Archive for the ‘Fourth Amendment’ Category

Connecticut: Anti-Gun Bill which Violates Fourth Amendment Heads to Committee – NRA ILA

Tomorrow at 9:00 a.m., the Joint Committee on the Judiciary will hold a meeting to decide whether the committee isgoingto hearHouse Bill 6200.Introduced by state Representatives Caroline Simmons (D-144), William Tong (D-147), and Daniel J. Fox (D-148), HB 6200 would require a person openly carrying a firearm to display their permit immediately upon demand by law enforcement. Please contact the members of the Joint Committee on Judiciary and urge them not to hear this bill!Please click the Take Action button below to contact the committee members!

It is legal to openly carry a handgun in Connecticut so long as the person has a valid Permit to Carry. Connecticut State Police Training Bulletin 2013-01 states that personnel shouldNOTarrest a properly permitted individual merely for publicly carrying a hand gun or firearm in plain view absent exigent circumstances. Examples of these exigent circumstances are a Breach of Peace situation or the person is under the influence of intoxicating liquor/drugs.

Under the Fourth Amendment, as affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio nearly half a century ago, police officers can stop and briefly detain a person to investigate only if they have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts that criminal activity is occurring. This is why Connecticut law should require that officers must have a reasonable suspicion that a crime is being committed before they can request proof of a permit.

This proposed bill is the equivalent of allowing the police to stop a motorist to demand their drivers license solely because they are driving. Law-abiding people carry firearms for self-defense. They shouldn't be treated as being engaged in criminal activity simply because they are choosing to openly exercise their constitutional Right to Keep and Bear Arms.

Link:
Connecticut: Anti-Gun Bill which Violates Fourth Amendment Heads to Committee - NRA ILA

Google must turn over foreign-stored emails pursuant to a warrant, court rules – Washington Post

A federal magistrate judge handed down an opinion this afternoon, In re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-01 to Google, ordering Google to comply with a search warrant to produce foreign-stored emails. The magistrate judge disagrees with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuits Microsoft Ireland warrant case, recently denied rehearing by an evenly divided court. Although the new decision is only a single opinion by a single magistrate judge, the decision shows that the Justice Department is asking judges outside the Second Circuit to reject the Second Circuits ruling and that at least one judge has agreed.

The new case involves two routine Stored Communications Act warrants served on Google for the contents of emails. Google responded with the emails that it knows were stored inside the United States, but it refused to turn over emails that could be outside the United States. Because Google breaks up its emails and the network might distribute them anywhere in the world, Google cant know where many emails are located and declined to produce them under the Second Circuits Microsoft case.

The government moved to compel Google to produce all of the emails within the scope of the warrant. Magistrate Judge Thomas J. Rueter ruled that Google has to comply with the warrant in full because the conduct relevant to the SCAs focus will occur in the United States even for the data that is retrieved from outside the United States:

That is, the invasions of privacy will occur in the United States; the searches of the electronic data disclosed by Google pursuant to the warrants will occur in the United States when the FBI reviews the copies of the requested data in Pennsylvania. These cases, therefore, involve a permissible domestic application of the SCA, even if other conduct (the electronic transfer of data) occurs abroad.

The court reasoned that when a network provider is ordered to retrieve information from abroad, that copying of information abroad and sending back to the United States does not count as a Fourth Amendment search or seizure outside the United States:

This court agrees with the Second Circuits reliance upon Fourth Amendment principles, but respectfully disagrees with the Second Circuits analysis regarding the location of the seizure and the invasion of privacy. The crux of the issue before the court is as follows: assuming the focus of the Act is on privacy concerns, where do the invasions of privacy take place? To make that determination, the court must analyze where the seizures, if any, occur and where the searches of user data take place. This requires the court to examine relevant Fourth Amendment precedent.

According to the court, there was no seizure abroad:

Electronically transferring data from a server in a foreign country to Googles data center in California does not amount to a seizure because there is no meaningful interference with the account holders possessory interest in the user data. Indeed, according to the Stipulation entered into by Google and the Government, Google regularly transfers user data from one data center to another without the customers knowledge. Such transfers do not interfere with the customers access or possessory interest in the user data. Even if the transfer interferes with the account owners control over his information, this interference is de minimis and temporary. See Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125-26 (holding that permanent destruction of small portion of property for testing a de minimis intrusion on possessory interest); United States v. Hoang, 486 F.3d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 2007) ([N]o seizure occurs if a package is detained in a manner that does not significantly interfere with its timely delivery in the normal course of business.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1144 (2008).

