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From the public university's Diverse, Equity, and Inclusion Task Force (emphasis added):

Recommendation 9: Miami University should explore the adoption of a zero-tolerance anti-discrimination policy and strictly enforce its existing University policy on discrimination.

Miami University must be able to determine under what conditions employees can be terminated and students can be dismissed from the University if proven they have made discriminatory (e.g., racist, sexist, homophobic, etc.) comments.

Note: This recommendation assumes the accused party was afforded proper due process and an appropriate finder of fact determined discrimination occurred.

Rationale: As a public institution of higher education, Miami University should demonstrate moral courage when defending its interest in having an efficient and disruptive-free work environment. Student dismissal or employee termination should not be shied away from because of fear of First Amendment violations. Case law dictates that a balancing test regarding private citizen's 1st amendment right vs public institution interest in an efficient and disruptive-free work environment (Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 1983; Dixon v. University of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269, 6th Cir. 2012; Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 2d Cir. 2006; Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 1968). The key legal factors (e.g., avoiding disruptions in regular operations, maintaining good working relationships among coworkers, avoiding erosion of working relationships dependent on confidence and loyalty, avoiding obstructions in employees' abilities to perform their work) favor Miami's case for an efficient and disruptive-free work environment.

Well, maybe the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion folks have no "fear of First Amendment violations "and think "moral courage" consists of promoting "efficient and disruptive-free work environment" without regard to student and faculty speech rights; but the University ought to have some fear here:

[1.] Student First Amendment Rights: Any policy saying that "students can be dismissed from the University if proven they have made discriminatory (e.g., racist, sexist, homophobic, etc.) comments" would violate the First Amendment. The Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Task Force may not "fear First Amendment violations," but the university, which will have to pay for those violations (and which presumably wants to comply with the law) should. Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, 55 F.3d 1177 (6th Cir. 1995), expressly struck down a campus "discriminatory harassment policy" that banned allegedly bigoted speech (there, "verbal behavior that subjects an individual to an intimidating, hostile or offensive educational, employment or living environment by (c) demeaning or slurring individuals through written literature because of their racial or ethnic affiliation; or (d) using symbols, [epithets] or slogans that infer negative connotations about the individual's racial or ethnic affiliation").

The same would be true of any policy calling for discipline for "racist, sex, homophobic, etc." "comments." See also Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (reaffirming that, even within government-run programs, the government can't impose viewpoint-based restrictions on supposedly bigoted expression); Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010) (reaffirming the protection of students' right to "express any viewpoint they wishincluding a discriminatory one," and stressing "this Court's tradition of 'protect[ing] the freedom to express "the thought that we hate"'").

[2.] Faculty First Amendment Rights: The rights of public university professors, as public employees, are more complicated, because the government as employer usually has more power to restrict employee speech than the government as college educator has over students. But courts have recognized that the government's power to punish faculty for speech in their research, public commentary, and even their teaching is still sharply limited.

Thus, for instance, in Hardy v. Jefferson Community College(6th Cir. 2001), the court held that a professor had a right to discuss offensive wordssuch as "nigger" and "bitch"in class, when that was "germane to the subject matter of his lecture." Likewise, in Levin v. Harleston(2d Cir. 1992), the court held that even "derogatory remarks about persons of certain racial or ethnic groups" (to quote Hardy's description of Levin) in letters to the editor and in journal articles were protected by the First Amendment. And Burnham v. Ianni(8th Cir. 1997) (en banc), recognized the right of faculty members to convey their views on campus outside class, even when some found that speech to be offensive.

Some restrictions on faculty speech may not violate the First Amendment, for instance when the speech appears unconnected to public debates (as in another portion of Dambrot). And high-level university administrators may be less protected from being removed from their administrative positions (though, if they're also faculty, they may still have a First Amendment right not to be removed from their faculty positions). That's what Dixon v. University of Toledo(6th Cir. 2012), the Toledo case to which the Task Force seems to be referring in the Recommendation 9 Details, held: An Associate Vice President for Human Resources could be removed for her speech, just as, say, a Governor's cabinet member can be removed by the Governor for his speech or political activity. (The Dixon court specifically cited the political appointee cases, such as Rose v. Stephens(6th Cir. 2002).)

