Mediaboss Marketing

The Supreme Court unanimously ruled Thursday for the National Rifle Association in a dispute over whether a New York state official had violated the groups First Amendment rights when she told companies to consider their reputations in doing business with the gun rights group.

The NRA brought the case against Maria Vullo, the former superintendent of the New York Department of Financial Services, saying she pushed financial firms to deny the group services because of its gun rights advocacy.

In a unanimous ruling, Justice Sonia Sotomayor said the group plausibly argued that its rights were violated, reversing the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decision to dismiss the lawsuit.

Government officials cannot attempt to coerce private parties in order to punish or suppress views that the government disfavors, Justice Sotomayor wrote.

The decision sends the dispute back to the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for reconsideration.

In the aftermath of the 2018 mass shooting at a high school in Parkland, Florida, Ms. Vullo said that financial services companies should consider whether they should serve pro-gun organizations like the NRA.

New York regulators opened investigations into certain insurance companies that were in business with NRA members. The NRA sued, saying Ms. Vullo was exercising government authority against its free speech rights.

A unanimous three-judge panel of the 2nd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Ms. Vullo, ruling she enjoyed qualified immunity and that her speech was lawful and protected as an exercise in law enforcement.

The NRA took the case to the Supreme Court.

Justice Sotomayor noted that Ms. Vullo struck a deal with an insurance company that had done business with the NRA that the firm would would instruct its syndicates to cease underwriting firearm-related policies and would scale back its NRA-related business.

In exchange, [the Department of Financial Services] would focus its forthcoming affinity-insurance enforcement action solely on those syndicates which served the NRA, and ignore other syndicates writing similar policies, the ruling noted.

It also highlighted the fact that Ms. Vullo praised businesses that severed ties with the NRA as fulfilling their corporate social responsibility.

Vullo was free to criticize the NRA and pursue the conceded violations of New York insurance law. She could not wield her power, however, to threaten enforcement actions against DFS-regulated entities in order to punish or suppress the NRAs gun-promotion advocacy, Justice Sotomayor wrote. Because the complaint plausibly alleges that Vullo did just that, the Court holds that the NRA stated a First Amendment violation.

Neal Katyal, counsel for Ms. Vullo, said they were disappointed in the ruling.

As the Courts decision makes clear, because of the posture of this case, this ruling required the Court to treat the NRAs untested allegations as true even though these allegations have no evidentiary merit, he said. This case will now go back to the Second Circuit, which threw out the lawsuit on qualified immunity grounds before. The Supreme Court did not address the qualified immunity decision of the Second Circuit, and we are confident Ms. Vullos claim of qualified immunity will be reaffirmed.

The American Civil Liberties Union, meanwhile, praised the decision. The ACLU represented the NRA in the dispute, despite the two groups having many disagreements.

Todays decision confirms that government officials have no business using their regulatory authority to blacklist disfavored political groups, said David Cole, an attorney for the ACLU who argued the case. The New York state officials involved here, former Gov. Andrew Cuomo and his chief financial regulator, Maria Vullo, were clear that they sought to punish the NRA because they disagreed with its gun rights advocacy. The Supreme Court has now made crystal clear that this action is unconstitutional.

Read the original post:
Supreme Court unanimously sides with NRA in First Amendment dispute with New York official - Washington Times

The Supreme Court handed down a unanimous victory for the National Rifle Association, the powerful pro-gun organization, on Thursday. Notably, the opinion was authored by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, an Obama appointee and one of the Courts few remaining liberal voices.

Yet nothing about the Courts decision in National Rifle Association v. Vullo should surprise anyone. The case involved an egregious and straightforward violation of the First Amendment, and Sotomayors name on the opinion drives home the fact that theres really only one fair-minded way to decide this case.

Vullo arose out of two moves Maria Vullo, the former superintendent of New York States Department of Financial Services (DFS), took against the NRA. One of these moves was entirely lawful, the other was clearly unconstitutional.

The lawful investigation concerned Carry Guard, an insurance program the NRA offered its members, which would pay the legal bills of a customer who shot someone. Carry Guard, which was provided by third-party insurers but promoted by the NRA, violated New York law in two ways. The NRA promoted it without a license, and it insured New York residents for intentional, reckless, and criminally negligent acts with a firearm that injured or killed another person.

For reasons that should be obvious, New York does not permit insurers to offer policies that pay out if the beneficiary commits an intentional criminal act.

While Vullo was pursuing her investigation into the Carry Guard program eventually imposing millions of dollars in fines on the insurance companies that administered and underwrote Carry Guard a gunman murdered 17 people at a high school in Parkland, Florida. This triggered a widespread backlash against the NRA, including within New Yorks government.

