Archive for the ‘Fourth Amendment’ Category

The Bootlegger, the Wiretap, and the Beginning of Privacy – The New Yorker

Nearly a century before a U.S. President accused his predecessor of ordering a tapp on his private telephone line, and before he tweeted a warning to the head of the F.B.I. that he had better hope that there are no tapes of our conversations, a professional spy, armed with a pack of cigarettes and an earpiece, hid in the basement of the Henry Building, in downtown Seattle, catching crackling bits of words being spoken miles away. Richard Fryant had worked as a wiretapper for the New York Telephone Company, tasked with eavesdropping on his own colleagues, and now took freelance assignments in the Queen City. On this occasion, he was seeking dirt on Seattles corrupt mayorwho was suspected of having ties to Roy Olmstead, a local bootleggerfor a political rival. At the behest of his client, Fryant rigged micro-wires to a certain exchange, ELliott-6785, and began to listen.

They got that load, one man said, breathing heavily.

The hell they didwho? asked another.

The federals.

The men speaking on ELliott-6785 hung up, but the conversation had only just begun.

Criminals and Prohibition officials alike called Olmstead the good bootlegger, a moniker that reflected his singular business philosophy. He never diluted his whiskey with water or corrupted it with poison; he declined to dabble in the seedier offshoots of his profession, such as drugs or prostitution; and he abhorred violence, forbidding members of his organization from carrying weapons (No amount of money is worth a human life, he cautioned). If apprehended, his men were instructed to rely on bribes instead of violence.

Olmstead had a particular respect for policemen, having been a member of the Seattle force for thirteen years, reaching the rank of lieutenant. In 1920, with the onset of Prohibition, the thirty-three-year-old married father of two ventured to the other side of the law, making midnight runs to retrieve imported Canadian liquor from tugboats in the Puget Sound. This practice earned his dismissal from the force and made him a local celebrity. With his old police colleagues on his payroll, he was free to conduct business brazenly and with impunity, often unloading his booze at high noon from trucks marked Fresh Fish. Seattle citizens were thrilled to glimpse Olmstead on the street, wearing a fine suit and carrying a wallet fat with money, always ready with a joke. As one acquaintance noted, It made a man feel important to casually remark, As Roy Olmstead was telling me today.

Olmsteads organization, comprised of an ever-growing staff of attorneys, dispatchers, clerks, skippers, navigators, bottlers, loaders, drivers, deliverymen, collectors, and salesmen, dominated the bootlegging scene in the Pacific Northwest. They relied heavily upon the telephone for day-to-day operations, using it to take orders, communicate updates on deliveries, and warn of impending raids, their words coursing across a web of wires connecting the citys fifty-two thousand devices (approximately one for every six citizens). Olmstead set up his communication headquarters in the Henry Building, just a block from the Federal Building, and established three exchanges: ELliott 6785, 6786, and 6787. One of his men, a former taxi dispatcher, sat during business hours at a roll-top desk, taking and making calls, keeping meticulous records of each transaction. If a serious matter arose, such as an employees arrest, Olmstead himself called a friend on the Seattle police force to have it quashed. At the end of each day, the dispatcher unplugged the three telephones, to stop their ceaseless ringing, and the routine began anew in the morning.

In early 1924, Olmstead was approached by Richard Fryant, the freelance wiretapper who had been hunkered down in the basement of the Henry Building, listening to Olmsteads lines. As the bootlegger would soon learn, Seattles Prohibition Director, William Whitney, had heard of Fryants surveillance and recruited him as a federal agent.

In Olmsteads version of events, Fryant presented him with a heavy stack of paper, explaining that the pages contained verbatim transcripts of conversations that had been conducted on the bootleggers office phone. For ten thousand dollars, Fryant said, the transcripts could be his. A quick perusal of the pages confirmed their authenticity.

A call from a cop to a worker at Olmsteads headquarters:

Down under the Fourth Avenue Bridge is a car with seven gallons of moonshine in it, and I was wondering if it is yours.

No . . . I dont think it is ours because we dont handle moonshine.

A call from Olmstead to the police station:

Hello, Roy, what is on your mind?

One of your fellows picked up one of my boys. . . . I dont give a damn what they do but I want to know before he is booked.

Ill take care of it for you, Roy.

A joking exchange between Olmstead and a dispatcher:

The federals will get you one of these days.

