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Five years ago on Monday, then-U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a 2015 multilateral agreement that imposed restrictions on Irans nuclear program. Although both the Trump andBidenadministrations promised to find a better solution, the Iran nuclear crisis has onlygotten worse. Economic pressure and external sabotage have not stopped Tehran from steadily increasing its uranium enrichment capabilities.Today, the regime is only weeks, if not days, away from the ability to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon, should it choose to take that step.

Although restoring the JCPOA has become increasingly implausible, understanding how it workedand what has been lostis essential for future global nonproliferation efforts.

Most discussions about the Iran deal focus on the wrong things. Critics argue that it wastoo permissivebecause it recognized Irans right to enrich uranium;too limitedbecause it included sunset clauses; and too narrow because it failed to address other troubling activities, such as Irans ballistic missile program and its support for violent groups in the Middle East. Defenders, meanwhile, emphasize that the deal allowed for unprecedented international monitoring and verification of Irans nuclear program. Both camps devote less attention to the agreements impact on Irans actual nuclear capabilities.

As recent events demonstrate, diplomacy cannot stop states from subsequently expelling inspectors, unplugging monitoring cameras, or resuming prohibited activities. Those who dismiss the JCPOA as a weak agreement, however, tend to overlook what made it credible and valuable from a nonproliferation standpoint. This has warped the public debate. Instead of dwelling on the JCPOAs more reversible features, we should focus on what made it truly unique. It is unusual for diplomacy to succeed in rolling back a more advanced nuclear program. And somehow, the JCPOA managed to do just that.

Proliferation is often presented as a binary: States either have nuclear weapons, or they do not. Thats why conversations about proliferation tend to revolve around breakout, or the time a state needs to amass sufficient fissile material for a single nuclear device. Roughly speaking, this translates to either 25 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium or 4 kilograms of separated plutonium. Breakout estimates consider multiple factors, including how much fissile material states possess, how quickly they can produce more, and how long it would take them to bring existing stockpiles up to weapons-grade.

On its own, however, breakout is a somewhat misleading benchmark. States need more than one nuclear device to establish a credible deterrent, and packaging fissile material into deliverable warheadsinvolves additional steps and technical bottlenecks. This is why a more holistic assessment of nuclear capabilities is valuable from the standpoint of risk reduction.

As scholars such asTristan Volpehave pointed out, there is a spectrum of latent nuclear capabilities. Tehran went into the JCPOA negotiations on the advanced side of that spectrum, with multiple active nuclear sites, including hardened facilities designed to withstand military strikes. Its scientists had already mastered key elements of the fuel cycle and recovered from setbacks such as theStuxnet virus, which sabotaged the centrifuges they use for uranium enrichment. As then-U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified in 2016, [Iran] does not face any insurmountable technical barriers to producing a nuclear weapon. (By comparison, when Libya voluntarily disarmed in 2003, its nuclear program was small and largely ineffective.)

The JCPOA extended Irans breakout time from a few months to a year, but more importantly, it ensured that in the worst-case scenario, Iran would be proliferating from a lower baseline.

The deal rolled back Irans nuclear capabilities in two main ways. The first was by removing stockpiles of fissile material. Eliminating materials automatically puts time back on the clock, because states cannot use what they do not have. Since the consequences are immediate, stockpile reductions are valuable confidence-building measures. Under theinterim nuclear agreement established in 2013, a precursor to the JCPOA, Tehran demonstrated its commitment to diplomacy by dismantling reserves of medium-enriched uranium. The JCPOA then requiredTehran to cut stockpiles of low-enriched uranium from roughly 7,000 kilograms to 300.

The second way was by impeding future activities. Although the JCPOA recognized Irans uranium enrichment program, it restricted the number and kind of centrifuges the regime could use and capped enrichment levels at 3.67 percent for 15 years. (Highly enriched uranium, which is required for nuclear weapons, involves enrichment to 90 percent.) Tehran dismantled various centrifuge cascades and agreed to store decommissioned equipment and other enrichment-related infrastructure in facilities that would be subject to continuous International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring. Negotiators also targeted processes that are crucial for weaponization. This is why the deal included a moratorium on uranium and plutonium metallurgy, which is used to produce bomb components, and a ban on research pertaining to nuclear explosives modeling and neutron initiation. The deal also curbed Irans capabilities by prioritizing its most concerning nuclear facilities. For example, the JCPOA did not allow uranium enrichment to continue at the Fordow fuel enrichment plant, which, at leastat the time, was less vulnerable to attack than the Natanz facility.

Part of the JCPOAs strength came from Iran accepting limits that are harder to reverse. This included surrendering access to equipment and materials. For example, Iran was obliged to export spent fuelwhich can be used to source plutonium for a weapons programfrom its research reactors. Other concessions had even longer-lasting effects. Limits that affect nuclear facilities physical infrastructure are particularly hard to undo. Some nuclear reactors pose a greater proliferation risk than others, either because they produce more weapons-useable material or are less vulnerable to export controls and other supply-side disruptions. Although most conversations about Iran focus on uranium enrichment, the JCPOA used reactor design to effectively block the plutonium pathway to proliferation.