Unfortunately, at least part of New Yorks response to the Parkland shooting was unconstitutional.

Vullo issued two guidance letters to insurers and financial services companies, encouraging them to continue evaluating and managing their risks, including reputational risks, that may arise from their dealings with the NRA or similar gun promotion organizations and to take prompt actions to manag[e] these risks and promote public health and safety.

Notably, Vullo issued these letters while her office was actively seeking millions of dollars worth of fines from the insurance companies responsible for the NRAs Carry Guard program.

Additionally, Vullo allegedly met with one insurance company, Lloyds of London, and told Lloyds that it could avoid liability for unrelated insurance law violations so long as it aided DFSs campaign against gun groups.

So Vullo encouraged many insurers to cut off ties with the NRA at the very moment that she was pursuing a major investigation into three companies that did business with the NRA. And she allegedly offered to shield one company from additional liability if it took further actions against the gun organization.

As Sotomayors opinion explains, thats not allowed.

Perhaps because the opinion is written by Sotomayor, and not by a more right-wing justice who may be eager to use the state of New Yorks blundering treatment of the NRA as an excuse to shut down legitimate enforcement actions against the gun group, the Courts decision also includes some language ensuring that the investigation into Carry Guard remains valid.

Thus, supporters of gun regulation avoided a crushing defeat in Vullo; this case could have ended in a far more sweeping win for the NRA.

The holding of Sotomayors Vullo opinion is straightforward. Vullo was free to criticize the NRA and pursue the conceded violations of New York insurance law, the justice writes. But, she could not wield her power ... to threaten enforcement actions against DFS-regulated entities in order to punish or suppress the NRAs gun-promotion advocacy.

Thus, the Court draws a clear line between the legitimate investigations into Carry Guard and the other efforts to pressure companies to cut ties with the NRA because New Yorks leaders disapproved of the organizations gun rights advocacy.

As Sotomayor writes, this conclusion flows naturally from the Supreme Courts decision in Bantam Books v. Sullivan (1963), which involved a similar effort by a government agency to punish speakers the agency did not like.

Bantam Books concerned the Orwellianly named Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth, a state body that targeted books it deemed objectionable for sale, distribution or display to youths under 18 years of age. The commission sent letters to booksellers asking for their cooperation in removing such books, while also informing these sellers of their duty to recommend to the Attorney General prosecution of purveyors of obscenity.

In at least one case, the commission also sent a police officer to one book distributor it targeted, who asked what steps the distributor had taken to comply with the letter.

Though neither the letter nor the police officer made an explicit threat, such as remove these books or you will be arrested and face criminal charges, Bantam Books concluded that the implicit threat was clear enough, and it held that this sort of coercion violates the First Amendment.

The same logic applies in Vullo. As Sotomayor explains, [A]s DFS superintendent, Vullo had direct regulatory and enforcement authority over all insurance companies and financial service institutions doing business in New York. She had the power to bring civil charges and, as DFSs investigation into Carry Guard shows, to impose significant monetary penalties.

Backed by this authority, Vullo encouraged DFS-regulated entities to discontinu[e] their arrangements with the NRA, including arrangements that were entirely lawful.

Thats not allowed. As Sotomayor writes, Vullo is accused of threatening to wield her power against those refusing to aid her campaign to punish the NRAs gun-promotion advocacy. If those allegations are proven (the case is still at an early stage and has not yet received a full trial), Vullo violated the First Amendment.

Its worth noting that Sotomayors opinion is brief and fairly surgical. It makes clear that Vullos unconstitutional actions do not strip DFS of its authority to sanction legitimate violations of New York law, including the NRAs decision to essentially offer murder insurance.

But her opinion also reaffirms one of the most foundational principles in First Amendment law: Even despicable people have the right to free speech.

Youve read 1 article in the last month

Here at Vox, we believe in helping everyone understand our complicated world, so that we can all help to shape it. Our mission is to create clear, accessible journalism to empower understanding and action.

If you share our vision, please consider supporting our work by becoming a Vox Member. Your support ensures Vox a stable, independent source of funding to underpin our journalism. If you are not ready to become a Member, even small contributions are meaningful in supporting a sustainable model for journalism.

Thank you for being part of our community.

Swati Sharma

Vox Editor-in-Chief

We accept credit card, Apple Pay, and Google Pay. You can also contribute via

Read this article:
Why Justice Sotomayor just handed the NRA a big Supreme Court victory - Vox.com

John Stockton usually won on the court during his illustrious career with the Utah Jazz, but the Basketball Hall of Famers recordincourt took a hit last week when a judge dismissed his First Amendment lawsuit against Washington Attorney General Bob Ferguson and Washington Medical Commission executive director Kyle Karinen.