No, those sons of bitches are too slow to catch cold, Olmstead quipped,

Reading the pages, Olmstead maintained his composure. As a former police officer, he said, when hed finished reading, he knew a thing or two about the rules of evidence. Wiretapping was illegal in the state of Washington, so the pile of paper would be useless in a courtroom. Furthermore, Fryant could go straight to hell.

Olmsteads bravado did not prevent him from hiring a telephone repairman to search the Henry Building first thing in the morning. Together, they found and removed three temporary taps (affixed with coil wire rather than soldered)two in the basement and one in the womens restroom. Still unsettled, Olmstead returned the following day and discovered that all three taps were back.

Fryant and Whitneys wife, Clara, a skilled stenographer, continued to monitor ELliott-6785 from an office one floor below. At each days end, Clara gathered up the handwritten notes and typed them with fastidious precision. The pile of paper continued to grow.

For the first time in his bootlegger career, Olmstead started exercising some discretion about his wordsbut only some, because he still trusted that Fryants wiretapping evidence would never withstand legal scrutiny. When managing the arrival of his whiskey boats in Puget Sound, he used a public pay phone to issue instructions and directions. For less sensitive issues, he continued to use his office line, and even had fun at the wiretappers expense, calling Whitney profane names and giving false orders about the timing and location of deliveries. It amused him to imagine the Prohibition chief sitting alone in the freezing rain, grasping his gun and waiting for boats that would never come.

Whitneys patience paid off in October, 1924, when Canadian officials seized one of Olmsteads boats. Three months later, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against Olmstead and ninety co-defendants for conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act. The Whispering Wires case, as it came to be called, concluded with a guilty verdict, a fine of eight thousand dollars, and a sentence of four years hard labor. Convinced that his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights had been violated (the right against unreasonable searches and seizures and against self-incrimination, respectively), Olmstead put his lawyers to work on Olmstead v. The United States. The Circuit Court of Appeals upheld his conviction, maintaining that, because the federal agents wiretapping pursuits did not require them to trespass on Olmsteads property or confiscate physical possessions, there had been no breach of rights.

The Supreme Court heard Olmstead v. The United States in February, 1928, and, in a 54 decision, upheld Olmsteads conviction. Chief Justice William Howard Taft, speaking for the majority, recognized the murky morality of wiretapping. Nevertheless, he argued that the practice served a greater good. A standard which would forbid the reception of evidence if obtained by other than nice ethical conduct by government officials would make society suffer and give criminals greater immunity than has been known heretofore, he wrote. He rejected the heart of Olmsteads case, insisting that the Amendment does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. . . . The reasonable view is that one who installs in his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to those quite outside.

The dissenting opinion was penned by Justice Louis Brandeis, for whom the issue of privacy was both ancient and increasingly, inescapably modern. In 1890, while practicing law in Boston, he had co-authored an article published by the Harvard Law Review titled The Right to Privacya manifesto, as Jill Lepore has written in this magazine, that argues for the existence of a legal right to be let alonea right that had never been defined before. Although the telephone was still decades away from being a familiar and necessary aspect of our lives, nearly every line of The Right to Privacy reveals prophetic insight into current concerns about how best to shield our innermost selves. The intensity and complexity of life have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, Brandeis wrote.

The Right to Privacy became a seminal work, and one that clearly influenced Brandeis himself as he considered Olmsteads case. When the Founding Fathers crafted the Constitution, he wrote in his dissent, the right to be left alone was inherent in the notion of pursuing happiness. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be considered a violation of the Fourth Amendment. . . . If the government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the law.

The media, although invested in a world where sensitive information might be easily and readily obtained, largely favored Brandeiss view. The Times declared that the Olmstead decision allowed universal snooping. The New Haven Journal-Courier predicted that every Tom, Dick and Harry would hereafter practice wiretapping without fear of reprisal. The editors of the weekly magazine Outlook were even more blunt, likening the verdict to a new Dred Scott and predicting dire consequences: We must weather the devastating effects of a decision that outrages a peoples sense of a security which they thought they had.

Forty years later, the Supreme Court finally caught up with Justice Brandeis, refining the Olmstead decision in two separate cases. In June, 1967, Berger v. New York considered the appeal of Ralph Berger, a public-relations consultant who had been convicted of conspiracy to bribe the chairman of the New York State Liquor Authority. Under the authority of a New York statute, police wiretapped Bergers phone for two months, and played excerpts of their recordings during the trial. In a 63 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the New York law was too broad in its sweepspecifically too long, as the two-month surveillance amounted to a series of intrusions, searches, and seizures that violated the defendants Fourth Amendment rights.

Six months later, the Supreme Court directly addressed the legacy of the Olmstead decision, in the case of Charles Katz, a California man convicted of placing illegal gambling wagers across state lines. Without a warrant, F.B.I. agents wiretapped public pay phones along Sunset Boulevard, hiding the device atop the bank of booths and listening in as Katz placed bets in Miami and Boston. The Court of Appeals upheld Katzs conviction, concluding that, since there had been no physical entrance, his privacy had not been compromised. In a 71 ruling, the Supreme Court reversed this decision, arguing that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and that its reach cannot depend on the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given space. Citing Justice Brandeiss manifesto, the Court established the protection of a persons general right to privacy (emphasis the Courts) and his right to be let alone.

Olmstead served his four-year sentence. Yet, in a way, he managed to win his case. Victory came in the form of a Presidential pardon, granted by Franklin D. Roosevelt, on Christmas Eve of 1935, which restored all of his rights as a citizen and cancelled the fine. Roosevelt was influenced, in part, by Olmsteads nascent transformation: hed quit drinking, converted to Christian Science, and started teaching the Bible to prisoners, who frequently asked if he was really *that *Roy Olmstead, the good bootlegger, the rum-running king of Puget Sound. His standard replyNo, not any more. The old Olmstead is deadamounted to fewer than a hundred and forty characters, and were the words he wished the whole world to hear.

See the original post:
The Bootlegger, the Wiretap, and the Beginning of Privacy - The New Yorker

Gang membership doesn’t color a crime, court says – The Rushville Republican

INDIANAPOLIS -- While wearing gang colors may be suspicious, it's not enough to justify a stop by police unless criminal activity is involved, the Indiana Supreme Court said this week.

As a result of the decision, Jordan Jacobs, Indianapolis, had his conviction reversed for Class A misdemeanor possession of a handgun. The state court ruled that a police search leading to Jacobs' arrest in 2015 was not allowed under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

On Aug. 31, 2015, there had been numerous reports of gunshots fired on Indianapolis' northeast side by youths wearing red clothing, indicating gang membership. The location near 30th Street and Keystone Avenue was known as a high crime area and police placed more attention on patrols.

Two days later during the afternoon, an Indianapolis police officer saw young men who "looked like they should be in school" at Beckwith Park, according to court records. Some of the teens were wearing red clothing. Jacobs, then 18, had been seen earlier carrying a red T-shirt.

When a park ranger's car was in the area, Jacobs and another man walked away. They returned after the car left and Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department officer Terry Smith, who is a gang detective, called for assistance. Smith ordered Jacobs to stop but he walked away. Another officer assisted in ordering Jacobs to the ground. Although handcuffed, Jacobs was told he was not under arrest but police saw a gun outlined in Jacobs' pocket.

In Marion County court, Jacobs' attorney objected to admitting the handgun into evidence on the grounds that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him under the Fourth Amendment. During a bench trial, Jacobs was found guilty and sentenced to one year probation.

In November, the Indiana Court of Appeals was split but found that Jacobs' behavior in evading police in a high crime area provided enough suspicion that a crime was "afoot."

The Indiana Supreme Court said that the officer's belief that Jacobs was truant at 2 p.m. that day was enough for an investigatory stop. But the actual stop occurred after school had let out for the day.

The court also addressed Jacobs' clothing. "Membership in a gang, by itself, does not provide the basis for prosecution for criminal gang activity," Justice Mark S. Massa wrote. "The State must prove that the individual was aware of the gang's criminal purpose."

He continued, "Jacobs' display of a red garment (which he was never wearing, and did not have at the time police approached), while standing among those clad in red, was thus insufficient to justify an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment."

The court said there was nothing to link Jacobs to the earlier gunfire.

Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment states, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Originally posted here:
Gang membership doesn't color a crime, court says - The Rushville Republican

Gang membership doesn’t color a crime, court says – Greensburg Daily News

INDIANAPOLIS -- While wearing gang colors may be suspicious, its not enough to justify a stop by police unless criminal activity is involved, the Indiana Supreme Court said this week.

