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HR6090, which passed the House of Representatives Wednesday by a 320-91 vote, would provide, in relevant part,

For purposes of this Act, the term "definition of antisemitism"

(1) means the definition of antisemitism adopted on May 26, 2016, by the IHRA [International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance], of which the United States is a member, which definition has been adopted by the Department of State; and

(2) includes the "[c]ontemporary examples of antisemitism" identified in the IHRA definition.

In reviewing, investigating, or deciding whether there has been a violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of race, color, or national origin, based on an individual's actual or perceived shared Jewish ancestry or Jewish ethnic characteristics, the Department of Education shall take into consideration the definition of antisemitism as part of the Department's assessment of whether the practice was motivated by antisemitic intent.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed

(1) to expand the authority of the Secretary of Education;

(2) to alter the standards pursuant to which the Department of Education makes a determination that harassing conduct amounts to actionable discrimination; or

(3) to diminish or infringe upon the rights protected under any other provision of law that is in effect as of the date of enactment of this Act.

(b)Constitutional Protections.Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish or infringe upon any right protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The IHRA examples state that "Contemporary examples of antisemitism in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to":

Calling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion.

Making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collectivesuch as, especially but not exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish conspiracy or of Jews controlling the media, economy, government or other societal institutions.

Accusing Jews as a people of being responsible for real or imagined wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish person or group, or even for acts committed by non-Jews.

Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms (e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish people at the hands of National Socialist Germany and its supporters and accomplices during World War II (the Holocaust).

Accusing the Jews as a people, or Israel as a state, of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust.

Accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations.

Denying the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor.

Applying double standards by requiring of it a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation.

Using the symbols and images associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to characterize Israel or Israelis.

Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.

Holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.

This, I think, has the potential to unconstitutionally suppress speech. Let me explain why.

[1.] To begin with, imagine that a Kamala Harris Administration backs and gets enacted the following hypothetical statute:

In reviewing, investigating, or deciding whether there has been a violation of title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on the basis of race, color, or national origin, based on an individual's actual or perceived shared Palestinian ancestry or Palestinian ethnic characteristics, the Department of Education shall take into consideration, as part of the Department's assessment of whether the practice was motivated by anti-Palestinian intent, that:

Contemporary examples of anti-Palestinian prejudice in public life, the media, schools, the workplace, and in the religious sphere could, taking into account the overall context, include, but are not limited to:

Denying the Palestinian people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that any Palestinian state would lead to terrorist attacks on Israel.

Applying double standards by requiring of Palestinians a behavior not expected or demanded of any other group that is waging an insurrection against an oppressive government.

Drawing comparisons of contemporary Palestinian policy and attitudes towards Jews to those of the Nazis.

Holding Palestinians collectively responsible for actions of Palestinian de facto governmental organizations.

Justifying the killing or harming of Palestinians in the name of protecting another nation's security, or on the theory that it is acceptable collateral damage in the other nation's defensive operations.

Now discrimination against Palestinian-Americans is indeed, like discrimination against Jews, likely already prohibited by Title VI as discrimination based on race or national origin, just as discrimination against Hispanics or Arab-Americans is already prohibited. But I take it that we'd be concerned that the following exampleseven if cast just as examples of what might be useful as evidence of discriminatory intentare likely to (and probably intended to) deter people from expressing their political views about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

To be sure, one can draw distinctions between the examples I give above and the examples in the IHRA Anti-Semitism statement endorsed by HR6090. For instance, some people argue that it's illegitimate to deny to Jews a right to have a nation of Israel, because it already does exist, but legitimate to deny the Palestinians a right to have a nation of Palestine, because it has not been officially recognized. (I'm quite skeptical of the view that official international recognition should make a difference for which arguments are legitimate, and especially for which arguments are protected by the First Amendment.) Or some might say that, in their experience, the view that Jews don't have a right to national self-determination is highly correlated with anti-Semitism but the view that Palestinians lack such a right is not highly correlated with anti-Palestinian prejudice.

But do you think it's likely that courts will indeed reliably accept such distinctions? Or do you think instead that, if HR6090 were passed and a court were to uphold it, would that decision be a powerful precedent in favor of the constitutionality of the hypothetical statute signed by President Harris?

