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The Supreme Judicial Court ruled today that prosecutors can use license-plate data from cameras mounted on both Cape bridges to make their case against an alleged heroin dealer who was nabbed in part because the data showed he was making frequent trips on and off the Cape - and alerted Barnstable police to the specific trip he made that led to his arrest.

The state's highest court spent much of its decision today considering the privacy implications of automated license-plate readers and said that at some point, it may have to consider limits on the type and use of data collected from devices, which are now found along the Massachusetts Turnpike and on other roads in the state.

But for now, the court said, Barnstable police did nothing wrong in going through data collected from four cameras mounted on the Bourne and Sagamore bridges to monitor, without a warrant, the comings and goings of a man they were already investigating as a heroin supplier in 2017. On Feb. 22 of that year, one of the cameras pinged Barnstable police the car was coming on-Cape and officers set out to follow it - and ultimately arrested its driver after they watched him meet with a suspected buyer.

The court said it would continue to use a particular legal theory, known as the "mosaic theory" for figuring out how much information is too much in a world where modern technology makes data collection incredibly easy even as we continue to have constitutional privacy rights under the Fourth Amendment and the similar section of the state constitution. Simply put, the theory compares data to colored stones: One stone by itself, seen close up, would not tell much of a story, but an observer who stands back could view a design, or mosaic, based on its positioning with multiple other stones.

The court said that a large enough network of license-plate readers could provide such a "mosaic" view of somebody's comings and goings that, when used by police, would constitute an unwarranted privacy invasion, an unconstitutional "search:"

A network of ALPRs that surveils every residential side street paints a much more nuanced and invasive picture of a driver's life and public movements than one limited to major highways that open into innumerable possible destinations. ...

Similarly, with cameras in enough locations, the hot list feature [which lets police get notified when a particular plate passes a particular location] could implicate constitutional search protections by invading a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's real-time location. If deployed widely enough, ALPRs could tell police someone's precise, real-time location virtually any time the person decided to drive, thus making ALPRs the vehicular equivalent of a cellular telephone "ping." See Almonor, 482 Mass. at 55 (Lenk, J., concurring) ("When police act on realtime information by arriving at a person's location, they signal to both the individual and his or her associates that the person is being watched. . . . To know that the government can find you, anywhere, at any time is -- in a word -- 'creepy'"). Of course, no matter how widely ALPRs are deployed, the exigency exception to the warrant requirement would apply to this hot list feature.

Finally, like carrying a cellular telephone, driving is an indispensable part of modern life, one we cannot and do not expect residents to forgo in order to avoid government surveillance.

But the case at issue is not such a case, and so the court said now is not the time to try to codify just how pervasive a network of plate readers has to be to be unconstitutional.

The cameras in question here gave police only the ability to determine whether the defendant was passing onto or off of the Cape at a particular moment, and when he had done so previously. This limited surveillance does not allow the Commonwealth to monitor the whole of the defendant's public movements, or even his progress on a single journey. These particular cameras make this case perhaps more analogous to [cell-phone location data], if there were only two cellular telephone towers collecting data. Such a limited picture does not divulge "the whole of [the defendant's] physical movements," Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, or track enough of his comings and goings so as to reveal "the privacies of life." Id., quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 403. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

While we cannot say precisely how detailed a picture of the defendant's movements must be revealed to invoke constitutional protections, it is not that produced by four cameras at fixed locations on the ends of two bridges. Therefore, we conclude that the limited use of ALPRs in this case does not constitute a search within the meaning of either art. 14 or the Fourth Amendment.

In a footnote, the court did allow as how its decision today not to establish a "brightline" rule on plate-reading pervasiveness could lead to some confusion - if four readers aren't enough to trigger constitutional issues, what is the limit?

We trust, however, that as our cases develop, this constitutional line gradually and appropriately will come into focus.

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Court warns against all encompassing surveillance networks, but says for now, it's legal for the state to keep records of every vehicle that crosses...

Recent weeks have been rough, with droves of people turning to virtual communication for sensitive conversations theyd like to keep private medical visits, seeing friends faces and hearing their voices, or solace for those whove lost loved ones.

Understandably, the end-to-end (E2E) encrypted messaging app Signal has been signing up new users at unprecedented rates and flipping the switch on servers faster than we ever anticipated, Signals Joshua Lund said last week.

and you can say goodbye to any of that staying stateside if the EARN IT Act passes.