[3.] Academic Freedom Guarantees: Besides the First Amendment, much of the protection for freedom of debate and inquiry at universities comes from Academic Freedom policies that the universities themselves adopt, and on which prospective students, faculty, donors, and legislative supporters rely. Miami of Ohio has such a policypresumably the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Task Force would be seeking to add viewpoint-based exceptions to it in order to implement the Task Force's goals. This is the current policy, which protects all ideas, whether or not people label them "racist, sexist, homophobic, etc.":

The teacher is entitled to full freedom in research and in the publication of the results, subject to the performance of his or her other academic duties; but research for pecuniary return should be based upon an understanding with the authorities of the institution.

The teacher is entitled to freedom in the classroom in discussing his or her subject, but should be careful not to introduce into his or her teaching controversial matter that has no relation to the subject. Limitations of academic freedom because of religious or other aims of the institution should be clearly stated in writing at the time of appointment.

College or university teachers are citizens, members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as a citizen, teachers should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As individuals of learning and as educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge the profession and the institution by their utterance. Hence, faculty members should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution.

The University also recognizes that the faculty member is an integral part of the institution. While observing the stated regulations of the University, the faculty member maintains the right to criticize and seek revision of University policy, both administrative and academic.

Thanks to College Fix (Alexander Pease) for the pointer, and see also this post from the Foundation for Individual Rights in Education (Will Creeley).

Originally posted here:
Miami Univ. (Ohio) Task Force Calls for Suppressing Student, Faculty Speech, Without "Fear of First Amendment Violations" - Reason

Mailyn Fidler has joined the Reporters Committee as a legal fellow for the Technology and Press Freedom Project. Her work focuses on litigation, policy and research on technology issues affecting the news medias First Amendment rights.

Ive always been interested in the tools and systems that people use to govern themselves, Mailyn said. Law is one of those systems, as is technology.

The Technology and Press Freedom Project team, led by Gabe Rottman, publishes a weekly newsletter analyzing legal and policy issues at the intersection of technology and press freedom, including government surveillance and leak investigations.

Mailyns past work also concentrated on technology and press freedom issues. As an undergraduate, she studied science, technology and society at Stanford University before attending Oxford University on a Marshall Scholarship to study international relations. While attending Yale Law School, she interned at the Knight First Amendment Institute and worked with a law firm litigating First Amendment issues on behalf of major internet platforms.

In law school, Mailyn also worked with the San Francisco City Attorneys Office to develop impact litigation related to cybersecurity and First Amendment rights, an experience that she says helped prepare her for this fellowship.

I think theres a lot of room for growth at this intersection of technology and press freedom, Mailyn said. She added that her past work is relevant to how RCFP thinks, particularly as were thinking of new ways and new angles to attack these issues.

As she begins her position with the Reporters Committee, Mailyn looks forward to working to support journalists.

I have found that in almost everything Ive done in law, somehow I end up talking to journalists, she said. I think they are very important to the rule of law.

Mailyn Fidler is not admitted to practice law.

The Reporters Committee regularly files friend-of-the-court briefs and its attorneys represent journalists and news organizations pro bono in court cases that involve First Amendment freedoms, the newsgathering rights of journalists and access to public information. Stay up-to-date on our work by signing up for our monthly newsletter and following us on Twitter or Instagram.

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RCFP's Technology and Press Freedom Project welcomes legal fellow - Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press

Christian Burke, a 24-year-old Portland stand-up comedian known as Creme Brulee, pleaded not guilty Monday to a single misdemeanor charge of assaulting a federal officer during a counterprotest downtown.

Burke is accused of flinging a large rock at a Federal Protective Service officer during a demonstration on Aug. 22, a federal prosecutor said. Burke was arrested on Sunday afternoon in the 1500 block of Southwest First Avenue.

As part of the conditions for release pending trial, Burke must not participate in a counterprotest, according to a negotiated agreement between the prosecutor and Burkes defense lawyer.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Stacie F. Beckerman hesitated to impose the condition, questioning how it would not violate Burkes First Amendment rights.

Assistant U.S. Attorney Parakram Singh told the judge that Burkes lawyer agreed that Burke would not affirmatively go to a location where an opposing protest is already ongoing.

Defense lawyer Richard Lee McBreen III said his client accepted the condition.