U.S. District Judge Thomas Riceruledthat Stocktons case, which he brought with two physicians and the Childrens Health Defense (a nonprofit chaired by presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr.), was meritless.

The group sued in March, seeking a judicial declaration that the commissions investigations into licensed medical professionals who publish disputed claims about COVID-19 violate the First Amendment and due process rights. Under Washington law, the commission is charged with regulating physicians to assure public confidence in the practice of medicine. It investigates allegations of misrepresentation, fraud, or dishonesty.

Stockton, 62, is not a medical professional and is not regulated by the commission. However, through podcasts and interviews, he has become a public voice on COVID-19. Stockton has criticized COVID-19 vaccines and objected to mask mandates. Stocktons refusal to wear a mask led his alma mater, Gonzaga University, to deny him entry to basketball games in 2022 on grounds he wouldnt follow a school policy.

A resident of Spokane, Stockton says he advocates for all Washingtonians who share his contention that people have the First Amendment right to hear the public soapbox speech of Washington licensed physicians who disagree with the mainstream Covid narrative. The NBAs all-time leader in assists and 10-time all-star argued the commissions prosecution of physicians for offering public opinions not in harmony with the commissions approved messaging amounts to governmental silencing of dissenting views.

Rice found several flaws inStockton et al. v. Ferguson & Karinen.

First, he reasoned the claims are unripe, meaning not yet appropriate for judicial review. The two doctors in the case have not (yet) been sanctioned by the commissionmeaning there is no penalty for the judge to assess.

Although Stockton insists the commissions investigation into physicians has a chilling effect on free speech and will dissuade many physicians from providing their candid opinions, Rice underscored that Stockton and the physicians continue to publicly champion their views. Their advocacy, Rice wrote, tends to cut against any argument speech has been actually chilled.

Rice also reasoned he must abstain from reviewing the claims. Under whats called the Younger Doctrine (from the 1971 U.S. Supreme Court caseYounger v. Harris), a federal court should refrain from considering demands for judicial declarations when there are ongoing state proceedings. The physicians who sued with Stockton are still under investigation by the commission.

The judge added that even if Stocktons lawsuit was ripe and not subject to abstention, it doesnt offer a plausible claim. Washington and other states, Rice stressed, have a long-recognized authority to regulate medical professionals and that authority does not run afoul of the First Amendment.Even if that regulation touches on speech, Rice stressed the First Amendment doesnt bar the states regulation of medicine and professions.

Stockton can appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Read the rest here:
John Stockton Loses Case Over Regulation of COVID Speech - Sportico

I thank Steve for his clarification below about his theory of why Trump might have a First Amendment defense in the New York case. As I understand it, Steve's argument can be understood as being about the phrase "another crime" in New York Penal Law 17.50:

A person is guilty of falsifying business records in the first degree when he commits the crime of falsifying business records in the second degree, and when his intent to defraud includes an intent to commit another crime or to aid or conceal the commission thereof.

Steve's argument is that the element of concealing the commission of "another crime" has to refer to an act that doesn't just satisfy the elements of a criminal statute, but that, interpreted independently, is a crime that satisfies independent First Amendment review. And so he argues that, if the jury identifies those elements of another criminal law as having been satisfied, that is not "another crime" if there would be a First Amendment defense to liability for those elements independently either under current law, or, if needed, on a better understanding of law as changed by the Supreme Court on appeal from Trump's conviction by overturning the Court's precedent.

This is an interesting argument, and I confess it is not what I thought Steve was arguing in his first post. So I certainly appreciate the clarification, and I apologize to Steve for the misunderstanding. One thought I have in response is that there's a pretty interesting interpretive question raised by Steve's argument. When the New York legislature uses the phrase "another crime" as part of an element, does "another crime" mean the elements of some other criminal law, or is "another crime" more of an independent constitutional concept meaning the elements of some other criminal law only to the extent that the elements could be a free-standing criminal offense without violating the Constitution?

I take it Steve believes the latter. That might be right. But I'm not entirely sure about that. Off the top of my head, I would think it's a question of statutory interpretation rather than the constitutional law of elements of crimes. Offenses have to satisfy the First Amendment as a whole, obviously, but I don't think there is a constitutional problem with a particular element of a crime involving First Amendment protected activities. For example, if a legislature says that it's a crime to punch someone during a protest, the fact that the protest is protected by the First Amendment doesn't mean that punching someone during a protest would be. If I'm right about that, then I would think this ends up an interesting question of statutory interpretation assuming that Steve is right about the First Amendment issue (either under current law or possible future law).

I poked around on Westlaw briefly to see if I could find New York cases on this question, but I didn't come across anything useful. It's a hard question to research, as the relevant terms end up bringing up a lot of unrelated cases. But thanks again to Steve for the clarification, and I'd be interested to know if others make more headway on the statutory question than I did.

