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In 2017, a high school student (referred to as B.L.) expressed her frustration with having not made the varsity cheerleading team through a private Snapchat post. The image showed her making an obscene gesture and was captioned, f- school f- softball f- cheer f- everything.

A friend saved the snap and showed it to school authorities, resulting in B.L.s expulsion from the junior varsity team. She was reinstated to the team a few months later as litigation ensued.

Ultimately, the case reached a federal appeals court, which ruled in the students favor on the grounds that the school districts punishment violated the First Amendment; however obscene it may have been, the snap was between friends, off campus and outside of school grounds.

But this was not the end of the story. Mahanoy Area School District appealed the decision to the Supreme Court, which heard arguments in January.

The justices should affirm the lower courts decision in favor of free speech for high school and college students, especially off-campus. Moreover, there is a need to clarify those protections in the modern social media landscape.

First of all, there is a judicial precedent to take into consideration: that of the case of Tinker v. Des Moines in 1969. The ruling of that case was that unless it threatened to disrupt the academic environment, freedom of expression could not be infringed upon on school grounds. If schools have less power over expression on-campus, what, then, gives them power to punish students for things they said off-campus?

B.L.s speech did not fit the criteria established by Tinker v. Des Moines, as there was no call to disrupt academic activity. Rather, she was momentarily expressing her frustration in a temporary post.

Moreover, B.L. expressed herself in private, which ought to be considered outside of the school districts jurisdiction. Not only did the district infringe on her First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and expression, but also her Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

Now, a right to privacy is not explicitly written in the Constitution, but it is implied: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated Because her speech was non-disruptive, it was not reasonable for B.L. to be punished for a statement she made in a private circle.

Although ruling in favor of rights to privacy and free speech and expression is the higher road for the Supreme Court to take, Mahanoy Area School Districts concerns must be taken into account. Officials there worry that if they have no jurisdiction over what is said by students off-campus, they will be unable to intervene in cases of cyberbullying and other such behavior outside of school.

Even taking that concern into account, the Supreme Court should rule in favor of First Amendment rights for students off-campus and their privacy. They should also uphold Tinker v. Des Moines with an additional provision for social media that being that it lies outside of school district authority with the exceptions of the use of school-owned handles and speech that disrupts academics or threatens or intimidates faculty, staff, or other students. Only in such exceptional cases should schools have jurisdiction over speech.

First Amendment rights are crucial to a students ability to communicate their thoughts and ideas with their peers and superiors. To quote the majority opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines, students do not shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate and certainly not outside of it.

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The precedent of free speech on campus | The Record - The Record

Judge Merrick Garland, U.S. President-elect Joe Biden's nominee to be U.S. Attorney General, speaks as Biden listens while announcing his Justice Department nominees at his transition headquarters in Wilmington, Delaware, January 7, 2021.

Kevin Lamarque | Reuters

Merrick Garland is finally getting his day before the Senate.

Garland, President Joe Biden's pick to be attorney general, will appear before the Senate Judiciary Committee on Monday for the first day of his confirmation hearings, scheduled to continue through the week.

The hearings were delayed amid some partisan squabbling while Democrats and Republicans struggled to come to a power-sharing agreement in the evenly divided Senate.

Those delays came after Garland was denied any hearings at all in 2016, when former President Barack Obama nominated the centrist judge to the Supreme Court following the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the conservative stalwart.

The federal appeals court judge is expected to be confirmed swiftly likely by the start of March though he may face some uncomfortable grilling, primarily from the panel's Republicans.

Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, the judiciary committee's ranking Republican, has indicated that Garland will be quizzed about how he will handle the federal probe into Biden's son, Hunter Biden, related to the younger Biden's finances. Hunter Biden has disclosed that federal prosecutors are examining his "tax affairs."

All-in-all, though, the hearings are likely to be low-drama. In a statement, Democratic Committee Chairman Sen. Dick Durbin of Illinois called Garland "a consensus pick who should be confirmed swiftly on his merits."

Garland has been a judge on the D.C Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals since 1997 and served as the chief judge on the court, considered the most important except the Supreme Court, from 2013 until 2020.

The 68-year-old, if confirmed, will lead the Department of Justice, which will be crucial to Biden's agenda for criminal justice reform. Biden has also said that he hopes that, by choosing Garland, he will be able to demonstrate a contrast from President Donald Trump's use of the department for self-serving aims.

"We need to restore the honor, the integrity, the independence of the DOJ of this nation that has been so badly damaged," Biden said during a January speech introducing Garland.

"I want to be clear to those who lead this department who you will serve: You won't work for me. You are not the president's or the vice president's lawyer," Biden added. "Your loyalty is not to me. It's to the law, the Constitution, the people of this nation."

Trump's four-year tenure was marked by controversy in the Justice Department.

His first attorney general, Jeff Sessions, was ultimately forced to resign in 2018 after Trump attacked him for months over his decision to recuse himself from former special counsel Robert Mueller's Russia probe.

William Barr, Trump's final attorney general, was accused of tampering in the prosecutions of Trump allies Roger Stone and Michael Flynn, and of issuing misleading statements related to Mueller's final report.

Garland has pledged to maintain his independence.

"The essence of the rule of law is that like cases are treated alike: That there not be one rule for Democrats and another for Republicans, one rule for friends, another for foes, one rule for the powerful, and another for the powerless," he said last month.

It is likely that Democrats will push Garland to address how his views on criminal justice align with Biden's pledge to boost racial equity in the legal system. Civil rights groups have noted that in his rulings as a judge, Garland has demonstrated a conservative bent.

"Judge Garland very rarely ruled in favor of defendants in Fourth Amendment cases and has generally found law enforcement action to be reasonable under the circumstances," the American Civil Liberties Union wrote in a 2016 report while Garland was under Supreme Court consideration.

The report also found that Garland's "notable sentencing decisions similarly demonstrate a pro-prosecution perspective."

During his campaign, Biden pledged to reduce the number of people incarcerated in the U.S. and to root out inequities in sentencing.

In his first days in office, he ordered the Justice Department to limit its contracting with private prisons and made other promises related to racial equity in the department. While the administration has been in place for a month, rights groups have been pushing it to do more.

An early test for Garland could come as a result of the Jan. 6 riot on the Capitol, which has led to increasing calls for a new domestic terrorism law to help the Federal Bureau of Investigation a part of the DOJ go after members of the pro-Trump mob that waged the attack.

Federal prosecutors have said the investigation into the attack is likely unprecedented in DOJ history, and that more than 200 people have already been charged.

While law enforcement associations have come out in support of such legislation, civil liberties groups have suggested that such bills tend to fall hardest on already persecuted communities, like Black and Muslim people.

Garland is expected to draw on his work in 1995 overseeing the prosecutions stemming from the Oklahoma City bombing, which was perpetrated by White supremacists.

In addition to assembling the trial team in that case, Garland drafted the Justice Department's critical incident response plan and "oversaw the United States Marshals Service's vulnerability assessment of federal facilities," according to paperwork he filed with the Senate as part of his confirmation process.

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Merrick Garland will finally face the Senate: Attorney general confirmation hearings start Monday - CNBC

RELIST WATCH ByJohn Elwood on Feb 18, 2021 at 4:39 pm

The Relist Watch column examines cert petitions that the Supreme Court has relisted for its upcoming conference. A short explanation of relists is available here.

Even after nearly a month off since the last installment, this weeks round-up is going to be abbreviated because of the press of business. There are about 489 cases that have been scheduled for resolution at this Fridays conference. Only four of those cases are new relists. They concern two basic issues.

The first three cases All Saints Episcopal Church (Fort Worth) v. The Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, 20-534, The Episcopal Church v. The Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, 20-536, and Schulz v. Presbytery of Seattle, 20-261 are all examples of something that the Supreme Court used to see a lot of, but seem like theyve been in someone shorter supply recently: property disputes pitting a breakaway faction against a national church for control of property. These cases involve how to apply two lines of case law, both involving leading cases with Jones in the caption. Under one line of authority, exemplified by the landmark 1872 case Watson v. Jones, civil courts adjudicating church property disputes essentially defer to the highest church authorities about who owns the property. But under 1979s Jones v. Wolf, the Supreme Court, by a 5-4 vote, held that courts could adjudicate such cases applying neutral principles of law to determine which party the property deeds, statutes, and church governing documents indicated the property belonged to.

The two cases brought by Episcopal entities involve a Fort Worth, Texas, sanctuary and rectory. The Texas Supreme Court held it belonged to the withdrawing faction rather than the national organization. The Presbyterian case involves church property in Seattle, Washington apparently, the very last downtown Seattle property not occupied by a coffee shop or outdoor clothing store. The Washington Court of Appeals held that courts should defer to the Presbyterian Church U.S.A.s designee, who said the property belonged to the group still affiliated with the national organization.

The national Episcopal Church and affiliated entities explicitly say that if the Texas decision is correct, Wolf should be overruled. The petitioners in the Seattle case, the trustees of a congregation that disaffiliated from the national Presbyterian church, clearly suggest that Watson is not good law. It will be interesting to see if the Supreme Court takes up an issue that has been percolating for almost a decade. [Disclosure: Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to SCOTUSblog in various capacities, is counsel on an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in the two cases involving the Episcopal Church.]

That brings us to the second issue, which involves the Armed Career Criminal Act, a three strikes-type sentencing enhancement whose legendary ambiguity has spawned so much litigation that, as Ive observed before, it can sometimes seem as if there are more Armed Career Criminal Act appeals than there are armed career criminals. The ACCA sentencing enhancement applies only if the defendant has three predicate convictions that were committed on occasions different from one another. 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). The question in Wooden v. United States, 20-5279 is: When a criminal defendant commits a series of offenses sequentially such as breaking into 10 different mini-storage units one after another (which is just what petitioner William Dale Wooden did one evening) were the offenses committed on occasions different from one another for purposes of the ACCA enhancement?

Some circuits say that offenses are automatically committed on different occasions if they are separated in time by even a short interval; thus the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit said Wooden had 10 prior offenses committed on different occasions because he burgled (thats right, I said burgled) 10 mini-storage units in a row, and he could not have been in more than one unit at the same time. Other circuits say that the offenses have to be treated as the same occasion unless they arose under different opportunities or circumstances meaning the offenses were part of different criminal episodes.

The Wooden petition also presents a second question: whether officers who use deception to gain access to constitutionally protected areas have violated the Fourth Amendment. The police officer here asked if he could step inside Woodens home to stay warm, but his real goal was to track down a fugitive. Once inside, he found a gun that Wooden shouldnt have possessed. The 6th Circuit held that was not a constitutional violation. That arguably splits from a decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit. [Disclosure: My law firm, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, is counsel to Wooden. I am not involved in the case.]

Thats all for this week. Stay safe (and warm) out there!

All Saints Episcopal Church (Fort Worth) v. The Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, 20-534Disclosure: Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to SCOTUSblog in various capacities, is counsel on an amicus brief in support of petitioners in this case.Issue: Whether the Texas Supreme Courts decision awarding the sanctuary and rectory of the petitioner, All Saints Episcopal Church (Fort Worth), to a dissident faction in contravention of the will of petitioners parishioners and an express-trust provision is consistent with the free exercise and establishment clauses.(relisted after the Jan. 22 conference)

The Episcopal Church v. The Episcopal Diocese of Fort Worth, 20-536Disclosure: Goldstein & Russell, P.C., whose attorneys contribute to SCOTUSblog in various capacities, is counsel on an amicus brief in support of the petitioners in this case.Issues: (1) Whether the First Amendment requires courts to enforce express trusts in church governing documents (as some jurisdictions hold, in line with Jones v. Wolfs first safeguard), or whether state law may render such trusts unenforceable (as others hold); (2) whether the First Amendment requires courts to defer to churches on questions of polity (as some jurisdictions hold, in line with Jones second safeguard), or whether courts may apply state law to determine the structure of a church (as others hold); and (3) whether the neutral-principles approach may constitutionally be applied either prospectively or retroactively to resolve church-property disputes.(relisted after the Jan. 22 conference)

Schulz v. Presbytery of Seattle, 20-261Issue: Whether, in a dispute between a local congregation and its former denomination over ownership of property to which the local congregation holds legal title, the First Amendment permits courts to apply a rule of absolute deference to assertions of ownership by the denomination.(relisted after the Jan. 22 conference)

Wooden v. United States, 20-5279Disclosure: My law firm, Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, is counsel to the petitioner. I am not involved in the case.Issues: (1) Whether a police officers use of deception to gain entry to a constitutionally protected area violates the Fourth Amendment; and (2) whether offenses that were committed as part of a single criminal spree, but sequentially in time, were committed on occasions different from one another for purposes of a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act.(relisted after the Jan. 22 conference)

Biden v. Knight First Amendment Institute, 20-197Issue: Whether the First Amendment deprives a government official of his right to control his personal Twitter account by blocking third-party accounts if he uses that personal account in part to announce official actions and policies.(relisted after the Dec. 4, Dec. 11, Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Chipotle Mexican Grill v. Scott, 20-257Issue: Whether a district court may consider factors other than the presence of a single material question of law or fact common to a group of employees when assessing whether the employees are similarly situated for purposes of the collective-action provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act.(relisted after the Dec. 4, Dec. 11, Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences) [NB: the parties have reached an agreement in principle to settle]

United States v. Vaello-Madero,20-303Issue:Whether Congress violated the equal-protection component of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by establishing Supplemental Security Income a program that provides benefits to needy aged, blind and disabled individuals in the 50 states and the District of Columbia, and in the Northern Mariana Islands pursuant to a negotiated covenant, but not extending it to Puerto Rico.(relisted after the Dec. 11, Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Texas v. California, 220153Issue: Whether Californias sanctions against Texas and Texans prohibiting state-funded or state-sponsored travel to Texas because Texas protects the religious freedom of faith-based child welfare providers within its borders are born of religious animus and violate the Constitutions privileges and immunities clause, interstate commerce clause and guarantee of equal protection. CVSG: 12/4/2020.(relisted after the Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Dobbs v. Jackson Womens Health Organization, 19-1392Issues: (1) Whether all pre-viability prohibitions on elective abortions are unconstitutional; (2) whether the validity of a pre-viability law that protects womens health, the dignity of unborn children and the integrity of the medical profession and society should be analyzed underPlanned Parenthood v. Caseys undue burden standard orWhole Womans Health v. Hellerstedts balancing of benefits and burdens; and (3) whether abortion providers have third-party standing to invalidate a law that protects womens health from the dangers of late-term abortions.(relisted after the Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Massachusetts Lobstermens Association v. Ross, 20-97Issues: (1) Whether, in conflict with the holdings of the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 5th and 11th Circuits and the National Marine Sanctuaries Act, the Antiquities Act applies to ocean areas beyond United States sovereignty where the federal government has only limited regulatory authority; and (2) whether the president can evade the Antiquities Acts smallest area requirement, including designating ocean monuments larger than most states, by vaguely referencing resources or an ecosystem as the objects to be protected.(relisted after the Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Harris v. Maryland, 20-101Issue: Whether, when preindictment delay has caused actual prejudice to the accuseds ability to defend himself, the due process clause requires that the defendant prove that the delay was driven by an improper prosecutorial motive, or that courts balance the particular prejudice to the defendant against the particular reasons (or lack thereof) for the delay.(relisted after the Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Johnson v. Precythe, 20-287Issues: (1) WhetherBucklew v. Precytheestablished a categorical rule that a state may obtain dismissal of an Eighth Amendment method-of-execution claim by proffering a reason for rejecting the plaintiffs opposed alternative method of execution that is legitimate in the abstract, regardless of whether the plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the states proffered reason is not legitimate or sufficient on the facts of the case; and (2) whether, in the alternative, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuits refusal to permit Ernest Johnson, after the Supreme Courts decision inBucklewwas issued, to amend his complaint to propose a previously-used alternative method of execution warrants summary reversal.(relisted after the Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

United States v. Tsarnaev, 20-443Issues: (1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit erred in concluding that Dzhokhar Tsarnaevs capital sentences must be vacated on the ground that the district court, during its 21-day voir dire, did not ask each prospective juror for a specific accounting of the pretrial media coverage that he or she had read, heard or seen about Tsarnaevs case; and (2) whether the district court committed reversible error at the penalty phase of Tsarnaevs trial by excluding evidence that Tsarnaevs older brother was allegedly involved in different crimes two years before the offenses for which Tsarnaev was convicted.(relisted after the Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Republican Party of Pennsylvania v. Boockvar, 20-542Issues: (1) Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court usurped the Pennsylvania General Assemblys plenary authority to direct [the] Manner for appointing electors for president and vice president under Article II of the Constitution, as well as the assemblys broad power to prescribe [t]he Times, Places, and Manner for congressional elections under Article I, when the court issued a ruling requiring the state to count absentee ballots that arrive up to three days after Election Day as long as they are not clearly postmarked after Election Day; and (2) whether that decision is preempted by federal statutes that establish a uniform nationwide federal Election Day.(relisted after the Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Corman v. Pennsylvania Democratic Party, 20-574Issues: (1) Whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court usurped the Pennsylvania General Assemblys plenary authority to direct [the] Manner for appointing electors for president and vice president under Article II of the Constitution, as well as the assemblys broad power to prescribe [t]he Times, Places, and Manner for congressional elections under Article I, when the court issued a ruling requiring the state to count absentee ballots that arrive up to three days after Election Day as long as they are not clearly postmarked after Election Day; and (2) whether that decision is preempted by federal statutes that establish a uniform nationwide federal Election Day.(relisted after the Jan. 8, Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

McCoy v. Alamu, 20-31Issues: (1) Whether a prison official is entitled to qualified immunity if he gratuitously assaults a prisoner but not every factor fromHudson v. McMillianfor when the use of excessive physical force may constitute cruel and unusual punishment favors the plaintiff, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit held here, or whether the plaintiff can nonetheless defeat qualified immunity, as the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 4th, 6th, 9th and 11th Circuits have held; and (2) whether a prison official who assaults a prisoner without justification is entitled to qualified immunity if past precedent involved different mechanisms of force, as the 5th Circuit implicitly held here, or whether precedent concerning unprovoked assaults by one weapon can clearly establish the unconstitutionality of unprovoked assaults by other weapons, as the 4th and 9th Circuits have held.(relisted after the Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

Bridge Aina Lea, LLC v. Hawaii Land Use Commission, 20-54Issues: (1) Whether, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuits extensive, published ruling eliminates property owners ability to recover for temporary property takings under any theory, and that ruling conflicts with decisions of other courts, including the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court needs to clarify the rules for recovery for temporary regulatory takings; (2) whether, in light of the confusion in the lower courts as to the application of the factors fromPenn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City to the point where it has become almost impossible for property owners to prevail on this theory the Supreme Court should reexamine and explain howPenn Centralanalysis is supposed to be done or dispensed with; (3) whether, in light of the 9th Circuits holding that almost no value loss no matter how great can ever establish a temporary taking under eitherLucas v. South Carolina Coastal CouncilorPenn Central, it is necessary for the Supreme Court to clarify the standards; and (4) whether, in light ofPenn Centrals clear direction that cases like this are to be determined ad hoc, on their individual facts, and the Supreme Courts approval inCity of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, that takings liability be decided by a jury, appellate courts need to stay their hands (as mandated by the Seventh Amendments re-examination clause) when as here reviewing jury findings of fact-based takings issues, particularly when the trial judge confirmed those findings.(relisted after the Jan. 15 and Jan. 22 conferences)

American Medical Association v. Azar, 20-429Issues: (1) Whether the Department of Health and Human Services rule for the Title X family planning program which prohibits and compels certain pregnancy-related speech between a Title X provider and her patient, proscribing abortion-related information but requiring information about non-abortion options is arbitrary and capricious; (2) whether the rule violates the Title X appropriations act, which requires that all pregnancy counseling under Title X shall be nondirective; and (3) whether the rule violatesSection 1554 of the Affordable Care Act, which requires that HHS shall not promulgate any regulation that harms patient care in any one of six ways, including by interfer[ing] with communications between a patient and her provider.(relisted after the Jan. 8 and Jan. 22 conferences, but not relisted for the Jan. 15 conference)

Department of Homeland Security v. New York, 20-449Issues: (1) Whether entities that are not subject to the public-charge ground of inadmissibility contained inImmigration and Nationality Act, and which seek to expand benefits usage by aliens who are potentially subject to that provision, are proper parties to challenge the U.S. Department of Homeland Securitys final rule interpreting the statutory term public charge and establishing a framework by which DHS personnel are to assess whether an alien is likely to become a public charge; and (2) whether the final rule is likely contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious.(relisted after the Jan. 8 and Jan. 22 conferences, but not relisted for the Jan. 15 conference)

Mayorkas v. Cook County, Illinois, 20-450Issues: (1) Whether entities that are not subject to the public-charge ground of inadmissibility contained inImmigration and Nationality Act, and which seek to expand benefits usage by aliens who are potentially subject to that provision, are proper parties to challenge the U.S. Department of Homeland Securitys final rule interpreting the statutory term public charge and establishing a framework by which DHS personnel are to assess whether an alien is likely to become a public charge; and (2) whether the final rule is likely contrary to law or arbitrary and capricious.(relisted after the Jan. 8 and Jan. 22 conferences, but not relisted for the Jan. 15 conference)

Cochran v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 20-454Issues: (1) Whether the Department of Health and Human Services rule, which prohibits Title X projects from providing referrals for abortion as a method of family planning, falls within the agencys statutory authority; and (2) whether the rule is the product of reasoned decisionmaking.(relisted after the Jan. 8 and Jan. 22 conferences, but not relisted for the Jan. 15 conference)

Oregon v. Cochran, 20-539Issues: (1) Whether the Department of Health and Human Services final rule which prohibits Title X providers from communicating certain abortion-related information to their patients and requires physical separation of Title X-funded care from healthcare facilities that provide abortion services or certain abortion-related information violates appropriations statutes requiring that all pregnancy counseling in the Title X program shall be nondirective; (2) whether the final rule violates Section 1554 of the Affordable Care Act, which prohibits HHS from promulgating any regulation that creates unreasonable barriers to obtaining appropriate medical care, impedes timely access to such care, interferes with patient-provider communications regarding a full range of treatment options, restricts providers from disclosing all relevant information to patients making health care decisions, or violates providers ethical standards; and (3) whether the final rule is arbitrary and capricious, in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act, including by failing to respond adequately to concerns that (a) the rule requires medical professionals to violate medical ethics and (b) the counseling restrictions and physical-separation requirement impose significant costs and impair access to care.(relisted after the Jan. 8 and Jan. 22 conferences; directed to file but not relisted for the Jan. 15 conference)

More:
Disputes over church property and ACCA ambiguity - SCOTUSblog - SCOTUSblog

WETHERSFIELD The father of an 18-year-old killed by a town police officer in 2019 has filed a wrongful death lawsuit and claims his sons civil rights were violated.

The lawsuit names the town of Wethersfield and former Wethersfield Police Officer Layau Eulizier as defendants in the April 2019 shooting death of Anthony Vega-Cruz.

Gary Evans, town manager for Wethersfield, said the town has not yet been served, adding that we wont take any action until or unless that happens.

The suit seeks an unspecified amount of damages for Jose Vega-Cruz, the teens father, and attorney fees. It was filed last week by nationally-renowned civil rights and personal injury attorney Ben Crump and his legal team.

Eulizier shot and killed Anthony Vega-Cruz during a traffic stop on Silas Deane Highway on April 20, 2019. Nearly a year later, the shooting was ruled justified under Connecticut law by the States Attorney for the Judicial District of Hartford.

The shooting later sparked legislation preventing police from positioning themselves in front of a fleeing vehicle, and prohibiting officers from shooting into the vehicle unless there is an imminent threat of death.

Euliziers actions and inactions ... heightened the risk of a deadly encounter, the lawsuit alleges. Eulizier failed to use reasonable caution in attempting to apprehend (Vega-Cruz).

Vega-Cruz was killed after police tried to pull him over for illegal window tints and a license plate belonging to a different vehicle with a suspended registration, according to an incident report.

According to the report, Vega-Cruz pulled over, but then sped away as the officer got out of his car, leading to a chase.

Eulizier, who had been getting food when the call came over the radio, responded and struck the front end of the car with his police cruiser, the report said.

Eulizier then got out of his cruiser and stood in front of Vega-Cruzs vehicle with his weapon drawn, according to the report and video footage of the incident.

As the vehicle reversed, the officer fired two shots, one of which struck Vega-Cruz in the head, the report said. He was later pronounced dead at Hartford Hospital.

The suit also claims that either the Wethersfield Police Department had an inadequate policy and training with regards to shooting at moving and occupied vehicles, or Eulizier violated the Wethersfield Police Departments policy and committed a felony.

The lawsuit alleges Euliziers use of deadly force was unreasonable, and claims he acted with a conscious and reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of Vega-Cruz.

A reasonable officer under similar circumstances would not have reasonably believed that the use of deadly force was necessary to effect an arrest or prevent the escape from custody of a person whom he reasonably believes to have committed an offense, or to defend himself or a third person from the use of imminent physical force while effecting or attempting to effect an arrest or while preventing or attempting to prevent escape, the suit claims. In other words, it was unreasonable for Eulizier to believe that the use of deadly force against (Vega-Cruz) was necessary to defend himself of a third person.

According to the lawsuit, Euliziers use of his cruiser to stop the Infiniti violated Vega-Cruzs rights against unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and 14th Amendment. The suit also claims Eulizier did not immediately provide medical care to Vega-Cruz.

Eulizier resigned from the Wethersfield Police Department soon after the states attorneys report absolving him in the shooting was released. In his resignation letter, he maintained the shooting was in self-defense, the radio station WNPR reported at the time.

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Father of CT teen killed by police files wrongful death lawsuit - CTPost

HELENA Senator Ken Bogner, R-Miles City, today introduced a bill that would submit a constitutional amendment to the voters of Montana to protect the privacy of their electronic data and communications.

Article II, Section 11 of the Montana State Constitution already protects Montanans persons, papers, homes, and effects from unreasonable searches and seizures, similar to the Fourth Amendment protections of the U.S. Constitution.

Senate Bill 203 would add Montanans electronic data and communications to that list of places and items that cannot be searched or seized by the government without a warrant based on probable cause.

Senate Bill 203 is about updating Montanas Constitution to reflect life in the 21st Century and make it explicitly clear that our digital information is protected from unreasonable government searches and seizures, Bogner said. Today, so much of our private livesfinancial information, communication with family and friends, medical information, and much, much moreis contained on and transferred electronically among many devices and computer systems. The government should need a warrant before accessing or gathering Montanans electronic data or communications.

I am proud to watch Montana continue to expand the privacy rights of our citizens. Our nations leaders in Washington, D.C., could learn a lesson or two from the Montana Legislature on how to work across the aisle and stand up to unchecked government surveillance, said former state Rep. Daniel Zolnikov, who became known for his work on protect digital privacy during his time in the Legislature. Montana continues to find a better balance between using our digital technologies and protecting our Fourth Amendment rights.

Montanans are overwhelmingly concerned about the privacy of their personal information and they want more protections from mass government surveillance. Lawmakers ought to listen to them, said Kendall Cotton, President and CEO of the Frontier Institute, a Montana-based think tank. Updating Montanas Constitution with expanded privacy protections will send a strong message that state government is making our rights a priority.

Digital devices are the modern equivalent of your home and should be treated with the same respect. Digital rights are just as important as physical rights; we just need to update the law to account for this, said Eric Fulton, a fellow with the Frontier of Privacy initiative by the Frontier Institute. Tech companies are exploiting everyday citizens because the Founders didnt foresee the digital era. Its time to update the law to match their intent. The Montana Constitution protects your privacy in your home. It should protect your digital home as well.

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Proposed constitutional amendment will protect Montanan's privacy in the digital age - Sidney Herald Leader