Signal claims that legal and liability concerns would make it impossible to operate in the US. That doesnt mean it would shut up shop entirely, but it could mean that the non-profit would need to move operations now based in the US.

Called the Eliminating Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act (EARN IT Act), the bill was introduced last month. If it passes, EARN IT would require tech companies to meet safety requirements for children online before obtaining immunity from lawsuits. You can read the discussion draft here.

To kill that immunity, the bill would undercut Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) from certain apps and companies so that they could be held responsible for user-uploaded content. Section 230, considered the most important law protecting free speech online, states that websites arent liable for user-submitted content.

The proposed legislations details havent been ironed out yet, but at this early point, the bills intent to water down Section 230 turns that protection into a hypocritical bargaining chip, Lund wrote on Signals blog.

At a high level, what the bill proposes is a system where companies have to earn Section 230 protection by following a set of designed-by-committee best practices that are extraordinarily unlikely to allow end-to-end encryption. Anyone who doesnt comply with these recommendations will lose their Section 230 protection.

Maybe some of the tech behemoths could swing the potentially huge financial risk that would come with slews of lawsuits as they suddenly become responsible for whatever random things their users say, but not Signal, Lund said.

It would not be possible for a small nonprofit like Signal to continue to operate within the United States. Tech companies and organizations may be forced to relocate, and new startups may choose to begin in other countries instead.

Its bizarre that a government thats reliant on secure, private messaging would even contemplate gutting E2E encryption, Lund said. In February, the European Commission endorsed the messaging app, telling staff to switch to Signal for encrypted messaging. Lund listed other military and government endorsements, calling the proposed legislation troubling and confusing:

For a political body that devotes a lot of attention to national security, the implicit threat of revoking Section 230 protection from organizations that implement end-to-end encryption is both troubling and confusing. Signal is recommended* by the United States military. It is routinely used by senators and their staff. American allies in the EU Commission are Signal users too. End-to-end encryption is fundamental to the safety, security, and privacy of conversations worldwide.

*The US Military also recommends Wickr for encrypted messaging: both it and Signal feature auto-delete functions that erase messages after a set period of time.

The bills backers claim that theyre not targeting encryption. Rather, as with other attempts to legally enforce encryption backdoors, theyre claiming that their real goal is to get companies to accept responsibility for the enabling of online child sexual abuse.

But as has been explained by Riana Pfefferkorn, Associate Director of Surveillance and Cybersecurity at The Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law, the bill doesnt have any tools to actually stop online child abuse. Furthermore, if it passes, it would actually make it much harder to prosecute pedophiles, she says.

As it now stands, online providers proactively, and voluntarily, scan for child abuse images by comparing their hash values to known abusive content.

Apple does it with iCloud content, Facebook has used hashing to stop millions of nude childrens images, and Google released a free artificial intelligence tool to help stamp out abusive material, among other voluntary efforts by major online platforms.

The key word is voluntarily, Pfefferkorn says. Those platforms are all private companies, as opposed to government agencies, which are required by Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search to get warrants before they rifle through our digital content, including email, chat discussions and cloud storage.

The reason that private companies like Facebook can, and do, do exactly that is that they are not the government, theyre private actors, so the Fourth Amendment doesnt apply to them.

Turning the private companies that provide those communications into agents of the state would, ironically, result in courts suppression of evidence of the child sexual exploitation crimes targeted by the bill, she said.

Pfefferkorn has also pointed out that the bill would give unprecedented power to Attorney General William Barr, a vocal critic of end-to-end encryption, who would become the arbiter of any recommendations from the best practices commission that the EARN IT bill would create.

The best practices approach came after pushback over the bills predicted effects on privacy and free speech. The best practices would be subject to approval or veto by Barr, who has issued a public call for backdoors; the Secretary of Homeland Security (ditto); and the Chair of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC).

Basically, those wolves are going to eat smaller encryption providers alive, Lund said:

It is as though the Big Bad Wolf, after years of unsuccessfully trying to blow the brick house down, has instead introduced a legal framework that allows him to hold the three little pigs criminally responsible for being delicious and destroy the house anyway. When he is asked about this behavior, the Big Bad Wolf can credibly claim that nothing in the bill mentions huffing or puffing or the application of forceful breath to a brick-based domicile at all, but the end goal is still pretty clear to any outside observer.

Last month, Sen. Ron Wyden, who introduced the CDAs Section 230, said that the disastrous legislation is a Trojan horse that will give President Trump and Attorney General Barr the power to control online speech and require government access to every aspect of Americans lives.

