Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

The IAEA Just Kept the US-Iran Nuclear Deal on Life Support | WPR – World Politics Review

Earlier this month, Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, traveled to Tehran amid growing concern over the proliferation risk posed by Irans expanding nuclear activities. In particular, the IAEA had recently detected uranium enriched to 84 percent in an Iranian nuclear site, at a time of heightened tensions due to the breakdown in multilateral talks on reviving the Iran nuclear deal.

During Grossis trip, Iran agreed to allow the IAEA to reestablish certain transparency measures at select nuclear sites. Iran had suspended IAEA access and monitoring measures at these locations in violation of the 2015 nuclear deal, known formally as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA. While the two sides must still work out the details that will determine the extent of the agreements benefits, any increase in transparency is a positive step that bodes well for international efforts to contain Irans nuclear program.

The agreement with the IAEA is the first step toward a de-escalation of nuclear tensions between Iran and the West that have grown since 2019. In response to the United States withdrawal from the agreement and reimposition of unilateral sanctions the previous year, Iran began gradually breaching limits put in place by the JCPOA, including the caps on enrichment levels and the stockpile of enriched material. While the JCPOA allowed Iran to stockpile 202 kilograms of uranium enriched to 3.67 percent, as of mid-February Iran possessed 87 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60 percent, 435 kilograms enriched to 20 percent and 1,324 kilograms enriched to about 5 percent. The uranium enriched to 60 percent is particularly concerning from a proliferation perspective because it can be rapidly enriched to weapons-grade levels, or 90 percent, of which roughly 25 kilograms would suffice for a nuclear weapon.

Original post:
The IAEA Just Kept the US-Iran Nuclear Deal on Life Support | WPR - World Politics Review

Rebellion in Iran: how far will the regime go? – Financial Times

What is included in my trial?

During your trial you will have complete digital access to FT.com with everything in both of our Standard Digital and Premium Digital packages.

Standard Digital includes access to a wealth of global news, analysis and expert opinion. Premium Digital includes access to our premier business column, Lex, as well as 15 curated newsletters covering key business themes with original, in-depth reporting. For a full comparison of Standard and Premium Digital, click here.

Change the plan you will roll onto at any time during your trial by visiting the Settings & Account section.

If you do nothing, you will be auto-enrolled in our premium digital monthly subscription plan and retain complete access for $69 per month.

For cost savings, you can change your plan at any time online in the Settings & Account section. If youd like to retain your premium access and save 20%, you can opt to pay annually at the end of the trial.

You may also opt to downgrade to Standard Digital, a robust journalistic offering that fulfils many users needs. Compare Standard and Premium Digital here.

Any changes made can be done at any time and will become effective at the end of the trial period, allowing you to retain full access for 4 weeks, even if you downgrade or cancel.

You may change or cancel your subscription or trial at any time online. Simply log into Settings & Account and select "Cancel" on the right-hand side.

You can still enjoy your subscription until the end of your current billing period.

We support credit card, debit card and PayPal payments.

Read more here:
Rebellion in Iran: how far will the regime go? - Financial Times

How Iran’s Tentacles Are Reaching Into Europe | Opinion – Newsweek

"My name is Khaled Barakat and I am here to express the views of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)." So begins a 2016 interview by Khaled Barakat, leader of the 'Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Network'.

Founded in 2012, and operating in Europe, North America, as well as Iran, Samidoun claims to be "an international network of organizers and activists working to build solidarity with Palestinian prisoners in their struggle for freedom."

The reality however is that Samidoun, and key Samidoun leaders, such as Barakat, serve as an inseparable arm of the PFLP, an EU-and U.S.-designated terror group, thereby being inextricably tied to the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The key question is for how much longer will the European Union keep turning its back and allow Samidoun to continue operating unabated, while Iran further spreads its tentacles of terror in Europe?

Most of the prisoners for whom Samidoun advocates are no mere common criminals. They are murderers and convicted terrorists with ties to PFLP, including Ahmad Sa'adat, who in 2001 assassinated Israeli tourism minister Rehavam Ze'evi in Jerusalem, and Georges Ibrahim Abdallah, who is serving a life sentence in France for his role in the 1982 murder of American and Israeli diplomats in Paris.

The PFLP was founded in 1967 as a Marxist-Leninist Arab nationalist group, to oppose by violence the existence of Israel. They first made a name for themselves during the 1960s and 1970s with a series of high-profile airplane hijackings, including in Europe. More recently, in 2014, PFLP terrorists armed with guns and meat cleavers entered a Jerusalem synagogue and murdered five people. In 2019, PFLP terrorists murdered 17-year-old Israeli girl Rina Schnerb by remotely detonating an explosive device.

In 2019, Samidoun leader Barakat was deported from Germany, following a Berlin appellate court finding that he "repeatedly acted as an activist for the PFLP."

In 2021, Israel formally designated Samidoun as a terrorist organization, specifically citing their links to PFLP and noting that Barakat, "is part of the leadership of PFLP abroad."

Barakat is not the only senior leader in Samidoun with terror links. Mustapha Awad is Samidoun's Europe representative. A Lebanese-Belgian national based in Brussels, he too is a member of PFLP, who was convicted in 2019 of receiving training by Hezbollah and wiring money to Barakat from Lebanon and Syria, on the directions of PFLP.

Another is Mohammed Khatib, who currently resides in Brussels and serves as the Europe Coordinator for Samidoun. Like his colleagues, Khatib is also a member of PFLP. On Oct. 29, 2022, Khatib coordinated the "March of Return and Liberation" rally in Brussels, proclaiming outside the European Parliament that "Defeating Israel means defeating the United States and defeating this colonial [EU] institution," using "any means necessary" including "bullets, Kalashnikovs, and rockets."

Even the major credit card companies and financial institutions shut down the ability of Samidoun to use their services for online fundraising, because of concerns they would be providing "material support" to terrorism.

The one destructive thread that weaves all this hatred of our shared democratic values, is the Islamic Republic of Iran.

The PFLP is a proxy of the Iranian regime, which provides the terror group with money, training, and weapons.

Samidoun, an off shoot of the PFLP, has a branch in Tehran. They have even held events there, under pretext of "cultural activity," to elicit support for operations in Europe. Their leader, Khaled Barakat, is a regular on Iran's state PressTV, calling for violence and lauding Iran's involvement in the region.

Senior Samidoun members in Europe, like Mustapha Awad, have been trained by Hezbollah, another Iranian terror proxy, and have transferred money from Lebanon and Syria to Barakat, representing the most direct financial link between Samidoun and the Iranian regime.

Samidoun has also expressed support and admiration for Qassem Soleimani, the former head of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who was killed in an American strike in 2020, calling him a major "military and political leader," while advocating support for the regime of Ayatollah Khamenei and an end to sanctions.

It is utterly incomprehensible, therefore, that the EU has not yet designated Samidoun a terror group.

According to the Council of the European Union, groups and/or individuals can be added to the EU terror list on the basis of "proposals submitted by member states based on a decision by a competent authority of a member state or a third country." In this regard, there is already a standing designation by Israel of Samidoun as a terror group and a decision of a German court finding Barakat to be a senior PFLP operative.

Furthermore, according to the Council of the European UnionCommon Position Paper 931 and the European Court of Justice, a decision of an EU Member State court is not even necessary. Even just the initiation of an investigation by police or national authorities, including those outside the European Union, would suffice.

Given the irrefutable axis-of-terror between Samidoun, PFLP and the Iranian regime, the EU has the duty to put Samidoun and senior Samidoun leaders on the EU terror list. They should do this not as some favor to Israel, but because otherwise they continue to turn their backs to a group that presents a clear and present security threat to the European Union and EU citizens.

Arsen Ostrovsky is a human rights attorney and CEO of The International Legal Forum. You can follow him on Twitter at: @Ostrov_A.

Patricia Teitelbaum is chair of the Brussels-based International Movement for Peace and Coexistence. You can follow the organization on Twitter at: @IMPACoexistence.

The views expressed in this article are the writers' own.

Read the original here:
How Iran's Tentacles Are Reaching Into Europe | Opinion - Newsweek

US Says Will Not Back Off In Syria Despite Iran-Backed Attacks –

The United States will not back away from its deployment to Syria, despite attacks on its forces there last week byIran-backed militia, the White House said Monday.

A one-way attack drone struck a US base in Syria on March 23, killing an American contractor, injuring another and wounding five US troops.

That triggered US retaliatory air strikes and exchanges of fire that a Syrian war monitoring group said killed 19 Syrian and pro-Iranian forces.

White House National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby said he was not aware of any additional attacks over the past 36 hours but cautioned, "We're going to stay vigilant."

Kirby also referred to President Joe Biden's remarks on Friday, when he warnedIranthat the United States would act forcefully to protect Americans.

"There's been no change in the US footprint in Syria as a result of what happened the last few days," Kirby said.

"We're not going to be deterred by these attacks from these militant groups."

Syria's foreign ministry on Sunday condemned US strikes, saying Washington had lied about what was targeted and pledging to "end the American occupation" of its territory.

Iran's foreign ministry also condemned the strikes, accusing US forces of targeting "civilian sites."

US forces first deployed into Syria during the Obama administration's campaign against Islamic State, partnering with a Kurdish-led group called the Syrian Democratic Forces. There are about 900 US troops in Syria.

Prior to the latest spate of attacks, US troops had been attacked byIranian-backed groups about 78 times since the beginning of 2021, according to the US military.

Reporting by Reuters

Read the original:
US Says Will Not Back Off In Syria Despite Iran-Backed Attacks -

Turkey-Iran: Why Ankara is reluctant to close the door on its neighbour – Middle East Eye

In the late 1870s, Persias ruler Naser al-Din Shah watched with trepidation as the caliph Sultan Abdulhamid promoted a new policy of Islamic unity under Ottoman leadership.

A century later, Ankara watched with apprehension as the Iranian revolution ousted the shah, and Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini pursued his own brand of Islamic expansionism in the region.

Despite a 17th-century treaty that ended 150 years of intermittent wars over territorial disputes in West Asia and Mesopotamia, the two hegemons have since pursued policies of competition, cooperation, engagement and, very infrequently, confrontation.

Even in modern times, as the West imposes a policy of containment and sanctions on Iran, Turkey has been reluctant to close the door on its neighbour, partly due to geography and Turkish trade and energy needs - but also due to an intersection of vital interests.

Yet, it would be a mistake to dismiss the warm relations between Turkey and Iran as a case of plus ca change - especially in view of the recent Saudi-Iran detente. Disputes of late outnumber their common interests. To name a few, Syria talks planned later this month in Moscow will include Iran.

Sign up to get the latest alerts, insights and analysis, starting with Turkey Unpacked

Turkey has been a major backer of the political and armed opposition to the Assad regime while Irans decades-long support for Assad puts the two countries at odds in these talks. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has also strongly objected to Turkish incursions into northern Syria.

A growing Israeli presencein the Caucasus region alarms Tehran, as does Turkeys own rapprochement with Israel.A historical battle for influence in Iraq, particularly in the northern region, between Ottoman Turkey and Persian Iran has only grown over the past decades, accelerated by the 2003 US-led invasion and more expansionist foreign policies in both Tehran and Ankara.

In addition, Turkeys alignment with Natoin the Ukraine conflict, while Iran exchanges military equipment with Russia, also raises concerns. Yet Turkey has tried to maintain good relations with Moscow, at times acting as a mediator, with President Recep Tayyip Erdogan working the phones with both Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky, following a policy of engagement, as confrontation would come with far higher costs.

Ankara would be hard-pressed to expect Tehran to sacrifice Yerevan without assistance in reining in Azeri irredentism

In Syria, Turkish and Iranian interests collide. For Iran, Syria is an arena to challenge Israel; for Turkey, Syria harbours a near-existential threat. The fallout from the Syrian conflict poses a direct challenge to Turkeys national security and territorial integrity, due to the presence of armed groups that are affiliated with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and actively supported by the West. At the same time, the influx of more than 3.5 million Syrian refugees places enormous pressure on a country currently managing a humanitarian crisis resulting from the 6 February earthquake.

The Astana process remains the only viable mechanism to resolve the Syrian crisis. Bringing in Iran, Syrian President Bashar al-Assads biggest supporter, may be the missing piece of the puzzle. Irans inclusion in the process is key to Ankaras normalisation with Damascus, and has boosted Turkish expectations of eliminating the PKK-linked Peoples Defence Units (YPG) in Syria and encouraging the return of Syrian refugees to their homeland. For Iran, its inclusion is an opportunity to cement its gains in Syria by leveraging its regional influence.

An unpopular view among those who supported the US-led invasion of Iraq two decades ago suggests that Iran and Turkey have emerged as the biggest winners. In Ankara, it is thought that Tehran may be able to influence an Iran-friendly government in Baghdad to manage Turkeys PKK problem in both Syria and Iraq.