[2.] More specifically, one problem with HR6090 (as well as the hypothetical proposed statute related to speech about Palestinians) is that speech has in recent years often been labeled discrimination, on the theory that certain statements create a "hostile environment" and therefore violate antidiscrimination rules. Under this theory, a rule that "Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis" is evidence of a Title VI violation means that a university could be punished under Title VI for allowing speech drawing such comparisons. Likewise, drawing such comparisons would violate campus speech codes that ban "discrimination" and "harassment."

As David Bernstein has pointed out, the problem here partly stems from the view that public comments by students, professors, and others can violate antidiscrimination law if they create a "hostile educational environment" based on race, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, and the like. Many courts have struck down campus speech codes framed in such terms, but the government and various universities have continued to assert that such speech restrictions are constitutional.

But HR6090, it seems to me, would exacerbate the problem by sweeping in anti-Israel speech (and not just overtly anti-Jewish speech) as potentially punishable "discrimination." Both anti-Israel speech and anti-Jewish speech are protected by the First Amendment (unless they fall within one of the narrow exception to First Amendment protection, such as for true threats). But broadening the unconstitutional restrictions is surely not a step forward.

Nor do I think that the provision that, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed to diminish or infringe upon any right protected under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States," helps much. The problem is that government officials often tend not to recognize that various speech, especially speech that is viewed as bigoted or "discriminatory," is protected by the First Amendment. HR6090, notwithstanding this proviso, tends to reinforce this attitude.

[3.] But say that HR6090, in its implementation, were limited to what one might think of as purely evidentiary uses of speeche.g., if someone has been attacked, or had his property vandalized, or has been excluded from some university program, or given a low grade, and the question is whether the action was motivated by his being Jewish. Let's set aside the possibility that, as some have argued, the creation or tolerance of a "hostile environment" would itself be treated by some as actionable conduct, even if the environment stems just from speech that doesn't fit within any of the narrow First Amendment exceptions. Let's focus instead on the purely evidentiary uses I just mentioned.

Even for such evidentiary uses, I think the bill would be dangerous and unconstitutional, as my hypothetical Harris Administration bill helps illuminate. Say that you are a professor who rejected a student's application to a graduate program. The student claims that the rejection stemmed from his or his parents' having been born in Gaza. (Assume he's an American citizen, so the claim is of discrimination based on national origin, and not based on current citizenship, which would raise more complicated problems.)

You argue that, no, you rejected him because you thought his past scholarly work wasn't strong enough. He responds that,

I think such an argument would be quite wrong, and dangerous to academic freedom. If the argument were accepted, it would sharply chill advocacy of various views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the government has no business doing that. And of course the same is true of HR6090.

Now I acknowledge that speech can be used as evidence of motive; indeed, sometimes it's the only such evidence. (See this post for more, including a discussion of some key Supreme Court cases on the subject.) Even in the absence of HR6090, if a professor publicly says "All Jews are scum and I hate working with them" or "all Palestinians are scum and I hate working with them," that could be evidence that a particular action by a professor with respect to a student was deliberate discrimination based on ethnicity. The same would be true if a student is being accused of punching a classmate or vandalizing the classmate's property based on the classmate's being Jewish or Palestinian.

But when there is such concrete evidence of ethnic hostility, HR6090 is unnecessary. HR6090 would make a difference only in cases where statements overtly expressing ethnic hostility are weak or even absent, and the evidence stemming from one's views on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict would then be brought in.

The closest analog in the Supreme Court precedents (not a perfect analog, but I think a helpful one) is the presumption struck down in Virginia v. Black (2003). There, the law banned cross-burning with the intent to intimidate; and some such cross-burning (e.g., burning a cross in front of a black family's house with the intent to make them fear that physical violence would be next) may indeed be punishable, when it falls within the First Amendment exception for true threats of violence. But the law also added,

Any such burning of a cross [including in any public place] shall be prima facie evidence of an intent to intimidate .