The EARN IT Act is only the latest of many attempts to inject an encryption backdoor that the US government and law enforcement agencies have been trying to inflict for years.

Digital rights advocates say that the proposed act could harm free speech and data security, and Sophos concurs. For years, weve said #nobackdoors, agreeing with the Information Technology Industry Council that Weakening security with the aim of advancing security simply does not make sense.

The EARN IT Act is still working its way through Congress, not having seen a vote in either the House nor Senate.

Theres still time to stop it, Lund said. To reach out to elected officials, you can look up contact information on The Electronic Frontier Foundations Action Center.

See the rest here:
Signal: Well be eaten alive by EARN IT Acts anti-encryption wolves - Naked Security

The COVID-19 outbreak has made one thing clear: we are a nation that is quickly forgetting how to be free. How many people, in the face of economic panic, have knelt before our elected officials and financial authorities, yearning to be led out of this crisis and made secure in their livelihoods? How many people have taken comfort in the small amount of safety that comes from knowing that millions are not allowed to go to work and support their families, or leave their homes for anything other than what the government deems necessary?

How many have taken comfort in knowing that the police, in complete violation of the fourth amendment, are conducting unwarranted searches for civilians not following quarantine mandates? How many have gained a sense of peace in the idea of forced checkpoints and the governments ability to dictate what companies ought to produce? How many people have taken comfort in their measly share of the $2 trillion stimulus package, which was financed from their own income and savings in the first place? And how many people have marveled at the governments power to indefinitely shut down the economy and bring millions of lives to a halt?

It appears we live in a nation of people who have chosen to dismiss, or are blissfully ignorant of, the wealth of historical evidenceexpertly documented in Robert Higgs's Crisis and Leviathanwhich lays bare the state's tradition of arrogating unwarranted powers during crises and emergencies, powers that never fully recede from its arsenal of economic and political manipulation once the crisis subsides. Higgs described this pattern as the ratchet effect and documented its unfolding throughout critical events of the 20th centurymost notably the Great Depression and both World Wars.

In each crisis, the government assumed incredible powers to manipulate both the economy and the court of public opinion. For example, World War I alone saw the initiation of the War Industries Board, the War Labor Board, the Espionage Act, the Food Administration, the Fuel Administration, the Railroad Administration, and many others. The War Industries Board and War Labor Board, for example, represented one of the most invasive economic planning attempts by our government to date. And the Espionage Act, created to prohibit interference with military operations, military recruitment, and punish enemy support, was also used to silence opponents of the draft and those who exercised their right to speak out against American involvement in the war.

After the war ended, every bureaucratic creation mentioned above was formally scrapped, except for the Espionage Act, which remains on the governments books to this very day. This is but one example of Higgss ratchet effect where not every power assumed by the government during an emergency is fully relinquished after the emergency subsides.

Even today our president has invoked the Defense Production Actestablished during the Korean War in 1950!to force private manufacturers to produce medical equipment in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. This invocation, along with the slew of social distancing mandates and forced closures of non-essential businesses, constitute part of the ratcheting up of government powers triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Only time will tell how many of these unprecedented powers the government will actually relinquish, but so far it has enjoyed zero pushback on behalf of the public.

Maybe we simply can't conceive of our public servants and their "experts" as being capable of wreaking nationwide political and economic destruction, especially when tasked with the delicate responsibility of keeping 320 million people safe from infection. "This is the United States," we say, "our dear leaders won't let things get that bad!"

But the question of whether or not private citizens are permitted to keep their "non-essential" businesses open, go to work, or attend church isn't even up for debate. We can only hope that the government will continue to permit us to do certain things, and then shrug our shoulders with mumbles of "Well, that's the price we have to pay" as more of our freedoms slowly come under siege. In the meantime, we are to do as our elected officials and their experts have told us, because our unquestioned obedience is necessary to secure our safety.

Many are likely to believe that private citizens are too greedy, irrational, or unpredictable to handle this pandemic on their own; and because of this, we need elected officials and their experts to help us grasp the importance of staying home and socially distancing ourselves to prevent the spread of infection. Others are probably asking the question, "How could any group of private actors possibly devise a more efficient and effective solution for the COVID-19 pandemic than our wise experts in the government?"

