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Criminal; Miranda waiver:Where the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about a gun involved in a felon-in-possession charge, but he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering a detectives questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights, his motion was denied. United States v. Medley, No. 18-4789 (filed May 11, 2022).

Immigration; class-wide injunctive relief: Where the district court issued a class-wide injunction that modified procedures used by the government to detain aliens pending their removal hearings, but the relevant statute expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws on a class-wide basis, that aspect of the district courts order was vacated. Miranda v. Garland, No. 20-1828 (filed May 12, 2022).

Labor; what constitutes an employee: Where the National Labor Relations Board concluded that the relationship between a vocational services program and disabled janitors was akin to a typically industrial relationship, thus making the janitors employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and substantial evidence supported that finding, its decision was affirmed. Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 21-1642, 21-1683 (filed May 10, 2022).

Consumer Protection; calculation of damages: The court clarified the damages a borrower shall collect for knowing violations of the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions of Maryland Commercial Law. Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Misc. No. 3, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed May 13, 2022).

BOTTOM LINE: Where the defendant moved to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about a gun involved in a felon-in-possession charge, but he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering a detectives questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights, his motion was denied.

CASE: United States v. Medley, No. 18-4789 (filed May 11, 2022) (Judges Gregory, Before King, QUATTLEBAUM).

FACTS: Jovon Medley appeals his felon in possession of a firearm conviction and sentence. Regarding his conviction, Medley challenges the district courts denial of his motion to suppress statements he made to the police, without the benefit of counsel, about the gun involved in the felon-in-possession charge. Regarding his sentence, he argues that the district courts application of a sentencing guidelines enhancement, based on its finding that Medley used the firearm to commit a carjacking, violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it was based on acquitted conduct.

LAW: Medley concedes that he was not federally charged at the time of his interview. However, he argues that the right to counsel nevertheless attached to his federal felon-in-possession charge because it is the same offense as the D.C. felon-in-possession charge.

Even assuming, without deciding, that Medleys Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to his federal felon-in-possession charge on the day that he was questioned by Detective Dalton, Medley waived the right because he never made a clear, unambiguous assertion of the right to counsel after receiving his Miranda warnings.

Medley never made a clear, unambiguous assertion of his right to counsel after receiving his Miranda warnings. He did not request his attorney, ask for the interview to stop or say anything that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand . . . to be a request for an attorney. Instead, Medley knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel by voluntarily answering Daltons questions after being properly informed of his Miranda rights.

A defendant who waives his Sixth Amendment right to counsel may still challenge his waiver by establishing it was based on misrepresentation or deception by the state. Medley argues Detective Dalton misled him by stating that he was not interested in Medleys D.C. case. He claims that, because of Daltons statement, Medley did not understand that by answering Daltons questions, he was waiving his right to counsel regarding his D.C. felon-in-possession charge. As a result, Medley claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the D.C. case.

However, this is an appeal from Medleys federal case and only concerns whether he waived his right to counsel regarding his federal charges. The use of Medleys statements in his D.C. case is not at issue here. What is at issue is whether Daltons representations prevented Medley from making a knowing or voluntary waiver of his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights regarding his subsequent federal charges. Medley does not even make this claim and, even if he had, the court sees no support for it in this record.

Medley next claims that the sentencing enhancement violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial because it was based on acquitted conduct. He concedes that this argument is foreclosed by Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent. However, consistent with a growing number of critics of this practice, he explains his objections to it. Whether or not the court agrees or disagrees with the precedent, it is bound to follow it.

Medley also argues that the district courts application of the guidelines enhancement constituted clear error because there was insufficient evidence to find that he committed the Maryland carjacking. Under the clear error standard, however, the court cannot say that the district court erred by enhancing Medleys sentence when it found, based on a preponderance of the evidence, that he used the Rock Island firearm in connection with the carjacking of Elton Wright.

Affirmed.

BOTTOM LINE: Where the district court issued a class-wide injunction that modified procedures used by the government to detain aliens pending their removal hearings, but the relevant statute expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws on a class-wide basis, that aspect of the district courts order was vacated.

CASE: Miranda v. Garland, No. 20-1828 (filed May 12, 2022) (Judge QUATTLEBAUM) (Judge Richardson concurred in part and dissented in part) (Judge Urbanski concurred in part and dissented in part).

FACTS: 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) permits the Attorney General to detain aliens pending their removal hearings. And the Attorney General has adopted procedures for making that discretionary decision.

A district court determined that a class of aliens had a likelihood of establishing that those procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. That court then issued a preliminary injunction ordering, on a class-wide basis, that to continue detaining an alien under 1226(a), the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that an alien is either a flight risk or a danger to the community. The district court also required immigration judges, again on a class-wide basis, to consider an aliens ability to pay any bond imposed and consider alternatives to detention.

LAW: The government argues that because the individual plaintiffs failed to appeal their bond decisions to the Board, the district court lacked the authority to review the immigration judges detention decision. The government has not pointed this court to any other provision of the immigration laws where Congress clearly required exhaustion, and neither has the court found one. Therefore, no statute applicable to Miranda, Espinoza and Adegokes claims provides that administrative exhaustion is jurisdictional. Because the government did not adequately address the district courts determination that administrative exhaustion was not required, the government waived this argument on appeal.

Next, the government argues that 1226(e) strips the courts of jurisdiction to review discretionary detention decisions like those at issue here. This is a close question of statutory interpretation, and the Supreme Court decisions do not provide a clear answer. After reviewing the statute, the court rejects the governments argument that it lacks jurisdiction to consider these claims.

Third, the government argues that 8 U.S.C. 1252(f)(1) deprived the district court of jurisdiction to issue class-wide injunctive relief. The court finds that 1252(f)(1) is a jurisdictional limit on the courts. Section 1252(f)(1) expressly precludes jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain provisions of the immigration laws, including 1226(a), on a class-wide basis. Despite this provision, the district court imposed class-wide limitations on the discretionary detention decisions permitted under 1226(a). Accordingly, that aspect of the district courts order is vacated.

The district courts order also granted Espinoza individual relief. The district court erred, however, because Espinoza did not show a likelihood of success on his claim that requiring an alien in a 1226(a) bond hearing to show, by a preponderance of evidence, that he is not a danger to the community nor a flight risk violates an aliens rights under the Due Process Clause.

Espinoza also failed to show a likelihood of success on his claim that due process requires immigration judges in 1226(a) bond hearings to consider an aliens ability to pay and alternative conditions on release. Without his alleged constitutional injury, Espinoza has failed to show that he will suffer irreparable harm. And the balance of the equities and public interest do not weigh in favor of the sea change in bond hearings that Espinoza desires.

Vacated and remanded.

CONCUR AND DISSENT: Because 1226(e) bars judicial review of any discretionary judgmentincluding those that apply to all detention decisions under 1226(a) and those alleged to violate the ConstitutionI disagree with my colleagues and would dismiss for a lack of jurisdiction on that basis. That disagreement does not preclude me from joining in striking down the class-wide injunction under 1252(f)(1).

CONCUR AND DISSENT: While the Supreme Court has not directly addressed this issue, the majority opinion concludes that 1252(f)(1) precludes class-wide injunctive relief. But plaintiffs also sought class-wide declaratory relief, which was not addressed below, perhaps because the government failed to raise 1252(f)(1) at the district court. As such, I would remand the case to the district court to allow it to address plaintiffs request for class-wide declaratory relief, which is not barred by 1252(f)(1). Further, in my view, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the government to bear the burden of proof in an immigration detention proceeding.

BOTTOM LINE: Where the National Labor Relations Board concluded that the relationship between a vocational services program and disabled janitors was akin to a typically industrial relationship, thus making the janitors employees under the National Labor Relations Act, and substantial evidence supported that finding, its decision was affirmed.

CASE: Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, Nos. 21-1642, 21-1683 (filed May 10, 2022) (Judges KING, Motz) (Judge Niemeyer, concurring).

FACTS: Sinai Hospital of Baltimore Inc.s vocational services program, or VSP, seeks judicial review of a decision and order of the National Labor Relations Board finding that VSP engaged in unfair labor practices by refusing to bargain with the union. Specifically, VSP contests the Boards underlying determination that certain disabled janitorial workers engaged by VSP are employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. The Board cross-petitions for enforcement of the bargaining order.

LAW: VSP argues that its relationship with the disabled janitors working at the Baltimore County Social Security Administration facility is primarily rehabilitative in nature, and that the Boards decision incorrectly classified the disabled janitors as statutory employees. VSP argues that the Board therefore lacked jurisdiction to certify the union as the janitors collective bargaining representative and that the bargaining order was in error by association.

Under Board precedent, the statutory employee status of disabled individuals working in rehabilitative vocational settings turns on whether the relationship between worker and putative employer is best characterized as typically industrial or instead primarily rehabilitative. The typically industrial versus primarily rehabilitative determination calls for a case-by-case factual assessment, and the party seeking . . . to exclude otherwise eligible employees from the coverage of the Act bears the burden of proving a primarily rehabilitative employment relationship to the Board.

In concluding that VSP had failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a primarily rehabilitative employment relationship, the Board resolved that the disabled janitors affiliation with VSP is more akin to that found in traditional private sector employment settings, such that the Acts leading purpose of restoring balance to bargaining power disparities is served by classifying the janitors as statutory employees.

To be sure, the Board acknowledged that certain testimony received during its representation hearings pointed toward a primarily rehabilitative relationship. But it ultimately ruled that [those] facts are insufficient to overcome the other facts supporting a traditionally industrial relationship and that each factor weighed against finding a principally rehabilitative connection between VSP and its disabled janitors. This courts review of the record fully supports the Boards determination.

Petition for review denied. Cross-application for enforcement granted.

CONCUR: I would approach this case with a strong presumption that disabled employees hired under a Javits-Wagner-ODay Act program, such as the one conducted by VSP, are not, as a class, employees within the ambit of the National Labor Relations Act and therefore are not entitled to the collective bargaining rights afforded by the Act.

Had VSP argued for such a categorical presumption before us, I would have welcomed the discussion and engaged both parties on that point. Instead, however, VSP focused its briefing on whether substantial evidence supported specific factual findings made by the Board. Because the record includes substantial evidence to support those findings, albeit narrow in scope, I concur in the opinion of Judge King, which ably demonstrates this.

BOTTOM LINE: The court clarified the damages a borrower shall collect for knowing violations of the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions of Maryland Commercial Law.

CASE: Lyles v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., Misc. No. 3, Sept. Term, 2021 (filed May 13, 2022) (Judges GETTY, McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Wilner).

FACTS: Jabari Morese Lyles initiated a class action against Santander Consumer USA Inc. for alleged violations of Title 12 of the Commercial Law Article, or CL, of the Maryland Codethe Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions, or CLEC, CL 12-1001 et seq. Before this court is a certified question of law from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland regarding the calculation of damages under CL 12-1018(b).

LAW: CL 12-1018(a) provides, in part [e]xcept for a bona fide error of computation, if a credit grantor violates any provision of this subtitle the credit grantor may collect only the principal amount of the loan and may not collect any interest, costs, fees, or other charges with respect to the loan. CL 12-1018(b) provides [i]n addition, a credit grantor who knowingly violates any provision of this subtitle shall forfeit to the borrower 3 times the amount of interest, fees, and charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle.

CL 12-1018(b) provides the penalty provision for knowing violations of CLEC. The provision begins with the words [i]n addition, which signals that this is an additional penalty to the penalty set forth in subsection (a)(2). A credit grantor that violates CLEC is limited by CL 12-1018(a)(2) to collect only the principal loan amount from the borrower, and a credit grantor that knowingly violates the subtitle is subject to further liability under CL 12-1018(b).

The provision continues, stating that the amounts to be trebled are the interest, fees, and charges collected in excess of that authorized by this subtitle. The phrase in excess of that authorized by this subtitle is central to this courts analysis. This language identifies that the amount to be trebled is that which the credit grantor is not permitted to charge to the borrower under CLEC. Put differently, the amounts that a credit grantor charged in violation of CLEC are the amounts to be trebled for a knowing violation of the subtitle.

If the General Assembly intended for this penalty provision to require a credit grantor to pay treble the amount collected in excess of the principal loan amount, it would have written the provision to read as such. However, the plain language of CL 12-1018(b) makes no reference to amounts collected in excess of the principal amount financed. The General Assembly only expressly authorized forfeiture of the amount of interest, fees, and charges that are collected in excess of that authorized by the subtitle.

As such, the amount to be trebled under CL 12-1018(b) are those amounts collected that are not authorized under CLEC.

Nothing in the legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended for CL 12-1018(b) to be interpreted inconsistently with its plain meaning. Accordingly, assuming Santander knowingly collected the convenience fees alleged by Mr. Lyles in violation of CLEC, the appropriate calculation of damages under CL 12-1018(b) is treble the amount of convenience fees collected. For the foregoing reasons, CL 12-1018(b) requires a credit grantor that is found to have knowingly violated CLEC to forfeit three times the amount of interest, fees and charges collected in violation of the subtitle.

Certified question of law answered as set forth above.

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Law Digest US 4th Circuit, Md. Court of Appeals May 19, 2022 - Maryland Daily Record

Now that rent control has made it onto the ballot, I have a couple questions? Why arent gas stations being forced to lower prices? Gas is crazy high. Why arent grocery stores having to keep costs in check? Those prices are skyrocketing. I could go on, but you get the point.

Placing the burden of lowering rents on the shoulders of mom and pop landlords who are having just as difficult a time with inflation as anyone is a veiled taking of private property rights and a violation of the fifth amendment of the US Constitution. Oh, wait, violatingrights seems to be okay these days.

Ive lived in Pasadena for more than 50 years. During that time, I was both a renter and a landlord. Toward the end of my dads life, I was able to move him into a duplex I owned so I could better care for him. If this ordinance had been in place, that might not have been possible. Sorry mom and dad, youre on your own.

I understand renters are angry and hurting. But, blaming and burdening our struggling mom and pop landlords is not the solution.

Pasadena is not doing enough to create much needed affordable housing, but that is no reason to take rights away from individuals who have worked hard to achieve what the City cannot. There are approximately 3,000 mom and pop landlords in the City of Pasadena that are struggling with a worsening economy just like everyone else these individuals did not sign up to do the job that our elected officials willingly agreed to do, yet sadly, are not.

When money is taken from mom and pop landlords, they have less money to make needed repairs and the quality of rental properties goes down.

Thats a fact. But wait, according to the proposed rental ordinance, mom and pop landlords also get penalized for not making the repairs they can no longer afford to make. Hows that going to work out?

Pasadena currently has the high number of rental properties it does because it abides by reasonable State rental laws. Make the rules unreasonable, and people will stop building rental units in Pasadena. How are fewer rental units in Pasadena going to make prices go down?

It isnt.

Simple economics says the answer is to build more affordable units. To disincentivize future rental units will stop new construction. Thats what rent control does. What may help in the present will definitely hurt down the road. It will take a bad situation and make it worse.

Just like we cannot force gas stations to subsidize high gas prices, nor ask grocery stores to artificially keep prices low, we should not force mom and pop landlords to provide subsidized housing. Its not fair, and it is not the answer. We live in a country that does nottake from private individuals without just cause theres that 5th Amendment again. But this ordinance does just that.

If we want a more affordable city, the City needs to require more affordable units in all new construction it also needs to fast-track the building of affordable units on church property, explore creative reuse of existing buildings, make it easier to build affordable units in the City, and any number of things its not doing enough of right now.

Kicking the can down the road by kicking mom and pop landlords and their families is a lose-lose solution. In the long run, it will degrade our precious existing housing stock and hinder the building of new units.

Todd HayesPasadena resident and Realtor

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Guest Opinion | Todd Hayes: Landlords Have Rights Too. Where Does the Taking of Rights Stop? Pasadena Now - Pasadena Now

by Jim McCarthy

Criminal justice at the local level in Virginia is the province of the 120 Commonwealths attorney offices funded primarily by the state, with some also receiving local supplement. Indigent defendants may avail themselves of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel through 28 public defender offices. Many other indigent defendants will be represented by court appointed counsel from lists and attorneys overseen by the Virginia Indigent Defense Commission (VIDC) which is the statutory organization for public defenders.

The genesis of the existence of public defenders arose in 1963, ten years before Roe v Wade, with the SCOTUS opinion in Gideon v Wainwright. The defendant, Clarence Earl Gideon, was sentenced to five years in prison after trial at which he requested the appointment of counsel to defend him. At the time, states were mandated to consider appointed counsel only in capital offense proceedings, not for lesser offences which might involve imprisonment. The unanimous court in Gideon concluded that the Sixth Amendment did not distinguish between capital and non-capital cases, finding that a defendant faces the danger of criminal conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

This hallmark decision and its progeny later gave rise to the familiar Miranda warning (Miranda v Arizona, 1966), a required notification by police in a custodial setting:

You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions. You have the right to have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you have the right to stop answering at any time.

Gideon and Miranda are derived from principles in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution which are reasonably inferred from those provisions and not literally expressed. This type of jurisprudential reasoning pervades virtually all court decisions in some manner and is a commonly held value or belief in fairness and equity. Its antithesis is characterized as originalism or textualism whereby judicial reasoning is deemed to require a textual or literal reference in the Constitution or legislation upon which to base a decision.

In criminal cases, the Fifth Amendment precludes an accused from being compelled to be a witness against himself or be deprived of liberty without due process of law. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that the criminal defendant have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense. Neither provision contains language conferring a right to court-appointed counsel; nor a right to remain silent; nor to cease answering questions. Were these conclusions reached by the justices based upon personal views? Are they reasonable, lawful? Does reliance upon them for decades create a fundamental entitlement?

Apparently, originalist justices are not of the opinion that precedent or reasonable interpretation of the Constitution or legislation may issue in the absence of text or clear language of such decision. That view is the essence of the leaked draft opinion in the abortion controversy by five justices. The Roe decision, they declare, was egregiously wrong when decided nearly 50 years ago because there is no basis in the Constitution for the protection of privacy.

In Garza v Idaho (2019), Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, joined in part by Alito, argued for the overturn of Gideon asserting it was wrongly decided in failing to identify a textual basis for appointed right to counsel. Thus, despite a statement limiting the overturn of abortion rights to that issue alone, the draft opinions line of jurisprudence as can be seen in Garza involves a much larger universe of established rulings. Privacy in marriage with respect to the use of contraception decided in Griswold v Connecticut (1965) is vulnerable. In that case, the court adverted to a penumbra of privacy based upon a view of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution together with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas frankly acknowledged that the Constitution does not mention the term privacy.

The logic of reductio ad absurdum may encourage and drive the present cohort of justices to an ultimate end of Constitutional jurisprudence. The 1803 decision in Marbury v Madison arrogated to SCOTUS authority to declare a law to be invalid upon judicial review. Chief Justice John Marshall crafted the ruling determining that a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was unconstitutional, conflicting with the supreme law of the land in Article VI. Neither judicial review nor a power to declare a law unconstitutional exists in legislation or the Constitution.

Conceivably therefore, in a contemporary case or controversy, the originalist majority would be bound to agree that SCOTUS has no power to declare a law of Congress or a states unconstitutional due to the absence of a textual anchor. Combined with the reservation of powers to the states (Ninth and Tenth Amendments) such conclusion is inevitable. As precedent is no barrier, the originalists on the Court would be consistent in dismissing judicial review itself as a nullity. It follows that Justice Scalias magnus opus in Heller, interpreting a right to firearms by one and all, is fallacious since the Constitutional reference to the right to bear arms applies only to militias not individuals. Moreover, Heller has been in place for only 14 years, a mere bagatelle of time in the eyes of originalists.

Circling back, Virginia, without public defenders, would be on a path to increase its prison population, ensuring innocent, mostly poor, defendants are jailed while police misconduct thrives in the absence of Miranda. A certain amount of chaos is expected as Constitutional clarity is exercised.

In the Old Testament, Gideon and his overmatched forces frightened the enemy into disbanding camp after surrounding it with blaring trumpets and flaming torches. Lord, what fools these mortals be, says Robin Goodfellow or Puck in Shakespeares Midsummer Nights Dream musing about human folly. Look for the Constitutional provision enumerating nine justices.

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Silence of the Trumpets - Bacon's Rebellion

Title IX, passed in 1972, is an amendment to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that focuses on sex-based discrimination in schools that receive public funding. On its surface, theres nothing wrong with this. Discrimination is bad and should not be allowed in public schools. In practice, however, that is not what this law is for.

A series of court decisions and eventually pressure from the Obama administration in the early 2010s clarified that sexual assault or harassment count as discrimination under this law. By allowing assault and harassment to go unchecked, the school is fostering discriminatory policies and they would lose federal funding. Therefore, schools are obligated to prevent harassment and assaults. Again, this may seem reasonable on the surface, but its not.

The problem is that when anybody is accused of wrongdoing by the government, they are constitutionally entitled to due process. This means that the accused must be presented with the evidence against them, be allowed to confront their accuser, and have an opportunity to provide evidence of their own for their defense. In practice, this does not happen. Schools actively prevent the accused from confronting their accuser, under the false guise of protecting victims. Tribunals are conducted behind closed doors without the accused even being allowed inside.

Schools have been sued countless times for violating peoples constitutional rights; despite schools continuously losing these suits, they keep doing this because they dare not risk losing federal funding.Even when the alleged victim says nothing happened, schools will still expel the accused.

Title IX has become synonymous with the Inquisition.

In 2015, Professor Laura Kipnis from Northwestern University wrote a letter in a newspaper criticizing the harassment policies so common in schools because they violate due process. In response, the university launched a Title IX investigation against her. She wasnt even accused of assault or harassing anyone. Students complained that because she dared to criticize school policy, her presence on campus created a chilling effect that prevented students from reporting when they are harassed. Criticism of Title IX is itself a Title IX violation.

Recently, three middle schoolers from the Kiel Area School District in Wisconsin are being accused of sexual harassment for refusing to use a self-described non-binary persons preferred pronouns. It is one thing to prevent slurs; it is entirely different to compel speech. This new standard, being pushed by the Biden administration, is untenable. This is not harassment, much less discrimination on the part of the school.

Modern Title IX law is so far corrupted from its original intent it is beyond saving. It violates peoples Fifth Amendment rights to due process, frequently kicking students (and staff) out of school with no chance to defend themselves, leaving them with tens of thousands of dollars in debt and no degree to show for it. It violates peoples First amendment right to free speech, both by prohibited speech people want to say, and compelling speech people do not want to say.

During the Trump administration, Education Secretary Betsy DeVos tried to institute much needed reforms, requiring due process. The ACLU (of all people) sued saying that due process is a bad thing. Now the Biden administration is undoing these reforms.

Peoples constitutional rights cannot depend on the whims of administrators. There are no reforms that can withstand partisan bickering. Title IX is fundamentally flawed and should be abolished.

William Smith lives in Fargo.

This letter does not necessarily reflect the opinion of The Forum's editorial board nor Forum ownership.

Originally posted here:
Letter: Abolish Title IX of the Civil Rights Act - INFORUM

Charter bus company North Fork Express, Tritec Real Estates planned Ronkonkoma Hub project and Tritecs Robert Coughlan (EverybodyWiki/Orenawong, Tritec Real Estate, iStock)

A developer may be forced to pump the brakes on a massive mixed-use project in Ronkonkoma, as a bus company owner is refusing to yield to an attempted seizure by eminent domain.

A depot operated by charter bus company North Fork Express stands in the way of the second phase of Tritec Real Estates $750 million Ronkonkoma Hub project, according to Newsday. Tritec has asked the Brookhaven Town Industrial Development Agency to condemn the depot, which sits on a 2.2-acre site on Hawkins Avenue near MacArthur Airport and Ronkonkomas Long Island Rail Road Station.

The IDA will hold a virtual public hearing on the issue Wednesday.

Municipalities use eminent domain when attempting to seize a property for a public purpose, such as parks or affordable housing. The Fifth Amendment requires municipalities to give owners just compensation for seized properties.

North Fork Express owner Greg Mensch said he could be willing to negotiate, but isnt happy with the offer hes received from Tritec.

They want to give you what they want to give you and thats it, Mensch told Newsday. Theyre taking private property and they, the town, want to give it to a private developer.

A spokesperson for Tritec said the firm prefers to negotiate.

Both sides have leverage. On the one hand, the town can seize the property and pay fair market value determined by an appraiser, which would result in Mensch losing the property, perhaps for less than hed want for it. But Mensch could mount a legal defense and drag out the eminent domain process, driving up the projects costs.

The initial phase of the Ronkonkoma Hub project wrapped up two years ago and the first tenants moved in three years ago. The second phase is expected to add 388 residential units, 74,000 square feet of retail, 17,000 square feet of offices and a village square for events.

Should it be completed, the development would contain 1,450 apartments, 195,000 square feet of retail and 360,000 square feet of offices.

In December, the IDA approved condemning more than a dozen properties, mostly small businesses, for the project. When the project was approved in 2014, the town and Tritec had said they had no plans to use eminent domain to acquire properties, according to Newsday.

[Newsday] Holden Walter-Warner

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Holdout threatens massive Long Island development - The Real Deal