The Court held that this "prima facie evidence" provision violated the First Amendment, for reasons stated by Justice Souter (joined by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg), and agreed with by Justice O'Connor (joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Stevens and Breyer):

As I see the likely significance of the evidence provision, its primary effect is to skew jury deliberations toward conviction in cases where the evidence of intent to intimidate is relatively weak and arguably consistent with a solely ideological reason for burning. To understand how the provision may work, recall that the symbolic act of burning a cross, without more, is consistent with both intent to intimidate and intent to make an ideological statement free of any aim to threaten. One can tell the intimidating instance from the wholly ideological one only by reference to some further circumstance. In the real world, of course, and in real-world prosecutions, there will always be further circumstances, and the factfinder will always learn something more than the isolated fact of cross burning. Sometimes those circumstances will show an intent to intimidate, but sometimes they will be at least equivocal, as in cases where a white supremacist group burns a cross at an initiation ceremony or political rally visible to the public.

In such a case, the prima facie evidence provision will have the practical effect of tilting the jury's thinking in favor of the prosecution. [T]he provision will encourage a factfinder to err on the side of a finding of intent to intimidate when the evidence of circumstances fails to point with any clarity either to the criminal intent or to the permissible one. The provision will thus tend to draw nonthreatening ideological expression within the ambit of the prohibition of intimidating expression.

To the extent the prima facie evidence provision skews prosecutions, then, it skews the statute toward suppressing ideas. The question here is [whether] the statute's terms show that suppression of ideas may be afoot. And if we look at the provision for this purpose, it has a very obvious significance as a mechanism for bringing within the statute's prohibition some expression that is doubtfully threatening though certainly distasteful.

I think the same reasoning applies here. If a university responding to a student complaint, or the Department of Education Office for Civil Rights determining whether a university's response was inadequate, sees the usual sorts of evidence that would normally prove discriminatory motivation (e.g., "I hate Jews"), it can certainly rely on that evidence.

But HR6090, by pointing to the IHRA definition and its list of specific political statements as potential evidence, "skew[s] [the decisionmaker's] deliberations toward [a finding of forbidden behavior] in cases where the evidence of [anti-Semitism] is relatively weak." It "tilt[s] the [decisionmaker's] thinking in favor of [a finding of guilt]" simply based on a professor's or student's expression of political views about Israel (or, in my hypothetical, about Palestinian organizations). If "[t]he question" is whether "[HR6090's] terms show that suppression of ideas may be afoot," those terms have "a very obvious significance as a mechanism for bringing within [Title VI's] prohibition some expression that is doubtfully [evidence of discrimination]."

[* * *]

On the merits of the Israeli-Palestinian controversies, I generally support Israel; and I don't always support arguments that various attempts to protect Israel or Israelis from discrimination violate the First Amendmentconsider, for instance, my amicus briefs (e.g., this one), filed on behalf of Prof. Michael Dorf, Prof. Andy Koppelman, and myself, arguing that various state anti-BDS statutes do not violate the First Amendment. (My position there is that actual refusal to deal with Israel and Israelis are not protected speech, even if they are politically motivated, just as refusal to deal with Muslims or Christians are not protected speech.)

But here it seems to me (as I've argued before as to similar proposals) that HR6090 really does risk suppressing not just discriminatory conduct but speechspeech that I generally disagree with, but speech that is fully constitutionally protected.

The bill cites President Trump's Executive Order on Combating Anti-Semitism, and is largely based on that; for a post about that Order, from which much of this post is drawn, see here. Likewise, for a post criticizing a 2018 Department of Education decision that took a similar view to HR6090 and the Executive Order, see here.

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"Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2023" (Which Just Passed the House) Could Suppress First-Amendment-Protected ... - Reason

Follow our live coverage of the college protests at U.C.L.A. and other universities.

Protesters on college campuses have often cited the First Amendment as shelter for their tactics, whether they were simply waving signs or taking more dramatic steps, like setting up encampments, occupying buildings or chanting slogans that critics say are antisemitic.

But many legal scholars, along with university lawyers and administrators, believe at least some of those free-speech assertions muddle, misstate, test or even flout the amendment, which is meant to guard against state suppression.

Whose interpretation and principles prevail, whether in the courts or among the administrators in charge of meting out discipline, will do much to determine whether protesters face punishments for campus turmoil.