View original post here:
More on the New York Trump Case and the First Amendment - Reason

As several members of Columbias leadership prepared to testify before acongressional committee on anti-Semitism on April 17, pro-Palestinian protesters erected a Gaza Solidarity Encampment setting up tents to camp out on the South Lawn of Columbias campus and demanding the university divest from Israel. After protesters refused several warnings to vacate, administratorscalled in New York City police on April 18 to clear out the encampment, which they did, arresting more than 100 protesters. But the following morning, protesters were back, this timesetting up camp on the West Lawn.

Their idea caught on. Similar encampments sprouted up oncampusesacross the country in the following days. Unlike traditional protests, in which participants usually gather with only their voices and/or signs, these encampments have been marked by students setting up tents and other structures, often with the stated intent to stay 24/7 until their institutions meet certain demands.

Student protesters have since erected encampments atmore than 100 colleges and universities nationwide as well asfive universities in the United Kingdom,seven in Australia, andat least two in Canada. While many have been peaceful, there have beeninstances of violence andthousands of arrests as college administrators summon local police to their campuses to clear out encampments.

Which begs the question: If public universities must honor students First Amendment right to peaceful protest, and most private campuses promise to provide near-identical protections, can these institutions ban peaceful encampments?

In short, yes.

While campus encampments are expressive conduct no one doubts protesters are sending messages here thats not the end of the story.

Even in spaces where protest rights are at their maximum public sidewalks, public parks, and open outdoor areas of public campuses the government, including public universities, can still enforce reasonabletime, place, and manner restrictions on when, where, and how people protest.

Institutions must be able to regulate on-campus expressive activity to ensure it doesnt interfere with their primary educational and scholarly missions.

These rules typically include limits on amplified sound, erecting structures, the number of people who can safely gather in a particular space, and, yes, bans on camping.

Time, place, and manner rules must becontent neutral, meaning theyre applied evenly regardless of the substance of the speech. They must also be narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, leave open ample alternative channels for communication, and be applied evenhandedly, not discriminating against particular viewpoints.

Restrictions on encampments and building occupations generally satisfy the criteria of a legitimate time, place, and manner regulation. While free expression and open inquiry key elements for the transmission and advancement of knowledge are values of paramount importance to a university, institutionsmust be able to regulate on-campus expressive activity to ensure it doesnt interfere with their primary educational and scholarly missions.

As Israel/Gaza campus protests spread nationwide, FIRE answers questions about students expressive rights.

Read More

Overnight encampments could createpublic safety risks andovertax campus security. They mayprevent other groups oncampus from using the space for a prolonged period. They couldobstruct access to campus facilities ordisrupt classes andother daily activities. All of these are legitimate reasons for universities to restrict encampments. Weve seen the result of these kinds of disruptions atColumbia,Tulane andUCLA, where the universities canceled classes or moved them online, or atRutgers, where the university postponed finals.

But universities power to regulate is not unlimited. Administrators cant target encampments because they dislike pro-Palestinian viewseven if some consider the expression anti-Semitic or otherwise offensive or hateful. Contrary to common misconceptions, that kind of speech is fully protected by the First Amendment unless italso constitutes conduct meeting the legal definition of a true threat, discriminatory harassment, incitement, or one of the few other, narrowly defined categories ofunprotected speech.

In practice, this means a protester on the quad, holding a sign reading Intifada or From the river to the sea is almost certainly engaging in protected speech. If that protester, however, hangs that sign on a tent theyve erected and which they refuse to vacate for days on end, the university can take steps to remove the encampment. Or, if that protester uses a sign (or anything else) to block a Jewish student from moving around campus, that could cross the line into discriminatory harassment and maybe even assault. In every situation, the facts are key to the First Amendment analysis.

Ultimately administrators may lawfully forbid encampments, overnight camping, and other similar actions on public and private campuses. But there are still plenty of ways to lawfully protest on campus. We encourage students to protest on issues theyre passionate about, within the bounds of laws that keep the free speech playing field safe and fair for everyone.

Check out FIREs guide to protest tolearn your rights so you are empowered to lawfully raise your voice.

FIRE defends the rights of students and faculty members no matter their views at public and private universities and colleges in the United States. If you are a student or a faculty member facing investigation or punishment for your speech,submit your case to FIRE today. If youre faculty member at a public college or university, call theFaculty Legal Defense Fund 24-hour hotline at 254-500-FLDF (3533). If youre a college journalist facing censorship or a media law question, call the Student Press Freedom Initiative 24-hour hotline at 717-734-SPFI (7734).

Continue reading here:
Campus encampment bans rarely violate the First Amendment. Here's why. - Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression