-- The court, without warrant from the Constitution's text or history, has divided Americans' liberties between those it deems "fundamental," such as speech and association, and others, many pertaining to economic activity and the right to earn a living, that are inferior. Abridgements of the latter have been given less exacting judicial scrutiny. The court calls this "rational basis" scrutiny; it should be called "conceivable basis" scrutiny. If a legislature asserts, or the court can imagine, a rational basis for the abridgement, it stands. Do you think judges should decide which liberties to protect or neglect? Should courts examine evidence of whether economic regulations are related to public health and safety or merely reflect rent seeking by economic interests?

-- The Ninth Amendment says: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Robert Bork said this is akin to an "inkblot" on the Constitution that judges should ignore. Do you agree? How can judges be faithful to this amendment? Was Madison correct that it should dispose us against a latitudinarian interpretation of Congress' powers? Is the Ninth Amendment pertinent to, say, the right to earn a living free from unreasonable licensure requirements or other barriers to entry into an occupation?

-- Other than a law that abridges a liberty enumerated in the Bill of Rights, are there limits to Congress' power over interstate commerce?

-- The Fifth Amendment says no property shall be taken "for public use" without just compensation. In the 2005 Kelo case, the court upheld a city's seizure of private property not to facilitate construction of a public structure or to cure blight, but for the "public use" of transferring it to a wealthier private interest that would pay more taxes. Did the court err?

-- Madison worried that Congress would draw "all power into its impetuous vortex." For many decades, however, our centrifugal Congress has been spinning off essentially legislative powers, delegating them to presidents and executive agencies. The Constitution says "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." Should the court enforce limits to Congress' power to delegate its powers?

-- Citizens United held that unions and corporations, particularly incorporated nonprofit advocacy groups, can engage in unregulated spending that is not coordinated with candidates or campaigns. Was the court correct that Americans do not forfeit their First Amendment rights when they come together in incorporated entities to speak collectively?

-- Is it constitutional for Congress, by regulating political spending, to control the quantity and timing of political speech?

-- You commendably believe that judges should adhere to the "original public meaning" of the Constitution's text. Would you feel bound to follow a previous court decision that did not evaluate evidence of original meaning and was, in your view, in conflict with it? If not, would you be elevating the views of judges over those of the Framers?

-- Oliver Wendell Holmes, a deferential, majoritarian jurist, said: "If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job." Discuss.

George F. Will is a columnist for The Washington Post.

Follow this link:
Questions for Judge Gorsuch - Helena Independent Record

WASHINGTON -- This week, the Senate Judiciary Committee will question Neil Gorsuch about the judiciary's role. Herewith some pertinent questions:

-- Lincoln's greatness began with his recoil from the 1854 Kansas-Nebraska Act, which empowered residents of those territories to decide whether to have slavery. The act's premise was that "popular sovereignty" -- majorities' rights -- is the essence of the American project. Is it, or is liberty?

-- Justice Robert Jackson wrote, "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to ... place [certain subjects] beyond the reach of majorities." Was that not also the purpose of the 14th Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause? It says: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." Was this amendment's purpose to ensure that the natural rights of all citizens would be protected from abridgement by their states?

-- If so, was the court wrong in the 1873 Slaughterhouse Cases? It essentially erased the Privileges and Immunities Clause, holding that it did not secure natural rights (e.g., the right to enter contracts and earn a living), for the protection of which, the Declaration of Independence says, governments are instituted.

-- Chief Justice John Roberts says the doctrine of stare decisis -- previous court decisions are owed respect -- is not an "inexorable command." The ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), upholding racial segregation in separate but equal facilities, has been undone. Should the Slaughterhouse Cases ruling be revisited?

-- The court, without warrant from the Constitution's text or history, has divided Americans' liberties between those it deems "fundamental," such as speech and association, and others, many pertaining to economic activity and the right to earn a living, that are inferior. Abridgements of the latter have been given less exacting judicial scrutiny. The court calls this "rational basis" scrutiny; it should be called "conceivable basis" scrutiny. If a legislature asserts, or the court can imagine, a rational basis for the abridgement, it stands. Do you think judges should decide which liberties to protect or neglect? Should courts examine evidence of whether economic regulations are related to public health and safety or merely reflect rent seeking by economic interests?

-- The Ninth Amendment says: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." Robert Bork said this is akin to an "inkblot" on the Constitution that judges should ignore. Do you agree? How can judges be faithful to this amendment? Was Madison correct that it should dispose us against a latitudinarian interpretation of Congress' powers? Is the Ninth Amendment pertinent to, say, the right to earn a living free from unreasonable licensure requirements or other barriers to entry into an occupation?

-- Other than a law that abridges a liberty enumerated in the Bill of Rights, are there limits to Congress' power over interstate commerce?

-- The Fifth Amendment says no property shall be taken "for public use" without just compensation. In the 2005 Kelo case, the court upheld a city's seizure of private property not to facilitate construction of a public structure or to cure blight, but for the "public use" of transferring it to a wealthier private interest that would pay more taxes. Did the court err?

-- Madison worried that Congress would draw "all power into its impetuous vortex." For many decades, however, our centrifugal Congress has been spinning off essentially legislative powers, delegating them to presidents and executive agencies. The Constitution says "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." Should the court enforce limits to Congress' power to delegate its powers?

-- Citizens United held that unions and corporations, particularly incorporated nonprofit advocacy groups, can engage in unregulated spending that is not coordinated with candidates or campaigns. Was the court correct that Americans do not forfeit their First Amendment rights when they come together in incorporated entities to speak collectively?