Well, in light of the fact that we live in a nation whose private enterprises have solved countless problems to catapult living standards to the highest degree ever attained in all of human history, and have given us just about every modern technological advancement and luxury that we'd go crazy to live without, Id say its possible, wouldnt you?

Sadly, as is the pattern with every national crisis, the fallout of our nation's economic and political decline will be met with cries for more government intervention into an economy whose impending recession only stands to be accelerated by this virus.

No doubt there will also be cries for additional regulation on behalf of the institutions whose laws have hindered the resourcefulness and productivity of the market's response to this crisis.

Perhaps most important will be the neglect of the biggest culprit behind our economy's poor health, the Federal Reserve: the most unaccountable, most influential, and therefore the most dangerous financial institution in the United States. Directed by its presidentially appointed Chairman, the monetary operations of the Federal Reserve stand completely removed from any trace of democratic accountability.

Adding insult to injury, very few people care to understand the deep interconnectedness between the Federal Reserve, the big banks, and the United States Treasury. The Federal Reserve enjoys a totally unbridled monopoly on interest rate manipulation and determination of the money supply.

Fortunately, the Austrian School of economists has correctly focused blame for the Great Depression, the Dot Com crash at the turn of the 21st century, and the housing crisis of 2008 and 2009 on the Federal Reserve and its manipulation of interest rates and generation of abundantly cheap credit.

It was also the Austrian economists who predicted these recessions, giving immense credibility to their teachings on the business cycle, which are more valuable now than ever. Our understanding of the coming recession will be key in determining whether or not more restraints and regulations will creep their way into our everyday lives.

Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve, by continuing to engage in the same type of monetary policy that has weakened our economy leading up to the COVID-19 outbreak, has set the stage for a tremendous recession, a recession that will impoverish far more individuals than have been hurt by our economy's shutdown, and to a much greater extent.

If the pattern holds, we can expect a vast majority of people, when severe recession settles in, to turn to the Federal Reserve and other state officials for economic salvation.

As Larry Reed pointed out, our nation's true test is yet to come. When the crisis is over, we will be able to fully assess, Reed notes, the extent of the measures taken to combat the virus; we will gain a much clearer picture of just how far the government overstepped its supposed bounds.

Until then we should ever be on guard against the governments arrogation of unwarranted powers, especially in light of what history shows the state is capable of doing in times of emergency. Once certain freedoms have been forfeited, that forfeiture will always serve as the precedent for future power grabs.

We have already given up the freedom to work and provide for our families, the right to avoid inspection without the presumption of having committed a crime, the right to go to church, and the right to travel at certain hours and to certain locations without the threat of facing arrest and/or imprisonment. We have allowed the government to determine whose livelihoods are "essential" and whose are "non-essential", and we will sooner look to the government to resolve the fallout of the economic destruction for which it ought to be held responsible.

Excerpt from:
Confronting the Leviathan of the COVID-19 Crisis - Foundation for Economic Education

There are few silver bullets in life, and pandemic control is no exception. But contact tracing may join social distancing, therapeutics, and the eventual vaccine to interdict the coronavirus and mitigate its impacts. There may be privacy-protective ways to do it. The American can-do spirit, our pro-technology outlook, and our fierce belief in rights may make contact tracing part of a balanced and effective pandemic control system. The Apple/Google contact tracing program looks good. Rewarding users of it may make it great.

For a time, the experiences of Singapore and South Korea seemed to make contact tracing the top response to coronavirus. Both were lucky enough early enough to use testing and contact tracing effectively. South Korea had the benefit, such as it is, of a super-spreader who provided something like one-stop shopping for tracing down exposed people. Singapore has seen mixed success over time, as it reported a new record number of cases this week.

The United States had cases pouring in from both Asia and Europe before anyone in a position to do something about them realized the need. And the US was distinctly poor on getting testing underway.

So its probably too late for contact tracing to work in the US as it did in the smaller, faster-acting countries. So said Steve Davies, Head of Education at the Institute for Economic Affairs in a recent Bruno Leoni Institute webinar, which is even more interesting for the broader historical view of pandemics he provides. My AEI colleague Scott Gottlieb was co-author of a paper out last week dismissing app-based contract tracing, saying cell phone-based apps recording proximity events between individuals are unlikely to have adequate discriminating ability or adoption to achieve public health utility, while introducing serious privacy, security, and logistical concerns.

But we do have a can-do, pro-tech attitude around here. Apple and Google have joined together to produce a system that can alert people of exposure to coronavirus in a way that sharply reduces their risk of exposure to general surveillance.