Further, there was no search abroad:

When Google produces the electronic data in accordance with the search warrants and the Government views it, the actual invasion of the account holders privacy- the searches will occur in the United States. Even though the retrieval of the electronic data by Google from its multiple data centers abroad has the potential for an invasion of privacy, the actual infringement of privacy occurs at the time of disclosure in the United States.

Because the search and seizure occurred in the United States, not abroad, the relevant privacy invasion was domestic and a domestic warrant could order it.

The court also argued that this outcome was needed to avoid absurd results. Because Google does not know where the emails are located, and yet Google has configured its network in a way that emails can only be accessed from California, applying the Second Circuits reasoning would lead to the absurd result that the information would be completely immune from legal process. The court presents that as a ground to distinguish the Microsoft case on its facts, see Footnote 17, but I think its more fair to say its a reason the court rejects the Second Circuits reasoning:

[I]f the court were to adopt Googles interpretation of the Microsoft decision and apply such a rationale to the case at bar, it would be impossible for the Government to obtain the sought-after user data through existing MLAT channels. In contrast, under this courts interpretation, Google will gather the requested undisclosed data on its computers in California, copy the data in California, and send the data to law enforcement agents in the United States, who will then conduct their searches in the United States.

Here are two thoughts on the new decision.

1) Although I think the Second Circuits opinion is deeply flawed the more I think of it, the more I think my argument in this post has to be correct I dont think the reasoning of this decision works. The issue in this case is statutory, not constitutional. Even if you accept the (wrong) framing of the issue as being whether the SCA applies outside the United States, the answer has to come from what Congress focused on, not where the constitutional privacy interest may or may not be.

Where you place the Fourth Amendment search or seizure strikes me as irrelevant to the extraterritorial focus of the statute. Remember, when the SCA was enacted in 1986, there was good reason to think emails werent covered by the Fourth Amendment at all. That was part of the reason the SCA was enacted. The SCA created Fourth Amendment-like rights by statute because it wasnt clear if the Fourth Amendment applied. If that thinking was right, then there was no constitutional privacy focus in the SCA at all. It was all a statutory right, not a constitutional one. I dont think it works to conduct a Fourth Amendment analysis 31 years later and then to say that, based on the Fourth Amendment inquiry today, the real interest Congress was regulating is deemed to be domestic so the statute applies. This is about what Congress did in 1986, not how the Fourth Amendment should be interpreted in 2017.

2) Even accepting the courts framing, I dont think its right that no seizure occurred abroad. As I see it, copying Fourth Amendment-protected files seizes them under the Fourth Amendment when copying occurs without human observation and interrupts the stream of possession or transmission (Orin S. Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 Yale L.J. 700, 700 (2010)). That test is satisfied here when the information was copied. The court suggests that bringing a file back to the United States is not a seizure because Google moves data around all the time and this interference is de minimis and temporary. I dont think that works. Google is a private company not regulated by the Fourth Amendment, so whether it moves around data is irrelevant. And I dont see what is de minimis and temporary about the government ordering Google to make a copy of your email pursuant to a court order. It certainly may be a reasonable seizure, but I think its still a Fourth Amendment seizure.

Stay tuned, as always.

Oh, and full disclosure: In the past, I have done some legal work for Google. And way back when, I did even more legal work for the United States. Obviously I have no involvement in this litigation, and I am writing entirely in my personal capacity.

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Google must turn over foreign-stored emails pursuant to a warrant, court rules - Washington Post

Was That Search Illegal? Sometimes, Neil Gorsuch Ruled It Was – New York Times


National Review
Was That Search Illegal? Sometimes, Neil Gorsuch Ruled It Was
New York Times
Although Judge Gorsuch has a decidedly conservative record on the bench, by at least one measure his view of the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches he has been relatively moderate, according to legal scholars and a ...
Trump's Supreme Court pick Neil Gorsuch has a solid record of defending the Fourth AmendmentRare.us
Here's what you need to know about SCOTUS nominee Neil Gorsuch.Reason (blog)
Neil Gorsuch & the Police: What Are His Views on Law Enforcement Issues?Heavy.com
Slate Magazine -The Atlantic -National Review
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Was That Search Illegal? Sometimes, Neil Gorsuch Ruled It Was - New York Times