While Beckerman noted that the condition is arguably a violation of your First Amendment rights, she accepted the defendants waiver of the right and imposed what she called the negotiated condition.

Christian R. Burke, 24, pleaded not guilty to assault on a federal officer during a brief hearing Monday in U.S. District Court in Portland.

Burke also must not carry or possess any weapons, including guns, lasers or other objects used as weapons during protests and not come within a five-block radius of the Mark O. Hatfield United States Courthouse in downtown Portland as the case continues, except to make a court appearance if necessary.

Our goal is to keep you out of custody and keep you safe, Beckerman said.

On Aug. 22, right-wing demonstrators clashed with left-wing counterprotesters outside the Justice Center and the Edith Green-Wendell Wyatt Federal Building on Southwest Third Avenue.

A Federal Protective Service agent saw a large rock thrown "directly towards him coming from the crowd,'' according to a release from the U.S. Attorneys Office. The rock struck a tree near the agent, and another federal officer identified Burke as the person who threw it, according to the U.S. Attorneys Office. Video evidence confirmed Burkes involvement, according to federal prosecutors.

Burke was arrested Sunday after an earlier attempt by a plainclothes federal officer to arrest Burke on Friday during an art therapy event in Irving Park was unsuccessful and drew scorn on social media.

Burke is one of 40 people accused of assaulting a federal officer during protests in Portland since shortly after the death of George Floyd, a Black man who died after a Minneapolis police officer knelt on his neck despite Floyds protestations that he couldnt breathe. Burke is one of 91 people facing federal prosecution in Portland from actions during protests in the city.

Burke uses a dance and comedic platform to react to injustices, Burke said in late July interview with Willamette Week.

Reached later Monday afternoon, Burke responded to questions about the case only by urging people to write in Teressa Raiford, a longtime Black Lives Matter activist, for Portland mayor in Novembers election.

In late July, a condition imposed by a different magistrate judge required about a dozen protesters arrested that month not to participate in any public demonstrations or public assemblies while on release,. But all parties agreed the condition was unconstitutional and it was dropped. The no-protest provision had been added when a defendant balked at a proposed curfew.

Nora Benavidez, a spokeswoman from PEN America, a nonprofit organization that celebrates literature and free expression, said in late July that any restrictions forcing First Amendment-abiding protesters to sign away their right to demonstrate to be released were gross violations of free speech and assembly.

-- Maxine Bernstein

Email at mbernstein@oregonian.com; 503-221-8212

Follow on Twitter @maxoregonian

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Excerpt from:
Portland stand-up comedian accused of throwing rock at officer agrees not to participate in counterprotest as - OregonLive

In brief

Following a public consultation period which commenced in December 2019, on 25 August 2020, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) of Saudi Arabia announced that it had issued amendments to the Securities Business Regulations (SBRs) and the Authorised Persons Regulations (APRs). The new APRs are now known as the Capital Market Institutions Regulations (CMIRs), following the terminology change from Authorised Persons (APs) to Capital Market Institutions (CMIs).

These amendments represent the first comprehensive revision to the APRs and SBRs for some time and the first amendment to the SBRs since its issuance in June 2005 (the last update to the APRs occurred in September 2017).

To allow sufficient time for CMIs to comply with the more significant amendments, the CMA has implemented a phased approach whereby the changes will come into effect in two stages, the first of which will be on 1 November 2020 (15/3/1442H) (as announced by the CMA), with the second phase coming into effect on 1 January 2022 (28/5/1443H). A summary of those changes which become effective on 1 January 2022 is also set out below.

As a result, unusually, both the current SBRs and current APRs as well as the new SBRs and the new APRs (i.e. the CMIRs) are published on the CMAs website. Accordingly, where a provision is subject to a phased approach, the current position will remain as per the current SBRs or APRs until 1 January 2022.

In summary, the key changes include the following:

Transition phases

As mentioned above, in order to enable existing CMIs to implement the required changes under the amendments, the CMA has introduced a two-phased approach. As such, the following amended provisions will be effective as of 1 January 2022:

All other amendments to the SBRs and the CMIRs will have effect as of 01 November 2022.

In detail

Changes to the scope of Securities Activities, types of authorisations and minimum capital requirements

A number of amendments to the scope of authorisations and minimum capital requirements for each of the five categories of Securities Activities have been made which will come into effect on 1 January 2022, as part of the phased approach.

Of the changes, perhaps the most significant is the expansion of the Advising activity to include financial planning or wealth management and the reduction in the minimum capital requirement for a Managing license where activities are limited to making investment decisions for non-real estate investment funds (but not operating these funds) or discretionary management of client portfolios.

Change to client classification and potential implications

One of the most significant changes reflected in the new CMIRs, with perhaps some of the most far reaching practical implications, is the change to the client classification which will take effect on 1 January 2022.

Under the CMIRs, from 1 January 2022, clients must be classified as either:

Under the changes, with a few exceptions, all requirements which were previously limited in application to clients classified as customers are now applicable, or will become applicable from 1 January 2022 to all clients regardless of classification.

The above changes to client classification and the consequential changes to other provisions will have far reaching consequences for CMIs. In particular, the re-classification of all clients in accordance with the new regime could be administratively burdensome for CMIs with large client bases. Moreover, CMIs whose client base has historically been limited to Counterparties will likely have to develop new processes, procedures and documentation to apply the requirements (previously only applicable to customers) to their clients.

However, as noted above, existing CMA licensees have until 1 January 2022 to implement these processes and become compliant with the amended provisions.

Narrowing the Securities Advertisement Exemptions

A significant development is the amendment to Article 20(4) of the SBRs, often referred to as the Securities Advertisement Exemption. Previously, this provision excluded Securities Advertisements from needing to either be made or approved by a CMI when directed only at other CMIs, Exempt Persons or Investment Institutions. The amendments have removed Investment Institutions from this exemption and, consequently, those relying on the previous provision to market to family offices, corporates and even large corporate subsidiaries of governmental entities on a cross-border basis, will potentially be affected.

Codifying corporate governance requirements applicable to CMIs

New provisions in Article 53 and Annex 6.1 of the CMIRs have been added (not previously included in the draft CMIRs circulated in December 2019) which codify the governance requirements set out in CMA Circular No. S/3/6/6970/18 dated 31 October 2018.

These include provisions addressing: (i) the inclusion of independent directors on the CMIs board; (ii) an obligation on the board to establish a corporate governance framework infrastructure; (iii) the issuance and content of an annual report; and (iv) controls in cases where the CMI is a subsidiary of a local bank.

Article 53 clarifies that the requirements above do not apply CMIs which are limited liability companies or whose authorisation type is limited to managing investments, arranging or advising.

These are just a sample of some of the recent amendments. We have put together a full client briefing note which analyzes the changes outlined in this client alert, as well as a wide range of other significant amendments, in greater detail.

Follow this link:
Publication of the New CMIRs and Amendments to the SBRs by the CMA in Saudi Arabia - Lexology

With social distancing requirements in effect at Statesboro City Hall, officials were working out how to accommodate more people for a Tuesday morning hearing on the proposed Nondiscrimination and Equity Ordinance.

This story was written Monday, when it remained to be seen whether there would be any actual crowd for City Councils 9 a.m. Tuesday meeting. The nondiscrimination package was the first of four proposed new ordinances on the agenda for their official first hearings and potential council votes. If a first reading is approved, a second hearing and council vote would be required at a later date for the new city law to take effect.

I really dont know, City Manager Charles Penny said when asked if a larger number of hearing speakers than usual would attend. There have been some social media posts out there, and some may have been specifically about the meeting. But we are trying to anticipate that there might be some folks to come and speak about the ordinance. Statesboro City Manager Charles Penny

With the six-foot spacing, usually only 16 chairs are set up in the public area inside the council chambers, and three of those are reserved for news media. Outside the chambers, another eight seats will be provided in two alcoves along the hallway on City Halls second floor. When those are full, anyone else will have to remain downstairs, Penny said.

But its a public hearing, so anyone that wants to speak has to be given the opportunity to speak, he said.

So if others are waiting outside to do so, speakers would have to leave the room after their turn to let someone else come in, Penny said.

As of midday Monday he had received one call, his administrative assistant another call and the city clerk two calls from people interested in the Nondiscrimination and Equity Ordinance hearing, Penny said. These were from people on both sides of the issue, and council members may have received additional calls, he noted.

The nondiscrimination ordinance would prohibit businesses, landlords and to some extent nonprofit organizations in Statesboro from discriminating on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, ancestry, sexual orientation, gender identity, age or military status. These protections would apply in hiring and employment, in housing and the sale or rental of real estate in general and in public accommodations.

As proposed, the ordinance states that complaints will be referred first to a mediator for non-binding mediation and, if not settled there, to a hearing officer. The hearing officer could apply a civil penalty of up to $500 for a first violation or a fine of up to $1,000 or suspension or loss of a business occupational tax certificate, informally known as a business license, for subsequent violations.

License revocations could be appealed to the mayor and council.

The proposal includes some exemptions for religious organizations and private clubs.

But on two previous appearances before the mayor and council, Reid Derr, a retired East Georgia State College history professor speaking as a member of Trinity Presbyterian Church, voiced an objection that the exemption for religious organizations, as proposed, does not go far enough.

Conscientious objection has a long and venerated history in the United States, and thats really in a sense what Im addressing today, Derr said during the Sept. 15 work session.

Although usually associated with refusals of wartime military service, conscientious objection really means the objection of people to cooperating with, encouraging or advancing social and political and religious doctrines or positions that they in good conscience oppose, he said.

As you expand nondiscrimination legislation, you tend then to press or disadvantage other aspects of the rights of people, Derr said. For example, in particular Im concerned with the First Amendment freedom of speech and the right to freely practice ones religion.

He presented council two requested changes to the proposed ordinance.

The first would add that nothing in it shall prevent a religious believer or person with other conscientious objection from refusing based on religious faith or personal conscience to cooperate in, encourage, propagate or advance social, political and religious doctrines, positions or actions or statements that the person in good conscience objects to, Derr said.

U.S. courts have shown a tendency to expand the interpretation of laws, leading to too much opportunity to use law aggressively against people that we disagree with, he said.

Derr cited the case of Kelvin Cochran, the otherwise distinguished former Atlanta fire chief fired by the city of Atlanta in 2015 after he published a book through his church describing homosexuality as a sin. Cochran sued, and after a complex ruling by a U.S. District Court judge in 2017, the city of Atlanta agreed to pay him and his attorneys $1.2 million to settle the suit.

In other words, City Council would want to avoid people using this ordinance to attack people they dont like and attack their views, and thats why I proposed that one, Derr said of his amendment proposal.

Among other lawsuits he noted were the Masterpiece Cakeshop case from Colorado and the Arlenes Flowers case in Washington state. Both involved business owners who refused to provide services for same-sex weddings.

There are these cases where the aggressive use of statute has really hurt especially small business that doesnt have a bevy of lawyers on staff to be able to defend itself, Derr said.

He said he would not want to see anyone who disagreed with (him) persecuted or disadvantaged in any way but also does not want individuals who take what he understands as the biblical view of marriage to face lawsuits that could force them into bankruptcy.

The other suggested amendment he presented was actually from the Rev. Roland Barnes, Trinity Presbyterians senior pastor, Derr said.

As currently drafted, a subsection of the proposed city law states in part, Nothing in this ordinance shall prohibit a religious organization to employ an individual of a particular religion to perform work connected with the performance of religious activities by the religious organization.

Barnes, through Derr, proposed more specific language to allow a religious organization to restrict hiring to people who are in agreement and complying with the founding principles and beliefs of the organization, as expressed in doctrinal statements and confessions of faith.

Noting the limitation on fines and the absence of restrictions on speech, Statesboro City Attorney Cain Smith suggested that the kind of legal battles Derr talked about were unlikely to result from Statesboros ordinance.

Other jurisdictions in the state that have adopted antidiscrimination ordinances have had the exact same language that we have set out in (the religious exemption clause), and that is in line with what the federal law has said so far, Smith said. Mayor Jonathan McCollar

Mayor Jonathan McCollar said city officials appreciated Derrs input and were willing to listen further. But McCollar asserted that the citys proposal reflects established federal law and that a more detailed religious exemption could invite legal challenges instead of preventing them.

Were not going beyond anything at the federal level, he told Derr. So I think what youre asking us to do would get us into trouble.

The nondiscrimination and equity package, drafted by Smith and the One Boro Commission with input from council members, contains other provisions that have been previously reported.

Go here to read the rest:
Nondiscrimination ordinance may draw further public input - Statesboro Herald