Mediaboss Marketing

RICHMOND, Va. -- A jury trial for two of five men charged with murdering 15-year-old Tynashia Humphrey began Wednesday in Richmond.

Humphrey was caught in the crossfire and killed in a September 2022 shootout in the Gilpin Court section of Richmond.

The Richmond teenager was walking from a store at the time and was not the intended target.

WTVR

Tyree Coley, 21, and Savonne Henderson, 24, are being tried together for the shooting.

Both men face charges of first-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, two counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, shooting in a public place, and shooting from a vehicle.

Both men pled not guilty to all the charges.

Prior to jury selection, prosecutors told the court they believed they would finish presenting their case by mid-Friday. The trial is scheduled for three days.

The defense attorneys told the court they believed the case would be in the jurys hands by Thursday as they did not intend to call any witnesses.

The trial for the three other suspects was supposed to occur in March but was delayed.

Opening Arguments

The case is being tried by Assistant Commonwealths Attorneys Andy Johnson and Katherine Groover. The prosecutions opening argument to the jury was made by Johnson.

First placing a photo of Humphrey on a stand in front of the jurors, Johnson told them that she did nothing to deserve what had happened to her the night in question and that if it were not for a cowardly and senseless act of violence committed by the defendants, she would be alive today.

Johnson said Coley had an ongoing beef with a person who was at Gilpin Court that night and he and the other suspects, who Johnson said Coley is in a gang with, committed the shooting because of that.

Johnson added Humphreys 12-year-old niece would testify they were walking home from the store and recalled seeing two cars at the intersection of N. First St. and E. Charity St. and saw men in one of the cars holding guns.

Johnson said when the people in the two cars started shooting, the niece ran and hid behind a tree while Humphrey ran down the street towards the person they were shooting at. He said she was short once in the back.

Johnson said at least 20 shots were fired from the two cars they allege the suspects were in, adding the person they were shooting at eventually returned fire and shot between seven to nine times.

He said a total of 37 shell casings were recovered from the scene and police said four firearms were used.

Johnson said police used cameras around the scene to determine the cars involved and found one car the next day with Rarmil as the sole occupant and found the other car three days later, with Henderson as one of the occupants.

He said all five suspects met up at an apartment before the shooting, before traveling to Gilpin in the two cars. He said that police obtained cellphone data for all five men, but added three of them turned their phones off briefly around the time the alleged murder happened.

Johnson finished by saying while no one would testify to seeing the two suspects on trial (or any of the other three defendants) fire the shots, the other information the prosecution would present would make it clear that both men are guilty.

Defense Opening Arguments

Because Coley and Henderson are being tried jointly, both men have their own defense attorneys who are each given a chance to speak and cross-examine any prosecution witnesses.

Henderson's attorney, Stephen Mutnick, gave his opening remarks first and said while Humphrey's death was a "senseless tragedy", police and prosecutors rushed their case and rush to judgement in an effort to find someone to blame. He said prosecutors will only present part of the story.

Mutnick added that no one will testify that the suspects were the ones firing the guns or even testify that they were at Gilpin Court that day.

He said that prosecutors will focus on surveillance camera video from the scene, but the video would not show muzzle flashes coming from the car they allege the suspects were in -- only from the car belonging to the other person.

Mutnick added part of the police's rush to judgement included failing to save one surveillance video from a gas station alleging to show the suspects together and another one from Gilpin was not saved before it was deleted and investigators only have a cellphone recording of that video to work with.

Mutnick said prosecutors will talk about bullet fragments, but no mention will be made of which gun fired the fatal shot (additionally, he said no guns were recovered to connect them to). He said the person who fired back at the alleged suspects said he fired seven-to-nine times and does not know if one of his bullets hit Humphrey; adding prosecutors would not be able to rule it out.

He added that while prosecutors will say Henderson's phone was pinging off a tower in the area, the FBI agent that will testify about the data will talk about limitations with the technology.

Mutnick told the jurors that while prosecutors will say it was the suspects, it will be up to them to decide and that there is reasonable doubt as to who was in the two cars police claim contained the suspects.

Coley's attorney, Gregory Sheldon, made similar comments about the video evidence, plus questions about who is actually in the two cars and what evidence actually placed Coley at the scene.

Sheldon added there will also be talk of DNA swabs taken from the cars and added that Coley's DNA will be excluded from those samples.