In Ankaras view, the PKK in northern Iraq is open to Iranian influence via its relationships with Iraqi Kurdish leaders, and some suggest that the Iranian government is in contact with both the PKK and its Syrian affiliates. Still, much rests on what Turkey is willing to offer Iran in return for such cooperation. Kurdish separatism, too, remains a concern for Tehran in its heavily Kurdish regions, and Turkey could prove helpful to Iran by managing irredentist ethnic Azeris in Iran.

Turkeys policies in Iraq are influenced by the presence of PKK bases in the porous border areas, the status of Turkmens, and the countrys territorial integrity. Iraqs central government has condemned Turkish cross-border operations against PKK sanctuaries, while doing little to tackle the issue to Ankaras satisfaction. Turkeys most recent anti-PKK operation, dubbed Operation Claw-Lock, was waged last April following a visit to Ankara by Masrour Barzani, the prime minister of Iraqs Kurdish region.

Iran, too, has a contentious relationship with its own Kurdish population. Kurdish separatist groups from Iran have found shelter in Iraq, and Iran regularly targets the positions of the Iranian armed opposition. Iraqs foreign ministry has condemned the attacks by both Iran and Turkey, saying they distract from the efforts of countering terrorism on a regional level - but beyond rhetoric, little has been accomplished.

Iran sees Israels presence in Azerbaijan as part of a western encirclement, suggesting that Israel is conducting intelligence operations by Israeli-backed Azeri agents in Iran

Meanwhile, the strengthening of Azerbaijan-Israel relations has given Tehran reasonable cause for discomfort, as Tel Aviv has made no secret of its intentions to use Turkey-allied Baku as a springboard for attacks on Iran, despite Azerbaijani denials.

Iran sees Israels presence in Azerbaijan as part of a western encirclement, suggesting that Israel is conducting intelligence operations by Israeli-backed Azeri agents in Iran to carry out sabotage and assassinations, notably the suspicious January 2023 shooting incident at the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran.

We see the presence of the Zionist regime in the region as a major threat to peace and stability. Wherever this regime is involved, there has been insecurity and crisis, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian told his Turkish counterpart on 8 March. The Islamic Republic of Iran warns the parties to pay close attention to the behaviour of the Zionist regime. They should not allow its presence in the region.

Turkeys own rapprochement with Irans arch-foe Israel has also raised serious concerns in Tehran. Analysts suggest the current climate will likely render Iran more amenable to negotiations with regional rivals, which might account for the recent detente with Saudi Arabia.

Azerbaijan and Turkey are on the same page on Caucasus matters, with both viewing the creation of a Zangezur corridor through Armenias southernmost Syunik province as key to a joint plan for a connected Turkic world. Standing steadfastly in the way of this dream is Tehran, which views that goal as incompatible with the regions geopolitical and historical realities - and bypassing Iran would be unacceptable.

Saudi-Iran reconciliation: Is Arab-Israeli alliance against Tehran ending?

More significantly, Iran is deeply concerned about the rhetoric emanating from Baku in the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war and the prospect of enraging the ethnic Azeri population in its north. The outbreak of popular protests in Iran only compounds the resurgence of Azeri irredentism in the north, Kurdish separatism in the west, and Balochi claims in the southeast.

How far Iran will go in appeasing tensions with its neighbour is debatable. Ankara would be hard-pressed to expect Tehran to sacrifice Yerevan without assistance in reining in Azeri irredentism or mitigating the risk of an attack on Iran from Israel. These matters are as existential to Tehran as PKK separatism is to Ankara, especially during an election year.

Yet, despite the differences between Tehran and Ankara, as US and western countries confront Iran, one should still expect Turkey to take a conciliatory and diplomatic approach to its relationship with Iran, even under enormous Nato pressure. A regional war would have significant adverse impacts on Turkey, and it is unlikely that any Turkish administration would be supportive of a military option.

Expect Ankara to carefully follow a policy of dialogue, to seek opportunities for cooperation and collaboration, and to monitor the situation closely for opportunities with or threats from Tehran.

Today is important, but so is history and geography.

The views expressed in this article belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

See more here:
Turkey-Iran: Why Ankara is reluctant to close the door on its neighbour - Middle East Eye