Public universities, as arms of government, must yield to the First Amendment and how the courts interpret its decree that there shall be no law abridging the freedom of speech or the right of the people peaceably to assemble.

But private universities set their own standards around speech and protest.

To be sure, private universities tend to embrace free expression more than, say, private businesses. Those policies and approaches, though, are driven by principles like academic freedom and the marketplace of ideas, not constitutional law.

Columbia University, a hub through this round of campus protests and the scene of an enormous police response on Tuesday night, has not forbidden all speech. But its current policy includes a set of rules, such as permissible demonstration zones and preregistration of protests, that the university says are intended to ensure safety while promising that all members of the university community have the right to speak, study, research, teach and express their own views.

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What the First Amendment Means for Campus Protests - The New York Times

MILWAUKEE The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) of Wisconsin released a statement ahead of protests planned at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee and the University of Wisconsin-Madison this week.

ACLU of WI Executive Director Dr. Melinda Q. Brennan said:

Over the last several weeks, thousands of college students from across the country have taken to the streets to engage in protected political speech. Rather than safeguard their students right to peacefully assemble, many colleges and universities have responded to these protests with overwhelming force, quickly calling on police to break up lawful protests while using other intimidation tactics to chill dissent. As a result, students, faculty, and staff have been tear-gassed, pepper sprayed, shot with rubber bullets, arrested en masse, and subjected to police abuse.

As anti-war protests spread to campuses in Wisconsin, university administrators are left with a choice one that will determine which side of history they will be on. They can stay true to the Wisconsin Idea the founding principle of our state university system which holds that college campuses must serve as incubators for self-discovery and empower students to critically examine, understand, and interact with the world around them. Or they can, regrettably, decide to follow the path of other universities that have succumbed to political pressure, betraying and punishing their students, faculty, and staff for peacefully exercising their right to dissent.

In Wisconsin, where we believe education is a public good and builds up our communities, our futures, and the next generation of leaders, we cannot betray our history as leaders and defenders of learning. Freedom of speech and peaceful assembly must not be undermined in places of learning and discovery. The next few hours, days, and weeks will reveal whether the Wisconsin Idea still lives and if free speech and First Amendment protections for all of us are valued.

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ACLU of Wisconsin Emphasizes the Importance Of Student's First Amendment Rights Ahead of Protests Planned at UW ... - ACLU of Wisconsin

Since last Wednesday night, Indiana University officials have betrayed fundamental free speech principles in their response to pro-Palestinian protests on the IU Bloomington campus. In response, students, faculty, and the Bloomington community are calling for university officials to return to the universitys unwavering support of free speech. The ACLU of Indiana urges President Whitten and Provost Shrivastav to listen to these voices, make meaningful changes to current practice regarding protests, and remedy the harms they have caused.

In response to news that a pro-Palestinian protest would be held in Dunn Meadow on the IU Bloomington campus, a tiny committee of university officials changed a decades-old policy the night before the protest was scheduled. The university then met a peaceful protest that violated this updated policy with aggressive law enforcement action leading toas of Sunday night56 arrests. Arrested protesters, including many current students, were then subjected to grossly disproportionate one-year bans from campus. Given these events, it is extremely difficult to interpret the universitys actions as anything other than an objection to the message of the pro-Palestinian protesters.

The Presidents and Provosts actions are creating an unnecessary crisis of values at a public institution that has weathered many larger, more disruptive protests with grace and dignity for more than fifty years. The administrations actions have caused significant harm to the protesters, the campus community, and free speech in Indiana.

Fortunately, many people have stepped up and spoken out in support of free speech principles. People from a variety of political backgrounds and views have unified behind calls for arrests of peaceful protesters to end, trespassing charges against protesters to be dropped, campus bans against those arrested to be rescinded, and the change in policy for protests on campus to be voided. The ACLU of Indiana strongly supports these demands.

Assaults on protected political speech degrade the educational environment and damage a universitys reputation, and they complicate universities responsibility to protect all people on their campuses from targeted threats, harassment, and intimidation. There is no doubt that antisemitism and Islamaphobia have been on the rise since last October 7th. However, when public university officials infringe on protected speech, it blurs the line between what is lawful, and makes it more difficult for universities to focus on any individuals on campus who are violating university policy by harassing others.