Witness Testimony

Witness 1 - RPD Officer

The first witness called to the stand by the prosecution was one of the first Richmond Police Department (RPD) officers who responded to the call and he described how he found Humphrey and his attempts to render first aid.

On cross examination, the officer confirmed he did not see anyone believed to be involved in the shooting. He also admitted he did not know if someone had moved Humphrey before he arrived on scene.

Witness #2 - Humphrey's Niece

The next witness was Humphrey's 12-year-old niece who she was walking home from the store with.

The girl said she remembered seeing two cars as they walked through the intersection of N. First St. and E. Charity St. and that people on the passenger side of one of the cars were holding guns.

She said one of the men had twist dreads and others were wearing masks.

The niece said no one else was shooting when the gunfire started from those two cars and it was not until Humphrey had fallen to the ground that the person who was being shot at began to return fire. She said she remembered hearing around six shots total.

On cross examination, the niece said she did not recognize either Coley or Henderson. She added the person who had the twist dreads was fat.

Witness #3 - Another Niece of Humphrey

The third witness was another niece of Humphrey's, a 14-year-old who went to the store with Humphrey, but was walking back a different way than Humphrey and the first niece.

This niece said she did not notice anything until Humphrey was almost hit by the two cars in the intersection and shortly after heard the gunshots. She recalled somewhere between ten to 20 shots. She said the two cars in the intersection were shooting in the direction of where Humphrey was walking.

Witness #4 - RPD Detective Sergeant

The last witness to testify before jurors on day one was Det. Sgt. Jon Bridges, the supervisor of the homicide unit that investigated Humphrey's death.

Bridges said he got on scene shortly before 8 p.m. and early on in the investigation, police learned of a Black Jeep being involved in the case somehow, but they developed more leads in the ensuring hours.

Bridges said they utilized the surveillance video system set up around Gilpin Court, but said to access and save the video they record requires them to go to an office and use a certain laptop. He said only some officers in the department know how to do this.

Bridges said one officer who knew how went with him and a few other investigators to look at the video and they saw the Black Jeep mentioned near where Humphrey was found and saw in other surveillance video afterwards. He said the officer who was helping investigators access the video knew who the driver was (eventually identified as the person being shot at by the suspects).

He said investigators also identified two other cars of interest on the security cameras, a black sedan and a light blue-gray sedan that were seen traveling in tandem.

Bridges also mentioned that all the video they viewed also has a certain process to download that can be "time-consuming and tedious" and officers may download immediately or defer to later if it is a longer clip. He said they downloaded a few clips that night and asked another officer the next day to go back and download a few more clips, which he said were sent to him a day or two later.

Bridges admitted that a request for a certain camera view was either missed or the request was misinterpreted and was not downloaded in time before the file was deleted, but said one officer on the night of Sept. 12 used his iPhone to record the clip as it was being played at the office.

This video of a video was of the intersection where the alleged shooting occurred, where Bridges said the two cars entered the intersection, paused, and then continued on. He added that in the video you could only see the driver sides of those two cars.

Bridges said they also used a license plate reader caught two cars in the area that he said matched the cars in the surveillance video.

Bridges then walked the jurors through a timeline on a map of when and where the two cars were spotted on the surveillance videos.

On cross examination, Mutnick raised questions about the poor quality of the video played in court, which Bridges said was because of the program being used to play it. He also took the blame the original video not being saved as it should have.

He also admitted that there is a hiccup in the video during the time that he alleged the two cars paused in the intersection.

Mutnick also asked how police confirmed the cars in the license plate reader photo were the same as in the surveillance video images since you could not make out the license plates in the surveillance video and Bridges said the compared it using other characteristics like make and model.

Meanwhile, Sheldon asked and Bridges confirmed that despite looking at a significant amount of video in the investigation they could never identify the occupants of the car.

On redirect (final questioning from the prosecution), Bridges said there was no difference in the context from the video he saw the night in question and the second-hand video that was played in the courtroom -- that the two cars traveled in tandem, paused in the intersection, and then left.

He added on the point of matching the cars in the license plate reader photos and surveillance video, that no other cars that came through the license plate reader camera matched those in the surveillance videos.

Issues with Next Witness

Before breaking for the day, the court tried to determine what to do with one witness prosecutors planned to call, but were concerned would not answer their questions and instead invoke his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The witness is the person who the suspects allegedly shot at and who allegedly returned fire.