-- Is it constitutional for Congress, by regulating political spending, to control the quantity and timing of political speech?

-- You commendably believe that judges should adhere to the "original public meaning" of the Constitution's text. Would you feel bound to follow a previous court decision that did not evaluate evidence of original meaning and was, in your view, in conflict with it? If not, would you be elevating the views of judges over those of the Framers?

-- Oliver Wendell Holmes, a deferential, majoritarian jurist, said: "If my fellow citizens want to go to Hell I will help them. It's my job." Discuss.

Go here to see the original:
GEORGE WILL: Here are questions senators should ask Gorsuch - Sioux City Journal

In a recent column ("Flawed Judicial Mindset," March 3), Dana Kelley argues that the death penalty is plainly constitutional. Therefore, he reasons, if the Supreme Court strikes down the ultimate sanction, the justices will be altering the U.S. Constitution rather than interpreting it. That would be an act of judicial "tyranny" because the Constitution may only be changed by Congress and the states via the formal amendment process set forth in Article V of our governing charter.

I disagree with Mr. Kelley's analysis in multiple respects.

Let me begin by disclosing my own biases. I believe that the death penalty is morally justified in principle. There are some crimes for which execution is a morally appropriate punishment. However, I also believe that the death penalty is not morally justified in practice.

While I hold this latter view on multiple grounds, the two most important are as follows.

First, according to the preponderance of the empirical evidence, the death penalty does not deter crime any more effectively than the sentence of life without the possibility of parole.

Second, our criminal justice system, while the best and most reliable in the world, is far from perfect. A small but critical percentage of jury trials result in a wrongful conviction. This is demonstrated by, among other things, the string of exonerations of death row inmates over the last three decades thanks to improved analysis of DNA. Furthermore, many leading criminal law scholars have concluded that innocent people have in fact been executed in this country. Thus, the risk of imposing the death penalty on an innocent person is simply too great given that the punishment has no supplemental deterrent effect in comparison to life without parole.

The morality and legality of the death penalty are two different issues. And Mr. Kelley's piece concerns the law. So now let's turn to that subject. Mr. Kelley rightly points out that certain parts of the Constitution appear to presume the existence of the death penalty. In particular, the Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be held to answer for a capital ... crime, unless" the person is indicted by a grand jury. And the amendment also states that a person may not be "deprived of life ... without due process of law." He says that these clauses codify capital punishment; they establish that the Constitution "allows the government to impose a death sentence, as long as it is the product of due process." But the story is considerably more complicated.

To begin with, the Fifth Amendment grants no government powers. Instead, it places limits on such power. Thus, the authority to execute a criminal must first be identified elsewhere in the Constitution. For state governments, the power to impose capital punishment is provided by the 10th Amendment, which grants states general authority to regulate the affairs within their borders. For our national government, the power comes from Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which identifies the legal domains that are subject to federal regulation.

But here is the key point: Any exercise of government power--state or federal--is prohibited if it violates one of the rights-bearing provisions of the Constitution, such as those set forth in the Bill of Rights and the 14th Amendment. For example, Congress is expressly granted the authority to regulate interstate commerce. But if it enacts a statute designed to govern the national economy that also happens to restrict the freedom of speech, then the law is unconstitutional because it violates the First Amendment. The death penalty is subject to the same limitations. Application of the ultimate sanction must be consistent with not only the due process clause, as Mr. Kelley explains, but also with every other rights-bearing provision in our national charter.

One of the most important such provisions is the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment. It requires that governments not discriminate on the basis of race, sex, and several other grounds. Unfortunately, there is considerable racial discrimination in our criminal justice system. And much research establishes that the death penalty itself is applied in racially discriminatory ways. As a result, there is a powerful argument that capital punishment--as currently applied in the United States--violates the 14th Amendment's equal protection clause.

At most, the 14th Amendment only bars capital punishment until we can expunge disparate racial treatment from our enforcement of criminal law. Does any part of the Constitution go further? In particular, might the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment make the death penalty unconstitutional more generally? Mr. Kelley thinks the answer is absolutely not. He relies upon Justice Scalia's argument that the framers of the Constitution could not have believed that the death penalty violates the Eighth Amendment because they wrote the Fifth Amendment, which expressly contemplates that executions will be carried out in at least some circumstances. And, Justice Scalia continued, the Eighth Amendment must be interpreted consistently with how it was understood in the late 18th century.

The problem here is that there is considerable evidence that the framers thought that the meaning of "cruel and unusual" would change with time. After all, they used the word "unusual." What is unusual is constantly evolving as governments alter the laws of punishment. It is thus quite reasonable to believe that the death penalty, as a matter of constitutional law, is now cruel and unusual, even though it was not so in 1790.

Now, I actually agree with Mr. Kelley's conclusion about executions and the Eighth Amendment: I do not think that the death penalty is unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment. My point here is this: there is a plausible legal argument that Mr. Kelley and I are wrong. And thus, should the Supreme Court strike down the death penalty on Eighth Amendment grounds, that will clearly not be an act of tyranny. It will, at worst, simply be a case where the Supreme Court got it wrong on a legal issue over which reasonable and fair minds can differ. And if the High Court instead uses the 14th Amendment to invalidate capital punishment temporarily, the justices will be on even firmer ground. Indeed, I think they will be right.

Joshua M. Silverstein is a Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas at Little Rock, William H. Bowen School of Law. The opinions in this column are his own.

Editorial on 03/19/2017

See the article here:
Death penalty might indeed be unconstitutional - NWAOnline