Public higher education officials serve a vital role in protecting free speech on their campuses and in their states and the larger Bloomington community is calling on the President and Provost to faithfully fulfill that role. We know that officials at Indiana University, like at other higher education institutions around the country, are under enormous pressure from elected officials to crack down on pro-Palestinian student groups, rallies, demonstrations, and protests. Complicating matters further, this pressure is framed as a response to antisemitism. This has led some higher education officials to conflate protected political speech that is sometimes controversial with unlawful harassment of individual students, faculty, and staff. Officials must exercise extreme caution to distinguish between the two.

The ACLU of Indiana will be closely monitoring the situation going forward for any violations of the First Amendment. If you are participating in a protest and you believe your constitutional rights have been violated, fill out our online legal intake form.

Read more from the original source:
Indiana University Officials Need to Follow Community's Lead on Commitment to First Amendment - ACLU of Indiana

The Supreme Courts decision inCitizens United v. Federal Election Commission(2010) continues to stoke controversy more than 14 years after it was decided. It even got ashout-out in the critically-acclaimed Barbie movie. Are corporations people? Is money speech? Whats the First Amendment got to do with this?

For anyone interested in free speech, election laws, campaign finance, or money in politics, providing accurate answers to these questions is crucial. Lets dive in.

Lets begin by noting that there are lots of ways that money is involved in politics, including donations to candidates, political parties, and political action committees (PACS), as well as funds spent on lobbying and issue ads not mentioning a candidate. This isnot whatCitizens United was about. These common political activities can greatly influence elections and are subject to their own rules, but those rules were not before the Court here.

The key rule before the court was theBipartisan Campaign Reform Act, passed in 2002 to address the proliferation of corporate money in federal elections. Like most divas, BCRA is a lot, with a rich backstory of campaign finance rules and corresponding lawsuits, but were concerned here only with its ban on corporations spending money on media about political candidates close to an election. Specifically, BCRA banned:

For example, BCRA would have banned a nonprofit corporation from spending money on billboards promoting Donald Trump, the Republican Party nominee, in October before a November 4 general election.

Lets also be clear that corporations include not just Fortune 500 companies, but also labor unions, mom-and-pop shops, newspapers, nonprofit organizations, advocacy groups, and a vast array of financial and nonfinancial entities. Everything from the ACLU, the NRA, Tesla, Apple, the New York Times, to even your favorite cafe, bar, restaurant, or gym is likely corporate. Because of the substantial financial benefits incorporation provides, most of Americas most beloved (and hated) organizations are corporations subject to BCRA.

In the runup to the 2008 Democratic Party primary election between Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, the conservative nonprofit group Citizens United sought to air Hillary: The Movie, a political documentary about Clinton. One reviewdescribes it as boldly negative, attorney and journalist Dahlia Lithwickcalled it virulently anti-Clinton, and Justice Breyerdescribed it as not a musical comedy. (So, its got that going for it.)

Yet BCRA prevented Citizens United from distributing the film in the heat of this campaign because the movie was (1) corporate-funded (2) political material (3) naming a specific candidate (4) within 30 days of a primary election. Cue the federal lawsuit that wound its way up the Supreme Court in 2010.

In a 5-4 decision, the Court struck down BCRAs ban because it violated the fundamental First Amendment right to engage in political speech. The Court held that people do not lose their speech rights because they decide to form a corporation; that the First Amendment prohibits discriminating against classes of speakers; that the BCRA discriminated against one type of speaker, corporations; and that a restraint on spending for communication is, in fact, a restraint on speech.

Atoral argument, the justices made hay of BCRAs grave potential to censor a wide array of political speech. Anything from books and news articles to billboards and movies could violate the act, even if they contain just a single line naming a candidate. In explaining how BCRA restricts everything from environmental groups supporting pro-green candidates to the NRA condemning politicians pushing gun control, the Court decried these classic examples of censorship.

The first pillar of themajority decision is that the First Amendment prohibits the government from discriminating based on a speakers identity. The government cannot ban speech merely because speakers are corporations, especially given that they contribute to the discussion, debate, and the dissemination of information and ideas that the First Amendment seeks to foster. This bedrock principle supplements the First Amendments protection for offensive speech by ensuring diverse and controversial speakers can participate in our democracy.

