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WASHINGTON, Oct. 6, 2020 /PRNewswire/ --As American workers are reeling from the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, important and permanent changes to immigration and guest worker policies will be necessary to help them recover from this crisis. In a newly released report, Immigration Reform Blueprint for the American Worker, the Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR) lays out a detailed list of reforms to immigration policies that would aid struggling and unemployed Americans regain lost ground.

The report examines the impact of all forms of immigration on American workers illegal immigration, ill-conceived and excessive legal immigration, and a host of guest worker programs and offers needed reforms to ensure that they serve the best interests of the nation and American workers.

"It has been evident for a long time that U.S. immigration policies serve no identifiable public interests, and in fact undermine the core interests of many Americans," noted Dan Stein, president of FAIR. "The economic crisis touched off by COVID-19 has elevated the need for a comprehensive overhaul of all aspects of immigration policy from urgent to imperative. Immigration Reform Blueprint for the American Worker, as its title suggests, does just that. It examines every aspect of our policies and provides commonsense reforms that can and should be adopted."

The report looks at how illegal immigration, family chain legal immigration, and a long list of guest worker programs affects American workers and what changes are needed to best protect their interests. Among the key findings and recommendations of the report:

"Current circumstances drive home the imperative to have an immigration policy that is designed and enforced with the interests of American workers as paramount. Whatever the outcome of the election, the next administration and the next Congress will be faced with the economic and fiscal realities brought on by the COVID-19 crisis. Fixing our broken immigration system will not ameliorate all of the problems caused by this crisis, but it would go a long way toward ensuring that American workers can get back on their feet as quickly as possible and all them to provide for themselves and their families," Stein concluded.

The full report, Immigration Reform Blueprint for the American Worker, can be found here.

Contact: Matthew Tragesser, 202-328-7004 or [emailprotected]

ABOUT FAIR

Founded in 1979, FAIR is the country's largest immigration reform group. With over 3 million members and supporters nationwide, FAIR fights for immigration policies that serve national interests, not special interests. FAIR believes that immigration reform must enhance national security, improve the economy, protect jobs, preserve our environment, and establish a rule of law that is recognized and enforced.

SOURCE Federation for American Immigration Reform (FAIR)

http://www.fairus.org

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FAIR Immigration Blueprint for the American Worker: Needed Overhauls to Immigration Policies in the Face of the COVID-19 Crisis - PRNewswire

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Overcrowded Housing Among Immigrant and Native-Born Workers

The Center for Immigration Studies hosted a panel on October 8th to discuss the Center's new report, Overcrowded Housing Among Immigrant and Native-Born Workers.

Mark KrikorianExecutive DirectorCenter for Immigration Studies

Steven A. CamarotaDirector of ResearchCenter for Immigration Studies

Peter SkerryProfessor of Political ScienceBoston College

MARK KRIKORIAN: Good morning. My name is Mark Krikorian. Im executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies, a think tank here in Washington. And we are sponsoring an event today that you can either watch now youre already watching it or later at CIS.org. Thats our website. Were on Twitter at @CIS_org.

And the COVID-19 epidemic is not the first illness to be spread by people in close proximity breathing on each other, nor will it be the last. Theres been significant speculation in the press and elsewhere about the prevalence of this illness among especially among essential workers and immigrant workers in particular, but its all been speculation. There really hasnt been anything substantive or data-based in these discussions. And so what we decided to do was actually look at the numbers look at the issue of overcrowding and what relation, if any, it has to the spread of COVID, and whether theres an immigration aspect, an immigration angle to this issue. And so to address that were releasing a paper today and having this discussion about it.

The first speaker about the paper is going to be one of the authors, Steven Camarota, who is the director of research here at the Center for Immigration Studies. Hes going to go over the findings of the paper. And then were going to have some discussion with Peter Skerry, political science professor at Boston College, whos written on various aspects of immigration over the years. And then were going to have some questions and some back and forth.

So first were going to start with Steve talking about his findings related to overcrowding and immigration and possible relation that has to COVID and other similar illnesses. So, Steve?

STEVEN CAMAROTA: Thank you, Mark.

As Mark said, the report that we are releasing today examines specifically the incidence of overcrowding among immigrant and native-born workers overcrowding, that is, in terms of residential housing. As Mark also said, the report was written by myself and Karen Zeigler, who is also here at the Center for Immigration Studies.

Now, overcrowding is an important issue for a number of reasons, but the most relevant question right now is as it relates to the current pandemic. There actually is a very large body of research, a lot of it done in the United States, looking at the relationship between overcrowded housing and the spread of respiratory communicable disease like COVID. And that research, not surprisingly, finds a very strong link between the two.

Now, the standard definition in the United States of overcrowded housing is that theres more than one person per room in your housing unit, excluding things like hallways, porches, balconies, bathrooms. Theres various specific data gathered in that way. So theres a pretty well-established way of looking at overcrowded housing, but one could think of a different definition.

Now, in addition to all the prior research looking at things like TB or the seasonal flu and overcrowded housing, theres some new research looking at specifically COVID-19 that also finds a link between crowding and the spread of the disease. Let me give you just let me quote from one. One of these newer studies came from the Donahue Institute at the University of Massachusetts, and that study concluded that overcrowding housing was the most indicative measure of COVID-19 spread thats their words that they found looking across communities.

I also should point out theres a new blog posting on our website that looks at the correlation between overcrowded housing and the incidence of COVID-19 infection across the nations counties. And again we find a pretty reasonably strong relationship, consistent with prior analysis, between the spread of COVID-19 and the incidence or the concentration of overcrowded housing.

Now, of course, none of this should be surprising. Living in close proximity to others, obviously, makes it more likely that communicable disease will spread. And if someone becomes sick, if the household is crowded it makes it harder to isolate someone. So again, its not just the research but kind of common sense which suggests that crowding is likely to facilitate the spread of respiratory infections.

Now, our analysis is based on the 2018 American Community Survey collected by the U.S. Census Bureau. And again, we use that standard definition of overcrowding. We looked specifically at immigrant and native-born workers. In the survey, immigrants or the foreign-born, as the Census Bureau refers to them are all people who are not U.S. citizens at birth. And it includes people on green cards, it includes naturalized citizens, and it includes some number of illegal immigrants, and well discuss that. In general, the survey is assumed to capture most illegal immigrants. What is certain is that a large number are in the survey, and later on in our analysis we do try to break them out separately. But for the most part, we look just at immigrants overall.

Now, when looking at immigrant workers, we find that immigrant workers are about four times more likely overall to live in overcrowded housing. Its about 3.5 percent for the native-born, but 14.3 percent for immigrants. As a result, immigrants account for nearly half of all workers in America living in overcrowded housing. I know that number seems hard to believe, but it is almost half, 46 percent. Even though immigrants themselves are only 17 percent of all workers, they just make up an enormous share of all overcrowded workers.

Now, to be sure, many factors having nothing to do with overcrowding or immigration have contributed to the United in the United States to the spread of COVID-19. Nevertheless, as I will show, the evidence indicates that as Ive already said, actually the overcrowding facilitates the spread of COVID-19 and immigration has added enormously to overcrowding.

There are consequences, of course, and we see this often when it comes to overcrowding when we look at specific sectors of the economy. There have been a number of shutdowns at warehouses and order-processing facilities, including those run by Amazon and Walmart, because workers in these facilities have gotten sick. In just May and June, the CDC reported that 111 meat- and poultry-processing facilities had significant outbreaks of COVID-19, and 24 of them had to be shut down at least temporarily.

Now, a significant share of workers employed in low-wage jobs many of which are considered essential during the COVID epidemic live in overcrowded housing, and immigrants account in many cases for a majority of workers living in overcrowded housing. They dont necessarily account for a majority of workers in this sector, but they do account for a majority in many cases of workers living in overcrowded housing.

For example, take the job category of butcher and meat processor. So these are a lot of these people work in these facilities that slaughter and cut up meat. It is one of the areas where overcrowding is quite common. In 2018, 24 percent of immigrant butchers and meat processors lived in overcrowded housing. Now, the comparable figure for native-born workers doing that same work was 6 percent. Now, because immigrants who do this kind of work are so much more likely to live in crowded housing, they account for one-third of all the butchers and meat processors overall, but they account for about two-thirds of all those who live in overcrowded housing. So that would be a good example of a sector where immigration and immigrant workers make up an enormous fraction of the overcrowded problem.

Lets look at one other, and I wont bore with too many statistics. The report is replete with those. But if we look at packers and packagers these are a lot of these people do things like work in warehouses we find that 24 percent of immigrants in that occupation live in overcrowded housing compared to 8 percent of native-born workers who do that same work. As a result, immigrants are 41 percent of packers and packagers so theyre a big percent but theyre 68 percent of packagers (sic; packers) and packagers who live in crowded housing. So again, a disproportional percent of people employed in that occupation who live in crowded housing are immigrants because the immigrants are so much more likely to be in overcrowded housing to begin with.

Now, the bottom line is that immigration, of course, has added enormously to overcrowded housing in a number of sectors, including production, health care, support, transportation, moving, food preparation, sales, and farming. And again, many of these occupations are both low-wage and thought to be essential during the COVID-19 epidemic.

Now, the high rate among immigrant workers overall or in specific occupations must not be thought of as some kind of moral failing on their part. Rather, it partly reflects the fact that immigrants, especially overall, are employed in these low-wage jobs, and they are also more likely to live in urban areas where cost of living is higher and overcrowding is more common. And another contributing factor is immigrants tend to live in larger families. We have a lot of statistics on that in the report, but on average immigrant families are larger than native-born families, and so are their households, and also a larger fraction live in large households.

But interestingly and I think this is one of our most important findings even when immigrants earn the same wage as the native-born, live in the same size household, and reside in an area with the same population density as the native-born, they are still much more likely to live in overcrowded housing than comparable natives; that is, natives who live in those same circumstances, earn the same wage, and so forth.

Just to give you one example I wont bore you; theres a lot 35 percent of immigrant workers who live in an urban area have five members in their household and earn $10 an hour or less live in overcrowded housing. So thats 35 percent. Of natives who have live in the same conditions, 16 percent live in overcrowded housing. And the same pattern holds even as we move up the income distribution. Higher-income immigrants are still much more likely to live in overcrowded housing than high-income or higher-income native-born workers, even when you control for household size and whether the person lives in an urban area.

So why is this? Well, I dont know that we have a clear answer, but I think its very likely that cultural preferences play a significant role in explaining why both legal and illegal immigrants are more likely to live in crowded housing than native-born workers, even those that are comparable. A large share of immigrants come from developing countries, where houses are typically much smaller than in the United States. So it should not be too surprising if many of them choose or have a different perspective about personal space, with many choosing to live in more moderately-sized homes even when they might be able to afford something larger. It makes sense.

Also, immigrants desire to save money on housing and perhaps send money home may also help explain why immigrants, even higher-income immigrants, are much more likely to live in overcrowding housing than higher-income natives with the same household size, and so forth. In case youre wondering, the estimate for sending money home is about $68 billion, so thats a lot of money. And prior research indicates its mostly sent home by immigrants, and so that could represent a significant share of their income. So living in more modest homes might be a way of saving and doing that, so that might be another reason.

Now something else. Since the data we used included illegal and legal immigrants, it could be that it is just the illegal immigrants that live in overcrowded housing and they have the high rates of it, and thats really what explains that overall picture for the native-born. But when we try to separate out legal and illegal immigrants, we dont really find that thats the case. Based on the Census Bureau data that we used, we estimated that illegal immigrants, consistent with other work, is about they are about 4 percent of all workers in America and they make up 16 percent of all workers in overcrowded housing. So, yes, their rates are high and they are disproportionately in overcrowded housing. Thats for sure.

But we also estimated that legal immigrant workers, who are much more numerous, are 13 percent of all workers but 30 percent of workers in overcrowded housing. In other words, legal immigrants by themselves are approaching one-third of all the overcrowded housing or workers living in overcrowded housing, even though theyre only about 13 percent of all workers. So even if there was no illegal immigration to the United States, legal immigration by itself would still have added significantly to the overcrowding problem.

Now, it should also be added that while overcrowding is more common among people who are new arrivals that was another thing that we examined. We were trying to figure out if maybe its really just something that people go through as a temporary phase. But it does not appear that the problem is simply among newcomers. Of immigrant workers who have lived in the United States for 10 or more years, 13.4 percent lived in overcrowded housing in 2018 based on the Census data. This compares to 14.3 percent for all immigrant workers.

So, yes, overcrowding declines over time, presumably as immigrants become more prosperous and earn higher wages, but then other things might tend to cancel that out. More relatives might join them over time. They may have additions to their family through having children. And so the difference between new established immigrants, people here for more than 10 years, and immigrants overall in overcrowding rates actually turns out to not be that different. In short, overcrowding is not just an issue for the newly arrived.

Now, all of that having been said, it is still the case that overcrowding among both immigrants and natives declines significantly with higher wages, and that is especially true of immigrants. Though, again, theyre more likely to be overcrowded at every wage level, and even when you throw in family size and where they live its still the case that theyre more likely to be overcrowded, its still the case higher wages is associated with lower rates of overcrowding.

Therefore, paying higher wages to workers would almost certainly help reduce overcrowding, especially those at the bottom end of the labor market where overcrowding tends to be more common. More than half of all workers who live in overcrowded conditions earn less than $15 an hour, or $15 an hour and less I should say. So it is something that is much more prevalent among people at the bottom.

So if you want to increase wages to hopefully alleviate some of the overcrowding, reducing the flow of immigrants in the country would not only directly reduce overcrowding over time by avoiding adding to it, it would also help reduce crowding indirectly by putting upward pressure on wages. Now, of course, employers across multiple sectors have argued for decades that there are not enough workers, particularly in low-wage jobs. However, I would just add this. Its a bit of a digression, but Ill say this: If workers really were in such short supply, then we would expect to find that wages would be rising very rapidly. But in general, and certainly not at the bottom end of the labor market, that has not been happening for most workers. Theres a large body of research on that.

I would also add, if anyones interested, that the majority of workers in just about every low-wage, lower-status job, from meat packer to janitor to construction laborer to home health-care aide, was born in the United States. So the notion that with higher wages we wouldnt be able to attract any Americans to these jobs doesnt make sense. After all, the majority in many cases, an overwhelming majority of the people who do this kind of work were born in the United States.

Now, to be sure, keeping wages low can create benefits for both employers and consumers. But keeping wages down by adding large numbers of immigrant workers almost certainly affects the livelihood of the least-educated and poorest Americans, both immigrant and native-born, and it also creates other issues. And most important for the current discussion, it adds enormously to overcrowded housing.

Now, in conclusion, I will say this. Once more data becomes available and the disease has run its course, researchers will be better able to determine the complex relationships between all the variables that contributed to the spread of COVID-19. However, it seems certain that overcrowding is one of the factors facilitating the spread of the disease, just as it does other similar infections. Of course, it would be wrong to think that overcrowding and the immigration that contributes to it are the only reason that the United States has done worse than many other industrialized countries in dealing with COVID. That is clearly not the case. That said, it seems almost certain that overcrowding has played a significant role in spreading the disease, and it is very unlikely that we continue to allow in large numbers of immigrants and not add significantly to the overcrowded problem.

But I would add that if we want to raise wages, reducing immigration is not the only thing we need to be thinking about. For example, raising the minimum wage, perhaps strengthening unions, or perhaps increasing income transfers like the earned income tax credit for workers and the additional child tax credit, the refundable portion its a cash payment to low-wage people, typically workers, and so is the earned income tax credit. These things, as well, might make housing more affordable for low-wage workers.

But immigration does seem to be playing a very large role in adding directly to the problem of overcrowding and in likely keeping down wages at the bottom end. So at the very least, policymakers need to consider the impact of immigration if we want to reduce our vulnerability to future pandemics. Thank you.

MR. KRIKORIAN: Thank you, Steve.

And now, for some comments, thoughts about the report, reaction to it, and also some sort of more general observations, were going to Peter Skerry, a professor of political science at Boston College. And, Peter, take it away.

PETER SKERRY: All right. Thank you, Mark. And thank you, Steve. Its a pleasure to join you here today.

I would begin by congratulating Steve and CIS for what I would consider a rather extraordinarily evenhanded piece of research on a problem that has arguably not gotten as much attention as it might because it deals with sensitive topics. As someone whos spent a fair piece of my career in Washington at various think tanks, including Brookings and the American Enterprise Institute, Im certainly familiar with the problems of policy research and advocacy research, and certainly mindful that in recent years those two different kinds of research have more and more overlapped, and regrettably watched that trend. And certainly, today were in an era where its hard to read anything in academic journals, journals of opinion, and certainly in newspapers where purported experts and specialists obviously indulge their biases and their predilections. Its become endemic in all parts of the political spectrum.

So when I read something from an advocacy organization thats clearly been preoccupied for a long time with reducing overall levels of immigration; and read a report like this that, one, picks up and points to a problem that has been neglected and that is potentially politically loaded, and then does it in an extraordinarily evenhanded and fair-minded way, looking at possible alternative explanations and being very careful to and precise about what its what its arguing, what it does know, and what it does purport to find out and what it does not purport to find out; I am struck very, very, very strongly and positively. So I congratulate Steve and his colleagues at the Center for Immigration Studies. And I think he made that clear, his perspective, not only in his report but in his remarks right now just preceding mine.

Now, what I would turn to is to point out some of the implications of what Steve and his colleague have reported on, and to emphasize and to draw attention to the fact that they have primarily looked at the long-term implications, and the long-term policy implications especially, of their findings. Not surprisingly, given CISs long involvement in immigration policy discussions and debates, and being concerned with the impacts the unacknowledged, unrecognized, or ignored impacts of historically high levels of immigration into the United States, the first among the first implications that Steve and his colleague point to is, of course, the possibly indeed, the desirability, from their point of view, I think its fair to say to limit overall immigration levels. But thats not the only thing they suggest. As Steve just got through mentioning and Im eager to underscore, he and his colleague also talk about the possibility of raising minimum wage levels or earned income tax credits and other such redistributive schemes that have proved relatively popular and relatively successful; or, a much more controversial notion and topic, promoting unionization among workers, including immigrant workers. And I think thats worthy of note. Thats a full array of possibilities and policy options that CIS is urging its readers to consider in response to this particular problem.

What I would add, though and I think perhaps this particular study and its proposal is less specific on and perhaps neglects a bit are the more short-term implications of the immigrant-related overcrowding and its impact on COVID-19 that it draws our attention to. By short-term implications, I would, first of all and here they do mention this and they stress it that immigrants should not be culpable in this regard. They should not be stigmatized. They should not be deemed guilty of committing or doing anything. This report, this study, recognizes that this is a complicated social and economic phenomenon that is one of the outcomes of our prevailing immigration policy, but theres not a hint here of immigrants being stigmatized or the notion that they ought to be stigmatized or blamed for these complicated structural and indeed to some extent cultural problems, as the report also points out.

In that spirit, one might also talk about although the report does not specifically mention this the need for special outreach programs to immigrant communities. That certainly would be one short-term implication of the findings of this of this study. There are there are others, obviously. But its that dimension, that aspect of our current situation that I think the authors could might have spent a bit more time focusing on. But I think thats a relatively mild criticism in the broader context of the care and the thoroughness with which these two investigators have explored this problem, especially, as I said at the beginning of my remarks, at a time when these issues are so charged and our environment is so charged.

Again, this is a remarkable piece of research on a very difficult public-policy problem not just the fact that its COVID-19, which itself is obviously rather controversial, but the connection between immigrants and the spread of COVID-19 is I daresay a topic that has been avoided in most contexts because it is so charged. So once again, I congratulate and express my admiration for the evenhandedness and the discipline of these two researchers, who have produced what I consider an important and enlightening and positive contribution to an important public-policy issue. And Ill stop there, OK?

MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah. Thank you, Peter.

Since Im paying for the mics, Ill take the first question and direct it to Steve. And then maybe after Steve gives his answer, well see if Peter has some thoughts on it too. But I mean, I have weve gotten several questions here, and one of them that Im not sure I mean, it doesnt relate directly to the to the data in the study, but it but it might explain some of it.

Steve, you had said that perhaps part of it is just a preference for denser living, as it were, because of, you know, housing patterns and what have you in the sending countries. But is there an aspect here of especially more recent immigrants simply choosing to spend their money in different ways? And what I mean by that is choosing to send money home to grandma rather than spending it on, say, somewhat higher rent to get, you know, an apartment that has an extra room in it or something like that. Do you see what I mean, Steve?

MR. CAMAROTA: Yeah, yeah. And we do mention that in the report. As I indicated, about $68 billion the latest World Bank figures come from the United States in the form of whats typically referred to as remittances. And those remittances typically, as far as we can tell from the best research, come from immigrants. Ninety percent plus do, so its mostly immigrants who send money home. Some native-born people send money out of the country as well, but its overwhelmingly done by immigrants. And that strongly suggests that that might be a motive to save money on housing, or perhaps there are other things. Maybe immigrants would prefer to invest money in their childrens education, and so save money on housing in a way that native-born people dont, and perhaps there are other items that they would rather have.

So, again, it must be emphasized that the that low-income immigrants we also have a whole analysis where we look at people in poverty or people who live near poverty. And since immigrants are more likely to fall under those categories and those categories are more likely to be overcrowded, that likely does have an impact as well.

But what Marks really asking is: Why do immigrants who are nowhere near poverty immigrants who make, say $35 an hour or more why are they about as likely to live in overcrowded housing as natives who make about $15 an hour? That isnt so easy to explain, and I think it has something to do with these things weve been talking about different perspective on houses, different ideas and attitudes. And so which make perfect sense, I think. And also this idea of maybe sending money home or maybe spending money on other things, as well. And that, I think, likely explains or contributes to it as well.

So I think there are a lot of factors there. And this data isnt very good at getting at that, but certainly thats another area to consider in the future for more research.

(TECHNICAL ISSUE) MR. KRIKORIAN: Im going to Im going to ask I was going to ask Steve another question here, and this kind of relates to the issue of housing as well. But do is there a role your data doesnt, obviously, get this. Its just simply numbers collected by the, you know, government surveys. But is there potentially a role in zoning and that kind of enforcement but you know, housing occupancy rules in reducing crowding among anybody, I mean immigrants or the native-born? In other words because there are rules on this different communities have. You can only have X number of unrelated people living together in the same home, that kind of thing. They are often not enforced very well or sometimes enforced at all. And so my question, Steve, is: Is there potentially a role not just for immigration policy, but this in a sense for kind of local, you know, standard kind of regular enforcement of these kind of occupancy rules?

MR. CAMAROTA: Yeah. Id say theres a real challenge here because one of the analyses we do, which I didnt talk about, is we try to look at what fraction of people in these in overcrowded households or immigrant and native households in general or I should say where immigrant and native workers are and what kind of households theyre in in which theyre unrelated to, say, the household head, a very quick and easy way to look at that question. And the short answer is, you know, the vast majority of these workers are related to the household head.

You know, theres this stereotype of immigrants living in housing that is that is crowded with a bunch of unrelated workers all trying to save money, you know, sleeping on cots kind of thing. That is just not what the data show. The data show that the vast majority of immigrant households overall and the vast majority of even overcrowded households are generally all people who are related. Now, they might have more distant relatives, but in general it is not the case that immigrants are living in a situation where theyre all a lot of unrelated people. That happens. In fact, the highest percentage of any occupation we could find among immigrants, I recall and Im doing this from memory was among meat and poultry processors and butchers, and I think it was like 16 percent of the workers were unrelated to the household head which is not a perfect measure, but a pretty good indication that these are mostly families; maybe extended families, but mostly families.

And so if you try to enforce zoning and housing regulations, A, I dont think it would have that much effect. And the other concern I have with that approach is it might not be very sensitive to the unique situation of immigrants and how they live their lives in and how they tend to have bigger families and so forth. So Im not sure we could do all that much with that.

And again, it must be emphasized its not a bunch of unrelated people, as far as we could tell but maybe thats an area for more analysis but as far as we could tell, of unrelated people living together. Thats not whats going on here. Its mostly related people. Its mostly families, and regulation cant deal with that anyway.

MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah, good. Thank you. Thats actually thats interesting. In other words, its not an issue of, you know, 16 guys rotating on mattresses or anything like that.

MR. CAMAROTA: No.

MR. KRIKORIAN: This is that does happen, but its a relatively small part of this of this phenomenon.

(TECHNICAL ISSUE)

MR. KRIKORIAN: Steve, theres one of the things that happens is that we see a lot of COVID there are hotspots in various outlier counties that dont really have a lot of immigration; in other words, where immigration clearly doesnt really seem to play much of a role in the spread of the virus in those places. I mean, does that underline the fact that, obviously, this is a contributing aspect in some cases, but not really whats driving the issue?

MR. CAMAROTA: Well, I would say this. When you look at some of those outlying counties, which we did with a county-by-county analysis which was very brief, I should point out theyre often unusual places. Some outlying counties either have a prison, a long-term care facility of some kind, or large jail or detention facility, not so far as I can tell, not associated with immigration, just in general. Or some of these more rural outlying areas have some kind of facility, typically meat and poultry processing, and that does seem to be playing a role.

There is another type of outlying county also, and that is some and you see this in the Dakotas and you also see this in Alaska Indian reservations. It is very common on Indian reservations. Although theyre typically these big ones are rural or generally rural, there is also a high incidence of overcrowding.

So I would say that there is also I should point out we do an analysis in the report looking by population density. And it is true that in rural areas there is more overcrowding than in some more, like, suburban areas, not relative to densely-populated areas. And that can reflect, often, the fact that farming, and meat and poultry, and fish processing often take place in rural areas, and these facilities, as I indicated also warehouses, even have had a lot of outbreaks. And so that may help account for that.

However, when we look at immigrants and natives who live in rural areas, the difference between the two groups remains extremely large. In other words, immigrants who live in rural areas, just like immigrants who live in urban areas, are dramatically more likely to live in overcrowded housing than are native-born workers who live in rural areas or urban areas.

Now, having said all that, it is absolutely essential to again emphasize that it would definitely be a mistake to think that overcrowding or the immigration that contributes to it is even the most important reason for the spread of COVID-19. When we think about why the United States has done worse than many other industrialized countries, its not at all clear that it has its overcrowding. What is clear is that prior research and some new research says overcrowding does play a role. The fact that its not by any means the only factor doesnt mean that its unimportant, and it looks like maybe its important even in rural and urban areas and areas in between.

MR. KRIKORIAN: Lets try one more time for Peter to get his thoughts in. Go ahead, Peter. Sorry about that.

MR. SKERRY: Thats OK. Can you hear me now?

MR. KRIKORIAN: Yes. Yeah, I can hear you. Go ahead.

MR. SKERRY: OK. Well, I think an overall point that I would I would make, that goes back to your original point but it covers the waterfront in some ways, is that what I think is intriguing about this from a public-policy and a political point of view is that the drivers of overcrowding among immigrants, whatever the specific and detailed causal components are and I think Steve and his colleague have done a good job of laying out the alternatives and which ones seem to be the most critical the fact is that it seems to me that immigrants are immigrants are making choices that are that we that most of us would regard as positive choices in the sense that theyre very concerned about their relatives. They open their houses up to relatives not just relatives, but theyre that they have a strong sense of obligation and duty to their to their friends and relatives. And I think that has to be, most obviously, connected to this overcrowding dynamic.

But like so many things in social policy, actions that are driven by positive motives may have negative outcomes negative health outcomes in this case which, again, is its important to underline that. So many of our discussions and debates about immigration and immigration policy either romanticizes immigrants and what and their motives and their culture, or it demonizes them. But the obvious reality for immigrants and for the rest of us is that often our own positive drives and emotions vis--vis our children, for example, might have obvious negative consequences for somebody elses children. If I take a spot in a in an you know, a very sought-after school for my kids, well, I may be depriving somebody else whose kids might in some other sense deserve to be there more. But that is a difficult tradeoff that we always encounter in social issues and social policy. And I think thats an interesting implication of what Steve is pointing to, that these are these are troubling outcomes often, I think, driven by positive motives.

MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah. And that kind of underlines the basic point, really, I think of a lot of CISs work, is that this isnt about immigrants as people; its about immigration as a policy.

MR. SKERRY: Yes.

MR. KRIKORIAN: Yeah. And one question maybe for both of you. I mean, whoever wants to weigh in on this. One of the what weve seen from CBP, which is the agency that oversees the Border Patrol and what have you, is that theyre suggesting that one of the things theyve seen is illegal immigrants who have come across the border and there still has been some flow, even though its lower than it was, you know, a year ago are more likely to be to have the virus and then settle in immigrant communities in the United States, and thus spread the virus that way, using that as kind of part of the rationale for the more extraordinary border-control measures weve seen. Does, I mean, either one of you have any thoughts on that as to whether its first of all, whether you have a sense whether its true or not, but also, you know, what are the possible implications of that? Either one of you wants to take that?

MR. SKERRY: I defer to Steve in the first instance and Ill ponder it.

MR. CAMAROTA: I dont know about what is the incidence of COVID among people crossing, but its an important question. Its certainly true that since immigrants, especially coming in or newly arriving or maybe even returning, are much are pretty likely to live with other immigrants, and since the analysis indicates that immigrants workers, anyway live often in an in an overcrowded residential setting, that would mean that someone coming in with it is going to be even more easily spread the disease, given the way these houses are laid out.

So I guess that would be a definite concern. In other words, if someones arriving in the United States and goes to an area where theres more overcrowding, then that and they have the disease then that probably is going to make the situation even worse. So thats a concern. And in a different way, keeping out people who have COVID-19 infections until at least their infections over is probably very helpful to immigrant communities because theyre uniquely vulnerable to these diseases because of the housing settlement patterns.

MR. KRIKORIAN: Any thoughts on that, Peter?

MR. SKERRY: Yeah. Yeah. Again, from a somewhat maybe broader angle and a point that I think is probably obvious, but like a lot of things in this in the immigration policy area the obvious often gets excluded or overlooked which is that one of the things Ive been struck by, especially teaching as I do especially undergraduates at Boston College, the rhetoric that one has heard and its not rhetoric in a pejorative sense; its just sort of the articulated assumptions that people, you know, come out with that doesnt that dont reflect much thought, but theyre just assumed to be correct that kind of rhetoric of always questioning borders, you know, being skeptical of the need for control of borders, that we live in a borderless world and thats, you know, the state of affairs, and thats even in fact desirable, well, suddenly in the last six, seven, eight months thats clearly been brought up short and undermined. I havent heard too many people complaining in Europe about the efforts of member countries of the European Union controlling their borders. Its obvious that they need to do that in the context of something like this pandemic.

And in the same way, while theres been a lot of dispute about the Trump administrations handling of borders generally, I mean, the notion that we need to monitor who comes into this country across our Mexican border is rather straightforward and obvious. Now, how it gets done and with what kinds of care and empathy, all those kinds of issues get drawn in, and I understand. But the basic logic of the need to control our borders, weve had a weve had a healthy wakeup call, and I think thats worth noting.

MR. KRIKORIAN: Good. Thanks.

Let me just take one more question because we want to respect everybodys time. But among the things that Steve and his co-author referred to and then you underlined as well, Peter was things like maybe increasing the minimum wage or increasing EITC or that sort of thing; in other words, government policy measures designed, hopefully, to increase the income, the earnings of people at the bottom, immigrants and natives. It wouldnt just be immigrants, obviously. But the question here with regard to immigration policy is that some significant portion not all of it, but a significant portion of this phenomenon that were talking about relates to illegal immigrants, and the whether its minimum wage or EITC, whatever, is going to be less relevant to them. Its not I mean, there are, in fact, illegal immigrants who file taxes and minimum wages do have some effect on what illegal immigrants are paid, but its more indirect. And so the question I would throw out is: Are these kind of interventions by the government related to increasing earnings likely to be less effective than we might hope precisely because a significant portion of the target population we would be trying to help are, in fact, illegal immigrants? Either one of you want to take that?

MR. CAMAROTA: Well, I mean, Ill just say this. If you raise the minimum wage, theres no reason you wouldnt say it counts for everyone, right? You could say that it doesnt matter your legal status. It doesnt mean were not going to enforce the law, but employers cant use your illegality as an excuse to pay you less. So that might be one of the more effective ways. Youre right, if you give out payments cash payments, if that were your option then, you know, youre going to obviously, its not likely to go to illegals, though in a Democratic administration and so forth it might. And in fact, theres evidence that the additional child tax credit is often received by illegals. I wont go into the details, but it has to do with the way the IRS interpreted the regulations. So, you know, theres that as well.

But your overall question of illegality, yeah, that does matter. But as I tried to indicate Ill summarize quickly about two-thirds of all the immigrant workers who live in overcrowded condition(s) are legal immigrants, so anything that would apply to legal immigrants would have a very big effect. Immigrants legal immigrants are about one-third of all the workers in America who live in overcrowded housing. And if you focus just, again, on immigrants, then immigrants are about two-thirds. So most immigrants who live in overcrowded are legal, and that makes sense. Legal immigrants are much more numerous than illegal immigrants. So, yes, its true that illegal immigrants would might be left out if you did income transfers, but a minimum wage should benefit them as well.

I should point out that when you drill down into the data at least that we had, and assuming that we were successfully and all we did was base our analysis on the work of others if we successfully identified the illegal immigrants, it does not look like they make dramatically less than the native-born working at the same job, which isnt too surprising because theyre doing the same work. They probably make about the same wages. So in that sense it doesnt look like immigrants, even illegal immigrants, work for dramatically less.

The reason illegal immigrants make a lot less on average overall is that theyre much less skilled. They only have 11 years of schooling on average. A large fraction, as far as we could tell, report that they dont speak English well. And these are big hinderance(s) in the U.S. labor market low levels of education, moderate levels of English-language knowledge, and so forth.

So maybe thats a long answer to a short question, but the bottom line is that things like minimum wage would probably help the illegal immigrants if were going to letting them stay. And I guess my final point is we have to make a decision about that question. If policy is to let illegal immigrants stay, then we need to legalize them and try to make sure that they are as protected in the labor market as they should be. If the policy is to try to enforce the law and encourage as many to go home as possible to help American workers, to help legal immigrants put upward pressure on wages, then thats the other policy.

In some ways, whenever you bring up illegal immigration and what to do about illegal immigrants here, it really hearkens back to the underlying question: What do we want to do with illegal immigration? Do we want to actually enforce the law and try to reduce the size of illegal immigration, or do we want to just tolerate it and manage its consequences? And to that end or maybe even legalize folks. Thats, obviously, another big option. And I think thats really the question youre asking, what to do about illegal immigration.

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Panel Transcript: Overcrowded Housing Among Immigrant and Native-Born Workers - Immigration Blog

McALLEN, Texas (Border Report) The acting head of the Department of Homeland Security on Tuesday issued the first-ever Homeland Threat Assessment report on the state of security of the United States, detailing illegal immigration, cyber threats, COVID-19, violent extremism and drug cartels as among the top threats to the nation.

Acting DHS Secretary Chad Wolf prefaced the 26 page report by writing in the introduction that it is for the entire American public to read, so they can understand the daily threats his agents face.

It is as close as the American people will get to seeing and understanding the information that I see as Secretary and that our employees see in their national security missions. As you read through the HTA you should have faith in knowing that these threats were identified using the best intelligence, operational information, and employee knowledge available to the Department, Wolf wrote. The result is a Whole-of-DHS report on the threats to the Homeland.

These threats were identified using the best intelligence, operational information, and employee knowledge available.

The report draws upon all sources of information and expertise available, he wrote. This includes information from intelligence officers, law enforcement agencies and operational units.

Top security threats to the American public include:

The report says Mexican-based TCOs represent an acute and devastating threat to public health and safety. It cites over 71,000 drug overdoses in the United States in 2019 and says TCOs foment corruption, and destroy confidence in the international banking system.

These organizations operate human trafficking chains that bring in illegal migrants and attempt to exploit legal immigration avenues, the report says.

Transnational criminal organizations especially those based in Mexico will continue to be an acute and devastating threat undermining public health and safety in the Homeland and a significant threat to U.S. national security.

The biggest threat by drug cartels is their ability to control territory including along the U.S. Southwest border and co-opt parts of government, particularly at a state and local level, the report says. The Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartel networks post the greatest cross-border drug smuggling threat as they dominate the trafficking of cocaine and other drugs.

Drug cartels operate large human smuggling rings on the Southwest land border and have tradditionally taxed human smugglers and traffickers to move migrants through their areas of operation.

Despite the coronavirus pandemic, the report cites that drug cartels and coyote traffickers have continued to move undocumented migrants, which threaten local border communities and DHS agents.

Many victims never seek assistance from law enforcement because of language barriers, fear of retaliation from their traffickers and/or fear of law enforcement. This allows traffickers to force victims into labor or commercial sexual exploitation. Traffickers continue to target people they believe to be susceptible for a wide variety of reasons, the report says.

The report acknowledges that the COVID-19 pandemic has changed how the Trump administration is admitting asylum-seekers who seek to lawfully cross at land ports. Since March, all land ports have been closed to anyone not considered an essential worker. And all U.S. immigration court cases have been indefinitely postponed.

The report predicts that the pandemic increases the chance of a mass migration event from Cuba or Haiti.

A surge in illegal immigration activity at the Southwest border will require United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to re-examine how resources are properly aligned at the Southwest Border, likely impacting the larger asylum system, it states.

Furthermore, the report is critical of a lack of bipartisan support of detention measures and budgetary impediments towards immigration that it says continue to undermine U.S. immigration enforcement policies.

This is despite billions of dollars that Congress has appropriated at the Trump administrations request to build a nearly 2,000-mile-long border wall along the Southwest border.

High volume of illegal immigration, including unprecedented numbers of family units and unaccompanied alien children arrivals, stretch government resources, and create a humanitarian and border security crisis that cripples the immigration system, the report states.

However, migrant advocates point out that since the coronavirus pandemic began and the Trump administration enacted Title 42 barring travelers from crossing at land ports to stop the spread of the virus the expulsion of migrants has been rapid, and agency officials have admitted that they are not being held in detention facilities.

U.S. Border Patrol Deputy Chief Raul Ortiz last month came to South Texas and told Border Report that the expulsion of thousands of migrants, many children, during this COVID-19 pandemic is swift, quick processing, often within hours, and they are then taken back to Mexico. This allows us to minimize the exposure to our workforce and to the communities and be able to repatriate and expel these individuals back to Mexico, Ortiz said.

Those who have gotten past Border Patrol checkpoints, the report warns, should note that interior raids by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents will soon begin in the interior. As the pandemic subsides, ICE will conduct additional enforcement operations to uphold its public safety mission and address the growing fugitive backlog, the report said.

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First-ever Whole-of-DHS report on US threats released - wreg.com

By Isabella Lloyd-Damnjanovic

The deaths of more than 350 migrants in the 2013 sinking of an overloaded smuggling vessel off the Italian island of Lampedusa shocked the world and reignited debate over the European Unions response to the increasing numbers of asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean Sea. At first, frontline EU Member States moved swiftly to set up search-and-rescue operations, adopting an approach in keeping with international conventions such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, which require rescue of persons in distress in states territorial waters regardless of their legal status.

This response proved short-lived. The European Union changed its approach at the height of the 2015-16 migration crisis, when approximately 1.4 million asylum seekers and migrants reached Europe via the sea. Shifting from a decentralized system of national rescue operations, the bloc instead concentrated on border management via Frontex, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and prioritized erecting obstacles to reaching its borders, increasing surveillance, and criminalizing search-and-rescue operations by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This move towards securitization made the sea passage more dangerous and difficult but did not reduce migrant deaths. Instead, years after the crisis, the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) has been responsible for more migrant deaths than any other waterway in the world, according to the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Approximately half of the more than 38,000 migrant deaths and disappearances globally recorded by IOM between January 2014 and October 2020 occurred in the Mediterranean; of these, 82 percent have been in the Central Mediterranean. Moreover, even as overall crossings have declined, the death rate has been going up: in 2019, one in 21 people who attempted the crossing died, slightly more than double the rate of 2016. It is difficult to establish direct causation, but migrant advocates and humanitarian responders have linked the policy changes restricting NGO search-and-rescue activities to this increased death rate.

While paths across the Mediterranean can overlap, the CMR, which runs from North Africa to either Italy or Malta, is one of three main sea routes; others take migrants from Morocco to Spain, from Turkey to Cyprus, or across the Aegean from Turkey to Greece. Nearly 14,000 people successfully disembarked in Italy or Malta in 2019, many after spending days at sea, and often aided by a robust smuggling industry in Libya that has ballooned since the 2011 overthrow of leader Muammar Gaddafi. The national origins of asylum seekers and other migrants vary by route and time period, but in 2019 most travelers along the Central Mediterranean were from Tunisia, Pakistan, or Cte dIvoire. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that at least one-third of those who arrived in Europe via the Central Mediterranean in 2018 were in need of international protection, among them unaccompanied or separated children, who accounted for 15 percent of migrants arriving in Italy in 2019. Although fewer people traveled the CMR in 2019 than any year since 2012, the rate of migrant deaths and disappearances relative to arrivals along this route has steadily increased, more than doubling from 2016 to 2019, from 2.4 percent to 6.4 percent. This rate dropped dramatically in 2020, potentially due to higher numbers of migrants departing in sturdier vessels from Tunisia, changes in movement patterns due to the coronavirus pandemic, and other factors.

This article evaluates the evolution of European policy regarding Central Mediterranean crossings, which initially was grounded in a search-and-rescue frame following the Lampedusa shipwreck but subsequently took on a hardened security lens. Europes approach shifted to prioritize enforcement against migrants at sea and criminalization of NGOs that launched their own search-and-rescue operations, sometimes to great publicity, as when the British artist Banksy financed a vessel in mid-2020. In the process, European leaders made the route more treacherous for migrants.

Initial Policy Response: Member State-Led Search and Rescue

Most migrants crossing the Central Mediterranean to Europe arrive in Italy. At the time of the Lampedusa shipwreck, Italian policy had largely taken a humanitarian approach to sea arrivals, rather than one focused on border enforcement. Officials often rescued asylum seekers and other migrants from vessels in distress, allowing them to disembark and undergo asylum processing in southern Italy. Following the Lampedusa shipwreck, the Italian government launched Operation Mare Nostrum, a search-and-rescue program with a monthly budget of 9 million euros, in an effort to decrease the number of deaths at sea. As a maritime security operation involving units from the Italian Navy and Air Force, Mare Nostrum spanned 70,000 square kilometers of the Mediterranean, including areas strategically positioned around the Libyan coast. The operation was equipped with two submarines, coastal radar technology, helicopters with infrared capability, drones, and 900 staff. Mare Nostrum proved to be highly effective in minimizing deaths at sea, rescuing nearly 156,400 people during its single year of existence. Moreover, the operation proved to be successful at identifying and apprehending smugglers; it was responsible for the arrest of more than 350 smugglers and the confiscation of nine ships.

Despite its objective success at minimizing maritime deaths, however, Mare Nostrums high cost and the refusal of other EU states to contribute to its funding eventually made the operation politically unsustainable. Increasing anti-immigrant sentiment and political pressure from within Italy and other Member States contributed to its termination in October 2014. Critics of Mare Nostrum cited it as a pull factor responsible for the uptick in migrant crossings in 2014. Within Italy, growing resentment of the lack of European support justified its dissolution; then-Interior Minister Angelino Alfano argued that Italy could not and should not take charge of the Mediterranean border on its own.

The end of Mare Nostrum heralded a dramatic decrease in Europes willingness and capacity to conduct search and rescue. In its place came a policy focused on centralized border management, characterized by border-control agreements with origin or transit countries such as Libya, the conditioning of development aid including the EU Trust Fund for Africa on migration management agreements, and the criminalization of civil-society rescue operations in its territorial waters. The consequences have been fatal.

From Search and Rescue to Border Externalization and Criminalization

Following the termination of Operation Mare Nostrum, surveillance and enforcement activities at Europes external borders were taken over by Frontex. Established in 2004 as the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders, Frontex was given an initial mandate to coordinate Member States border control, facilitate intelligence sharing, and assist in returning third-country nationals entering the bloc without authorization.

In November 2014 the agency launched Operation Triton, whose primary focus on border surveillance and enforcement illustrated the shift in priorities. With less than one-third the funding of its predecessor and only 65 personnel, Triton initially confined its area of operations to a mere 30 nautical miles beyond the Italian coastline, severely limiting its capacity to conduct search-and-rescue activities. Fabrice Leggeri, Frontexs head since January 2015, insisted that Triton had not been designed to replace Mare Nostrum, whose activities he said had bolstered Libyas smuggling trade. Search-and-rescue operations were not in Frontexs mandate, and this is in my understanding not in the mandate of the European Union, he said in 2015. We should not support and fuel the business of traffickers.

After more than 1,200 migrants died in two shipwrecks in April 2015, Frontex expanded Tritons reach to 138 nautical miles off the Italian coast and the European Union launched a military mission, European Union Naval Force Mediterranean (EU-NavFOR Med), also known as Operation Sophia, to more comprehensively address trafficking and smuggling. Sophia extended its patrol activities into Libyas territorial waters and focused on targeting smugglers vessels. To evade these patrols, smugglers abandoned traditional wooden vessels in favor of cheaper, unseaworthy rubber dinghies without engines, which were often towed by skiffs and then left adrift. A 2017 European Commission joint communication noted the consequences of these changes, concluding that the large number of dinghies contributes to making journeys increasingly dangerous and to the rise in the number of deaths at sea. While the rhetoric of both missions suggested that humanitarian operations remained a core component of EU policy, neither operation had a specific search-and-rescue mandate, and the proportion of rescues conducted by Triton and Sophia steadily decreased during their tenures. For example, according to data collected by the Italian Coast Guard, Triton was responsible for 24 percent of total rescues in 2015, but for just 13 percent by 2017.

In December 2015, at the height of the migration and refugee crisis, the European Commission proposed expanding Frontexs mandate, making it responsible for managing the entirety of the European Unions borders and giving it executive powers similar to those of national border agencies. Many legal scholars and human-rights activists were quick to condemn what they saw as the potential for abuse of these executive powers. They were particularly concerned about agency accountability for human-rights abuses committed in remote locations such as on the high seas, during joint return flights, and in third-country detention centers, as well as the challenges associated with guaranteeing adequate mechanisms for reporting and addressing complaints by foreign nationals outside EU territorial waters.

The number of migrants crossing the Mediterranean by sea into Europe reached a peak of more than 1 million in 2015, precipitated largely by upheaval from the Syrian civil war. This represented an almost six-fold increase in migrant arrivals since the previous year, and though this number dropped to about 360,000 by the end of 2016, it still constituted more than twice the previous average of annual arrivals. In response to this spike in crossings and the void left by changing EU policy, maritime NGOs began to expand their search-and-rescue operations. Between 2015 and 2016, the number of nongovernmental search-and-rescue vessels active along the CMR more than tripled, from four to 13, according to the Italian Coast Guard. Groups such as Mdecins Sans Frontires, Sea-Watch, and Migrant Offshore Aid Station (MOAS) became important search-and-rescue actors in the Mediterranean, accounting for 26 percent of all rescues in 2016. The Italian Navy (20 percent) and Coast Guard (20 percent) also accounted for significant operations, while EU-NavFOR Med accounted for about 13 percent and Frontex just 8 percent of total rescues that year. NGOs importance rose over time to account for 38 percent of total rescues in 2017 and 40 percent of rescues by the first half of 2018.

Italy-Libya Deal

In 2017, the Italian and Libyan governments signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) placing responsibility to intercept and return smugglers and migrants with the Libyan coast guard. In exchange, Libya received significant development funding from the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, border enforcement training for its coast guard, and financing and medical equipment for its migrant detention centers. Although Italy had negotiated with Gaddafi to curb migration and crack down on smuggling operations throughout the 2000s, this was the first externalization agreement the two countries signed since the outbreak of the Libyan civil war and the 2012 European Court of Human Rights verdict in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy. The decision in that case found Italy responsible for violating the principle of nonrefoulement by returning asylum seekers from the Maltese area of responsibility back to Libya. The MoU was renewed in early 2020.

This redirection of responsibility for preventing migrants from reaching Europe to Libyan authorities has resulted in more instances of arbitrary detention and a spike in detention-related abuses in Libya. Human-rights groups have argued that the MoU directly implicates Italy and the European Union more generally in the large-scale violation of asylum seekers rights. Reports indicate that conditions in Libyan detention centerswhere hunger strikes, overcrowding, riots, torture, lack of medical care, and physical and sexual abuse run rampantconsistently violate human-rights standards. Although Libyan authorities have been well funded by the European Union, the country remains in the midst of civil war, and coast guard leaders include an assortment of former smugglers and militia members.

Criminalization Takes the Lead

The Italy-Libya agreement and Frontexs prioritization of anti-smuggling surveillance was accompanied by the increased criminalization of NGOs search-and-rescue activities. Until 2013, Member States in the Mediterranean had discouraged private vessels from fulfilling their international obligations to rescue people in distress but did not prosecute them for it. This changed after the expansion of Frontexs powers in 2015, and EU members began actively prosecuting NGOs involved in rescue activities, seizing and impounding their vessels, and charging crew members with facilitating illegal immigration. Data collected by the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) show that 17 NGO ships were involved in legal proceedings between 2017 and June 2020. NGOs have nonetheless continued to intervene in rescue activities at their own risk. In the process, some activists have emerged as unlikely celebrities, such as Sea-Watch ship captain Carola Rackete, who squared off against the Italian government, and Pia Klemp, who commands the Banksy-funded rescue boat Louise Michel.

In 2017, as a result of intense political pressure, NGOs operating in the Mediterranean agreed to sign a code of conduct, drafted by Italy in consultation with the European Commission, which prohibited search-and-rescue activities in Libyan territorial waters and enacted other restrictions. Because of the MoU with Libya, the new code of conduct effectively limited the NGO ships available scope of rescue to European territorial waters and redirected most responsibility for search and rescue to Libyan authorities.

Italy and Malta have prevented civil society search-and-rescue vessels from disembarking at their ports since 2018. The following year, with the backing of then-Interior Minister Matteo Salvini, Italys Parliament adopted a law imposing fines of up to 1 million euros and automatically impounding private vessels found to be conducting rescue activities. European states affected by irregular sea arrivals, including Italy, Greece, Spain, and Malta, since 2015 have pursued legal cases against individuals and NGOs for their humanitarian intervention, alleging crimes such as facilitation of irregular immigration, human smuggling, membership in a criminal organization, and money laundering. According to FRA, more than 40 criminal investigations have been initiated by European states since 2017, of which a dozen remain pending. For example, in 2017 Italy pressed charges against the crew of the German NGO Jugend Rettets Iuventa for their activities off the Libyan coast; the Italian NGO Mediterranea Saving Humans had two vessels impounded for several months starting in mid-2019. Frontexs Operation Sophia was ended in March 2020, after a year of operating without naval vessels, a change made under pressure from Salvini. It was replaced with Operation Irini, which focuses solely on enforcing an arms embargo against Libya.

NGOs, meanwhile, have directly blamed the European Union and its Member States for the increased rate of migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Their leaders have criticized governments for scaling back search-and-rescue operations while targeting private rescuers. Mdecins Sans Frontirs stated: Not only has Europe failed to provide search-and-rescue capacity, it has also actively sabotaged others attempts to save lives.

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Criminalization of Search-and-Rescue Operations in the Mediterranean Has Been Accompanied by Rising Migrant Death Rate - World - ReliefWeb

WASHINGTON If North Texas lawyer Stephen Daniel has his way, the race for Texas' 6th Congressional District will be decided on the issue of health care.

But U.S. Rep. Ron Wright, R-Arlington, says his battle with cancer amid the campaign has given him an up-close look at the health care system and why the Democratic policies that Daniel is campaigning on would be bad for North Texas.

Across the board, the campaign has been defined by the coronavirus pandemic and Wrights cancer diagnosis.

Daniel, 44, says both highlight the need to improve the nations health care system and make it more equitable for Texans living in the district.

My opponent goes around and hes bragged about what great health care he gets, and he consistently votes against everyone elses health care and denies everyone else the same great health care that he gets, Daniel said in an interview with The Dallas Morning News.

Thats something that has really bothered me in this race. Its that type of mentality that we just dont need in Washington. We should all have access to great affordable health care and great [prescription] drugs at low prices, he added.

Wright, 67, announced in July 2019 that he had been diagnosed with lung cancer earlier that year. He said he had no intention of slowing down but was hospitalized twice last month due to complications with his treatment and has been unable to campaign since then.

Due to his health, Wright was unable to participate in an interview, but he provided statements in response to questions from The News.

As Ive battled cancer while remaining hard at work, Ive come to understand just how reliant on American healthcare ingenuity the rest of the world is, Wright said. If we go down the road Democrats demand, mainly the complete government takeover of our healthcare system, we will forever diminish our ability to innovate and find new treatments. We will also destroy whats left of competition in the healthcare arena, driving up costs for the taxpayer.

Daniel hit Wright for the GOPs efforts to repeal the Affordable Care Act and his vote last year against a Democratic-led bill that would reverse a decision from President Donald Trump to relax a provision of the ACA that allows states to receive federal financial support and to waive the ACAs mandates, known as Section 1332. In return for the flexibility, states are required to guarantee coverage that is as comprehensive and accessible as that provided by the ACA.

I have friends and family that paid more for health insurance per month than they do for their house or their car, Daniel said. In Texas, we have the highest uninsured rate of any place in the nation, and its only gotten worse during the pandemic with people losing their jobs. Thats the main reason I got into [the race]. I was so struck by how nightmarish the health care system is.

Wright, the former tax assessor-collector for Tarrant County, is in his first term in Congress, succeeding longtime U.S. Rep. Joe Barton, who Wright worked for as chief of staff and district director from 2000 to 2009. Wrights been involved in North Texas politics for decades, serving on the Arlington City Council from 2000 to 2008.

In 2018, Wright secured his seat by an 8% margin and won an uncontested primary in March of this year.

Daniel was born in Austin, moving to the North Texas town of Itasca as an infant. He attended the University of Texas at Austin, becoming the first member of his family to graduate from college in 1999. Daniel then attended St. Marys Law School in San Antonio, graduating in 2002, and now works for Dallas County Judge Clay Jenkins' law firm.

Daniel became the Democratic nominee for the district in March when he also won an uncontested race.

Most of the districts population is in suburban Arlington and the southeast corner of Tarrant County. The district stretches to the southeast, encompassing Waxahachie, Corsicana and the rural areas around the two towns.

National Democrats are targeting Wrights district and have it on the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committees list of districts that its seeking to flip this November. The DCCC, the campaign arm for House Democrats, polled the district in June, finding just a single-digit lead for Wright. Democratic U.S. Senate candidate Beto Orourke also outperformed Wrights 2018 challenger in the district in his race against Sen. Ted Cruz.

Along with health care, Daniel said he will prioritize improving public schools, increasing access to broadband internet in rural areas and assisting small businesses hurt by the pandemic, if elected in November.

Wright promised to defend conservative values and rebuild the economy from the damage caused by the pandemic.

I prioritize constituent services at home, and in D.C. I stand up for the common-sense, conservative values of our district, Wright said. Our campaign is all about getting our nation back to work after the COVID pandemic, fighting for true border security, including stopping human trafficking, and returning fiscal sanity to Washington by reducing spending and waste.

Daniel turned Wrights conservatism against him, calling him an extremist who follows his partys lead when voting on legislation. Several controversial opinion columns that Wright wrote for the Fort Worth Star-Telegram in the 1990s are further proof of that extremism, said Daniel, promising to be a congressman who works with members in both parties.

I am not just a checkbox for a party vote, and I think thats what separates us. People are tired of the extremism in Washington, Daniel said. I know I am.

When Wrights columns resurfaced this year, his campaign called the columns out of context comments from two decades ago and accused Daniel of embracing mob-mentality cancel culture.

Wright continues to play up his conservative bonafides, highlighting his decades of service in the district.

Ive served this district for many years, Wright said. Be it as Tarrant Co. Tax Assessor-Collector, Chief of Staff for CD-06, or as your Congressman, Ive been a taxpayer watchdog, fighter for the unborn, and strong advocate for ending illegal immigration and human trafficking on our southern border.

Despite the outside support, Daniel faces an uphill battle to unseat Wright.

Wright reported just over $105,000 in cash on hand at the end of the last fundraising period in June. Daniel reported $84,900 in cash on hand at the end of the same period.

Neither man has been able to campaign in person recently, with Daniel holding online events due to the pandemic and Wright on bed rest due to his hospitalizations.

You try to get your message out any way you can, Daniel said.

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In suburban D-FW congressional race, Wright touts conservative record, Daniel calls for end to extremism - The Dallas Morning News