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The Supreme Court has handed down Heien v. North Carolina, the Fourth Amendment case I have blogged about a few times on whether the Fourth Amendment is violated when an officer pulls over a car based on a reasonable but mistaken belief that the traffic laws prohibit the drivers conduct. The Court ruled 8-1, per Chief Justice Roberts, that the Fourth Amendment is not violated in such circumstances. Only Justice Sotomayor dissented. The basic reasoning of the case is simple, but it leaves some complications that have some interesting implications for lower courts and for the relationship between Fourth Amendment rights and remedies.

Heres the core of the Chief Justices opinion:

As the text indicates and we have repeatedly affirmed, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Riley v. California, 573 U. S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip op., at 5) (some internal quotation marks omitted). To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials, giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the communitys protection. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U. S. 160, 176 (1949). . . .

Reasonable suspicion arises from the combination of an officers understanding of the facts and his understanding of the relevant law. The officer may be reasonably mistaken on either ground. Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or the law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: the facts are outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law.

The Courts holding raises two major questions. First, how much law does a reasonable police officer know? And second, if a reasonable mistake of law means there was no Fourth Amendment violation, how do we reconcile that with the remedies cases saying that a reasonable mistake of law is a reason why there is no Fourth Amendment remedy? Ill consider each in turn.

(1) How much law does a reasonable police officer know?

If the Fourth Amendment incorporates reasonable mistakes of law, then there must be a standard for how much law a reasonable officer knows. For example, does a reasonable officer just follow the text of the law like a lawyer would? Does he know the major cases interpreting the law? Or does he just know what is taught at the police academy, or maybe what the public thinks the law probably is?

The majority opinion says that the standard is whether it is objectively reasonable for an officer in [the searching officer's] position to think that the conduct violated the law. The opinion explains:

[T]he inquiry is not as forgiving as the one employed in the distinct context of deciding whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a constitutional or statutory violation. Thus, an officer can gain no Fourth Amendment advantage through a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce.

Thats a start, although its still pretty vague. Sloppiness is a relative term. A sloppy study of the law for a lawyer might be a very careful study of the law for a non-lawyer. Whats the reference point to determine sloppiness? The Courts application of the standard at the end of the opinion mostly focuses on the text of the law, and also notes the absence of cases construing the text. So maybe the reasonable officer knows the text and is aware of at least major cases interpreting it? Its hard to say.

Read more:
Volokh Conspiracy: Reasonable mistake of law can generate reasonable suspicion, Supreme Court holds

The exercise of police discretion to stop people on the street is front and center in todays headlines. In this case, a North Carolina policeman stopped Heiens car because it had a brake light that did not work. During the stop, Heien consented to a search of the car, which yielded cocaine in a duffle bag and Heiens ultimate conviction for attempted drug trafficking. On appeal, the North Carolina appellate courts surprisingly ruled that the outdated state vehicle code required only one working brake light (a stop lamp, in the words of the statute); therefore, there had been no violation of law that would permit the stop. The officer made no error about the facts; but he had been mistaken about the meaning of the law. However, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled, the officers mistake about this law was reasonable, and for that reason the Fourth Amendment right to be secure from unreasonable seizures was not violated. This mornings opinion in Heien v. North Carolina affirms that holding.

Chief Justice Roberts announcing the opinion. (Art Lien)

The constitutional law of reasonableness The vague word unreasonable in the Fourth Amendment is a lawyers playground, and questions about what sort of circumstances constitutionally permit law enforcement seizures have thus plagued the federal courts since the Fourth Amendment was adopted. In 1813, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that the constitutional standard is circumstances which warrant suspicion a relatively unspecific and therefore unhelpful standard. But its unhelpfulness flows from the generality of the amendment itself. It is not judge-made policy; it is constitutional text.

Over the years the Court has honed its thinking about what constitutes probable cause to stop or search (for example, Illinois v. Gates in 1983), and in Terry v. Ohio in 1968 the Court famously ruled that even brief stops on the street require at least specific and articulable reasonable suspicion, not just hunches. The Court has subsequently made clear that even when police are mistaken about facts, their stops do not violate the Constitution if their mistakes are reasonable.

Todays opinion

Today, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, a majority of eight Justices affirmed that there is no reason why this same result should not apply when reached by way of a similarly reasonable mistake of law. The Court conceded and Justice Sonia Sotomayor, the lone dissenter, agreed that no precedent of the Court has expressly answered this reasonable mistake of law question (scarcely a peep). The Court noted, however, that as early as 1809, the Supreme Court ruled that a reasonable mistake of law about probable cause permitted a customs seizure under a federal statute. By 1860, this general principle had been adopted in numerous [lower court] cases. While acknowledging that the statutory customs cases were not directly on point for the constitutional question, the Court also explained that no decision of this Court in the two centuries since has undermined that understanding that reasonable mistakes of law can excuse governmental action. In fact, the Court explained that in more recent cases, such as Michigan v. DeFillippo, it had found no Fourth Amendment violation even when governmental searches were based on state statutes later declared unconstitutional. (Justice Sotomayor strongly disagreed with this reading.)

Arguing for Heien, attorney Jeffrey Fisher had struggle[d] to limit the Courts ruling solely [to] the exclusionary rule that is, the remedy in lieu of a more general ruling about the right (that is, whether the officers stop was an unreasonable violation of the amendment). This was likely an attempt to preserve some relief for Heien on remand, because North Carolina purportedly has not adopted a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. But there will be no remand for further proceedings under todays ruling, which flatly affirmed the state courts ruling. The Court said that DeFillippo was plainly a decision about the meaning of probable cause, and thus its holding regarding a reasonable mistake of law cannot be transform[ed] into an exclusionary rule decision. So in this case, because the officers mistake about the meaning of North Carolinas vehicle code was reasonable, there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment in the first place.

(By contrast, the Court also noted that an individual officers mistaken view, no matter how reasonable, that he has complied with the Fourth Amendment, does not undermine a reviewing courts ultimate conclusion that governmental actions have violated the Fourth Amendment even though it might affect the remedy. This significant reservation regarding the scope of the Courts ruling is emphasized in footnote 1 of Justice Elena Kagans concurring opinion, and should not be overlooked.)

The majoritys limitations, and two separate opinions

Importantly, particularly in light of recent controversies, the Court observed that the standard of reasonableness for mistakes of law is not as forgiving as some might have it. An officers legal error must be objectively reasonable, and not based on a particular officers subjective understanding or on a sloppy study of the laws he is duty-bound to enforce. Thus, the Court suggested, an officer must learn[] the law, and I would expect that the familiar standard of a reasonably well-trained officer will be rigorously applied by lower courts when confronted with Heien errors in the future.

Read the original:
Opinion analysis: Reasonable mistakes of law by police do not violate the Fourth Amendment

The Supreme Court ruled Monday that a police officer's mistaken idea of the law doesn't make an arrest and a search invalid, as long as the officer's understanding of the law was reasonable. The case evolved from a traffic stop in 2009, in which Nicholas Heien was pulled over on Interstate 77 in North Carolina by a county sheriff's deputy because one of his brake lights was out. After getting permission to search the car, the deputy found a baggie of cocaine, and Heien was charged with drug trafficking.

But it turned out North Carolina law did not require cars to have two brake lights. The state law said they must have "a" stop lamp on the rear and elsewhere referred to "the" stop lamp, meaning the deputy was apparently wrong about the law. Heien's lawyer backed by civil liberties groups said if a law wasn't being broken, there was no authority to arrest him or conduct a search. But by a 8-1 vote, the Supreme Court said the arrest and the search were valid, even if the officer was wrong about the law. The Fourth Amendment bars "unreasonable" searches and seizures, the court said. "To be reasonable is not to be perfect, and so the Fourth Amendment allows for some mistakes on the part of government officials," said the opinion, written by Chief Justice John Roberts.

The lone dissenter, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, said an officer's mistake about the law, no matter how reasonable, "cannot support the individualized suspicion necessary" to justify an arrest. The nation's courts were sharply divided on this issue, though most said if an officer is wrong, the arrest doesn't count.

Supreme Court opinion: Heien vs. North Carolina

Pete Williams

First published December 15 2014, 8:18 AM

Excerpt from:
Police Mistakes Can Lead to Good Arrests, Court Says

Why nanny statists hate the Fourth Amendment
Why nanny statists hate the Fourth Amendment.

By: Chynoweth

Read the original here:
Why nanny statists hate the Fourth Amendment - Video

Dollree Mapp, who challenged a police search of her home, leading to a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1961 that extended the exclusionary rule protecting citizens from illegal searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment, died Oct. 31 in Conyers, Ga. She was 91.

Her death, which was confirmed to news outlets by her family, was not widely reported until this week. The cause was not disclosed, but she had dementia for many years.

Tough and street savvy, Ms. Mapp spent much of her life on the margins of society and had trouble with the law on several occasions.

On May 23, 1957, plainclothes police officers who were looking for a suspect in a bombing knocked on her door in Cleveland. The explosion a few days earlier had been at the home of a Cleveland gambling figure, Don King, who later went to prison for manslaughter and still later became a well-known boxing promoter.

Ms. Mapp refused to let the officers enter her house without a search warrant.

They returned three hours later. She demanded to see the warrant and then grabbed the paper from an officers hand and stuffed it inside her dress.

In the ensuing struggle, an officer retrieved the paper while Ms. Mapp shouted, Take your hand out of my dress!

The police searched and ransacked Ms. Mapps house, finding what they believed to be gambling paraphernalia and pornography. Ms. Mapp insisted that drawings of nude women and books with such titles as Memoirs of a Hotel Man and Affairs of a Troubadour belonged to a previous tenant. Nonetheless, she was arrested and taken away in handcuffs.

She was acquitted of the gambling charges but, after only 20 minutes of deliberation, a jury found her guilty of possession of lewd and obscene materials. She was sentenced to one to seven years in prison. A man suspected in the bombing case was set free.

Ms. Mapp lost several appeals before her case, Mapp v. Ohio, was argued before the Supreme Court in March 1961. Much of the legal debate was over whether Ohios obscenity law violated the First Amendment.

Originally posted here:
Dollree Mapp, figure in landmark Supreme Court decision in 1961, dies at 91