As a result of the decision, Jordan Jacobs, Indianapolis, had his conviction reversed for Class A misdemeanor possession of a handgun. The state court ruled that a police search leading to Jacobs arrest in 2015 was not allowed under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution.

On Aug. 31, 2015, there had been numerous reports of gunshots fired on Indianapolis northeast side by youths wearing red clothing, indicating gang membership. The location near 30th Street and Keystone Avenue was known as a high crime area and police placed more attention on patrols.

Two days later during the afternoon, an Indianapolis police officer saw young men who looked like they should be in school at Beckwith Park, according to court records. Some of the teens were wearing red clothing. Jacobs, then 18, had been seen earlier carrying a red T-shirt.

When a park rangers car was in the area, Jacobs and another man walked away. They returned after the car left and Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department officer Terry Smith, who is a gang detective, called for assistance. Smith ordered Jacobs to stop but he walked away. Another officer assisted in ordering Jacobs to the ground. Although handcuffed, Jacobs was told he was not under arrest but police saw a gun outlined in Jacobs pocket.

In Marion County court, Jacobs attorney objected to admitting the handgun into evidence on the grounds that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him under the Fourth Amendment. During a bench trial, Jacobs was found guilty and sentenced to one year probation.

In November, the Indiana Court of Appeals was split but found that Jacobs behavior in evading police in a high crime area provided enough suspicion that a crime was afoot.

The Indiana Supreme Court said that the officers belief that Jacobs was truant at 2 p.m. that day was enough for an investigatory stop. But the actual stop occurred after school had let out for the day.

The court also addressed Jacobs clothing. Membership in a gang, by itself, does not provide the basis for prosecution for criminal gang activity, Justice Mark S. Massa wrote. The State must prove that the individual was aware of the gangs criminal purpose.

He continued, Jacobs display of a red garment (which he was never wearing, and did not have at the time police approached), while standing among those clad in red, was thus insufficient to justify an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment.

The court said there was nothing to link Jacobs to the earlier gunfire.

Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment states, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

See the original post:
Gang membership doesn't color a crime, court says - Greensburg Daily News

Federal judge rules two deputies used excessive force – The Spokesman-Review

UPDATED: Thu., June 29, 2017, 9:05 p.m.

A man pulled from his home and arrested at gunpoint after two Spokane County Sheriffs deputies went to the wrong address achieved a partial victory this week when a federal judge ruled that the deputies violated his Fourth Amendment seizure rights and used excessive force.

Conner Griffith-Guerrero filed a federal civil lawsuit against Deputy Robert Brooke, Deputy Evan Logan and Spokane County in 2015, two years after the incident at his home on North Five Mile Road. Both sides filed summary judgment requests and this week U.S. District Court Judge Thomas O. Rice ruled that a portion of each request would be granted.

On Dec. 13, 2013, a resident on North Five Mile Road called 911 to report that there was a suspicious car parked at his neighbors house and his neighbor was in Arizona for the winter. He provided the address to the house, but deputies couldnt find the house and instead went to another home. They drew their guns and walked around the house, testing doors and shining their flashlights in windows, according to court documents.

Griffith-Guerrero was in the basement watching television when he saw the flashlights shining in. He said he was afraid he was about to be burglarized so he went upstairs and hit the front door to let whoever was outside know that someone was home, the lawsuit said. He went outside to look and saw someone with a gun. He screamed and ran into the house.

Brooke then identified himself and Griffith-Guerrero opened the door and was ordered outside the home and told to kneel in the front yard while he was handcuffed. He said that one of the deputies was pointing a gun at him the whole time, but the deputy testified in a deposition that he was merely holding his gun in the low ready position.

After it was determined that Griffith-Guerrero lived there, Brooke reportedly told him Youre lucky I didnt (expletive) shoot you, the lawsuit said.

According to court documents, Brooke received a shift counseling, described as the lowest level of discipline, for going to the wrong address.

Heather Yakely, the attorney representing Spokane County and the deputies, argued that the deputies had reasonable suspicion to approach the house and detain Griffith-Guerrero. The deputies were checking for signs of a burglary and Yakely argued there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment because deputies never crossed the threshold into the house.

Rice said the deputies did have the right to check the home for signs of a break-in, but ruled the deputies committed a warrantless seizure and used excessive force. Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable, he wrote. It does not matter that the officers did not actually enter the house to make the arrest.