The technical specifications are too inscrutable to translate into English with precision (or for me to calculate privacy consequences down to the last). But the basic idea is that phones would discover each other using Bluetooth and share randomized codes representing the encounter. Such codes would not include information about who held the phone or where the phone was, simply that the two phones met. If the owner of one of the phones received a positive coronavirus diagnosis afterward, he or she could instruct an app on the phone to relay codes from the relevant time period to a server that would in turn share them with all phones in that part of the world. The information would be meaningless to all but the phones that recognized the encoded earlier meeting. Thus, people would be alerted to past contact with someone that was later diagnosed with coronavirus.

On Monday, Axios reported that the system will allowhealth authorities to provide users proof of a diagnosis. Passed along, such proofswouldcontrol whether the broadcast server distributes codes. Thats essential because false alerts could burden the system and bury public confidence.

For a system like this to provide significant benefits, it must see widespread use. A diagnosis confirmationcode could help with that. Let entry of that code and sharing of contact data with the diagnosis server qualify the holder of the phone for a payout (once only) of a few hundred dollars. People would be spurred to use the app by the prospect of a cash bonus at a time when we know they would need it.

Much discussion of contact tracing has turned on whether acute data surveillance for public health purposes squares with the Fourth Amendment. The touchstone, of course, is whether its reasonable to seize and search peoples data to get a certain increment of information about the spread of disease. Thats essentially impossible to know when we know so little about contagiousness, fatality rates, immunity, and so on.

Buying data in the way Ive suggested here would elidethose impossible questions. Or, perhaps it would answer them by gatheringinductively what is a reasonable inducement to share information. In any event,it would provide support for victims of the coronavirus. It turns out there aresilver bullets after all.

Continue reading here:
Fighting the COVID-19 pandemic with Big Tech, apps, and money - American Enterprise Institute

A federal appeals court ruled yesterday that Boston police officers did nothing wrong when they walked through an open door into a boisterous party at East 6th and O streets on St. Patrick's Day in 2013 in response to a noise complaint - and wound up arresting several partygoers after a shoving match broke out.

The decision overturns a lower-court ruling that Boston police officers Harry Jean, Keith Kaplan and Daran Edwards, who initially walked into Christopher Castagna's apartment should not have done so - and means the Castagna and his brother Gavin won't get the settlement ordered by that judge: $1.

At issue was whether three officers - the Castagnas initially sued some 20 officers, but the suits against most were dismissed - should have just walked into Christopher Castagna's apartment without a warrant or his permission after responding to a noise complaint, spotting one seemingly underage lad come outside whirl around and vomit and seeing other apparent pre-21ers through a window. Castagna was not in a position to grant permission since he was, according to the court's summary of the case - in a rear bedroom, drinking and possibly toking up, while his guests grooved to the loud music in the living room, which made it impossible for him to hear the cops shouting "Boston Police!" as they approached and then entered his open apartment door.

In its ruling, the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said that the officers were protected by "qualified immunity" - basically, they were doing their job, and more specifically by a "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment that lets police take certain actions to safeguard the public even in the absence of the sort of serious crime that is normally required for warrantless searches - in this case, the loud music blaring from the apartment and the apparent presence of several underage drinkers, at least one of them literally sick to his stomach.

According to the court summary of the case, Boston officers arrived at East 6th and O shortly after 7:30 p.m. on March 17, 2013 - roughly 90 minutes after somebody called 911 to complain about a loud party.

By early evening, many of the guests at the Castagnas' party were intoxicated. Different guests estimated that they drank "between [twelve] and [fifteen] beers," eleven to thirteen beers, "ten beers," and "seven or eight beers" that day, respectively. ...

Jean arrived slightly after his fellow officers. He also heard music, saw that the front door was open, and noticed through the window that the people inside were drinking. He, too, believed that some of the guests were underage. As he approached the apartment, Jean "saw a young male come stumbling outside" onto the public sidewalk. Jean testified that the young man "walked around like -- you know, like a circle or half-circle, and then he hurled over, vomiting, and he did that twice. And then he stumbled back into the address that we were looking at."

Kaplan reached the apartment door and yelled "hello" several times and then "Boston Police." No one answered. According to Kaplan, "[w]hen no one answered, we kind of walked in."