Prosecutors told the judge nothing the witness could say in court could be used against him because he had already said them in interviews with police.

The witness was then brought into court for questioning, but without the jurors present.

When asked if he recalled being at Gilpin Court on Sept. 12, 2022, the witness said he was not sure. When asked if he was being honest, the witness then said he was there a lot and exact dates do not stand out.

When Groover asked if he remembered the night he watched a girl fall next to his vehicle, the witness remained silent for about twenty seconds. When Groover asked again, he invoked the Fifth Amendment.

Groover asked several more questions to which the witness either remained silent, answered in the affirmative, or invoked the Fifth Amendment.

The witness is currently in custody for an unrelated matter and is being represented by Gianna Fienberg, who then spoke up in court and said their client was being asked questions that were leading to ones that could implicate him in more specific crimes either from the state or federal level.

Groover said it is not her belief that he was being charged by her office (and would draw up a letter stating he will be protected from anything he would say) and added she had spoken to federal prosecutors who said they had no intentions of charging the witness in relation to this case.

Judge Hairston said he was hesitant to compel the witness to testify without knowing what he would say. The defense counsel then gave the judge a copy of the police interview transcript for him to review.

CBS 6 Legal Analyst Todd Stone offered the following analysis of this issue:

"The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides a witness with the right against self-incrimination, meaning they cannot be compelled to testify against themselves in a criminal case. Its important to note however that the right can hinge on an offer of immunity from prosecution. If a witness is being offered immunity from prosecution, it means that they are being granted protection against any criminal charges that may arise from their testimony. In such cases, the witness could be compelled by the Court to testify (since their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would no longer apply.) By providing immunity, the prosecution is essentially removing the threat of prosecution, which encourages the witness to provide truthful and potentially incriminating information," said Stone. "A state prosecutor however does not have the authority to offer immunity from federal criminal prosecution so the offer of state immunity can often be an insufficient basis for a Court to compel that witness to testify."

The judge told prosecutors they would come back Thursday and put the witness on the stand with jurors present and if they still remained at a impasse, to have their arguments ready for why the judge should compel him to testify.

Court is set to resume at 9 a.m.

This is a developing story, so anyone with more information can email newstips@wtvr.com to send a tip.

EAT IT, VIRGINIA restaurant news and interviews

See the rest here:
She was killed walking home. Two men are now on trial for her ... - CBS 6 News Richmond WTVR

In this Nov. 30, 2005 file photo, an anti-abortion supporter stands next to a pro-choice demonstrator outside the U.S. Supreme Court in Washington. (AP Photo/Manuel Balce Ceneta).

Are laws restricting abortion takings of "private property" that require the government to pay "just compensation" under the Fifth Amendment? In a recent law review article on abortion rights (pp. 504-508) and in her important new book After Misogyny, Fordham law professor Julie Suk argues that the answer is "yes." Her argument is a fascinating example of a famous left-liberal law professor arguing for a major expansion of Takings Clause protection for property rights.

The position she advances has a strong basis in natural rights theories of property, including those advanced by James Madison, the principal framer of the Takings Clause. But it also cuts against centuries of legal precedent and practice. If accepted by the courts, it would have fairly radical libertarian implications that would make me happy, but might be less welcome to many left-of-center advocates of abortion rights. Suk's theory faces an uphill fight under US Supreme Court precedent. But it could perhaps fare better under some state constitutions. Her argument is also notable as one of several examples of left-liberals potentially rethinking their traditionally negative view of constitutional property rights.

The basic argument here is admirably clear and simple. People have property rights in their bodies. Laws banning abortion restrict those rights. Moreover, the imposition is a pretty severe one. To put it in more legalistic terms, the Supreme Court has ruled in Cedar Point Nurseries v. Hassid (2021) that even a temporary physical occupation of property qualifies as a "per se" taking, automatically requiring compensation. By similar logic, abortion bans can be seen as compelling unwanted physical occupation of a woman's body by the fetus.