From Buckley v. Valeo (1976) to Citizens United v. FEC (2010), legal disputes over the constitutionality of campaign finance laws have captured the publics attention for decades.

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Corporations are not literally people, of course, but they are made up of people. They are one way that people collectively organize themselves: Labor unions, advocacy groups, nonprofits, newspapers, small businesses and, yes, other corporations have free speech rights. This is not exactly a novel concept. Fordecades beforeCitizens United, courts have consistently struck down rules squelching corporate speech. The key takeaway is the government cannot say that free speech rights differ based on the form of an entity people have chosen to form. (We do have a vested interest in this outcome FIRE is a nonprofit corporation that uses its speech rights to speak up for the rights of others.)

The Court explained how a ban on corporate expenditures is a ban on speech. Thislong-established First Amendment principle prevents the government from repress[ing] speech by silencing certain voices at any of the various points in the speech process. Unless your advocacy consists entirely of shouting at strangers in the middle of the street, you need money to amplify your words. Pens and pencils, printers and paper, computers and connection to the internet all cost money. Just imagine the potential for censorship if the state could restrict purchasing goods and services to broadcast your message. Any spending limit necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.

BCRA, like many campaign finance laws, furthers the goal of addressing the appearance of corruption and, according to the government, the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the publics support for the corporations political ideas. But is this interest enough to justify BCRA?

When a law burdens political speech, courts generally applystrict scrutiny to evaluate whether it is constitutional under the First Amendment, which requires assessing whether it is narrowly tailored to a compelling government interest. In other words, does the law advance its goals without burdening protected speech any more than is necessary?

The First Amendment doesnt tolerate burdens on core political speech based on mere speculation of potential corruption.

Much of campaign finance regulation rests on dispelling corruption. If Americans believe their elections are bought and paid for, why vote? Why participate at all? This is why corporate donations to candidates remain largely banned. But this interest becomes too attenuated when it comes to any communication that merelymentions a candidate. And, on a fundamental level: Favoritism and influence are not . . . avoidable in representative politics. It is in the nature of an elected representative to favor certain policies, and, by necessary corollary, to favor the voters and contributors who support those policies. Some level of connection between expression and politics, and the responsiveness it creates, is a function of democracy.

The Court also rejected the notion that the immense wealth of corporations justifies BCRA. Restricting speech in these industries would muffle the voices that best represent the most significant segments of the economy. Additionally, this interest doesnt justify a ban onallcorporations, including those without massive wealth, such as small newspapers. Even if the target is wealthy companies, the First Amendment does not tolerate laws censoring media corporations.

Because of the decision, corporations can spend to their hearts desire on independent expenditures close to an election. There are still restrictions on donations, lobbying, issue ads, fundraisers, endorsements, and tons of other forms of advocacy contact your friendly neighborhood campaign finance attorney for more information on that. States also havedifferent rules for their elections as BCRA mostly only affects federal elections.

And if you disagree with the decision, we encourage you to read the dissent, which does an excellent job of breaking down the majoritys rationales. The four dissenting justices decried the corrupting effect of corporations ability to spend unrestricted sums on elections, claiming this can cause cynicism and disenchantment and an increased perception that large spenders call the tune and a reduced willingness of voters to take part in democratic governance. However, as the majority pointed out, BCRA doesnt even affect the most common forms of money in politics, such as donations, lobbying, issues ads, and independent expenditures outside of election season. The First Amendment doesnt tolerate burdens on core political speech based on mere speculation of potential corruption.

For more on the decision, its merits, and its impact, seeSCOTUSblog for the case materials and a collection of political commentary.

FIRE defends the rights of students and faculty members no matter their views at public and private universities and colleges in the United States. If you are a student or a faculty member facing investigation or punishment for your speech,submit your case to FIRE today. If youre a faculty member at a public college or university, call theFaculty Legal Defense Fund 24-hour hotline at 254-500-FLDF (3533). If youre a college journalist facing censorship or a media law question, call the Student Press Freedom Initiative 24-hour hotline at 717-734-SPFI (7734).

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Citizens United, campaign finance, and the First Amendment - Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression