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In a Friday, April 14, 2023 sermon in Arak, Iran, Khamenei's representative in Markazi Province, Gholamali Dorri-Najafabadi, said that the Jews "love life" and fear death, and that in contrast, Iranian children "love martyrdom" and "will [inherit] the Kingdom of Heaven." He said that if you capture one Zionist, it is "as if you took the lives of all of them [] They would be willing to give up everything to free just one of them." He added that the Zionists do not care about "matters of faith" and that all they do care about is "lust, sex, other dirty activities, embezzlement, plundering, treason, and other things." In addition, Dorri-Najafbadi cited Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah's statement that Israel is "weaker than a spider web." The sermon was aired on Aftab TV (Iran).

To view the clip of the Friday Sermon in Iran click here or below:

The Jews Are "Greedy For This Life And Afraid Of Death"; They Are "Willing To Give Up Everything To Free Just One Of Them"

Gholamali Dorri-Najafabadi: "The Jews are terrified. Our esteemed brother, Talkhabi, who represents Qazvin in the Assembly of Experts, said: One of the [Jews'] main issues is that they are very loyal to the material world. They love to live, they would love to live a thousand years.

"They are greedy for this life and are afraid of death. Death is more terrifying than any other event for them. They are not ready [to die]. The Yasin [sic] Surah of the Quran states: '... then wish for death if what you say I true!'"

Crowd: "Death to Israel! Death to Israel! Death to Israel! Death to Israel!"

Dorri-Najafabadi: "Death to Zionism. If you capture one of them, it is as if you took the lives of all of them. In fact, they would be willing to give up everything to free just one of them.

"Matters Of Faith Are Not Important To The Zionists, [Who] Only Care About Lust, Sex, Other Dirty Activities, Embezzlement, Plundering, [And] Treason"

"They are not like our kids, who love martyrdom. The others have nothing. Our kids are the ones who [inherit] the Kingdom of Heaven. Matters of faith are not important to the Zionists. They care about lust, sex, other dirty activities, embezzlement, plundering, treason, and other such deeds.

"Really, just like Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah said Israel is weaker than a spider web."

Read the original:
Iran Friday Sermon By Khamenei's Representative In Markazi ... - Middle East Media Research Institute

After her career as a news journalist, Liimatainen became a non-fiction author. Her first book, "Iran: Huntu ja haaste" (Iran: Veil and Challenge), was published in 2009 and examines Iranian society and women's issues. Another book, "Saudi-Arabian toiset kasvot" (The Other Face of Saudi Arabia), was published in 2013. Her latest book: Riikinkukko ja Kameli (The Peacock and the Camel) about the history of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia was published in 2022.

For her last book traveled extensively across the region and spoken to both ordinary people and government officials. Her unique perspective on the region offers deep insights into the complex relationships and political landscapes that shape the Middle East. In this Q&A article, we explore Liimatainen's thoughts on recent developments in the region, including the potential for peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the challenges faced by Lebanon, and the future of the Abraham Accords.

Q: You have researched Iran and Saudi Arabia for a long time. You have written several books on this topic, and the latest book, The Peacock and the Camel, just came out. Was it a surprise for you that Iran and Saudi Arabia made peace?

A: No. It was already happening. I mean, the former Iraqi Prime Minister has been a mediator in this deal, and there had been five meetings before this in Baghdad.

Also, behind this story, there is an Iranian attack in 2019. They attacked with drones on production plants. It was a terrible message for the Saudis because with this attack, the Iranians showed that they knew everything about them. They could destroy the source of their wealth if they wanted to, but they didn't want to do that. They wanted them to change their politics, and this message was accepted by the Saudis. It was a terrible message for them, and they accepted it and started to negotiate with Iraqi mediation.

I interviewed a very important female journalist in Tehran when I was there last time, in March 2020. She told me that the Iranians wanted this kind of deal, and there was a will within the population to resolve this issue with the Saudis. Somehow, it was accepted by the population. So, it was already in the works, and I could see it coming.

Q: So, you think that drone attack was a turning point?

A: I think it was clearly a turning point. It was a tremendously well-orchestrated attack. Israeli experts said that it was the most precise attack ever made: two oil production plants were attacked by 25 drones, and every drone hit exactly where it was supposed to attack. And also, the fact that it was not some kind of massive destruction, it was a very intelligent strike which was meant as a message, and the Saudis understood the message. So they realized that the Iranians could hit any target inside Saudi Arabia if they wanted to.

Q: What do you think the reaction of the United States will be to this peace agreement between Iran, Saudi Arabia?

A: We must remember that the United States made a deal with Iran for the nuclear agreement, and the Biden administration has tried to restart negotiations. So, there is a will to resolve this because they want to control Iran's nuclear policy. I can't imagine that they see it as a very negative event. Of course, I think they mainly see a big and dangerous competitor in China who mediated the peace. A competitor for the future that is following a different line using the economy to influence instead of the military.

The American power has always also used economic means, but I think this Chinese version is new. At least officially, they don't use armies; they use the economy, technology, and loans. I can't understand what the Americans could say to this. Of course, it can harm their way of dealing, but let's hope it also makes them understand that there are other methods.

Q: Do you think that the peace between Saudi Arabia and Iran decreases US influence? Because if Saudi Arabia doesn't have an enemy like Iran, they won't buy more weapons, they don't need US bases in the country, and they wouldn't help the USA in containing Iran.

A: I think the US has decided on its own initiative to change its situation in the Middle East. Already during the Trump administration, they decided this. For example, the drone attack was during the Trump period, and it was terrible for Mohammed bin Salman that the Americans reacted so mildly. The Americans have realized by themselves that they can't afford the old kind of imperialist intervention anymore.

The US has to somehow adapt to the new reality of the world. They are not the only global power; there are other actors, and China is emerging very strongly. And of course, the fact that China is making some kind of alliance with Russia is a danger for Americans. But I think the American leadership must realize that the world is changing.

The main question was if this peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia would decrease the influence of the US in the region. I think US is very strongly oriented towards Asia

Yes, the other part of Asia is also significant for Americans, as future competition lies there. As a result, there has been a decrease in American presence in the Middle East, which is part of Eastern Asia. This is because they have felt that they have lost too many American soldiers and invested tons of money without achieving their goals.

It is unclear whether the new American offensive in the far east will be productive, but it seems that the United States is realizing that the world is changing, and so is the concept of East and West. For example, when Saudi Arabia declined Biden's request to increase oil production after the Ukraine war, it signaled that the country is no longer willing to accept the rules and demands of the United States.

One of the primary objectives for Saudi Arabia is the reorganization of its society and economy, as they understand that depending solely on oil is not sustainable in the long run. They need to invest on other revenues that are not generated from oil in the future. By refusing the American request, the Saudis sent a message that the world is changing, and they are no longer an obedient ally, always ready to serve the interests of the United States.

In summary, the message from Saudi Arabia highlights the shifting dynamics in the global landscape and the evolving relationships between countries like the United States and its traditional allies.

Q: Does de-dollarization in trade contribute to the fading influence of the United States?

A: Yes, I believe it does. As the concentration of global politics shifts more towards the East, the financial sector must adapt to these changes in order to follow the political landscape.

Q: What are the regional effects of peace between Iran and Saudi Arabia, considering countries like Yemen, Lebanon, Iraq, and Syria? How would peace between these nations affect these countries and beyond?

A: Well, for example, Saudi Arabia is negotiating with Syria and its leader, Assad. Previously, Assad was considered a terrible enemy by Saudi Arabia due to his alliance with Iran. The Saudis financed jihadists, while Iran had its proxies in Syria. However, in the current situation, the Arab nations, led by Saudi Arabia, are trying to salvage their relations with Syria because they sense that the Arabs are in a precarious position in the Middle East.Now, they need not just Syria, but also Assad on their side. They are negotiating with him in order to restore the power position of the Arab nations. With all the changes occurring globally, the Arab nations feel that they are losing the next game, and so they are investing in these relationships.As for Iran's role in Syria, it seems that they are less focused on the country now that the major conflict is over. However, it is important to remember that Iranian proxies were one of the main opponents of ISIS. While ISIS was attacked heavily by American airstrikes and heavy weapons, it was mainly Iranian militias that liberated towns like Mosul, which had been occupied by ISIS.Currently, ISIS still operates in the region between Syria and Iraq. Iran remains a strong force there, with its militias present in the border zone. They continue to make decisions and engage in questionable deals, which has led to criticism from Syria and Iraq. But they are also a strong force able to oppose ISIS on the ground in that zone.

The fact that Saudis are negotiating with Assad likely indicates they need some kind of central power in Syria. Perhaps this is one reason, but I'm just trying to guess. What we see in the Middle East is a long-lasting war with different components, and now there is a general resurgence of efforts to stabilize peace and move forward with the economy.

This seems to be a general feeling, and I think that if Iranians and Saudis made this deal, even if they are still strong enemies, it is in line with this sentiment. They have to restore some semblance of normal life in that region. For example, in Yemen, which has been severely affected by the conflict, Saudis need a deal. In Syria and Iraq, there have been changes in government, with Iraq now having a government consisting mainly of pro-Iranian parties.

However, even these pro-Iranian parties seem to be working differently now. Iran has tremendous power in Iraq and strategically feels the need to maintain control. But perhaps even there, some reasoning is taking place, as constant fighting and destruction do not improve people's lives.

As for Lebanon, I fear it is almost lost. Sectarian politics have ruined the country, a legacy of French colonialism aimed at protecting Christians. The country is now in economic ruin, and there is no sign of willingness to change the rules in Lebanon. Saudis have grown tired of the Lebanese, but they are now trying to reestablish relations.

However, Hezbollah is too strong in Lebanon, making it difficult to deal with them. The economy in Lebanon has completely collapsed, and it is a tremendous challenge to help the country recover. In Yemen, it remains uncertain whether there will be peace now that Saudi and Iran have made a deal. The Yemeni population has suffered terribly from the war, and they need peace. Saudis also need peace because they can be continually attacked.

Q: What do you think will happen to the Abraham Accord?

A: Regarding the Abraham Accords, it was an attempt by Israel and the United Arab Emirates to reach a deal, but Saudis have not been too enthusiastic. The current Israeli government is more extremist than ever before, which may worry those participating in the Abraham Accords. Those countries that made a deal and others who probably want to make a deal now have to think about where they are going and if this deal with Israel will continue.

Q: How do you see Iran and Saudi Arabia as a Finn who has traveled to both several times? Are there more differences or similarities between two countries and cultures?

A: Iran and Saudi Arabia are very different countries, with Iran having a long and complex history and civilization, while Saudi Arabia's society has been more nomadic. Iran has had a parliamentary system and civil society for decades, while this is a completely new concept in Saudi Arabia. These two countries have been on opposite sides, but now they are trying to understand each other and move forward, despite their differences.

Q: Who do you think will be fighting the next war in the Middle east?

A: It is difficult to predict if there will be a new war in the Middle East, given the recent attempts at peace. The main actors are trying to make peace, so it is not clear who would be involved in a potential conflict. Israel and Iran could be contenders, because Israel's current leadership may not be able to live in peace within the region. Iran, while making peace with Saudi Arabia, might still try to exert control over the Middle East through its proxies and other means.

HT

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Q&A with Liisa Liimatainen on Iran and Saudi Arabia - Helsinki Times

As Irans conservatives face an uphill task in next years elections, they also debate whether the regime should be a republic, or based on full clerical rule.

The sorrow state of Irans economy has put the conservative-hardliner forces in charge of both the parliament and the president on the back foot prior to parliamentary election next March.

Conservative politician Hossein Kanaani Moghaddam believes that parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and his allies will be among the most serious contestants within the conservative camp in the next election.

Asked how he would describe the configuration of conservative parties in the competition now that there is an all conservative government in Iran, Moghaddam said: The competition dates back to the fundamental difference in Iran's conservative camp between an "Islamic Republic" and an "Islamic government." He said each one of those ideas have their own supporters among conservatives. However, he said that without an Islamic Republic, it is impossible to create an Islamic government.

The Islamic Republic, as it exists and operates today, is based on the idea of the people's rule. However, in practice the Supreme Leader has absolute power. The interventions by Ali Khamenei and his Guardian Council and other centers of power under his control have left very little of the regime's democratic faade.

The idea of Islamic government, on the other hand, which was outlined by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the founder of the Islamic regime in Iran, is based on the idea of the holy Koran being the Constitutional Law of the government. When he came to power, Khomeini spoke very little about his book, The Islamic Government, in which Shiite clerics rather than the members of the parliament should make key decisions.

Conservative politician, Hossein Kanaani Moghaddam

Moghaddam said that a part of the conservative camp in Iran believes in establishing an Islamic government albeit based on their own definition and interests. Another part, he said, maintain that an Islamic government is impossible without an Islamic Republic. In other words, the two groups differ on the role of the people in the government.

In Iran, the late founding father of the ultraconservative Paydari party, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi said on many occasions that the people should have no part in the government and it is God who appoints the country's leaders. He even insisted that the leader's aides are also chosen by God rather than the people.

Moghaddam said that the Paydari Party is following the idea of establishing an Islamic government. He added that the two opposing conservative groups need to come to some sort of accord, otherwise, none of them can survive in Iran's political landscape. He also maintained that prejudiced support for the idea of Islamic government can deter the people and put an end to their support for the government.

Moghaddam himself is one those who believes in the Islamic Republic rather than an Islamic government. By warning about loss of popular support, he distanced himself from Paydari party which holds the majority both in the Majles and in Raisi's government. He further stressed that "talking about an Islamic government in Iran would be a mistake."

Asked how the two conservative groups can resolve this dichotomy, Kanani Moghaddam said: "They need to follow the Supreme Leader, otherwise, insisting on one of the two ideas will intensify factional infighting."

Regarding the status of Ghalibaf's "neo-con" group, he said that it is also one group among many other conservatives including traditional conservatives, moderate conservatives, conservative critics of the government, revolutionary groups and several conservative coalitions.

That degree of diversity among conservatives is healthy, but if their competition leads to conflicts and confrontations, then none of them can claim to represent the conservatives.

Originally posted here:
Irans Conservatives Divided Over Nature Of Islamic Regime -

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Defiant youths carried out thirteen courageous campaigns on April 17 in response to Ali Khameneis oppressive actions, including compulsory hijab and chemical attacks on girls schools. The campaigns targeted two IRGC Basij bases in Robat Karim and Tonekabon, one seminary affiliated with the regime in Amol, two judicial centers of the regime in Isfahan and Koohdasht, and the Coordinating Council for the Propaganda in Shahriar with Molotov cocktails.

In addition, they set fire to the sign of the Ministry of Intelligences spying headquarters in Borujerd and Nowshahr, the sign of compulsory hijab in Kalar Abad, Mazandaran, banners of Quds Day in Isfahan and Minab, and pictures of Ali Khamenei and Khomeini in Naziabad of Tehran, and Rafsanjan.

Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)

April 19, 2023

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Iran: Defiant Youths Target Regime's Centers and Billboards - NCRI - National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)

Implications for the Enforcement of Investor-state Arbitration Awards Arising From the Application of International Sanctions Against Russia

On 30 March 2023, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its judgment in Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America (Certain Iranian Assets), a dispute arising from the United States imposition of various legislative and judicial measures against Iran that were alleged to have resulted in the breach of the United States obligations under the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (1955) (the Treaty of Amity). While Certain Iranian Assets has been heralded as a win by both Iran and the United States, its greater impact may be on the evolving landscape of investor-State arbitration claims resulting from the application of sanctions on persons or entities, including most notably in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Interested host states and foreign investors alike should be keenly aware that this decision is anticipated to have important implications for states that have imposed international sanctions on Russia (or are developing legal mechanisms to provide for the enforcement of foreign judgments or arbitral awards against Russian assets in their jurisdictions) as well as for related disputes. As discussed below, both host states and foreign investors should take proactive action to assess potential risks and protect available rights implicated by the quickly evolving landscape of international investment law amid the current climate of international sanctions against Russia.

As indicated in the Preamble of the Treaty of Amity, Iran and the United States signed this treaty, inter alia, to promote friendly relations and to encourage mutually beneficial trade and investments and closer economic intercourse generally between their peoples as well as to regulate consular relations.1 To this end, the Treaty of Amity featured certain substantive obligations for the state parties, including that Iran and the United States:

The Treaty of Amity entered into force on 16 June 1957 and remained in force when the United States and Iran cut diplomatic ties in 1980 following the 1979 Iranian Revolution that resulted in the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran. The Treaty of Amity then continued in force during the following:

Many default judgments and significant damages judgments against Iran and Iranian state-owned entities followed these legislative and executive measures, and certain assets of Iran and Iranian entities (e.g., the assets of Bank Markazi) either are subject to enforcement proceedings or have been distributed to judgment creditors.11 Iran applied to institute ICJ proceedings on 14 June 2016 seeking,12 inter alia, declarations that the United States had breached the Treaty of Amity and that Iran and Iranian State-owned companies are entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of the US courts and in respect of enforcement proceedings in the United States as well as orders for the United States to comply with its obligations under the Treaty of Amity and to pay reparations to Iran for past violation of the United States international legal obligations.13 The United States announced that it was withdrawing from the Treaty of Amity on 3 October 2018.14

One key holding from the ICJs March 2023 Judgment in Certain Iranian Assets is that, since Bank Markazi did not constitute a company as that term is defined for the purposes of protection under the Treaty of Amity, the ICJ did not have jurisdiction to consider Irans claim in relation to what is reportedly over [US]$1.75bn in frozen assets from Irans central bank held in a Citibank account in New York, by far the largest amount claimed back by Tehran.15 The ICJ did find, however, as follows:

The ICJ concluded that Iran is entitled to compensation for the injury caused by violations by the United States that have been ascertained by the Court and that the ICJ will determine the amount due on the basis of further written pleadings limited to this issue absent agreement between the United States and Iran on the amount of compensation due within 24 months of the issuance of the judgment.23

Interestingly, Certain Iranian Assets has been hailed as a victory for both sides. The US Department of State highlights the case as a rejection of the vast majority of Irans case under the now-terminated Treaty of Amity in a major victory for the United States and victims of Irans State-sponsored terrorism.24 Irans Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, cites the judgment as another proof of the Islamic Republic of Irans righteousness and the violations by the US government.25 What is clear for other interested states and foreign investors, however, is that international investment law can be a double-edged sword for states imposing sanctions that may be considered to be contrary to their preexisting obligations in public international law.

The recent legal conversation about Russias invasion of Ukraine is understandably centered on such aspects as the proposed creation of an international claims commission to adjudicate claims for compensation26 and the International Criminal Courts recent issuance of arrest warrants for alleged war crimes against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Childrens Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation Maria Lvova-Belova.27 In time, however, the legal focus will likely broaden to consider related disputes arising in international investment law, whether in the state-to-state or investor-state context. As explained in our alert published last year shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the targeted economic measures Russia has imposed on foreign investors are likely in the near future to give rise to a number of investor-state disputes against Russia as a host state for foreign investment.

As arbitral awards are issued in the coming years, greater attention will likely shift to the legal mechanisms for enforcement of such arbitral awards against Russia (including perhaps in relation to the assets of Russian state-owned entities). In reality, this conversation has already begun as the European Parliament has recently declared Russia a state sponsor of terrorism and called on the EU and its member states to put in place the proper legal framework and consider adding Russia to such a list of state sponsors of terrorism.28 Similarly, last summer, the US Senate introduced Senate Resolution 623, [a] resolution calling on the Secretary of State to designate the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (although the Biden administration reportedly opposes taking such an action).29

For states that have imposed international sanctions on Russia or are beginning to consider legal mechanisms to provide for the enforcement of foreign judgments or arbitral awards against Russian assets in their jurisdictions, the ICJs judgment in Certain Iranian Assets will serve as a reminder that state-to-state or investor-state disputes may be anticipated to arise where the imposition of sanctions regimes could be seen as breaching state obligations under public international law. Accordingly, host states considering amendments to their regimes for the enforcement of arbitral awards should engage proactively, beginning with a review of their current international investment agreements and applicable obligations in public international law. Such a review may identify critical issues to inform the crafting of appropriate domestic law in this space.

Similarly, foreign investors considering pursuing investor-State disputes arising from the imposition of sanctions in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine should evaluate both the current legal landscape and the evolving context for the enforcement of arbitral awards to inform their decision-making processes. Ultimately, the implications of Certain Iranian Sanctions require both host states and foreign investors alike to address potential risks and available rights implicated by the quickly evolving landscape of international investment law at this time of widespread international sanctions against Russia.

1 Treaty of Amity, Preamble.

2 Treaty of Amity, Article IV(1).

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Treaty of Amity, Article IV(2).

6 U.S. DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2021: IRAN (2021), https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/iran/ (last accessed Apr. 3, 2023).

7 See Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 U.S.C. ch. 97, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title28/part4/chapter97&edition=prelim.

8 See U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/federal-insurance-office/terrorism-risk-insurance-program (last accessed Apr. 4, 2023).

9 Exec. Order No. 13599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6657 (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/02/08/2012-3097/blocking-property-of-the-government-of-iran-and-iranian-financial-institutions.

10 Bank Markazi v Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 (2016).

11 Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Judgment of 30 March 2023, [30].

12 Id., [1].

13 Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Application Instituting Proceedings of 14 June 2016, [33].

14 Edward Wong & David E. Sanger, U.S. Withdraws From 1955 Treaty Normalizing Relations With Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/world/middleeast/us-withdraws-treaty-iran.html. According to the specific terms of the Treaty, termination is effective only after one years prior notice. As a result, the formal United Stated termination date was one year after this announcement.

15 ICJ orders US to pay compensation for freezing Iranian assets, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 30, 2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/3/30/icj-orders-us-to-pay-compensation-for-freezing-iranian-assets.

16 Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Judgment of 30 March 2023, [76] to [84].

17 Id., [85] to [93].

18 Id., [99] to [103]

19 Id., [104] to [109].

20 Treaty of Amity, Article IV(1). See also Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Judgment of 30 March 2023, [159].

21 Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Judgment of 30 March 2023, [159].

22 Id., [223].

23 Id., [231].

24 Press Release, U.S. Dept of State, Judgment in Certain Iranian Assets Case (Mar. 30, 2023), https://www.state.gov/judgment-in-certain-iranian-assets-case/.

25 Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Foreign Affs., Iranian Foreign Ministrys statement about the ruling of the International Court of Justice (Mar. 30, 2023), https://en.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/715766.

26 See, e.g., Chiara Giorgetti, Markiyan Kliuchkovsky & Patrick Pearsall, Launching an International Claims Commission for Ukraine, JUSTSECURITY.ORG (May 20, 2022), https://www.justsecurity.org/81558/launching-an-international-claims-commission-for-ukraine/.

27 Press Release, Intl Crim. Ct., Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova (March 17, 2023), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and.

28 Press Release, Eur. Parliament, European Parliament declares Russia to be a state sponsor of terrorism, (Nov. 23, 2022), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IPR55707/european-parliament-declares-russia-to-be-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism.

29 Alexander Ward, Andrew Desiderio &Lawrence Ukenye, New Senate bill ramps up fight over Russia terrorism label, POLITICO.COM (Sept. 14, 2022), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/09/14/new-senate-bill-ramps-up-fight-over-russia-terrorism-label-00056600.

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The Decision of the International Court of Justice in Certain Iranian ... - JD Supra