The idea that people have property rights in their bodies is far from a new one. John Locke famously defended such rights in the 17th century. So too did James Madison, the Founder principally responsible for drafting the Takings Clause and getting it included in the Bill of Rights. In his famous 1792 essay on "Property," Madison wrote that property includes not only "a man's land, or merchandize, or money," but alsoamong other things"the safety and liberty of his person." He goes on to say "[t]hat is not a just government, nor is property secure under it, where the property which a man has in his personal safety and personal liberty, is violated by arbitrary seizures of one class of citizens for the service of the rest."

As an example of such "arbitrary seizures," Madison gives the case of "a magistrate issuing his warrants to a press gang" (referring to the then-common practice of governments seizing men for forced labor or military service). But it's not hard to see how coerced pregnancy can also be considered a seizure of "one class of citizens for the service of the rest." Locke's and Madison's arguments have been extended by modern libertarians (myself included), who have long argued for a broad notion of self-ownership. The idea of self-ownership was also central to the anti-slavery movement that inspired the Reconstruction-era amendments. And, of course, one of the major achievements of the feminist movement was the extension to women of bodily autonomy rights previously fully available only to men.

But despite this impressive historical pedigree, the idea of self-ownership property rights in the body has never played a meaningful role in takings doctrine. Takings jurisprudence has historically been confined to property in land and objects ("real property" and "personal property," in legal terminology), a limitation embodied in William Blackstone's famous definition of property as "that dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in exclusion of every other individual." To my knowledge, federal and state courts have never ruled that a restriction on bodily autonomy violates the Takings Clause.

There is a long history of state and federal laws that impose severe restrictions of that type, and would be vulnerable to attack on takings grounds, if state and federal constitutional takings clauses had applied to them. Most obviously, military conscription literally seized men's bodies and forced them to be used for purposes against their will. The same goes (to a lesser extent) for mandatory jury service. Draftees and jurors usually get paid, but generally far less than the "fair market value" Supreme Court precedent requires as "just compensation" for takings.

In the 1916 case of Butler v. Perry, the Supreme Court upheld a Florida law forcing men between the ages of 21 and 45 to do road repair work, six days per year. The Court cited a long history of similar statutes. I think the justices were wrong to reject the Thirteenth Amendment argument against the constitutionality of these horrible forced-labor laws. But it's notable that no one seems to have tried to challenge them on Takings Clause grounds.

There is one major historical example of takings arguments being deployed to attack the seizure of property rights in human bodies. But it's not one likely to appeal to modern sensibilities. Before the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, defenders of slavery often argued that abolition should be considered a taking, thereby requiring compensation. On top of that, they also contended that it would be a taking not for a "public use," (as required by the Fifth Amendment), because the new owners of the "property" in question would not be the government, but private individuals (the freed slaves themselves). Abolitionists responded (correctly, in my view) that emancipation was not a taking because the ownership of slaves was not a "natural" property right, and therefore not one protected by the Takings Clause at all. I go over this debate and its implications for modern takings issues in Chapter 2 of my book The Grasping Hand.

For present purposes, the key takeaway is that takings arguments were used here because this was the one major situation in American history where mainstream legal thinkers (at least those supportive of slavery) thought that property in a person was essentially similar to property in objects or animals. For defenders of slavery, owning a slave was just another example of Blackstonian "dominion. over the external things of the world."

I do not mean to suggest that Suk's argument is somehow on the same moral plane as that of the slaveowners. There is an obvious moral chasm between claiming ownership of one's own body, and claiming a right to control the bodies of other people by force. But the paucity of other historical takings arguments of this type underscores the reality that takings doctrine has never been understood to protect bodily autonomy, as opposed to the ownership of "external things."

Suk cites a number of cases recognizing property rights in body parts, such as a spleen removed during an operation. But these weren't takings cases. Moreover, they mostly involved property rights in body parts that have already been removed from the body, thereby becoming external objects (standard "personal" property). The exception is cases involving surrogate parenthood, in which the surrogate carries and gives birth to a fetus on behalf of a couple unable to do so on their own. But, legally speaking, this is best understood as a contract for labor, similar to other situations where people commit using their bodies to do work for pay (sometimes risking various dangers in the process). Government regulations restricting such labor contracts, have never been held to be takings and the same applies to laws banning or restricting surrogacy.

A second doctrinal challenge for Suk's argument is the so-called "police power" exception to takingsthe longstanding rule that restrictions on property rights that would otherwise be takings are exempt from the requirement of just compensation if they were adopted for the purpose of protection public health and safety. For example, during the Covid pandemic, a number of court decisions rejected takings challenges to public health orders shutting down various businesses on the grounds that they fit within the police power exception. The scope of this exception has never been all that clear, and there is a long history of debates over how far it should go. But if you believe that abortion is akin to murder or manslaughter, you are also likely to conclude that abortion restrictions fall within the police power exception. You might even reach that conclusion if you think that the government just has a reasonably plausible claim that restricting abortion is needed to protect innocent life.

I don't myself hold that view (I am pro-choice with respect to the overwhelming majority of abortions), and I think the police power exception should be given a fairly narrow interpretation, more generally. But the issue is not an easy one. As with many other arguments about abortion, much depends on the extent to which you believe fetuses have a right to life comparable to that enjoyed by infants. The plausibility of the pro-life position on this point is one of the key factors that makes abortion a tougher issue than many other bodily autonomy issues.

More can be said about the police power question. For now, I just note this is a difficult question that Suk doesn't address, but should consider taking up in the future.

Let's assume these doctrinal problems can be overcome, and courts must declare abortion restrictions to be takings. Such a conclusion would have major implications that go far beyond abortion. At the very least, the draft, mandatory jury service, and any other significant government-imposed forced labor would have to be considered takings as well. That includes various proposals for mandatory national service periodically propounded by advocates on both the right and the left.

All such policies involve the appropriation of a person's body to perform various types of work against his or her will. And, in many cases, especially the draft, the severity of the imposition is at least as great as that of an unwanted pregnancy. Draftees are generally required to serve longer than nine months, andat least in wartimethey may face much greater risks to life and health than most pregnant women.

Other state-imposed constraints on bodily autonomy do not involve physical appropriation of the body, but "merely" restrictions on what you can do with it. If you believeas many takings experts dothat the Takings Clause protects against "regulatory takings" as we well as "physical" ones, then these should also go on the chopping block. Examples include the War on Drugs, bans on the sale of organs, laws banning prostitution, FDA restriction on what types of medicine people are allowed to take, and much more. As with the draft, some of these regulations impose very severe burdens, at least as great as those of abortion restrictions. Laws banning organ markets literally kill many thousands of people every year. FDA restrictions have created a vast "invisible graveyard" of people who died because regulatory barriers prevented from using medicines that might have saved their lives.

Some of these can potentially be distinguished on the grounds that they "merely" involve bans on the payment of money, rather than on the activity itself. For example, current law allows you to donate an organ for transplant, but not to be paid for it. Ditto for the legal distinction between prostitution and sexual encounters. But the vast majority of abortions are also performed by people who are paid for the service. I suspect Suk would not accept the idea that her takings argument doesn't apply to laws that "only" ban abortions performed for pay.

Current Supreme Court precedent does offer some protection against regulatory takings, but much less than against physical invasions and appropriations. The more you believeas I dothat these two types of takings should be treated more equally, the broader the potential impact of expanding the Takings Clause to protect bodily autonomy.

Such protection would not be absolute. The Takings Clause is not a total bar on regulation, but merely a requirement that the state must pay just compensation (and that the seizure of property rights be for a "public use"). But the need to pay compensation might end up deterring many types of regulation, if maintaining them required payment of vast sums to large numbers of people. The War on Drugs probably wouldn't survive for long if government had to pay fair market value compensation to everyone who wants to sell, distribute, or use currently illegal narcotics. Many states might prefer to abolish mandatory jury service if they had to pay market wages to jurors (I would be happy to see such a shift). And the same goes for many other policies.

While I'm notso farconvinced that our present Constitution requires it, I would be absolutely thrilled to have a constitutional system in which restrictions on bodily autonomy are generally considered takings, subjectperhapsto a narrow police power exception. Even if that rule were limited to "physical" takings, it would still be a huge improvement over the status quo.

Obviously, people less libertarian than me might not be so happy to embrace these implications of the argument that abortion restrictions are takings. Some might even be horrified at the mere thought of them.

I urge Prof. Suk and other advocates of the argument that abortion restrictions are takings to carefully consider the implications of their reasoning for other issues. If they want to embrace the implications sketched out above, that's great! If not, they should spell out which ones they reject and why. A rationale narrowly confined to the abortion context risks being rejected as arbitrary special pleading; or at least that may happen unless it is accompanied by a compelling theory explaining why the same reasoning doesn't apply to other significant restrictions on bodily autonomy.

While Suk's argument faces tough sledding under US Supreme Court precedent, it could potentially fare better under at least some state constitutions. Virtually every one of the latter has a takings clause of its own. And many of them have different histories (and sometimes even different wording) from the federal one. State courts can and sometimes do interpret their takings clauses as providing more protection for property rights than the federal Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, many state constitutions are much easier to amend than the federal one. Perhaps a state could enact a Self-Ownership Amendment under which significant constraints on bodily autonomy are presumptively considered takings, or even just presumptively banned altogether. State constitutional law matters greatly here, because many constraints on bodily autonomy (including most abortion restrictions) are products of state law, not federal.

Finally, Suk's argument is notable as an example of the broader trend of left-liberals rethinking traditional left-wing hostility to expansive constitutional property rights. Since the Progressive and New Deal eras, the dominant left-wing view has been that property rights deserve little, if any, judicial protection, because they were seen as tools by which the rich exploit the poor and impediments to rational, scientific social planning.

But the Supreme Court's recent unanimous decision in Tyler v. Hennepin County (using the Takings Clause to ban home equity theft) is an example of how property rights protections often actually benefit the disadvantaged, minorities, and those lacking in political influence. And this issue just the tip of a much larger iceberg, that includes such issues as exclusionary zoning, "blight" and "economic development" takings, asset forfeitures, and more.

These types of issues have gradually begun to shift left-liberal attitudes on property rights issues, albeit liberal constitutional law scholars have been more wary than economists and land-use specialists. I hope the trend will continue andhopefullypick up steam.

See the article here:
Are Abortion Bans Takings? - Reason

A former San Francisco official whose beating spurred claims that he bear-sprayed homeless people in a series of incidents near his home denied allegations Monday that he carried out one of the numerous attacks.

But the ex-official, former Fire Commissioner and businessman Don Carmignani, invoked his Fifth Amendment right to not incriminate himself and refused to answer questions from the stand about the other spray attacks on homeless people that surfaced in connection with the case.

Carmignani was in court to testify against Garret Doty, a 24-year-old homeless man who beat him with a metal pipe near Carmignani's home in the Marina District on April 5, in an incident that drew national attention and sparked fears about crime.

While Doty faces assault and battery charges, his defense lawyer, Kleigh Hathaway, accuses Carmignani of instigating the attack by confronting her client with a can of bear spray. Doty, the lawyer argues, knew that Carmignani had a history of violence against homeless people and struck him with the rod in self-defense.

Under intense questioning by Hathaway, Carmignani directly addressed one of those prior incidents for the first time Monday. He said he was not the assailant who reportedly opened up a tent near Lombard and Pierce streets on Nov. 11, 2022, pepper-sprayed the man sleeping inside and told the victim to get out of my town.

In this one instance, instead of invoking the Fifth Amendment, Carmignani asked the judge if he could pull out his phone to look at his calendar before offering up a possible alibi.

On Nov. 11, I had a flight first thing in the morning to go to a wedding with my girlfriend, Carmignani said from the stand.

While Carmignani denied spraying the man sleeping in the tent, he declined under guidance from his attorney to answer questions about other spray attacks on homeless people near his home. He did, however, say he was not the man seen in a photo of a possible suspect in a Jan. 6 incident. In that case, the assailant reportedly sprayed a man and woman, stole the womans wallet and threw their dog to the ground.

Whether Hathaway can show that Carmignani is responsible for any of the earlier attacks is central to Dotys defense, because the alleged violence could explain why Doty repeatedly beat the former official with a metal rod and chased him down the street in broad daylight.

To further her argument, Hathaway played body-worn camera audio that appeared to capture Carmignani telling his girlfriend not to talk to the police after his beating.

Dont say nothing to nobody, Carmignani can be heard telling his girlfriend. Dont say nothing to any cop, no one.

Carmignani suffered serious injuries to his head, a punctured cheek and a broken jaw. He underwent surgery and has shown up in court using a walker to get to the witness stand.

Doty was previously out of custody in the case, but after being arrested for skipping court, he appeared dressed head to toe in County Jail orange on Monday.

The judge, Linda Colfax, had previously released Doty because Carmignani was not well enough to testify against him. She found Doty in contempt of court for not showing up to his preliminary hearing last week and gave him 5 days in jail, which he has already served.

While prosecutors objected to Hathaway asking Carmignani about the earlier incidents, Colfax allowed her to question the former official about some of them.

The judge said the suspect descriptions in those cases are very similar to Mr. Carmignani, and the locations of the incidents were in a similar area.

Police have said they are investigating whether Carmignani committed the earlier attacks but have not publicly named him as a suspect.

The case against Doty is expected to continue Tuesday morning.

See the article here:
Ex-San Francisco Official Offers Alibi for One of Series of Bear-Spray ... - The San Francisco Standard

Bill Bateman always dreamed of having his own farm.

His dream became a reality when his family acquired the former Kendi Farm in April 2013.

Tucked within the thickness of trees on Kendi Road in Upper Tyrone Township, the 194-acre tract with 180 acres preserved offers a tranquil lifestyle for Bateman, wife, Lisa, and their family.

With major plans for changes to nearby U.S. Route 119 that include property acquisition and construction of a roundabout within several years, PennDOT could impose on that dream.

So many farms are drying up, Lisa Bateman said, You cant get the ground back once it is gone. What PennDOT sees is taking 6 acres.

But 6 acres in Fayette County compares differently than in Westmoreland County. And we will lose access to between 25 to 30 acres. Well lose three pasture fields.

The Batemans met with state Sen. Pat Stefano (R-32), Fayette County Farm Bureau President Darrell Becker and Farm Bureau official Andy Bater to express concerns.

This is going to affect everything right down to my dogs, Lisa Bateman said. It took forever to preserve the farm.

Becker said the Farm Bureau is trying to change the practice of governmental land acquisition through eminent domain.

Eminent domain refers to the power of the government to take private property and convert it to public use, referred to as a taking, according to the Cornell Law School website.

The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that the government may only exercise this power if it provides just compensation to the property owners, the site states.

Becker said state Sen. Chris Dush supports efforts to ensure proper reimbursement to property owners when faced with eminent domain situations.

Dush is a Centre County Republican representing the 25th Senate District.

Stefano said the situation is just adding another straw to the camels back.

Becker said state census figures have shown farm acreage has declined in recent years.

Stefano said future plans for PennDOT are to create more limited-access highways, because of the way people drive.

We have got to get to the point where someone has to be educated and think further down the line, Lisa Bateman said. We just want a decent life, and too many farmers are facing this.

Bater said the challenge of transportation is to make sure that farms are made whole for all collateral impact.

Bill Bateman said the farm had initially been sold by the Kendi family to a firm planning to develop an industrial park.

A petition circulated by township residents drew enough support to block those plans, he added.

Stefano said another public meeting or two are likely before PennDOT can begin work on the project. He said the earliest work could begin would be in 2025.

The Batemans have not received a monetary offer from PennDOT for acquisition of the 6-acre tract.

Stefano said a PennDOT offer made to the owners of the Galley garage property along Mt. Pleasant Road was refused.

I have a real problem with this heavy-handed government, he said.

Paul S. Brittain is a Daily Courier staff writer. He can be reached at psbritt@cvzoom.net.

Link:
Road project threatens preserved farmland | News | dailycourier.com - Front Page

Teacher and accused felon Philip Zlomke faced the Grand Island Public Schools Board of Education Tuesday night, fighting to maintain his contract with the district.

The hearing, initiated by Zlomke, was an attempt to overturn the districts initial decision to terminate Zlomkes contract. Zlomke, a financial literacy teacher at Westridge Middle School, requested the district continue his contract until his cases were decided in court.

On March 17, 2022, Zlomke was arrested at Westridge Middle School before classes started. For that arrest, he was accused of two counts of first-degree sexual assault. The crimes allegedly occurred in 2021.

On May 4, 2022, Zlomke was served with another arrest warrant (not on school property), this time accused of committing sex crimes against a minor. The five charges include three counts sexual assault of a child, first degree, occurring in 2017, 2018 and 2021.

None of the crimes Zlomke is accused of involve Grand Island Public Schools students, according to district spokespeople.

Zlomke was initially notified his contract was terminated May 2, 2023, more than one year after his arrest at Westridge. In the meantime, Zlomke was on leave, but receiving unemployment, according to proceedings.

Soon after Zlomke received his letter of termination from the district, he requested a hearing to contest his termination. Said hearing was Tuesday night at Kneale Administration Building.