Trump’s Supreme Court pick Neil Gorsuch has a solid record of defending the Fourth Amendment – Rare.us


Rare.us
Trump's Supreme Court pick Neil Gorsuch has a solid record of defending the Fourth Amendment
Rare.us
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads, The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable ...
Supreme Court nominee Neil Gorsuch's key cases: In his own wordsUSA TODAY
Here's what you need to know about SCOTUS nominee Neil Gorsuch.Reason (blog)
In Judge Neil Gorsuch, an Echo of Scalia in Philosophy and StyleNew York Times
Heavy.com -Slate Magazine -The Atlantic -SCOTUSblog
all 3,550 news articles »

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Trump's Supreme Court pick Neil Gorsuch has a solid record of defending the Fourth Amendment - Rare.us

President Trump Should Continue Justice Scalia’s First & Fourth Amendment Legacy – Center for Democracy and Technology (blog)

Written byLisa A. Hayes

The Supreme Court has been short one justice for nearly a year, and President Trump is expected to announce a nominee for the vacant seat this week. While we do not yet know who that nominee will be, the President has repeatedly promised to fill the vacancy with a justice very much like the late Justice Antonin Scalia. While I personally take issue with much of Justice Scalias jurisprudence through the years, there is no disputing that he was a strong supporter of the First and Fourth Amendments, and the person appointed to take his seat should be the same.

Justice Scalia was a fierce defender of Americans right to privacy. He believed that the sanctity of a persons home and property was to be held above the governmental interests in fighting crime. For example, he wrote the majority opinion in Kyllo v. United States, a 5-4 ruling that barred police from peeping into a home with a thermal-imaging device. In United States v. Jones a man had his Jeep tracked with GPS devices without a warrant, leading to a drug trafficking conviction. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion to hold that when law enforcement officers install a digital age GPS tracker on a suspects car, enabling the police to constantly track the vehicle, they must first get a warrant. And Justice Scalia famously dissented in Maryland v. King, arguing that the Fourth Amendment forbids law enforcement from collecting DNA from arrestees and predicting that as a consequence of the majoritys decision, your DNA can be taken and entered into a national DNA database if you are ever arrested, rightly or wrongly, and for whatever reason.

In the First Amendment realm, Justice Scalia cast a decisive 5-4 vote in one of the most important free speech case of the 1980s, Texas v. Johnson, which held that flag burning qualified as constitutionally protected expression. He did this despite his personal distaste for flag burners: If it were up to me, I would put in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo who burns the American flag. But I am not king. Similarly, he authored the majority opinion in 2011s Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, a victory for First Amendment advocates. There the video-game and software industries, filed a preenforcement challenge to a California law restricting the sale or rental of violent video games to minors. Led by Scalia, the Court found video games qualify for First Amendment protection because the games like protected books, plays, and movies communicate ideas. Justice Scalia found the basic principles of freedom of speech do not vary with a new and different communication medium.

The next justice will be asked to protect our First and Fourth Amendments in the digital context. 87% of Americans, and 99% of all 18-29 year-olds are online. Even my 97 year-old grandmother uses the internet to read the news, make political donations, and communicate with her loved ones and doctors. Almost 70% of adult Americans own a smart phone. The phones are used to message, Instagram, and tweet, as we maneuver from point A to point B. In the process, we leave data trails everywhere, with no clear legal guidance as to how that data should be protected or utilized.

In recent years, we have been grappling with an increasing morass of technology law headed to the courts: We monitor our pets, children, and homes remotely; can authorities tap into those same secure webcams and listening devices? We use voice activation to turn on virtual assistants to play music or listen to a weather forecast; can those requests be recorded and later released to the police? Upon being arrested, can you be compelled to unlock your phone with your fingerprint reader, or to provide the phones security code or pattern? Commuters pay their bridge and toll fees with an automated device; can the police use the same data about their driving distance and times to slap them with a speeding ticket?

Most of the law surrounding technology use has yet to be written. Many of us intuitively understand that our steadily growing mountains of online data are best viewed as an extension of our offline persona. How much privacy we are entitled to retain in our own involuntarily generated data and how much protection we receive for our speech online remains to be seen.

Americans deserve a justice who will protect their First and Fourth Amendment rights.

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President Trump Should Continue Justice Scalia's First & Fourth Amendment Legacy - Center for Democracy and Technology (blog)