Ordering plaintiff out of his home is a categorical violation of his Fourth Amendment rights whether it is called a temporary detention or an arrest, it was a seizure.

Rice wrote that he found the defenses arguments that the deputies did not use excessive force unconvincing.

Pointing guns at plaintiff, ordering him out of his home at night and onto his knees in his own front yard to handcuff him was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, Rice wrote.

Rice did agree with Yakely on another issue. He ordered Spokane County dismissed from the lawsuit because Griffith-Guerrero didnt show that there was a pattern or practice of officers conducting illegal warrantless searches.

Rice ruled that Griffith-Guerreros claims of assault and battery, false arrest and imprisonment and negligence in the lawsuit can be pursued.

Read the rest here:
Federal judge rules two deputies used excessive force - The Spokesman-Review

A Supreme Court call on the third party doctrine – Washington Times

ANALYSIS/OPINION:

This week, constitutional law experts and the law enforcement community were abuzz after the U.S. Supreme Court added Carpenter v. United States to its docket, a case that could reshape government data collection and the Fourth Amendment in the internet Age. The Fourth Amendment asserts that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. Timothy Carpenter, the petitioner in this case, alleges that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.

The case comes at a time when domestic surveillance by intelligence agencies is under scrutiny, and smartphone and internet records are playing a greater role in law enforcement investigations. It raises an important legal question about the applicability of old doctrines that give the government immense power in the Information Age.

Carpenter was convicted of taking part in six armed robberies in Michigan and Ohio. The FBIs evidence at trial included information collected from his cellphone carrier without a warrant, including location information that placed him in the vicinity of the robberies. Police almost certainly could have gotten a search warrant for Carpenters phone records. The appeals court upheld his conviction and dismissed his argument because, as most courts hold in these cases, personal information gathered from businesses like phone companies is not a search or seizure and doesnt require a warrant.

Before the creation of the web or smartphones, courts developed whats known as the third party doctrine for Fourth Amendment cases. This doctrine denies that information turned over to a third party like phone call and location information automatically transmitted to a phone company when placing a call is protected by Fourth Amendment. The doctrine derives from Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s about phone and bank records.

Today, technological advancements mean we each turn over tremendous amounts of personal data to third parties simply with routine use of the digital services of our age. New services that transmit data to the internet cloud, like smart homes, voice-activated devices, and Google Docs, offer law enforcement an even bigger treasure trove of personal records that, under the third party doctrine, does not require a warrant to collect.

The mere fact that the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Carpenter case was a small victory for civil liberties groups. The third party doctrine is a blunt instrument that, in our connected world, permits too many low-value fishing expeditions by law enforcement. Cellular phone companies in particular are inundated with law enforcement subpoenas every year for user data, including user location. Verizon, for instance, reported that the government issued more than 120,000 subpoenas to the company in 2016 over 350 per day. Legal teams at Google, Facebook, Amazon and Uber are required to sift through similar government requests for information.

The political right and left have bristled in recent years against intrusive and often secretive government data collection. Conservatives were alarmed when The Wall Street Journal broke news last October that federal agents in Southern California had co-opted state license plate readers and drove around a parking lot to collect information about thousands of gun show attendees. For years, police departments around the country have spent millions acquiring cell site simulators that jam cellular signals and collect data from hundreds of nearby smartphone users. Progressives have alleged that these devices are used to identify people at mass protests.

The third party doctrine denies that such information can ever be unreasonably seized or searched. As the Cato Institute argues in its amicus brief in the Carpenter case, its time for the court to strip away the decades of privacy doctrine that has permitted police data collection to metastasize.

If the court takes up the Fourth Amendment issues, it should scrupulously apply the Fourth Amendments language: Are Carpenters phone records papers or effects? Were they searched or seized? Was the search or seizure unreasonable? Courts ask these questions in other criminal cases, but not when information leaves someones home or device. Justice must be served, but the third party doctrine short-circuits what should be a demanding constitutional analysis that protects us all.

Contracts between individuals and phone and app companies affirm the confidentiality of sensitive information, and courts should allow only reasonable searches of that data. We should not relinquish Fourth Amendment protections the moment a third party is involved especially in an era when devices in our pockets automatically transmit data.

Brent Skorup is a research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University. Melody Calkins is a Google Policy Fellow with Mercatus.

See the rest here:
A Supreme Court call on the third party doctrine - Washington Times