In his opening statements, Zlomke said, Please know that due to the nature and ongoing litigation, that I am not at liberty to discuss the details pertaining to the allegations that have been levied against (me), he said. Please note that if I choose to practice my Fifth Amendment rights, it is out of my desire to keep the litigation within the courtroom.

By the end of the hearing, Zlomke had invoked the Fifth Amendment several times.

Zlomke, who represented himself, asked interim GIPS Human Resources Director Wayne Stelk why it had taken a year to present Zlomke with contract termination.

Stelk was not with the district between March 2022 and October 2022.

What happened between March and October was not something that I was privy to, as far as any kind of decision making process, Stelk said.

Once he became aware of the situation, Stelk said the legal process progressed slowly.

It was in January, approximately, that I made the decision that we can't just keep letting this (be) hanging out there in limbo, he said. In my opinion it had already hung out way too long.

Zlomkes absence from the classroom had placed a burden on the buildings teachers, said Westridge Assistant Principal Stefanie Novotny.

It's been difficult for us to determine how we're going to plan staffing and building our schedule with the unknown, Novotny said in her testimony. It makes it hard not knowing when the proceedings will be finished. It's hard for us to plan moving forward.

While questioned by Zlomke, Stelk said, Even though we have filled your position, that doesn't mean that it doesn't still create additional burdens on (the) district because now we have fewer people to use in other vacancies that we may have.

Over the course of the hearing, prior complaints about Zlomke from students to Westridge administrators surfaced, most notably an incident involving poking a student in the buttocks with a fork. For that incident, Zlomke was presented a memorandum of understanding (MOU).

Still, Zlomke contended, he was an effective teacher with a good rapport with his students.

Stelk said, We're not here to try to convince the board that you were an ineffective teacher. We're talking about the felony charges that you've been charged (with).

If the felony charges (had) never been brought forth ... the publicity along with that you've been arrested at the school if none of that would have occurred and all we had was an MOU, we would not be talking about cancellation (of contract), in my opinion, Stelk said.

Matt Fisher

Besides concerns about Zlomkes conduct, the reputation of GIPS was also brought into question, said GIPS Superintendent Matt Fisher, alluding to news coverage.

In the headlines, it doesn't say Grand Island man was arrested for these charges. It says Grand Island Public Schools teacher was arrested, Fisher pointed out. Three of the districts exhibits were news headlines.

During testimony, Zlomke asked Fisher if he thought Zlomke lacked ethics.

Well certainly the incident having a student bent over and poking them in the butt with a fork demonstrates a clear lack of ethics in my mind, Fisher told Zlomke before mentioning other alleged misconduct: We can put these other things as far as talking about porn, regardless of the depth, to me demonstrate(s) a lack of ethics.

Justin Knight, legal counsel for Grand Island Public Schools, questions a witness during the hearing deciding Philip Zlomkes contract. Zlomke is accused of committing seven felonies. His contract was on the line during a special school board hearing Tuesday night. To Knights left is GIPS Superintendent Matt Fisher.

In his closing statement, GIPS legal counsel Justin Knight told the board, I don't know how a board can bring someone back with seven felonies pending against them as serious as we have here today.

Knight then addressed the timing of Zlomkes termination. I do think it is a fair question: Why we weren't here in June of 2022? As has been said, we can't answer that. Thats something that I think in hindsight the administration at that time should have pursued a lot faster.

Zlomke said in his closing statement, I'm not asking for (the board) to put me back in the classroom yet. I do not expect that putting me back in the classroom without a verdict is irrational I'm asking you to wait and hear from those trials.

Following executive session, the board unanimously upheld the decision to terminate Zlomkes teaching contract, effective immediately. Board members Lindsey Jurgens and Dave Hulinksy were absent. Board member Josh Sikes recused himself from participating in the hearing.

Westridge Middle School Principal Brad Wolfe was among the school districts witnesses. Zlomke did not have any witnesses on his behalf. Attorney Lily Amare presided over the hearing, which lasted nearly four hours.

Jessica Votipka is the education reporter at the Grand Island Independent. She can be reached at 308-381-5420.

Get our local education coverage delivered directly to your inbox.

See the article here:
Teacher, accused of seven felonies, pleads his case to Grand Island ... - Grand Island Independent