At that point, none of the officers were intending to arrest anyone at the party, for underage drinking or any other crime. Kaplan explained that this response was in line with the police department's normal practice for responding to noise complaints: "Typically, we would just knock on the door, try to see who the owners are and tenants and have them turn the music down, shut the doors, keep the windows up and keep everything inside." Indeed, several of the officers did not have their handcuffs on them, which would have been necessary to make an arrest, explaining that they left them behind to lighten their load during a long day walking the parade route.

The officers explained at trial that there were two reasons for entering the home that evening: (1) to respond to the noise complaint by finding the homeowners and having them lower the volume of their music and (2) to make sure that any underage drinkers were safe, including the young-looking man who had vomited outside the home and returned inside.

The guests were in the middle of a dance competition when the police entered through the open door, and they did not immediately respond. Eventually, when they noticed the officers, the guests turned off the music. Kaplan explained that there had been a complaint of underage drinking and asked for the homeowners. There was a lull in which no one answered. Eventually some of the guests told the police that the owner's name was "Chris," but he was not in the room and was "in the back or the bathroom or something to that effect." Jean and another officer went to look for Christopher while the others stayed in the kitchen with most of the guests. ...

The court continued that the officers eventually found the Castagnas in a rear bedroom, that Christopher Castagna opened the door but that when he saw one of the cops eyeing some pot in the room, he tried to slam the door shut, only the officer's foot was right there, preventing him from closing the door all the way.

In the bedroom, Christopher shoved Jean a second time and the conflict between the officers and the party guests escalated. Other officers were called as back-up. Eventually, several of the guests and both brothers were arrested on various charges.

The brothers eventually sued all the cops who responded in federal court, on a variety of charges, including false imprisonment, assault and battery and malicious prosecution - and violation of their Fourth Amendment rights against unlawful entry and their First Amendment rights.

The case came to trial in 2018. The judge declined to tell the jury about the "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment, but the jury found for the officers under the "exigent circumstances" exception, which is the one normally used for serious criminal activities - that the officers had probable cause to know they had to act immediately to stop something serious.

The Castagnas' attorney filed for a new trial, calling the entry into the apartment and then Christopher Castagna's bedroom "a miscarriage of justice." Instead of a new trial, however, the judge amended the decision to find that the three specific officers were, in fact, guilty of "unlawful entry" because they had neither a warrant nor Christopher Castagna's permission to enter the apartment.

The court awarded the two brothers one dollar in nominal damages from each of the three officers. The court did not disturb any of the other jury verdicts.

The officers then appealed. In its ruling, the appeals court allowed as how there is some ambiguity about community caretaking - in fact, the appeals court did not directly address it until a case after the officers' trial - but not so much that the trial judge, Indira Talwani, shouldn't have told the jury about it:

The officers' entry into the home was in fact constitutional under the community caretaking exception and it was not clearly established at the time of their entry that the community caretaking exception would not give them an immunity defense.

The court continued:

Here, the function being performed by Edwards, Jean, and Kaplan was a community caretaking one. When the officers arrived at the scene, they saw intoxicated guests who appeared to be underage entering and exiting a party freely through an open door. Jean saw a guest that looked underage leave the house, throw up twice outside, and then reenter the apartment. The party was loud enough to be heard from the street. In their efforts to have the music turned down and make sure any underage guests were safe, they were aiding people who were potentially in distress, preventing hazards from materializing, and protecting community safety. ...

The officers acted reasonably. The officers had an implicit invitation to go up on the porch and knock on the apartment's door. See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 8 (2013). The officers did not enter the home until announcing themselves and failing to get the guests' attention. They needed to get the attention of the homeowner because he is the person ultimately responsible for the impact of the party on the neighborhood. Because they were responding to a 911 call reporting a noise complaint, the officers knew that people in the neighborhood were disturbed by the party. In addition, underage drinkers pose a safety risk. This is especially true on a holiday known for drinking and one that requires extra police officers to be deployed throughout the city.

Given the open front door, the people coming in and out of that open door at will, the evident lack of supervision by the owner of who entered, and the owner's failure to respond, any expectation of privacy was greatly diminished. It was objectively reasonable for an officer to have on-going concerns about noise complaints and underage drinking and determine that they might be easily resolved by entering through an open door (the same one the guests were coming and going through freely) to bring these complaints to the owner's attention.

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Ain't no party like a South Boston St. Patrick's party, cuz it don't stop, no, it don't stop - at least until the cops show up, and sometimes not even...