Under the deal, the international community promised to help convert the heavy-water research reactor in the Iranian city of Arak into a design that would be more conducive to civilian scientific work and less conducive to a weapons program. Without these alterations, the reactor would have generated enough plutonium in its spent fuel for one to two bombs each year once it came online. Since 2019, Tehran has accelerated uranium enrichment, but at leastfor now, the benefits of a more efficient research reactor have translated into a more durablecheck on plutonium production. Alone, this will not prevent proliferation, but it willconstrain Irans future capabilities.

Although more technical risk-reduction measures such as those in the JCPOA receive less public attention, they have long playedand should continue to playan important role in U.S. nonproliferation policy. For decades, diplomats have used nuclear cooperation agreements to influence reactor design, incentivize adherence to safeguards, and induce greater reliance on the globalized nuclear marketplace.

The now defunct Agreed Framework between Washington and Pyongyang attests to the lingering impact of such concessions. An underappreciated consequence of that deal is that it permanently set back North Koreas ability to produce plutonium.Under the agreement, the United Stateswith help from Japan and South Koreapromised to build two proliferation proof light-water nuclear reactors if North Korea halted construction on two graphite-moderated reactors, which are better at generating plutonium than electricity. Over time, those frozen construction sites becameunsalvageable. (The light-water nuclear reactor power plants, meanwhile, never came to fruition.) North Korea was still able to build a nuclear arsenal, but even today, it can only produce significant amounts of plutonium for its weapons program at one site in Yongbyon.

Of course, nonproliferation agreements are imperfect. Stockpiles can be rebuilt, as Tehran demonstrated after the Trump administrations withdrawal. According to a February 2023 IAEA report, Iran now has roughly 87 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium and about 435 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium. The stockpiles that Iran dismantled under the JCPOA were not as close to weapons grade; it only began amassing 60 percent enriched uranium in 2021. And even intrusive monitoring regimes cannot guarantee that states will not continue some activities in secret. North Korea had a covert uranium enrichment program while the Agreed Framework was in force, and it likely pursued illicit weaponization research. But the imperative of concealment stymies progress, especially under agreements that include stringent monitoring. States cannot go as far, as fast, if they want to avoid detection.

Defenders are not off base in praising the comprehensiveness of the Iran deals monitoring and verification regime. Nor are skeptics wrong about some ofthe JCPOAs limitations, including its failure to address Irans other concerning behaviors at home and abroad.

But exclusively focusing on questions of scope and duration perpetuatesthe myth of a better dealthe idea that more pressure or more diplomacy might yield a better solution to the Iran nuclear crisis. Even the Biden administration was initially enamored with the notion of a longer and stronger agreement with Iran. From a risk-reduction standpoint, however, the JCPOA was valuable because it directly impacted Tehrans present and future nuclear capabilities. What the JCPOA briefly achieved was a safer status quo by rolling back Irans nuclear program and institutionalizing mechanisms to contain the regime at this lower level. Irans compliance with the deal over any period was designed to have lingering effects on the size of any future arsenal, weaponization timelines, and Tehrans ability to cross the nuclear threshold undetected.

Nonproliferation gets harder as nuclear programs advance. There are many reasons for this: path-dependency, vested interests, and the irreversibility of scientific knowledge and experience. Nuclear sophistication may also havediminishing returnsin diplomacyas Volpe has argued, states with highly advanced programs suffer from a credibility gap at the negotiating table. This is concerning, as Tehran seems to believe that drawing closer to the brink will give it more diplomatic leverage. The JCPOA was already an unlikely achievement given the status of Irans nuclear program back in 2015. These problems will only multiply as the regime becomes more capable.

In the past five years, the prospects of peacefully resolving the Iran nuclear crisis have gone frombad to worse. Tehran is once again on the precipice of breakout, and addressing proliferation concerns through diplomacy has only gotten harder. In addition to the technical hurdles, political conditions have deteriorated significantly. Trumps withdrawal undermined confidence in the reliability of U.S. commitments. Engaging with Iran has only gotten more complicated since 2021, when the Hassan Rouhani government was replaced by the hard-line Ebrahim Raisi administration, which is more skeptical of diplomacy with the West. Meanwhile, consensus among the rest of the deals original signatories (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia, Germany, and the European Union) has eroded, and Iran has deepened and diversified its ties with other autocracies, including Russia.

At this point, it is probably too late for the JCPOA. Still, the deal demonstrated that it is possible to negotiate meaningful limits on advanced nuclear programs. Cultivating broader awareness about how this agreement worked should at least inform future debates over nonproliferation strategy and nuclear risk reduction with Iran and other potential proliferators. U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivans recent comments about seeking a diplomatically brokered outcome that puts Irans nuclear program back in the box indicate that Washington is again taking nuclear capabilities seriously. On the anniversary of the Trump administrations withdrawal from the JCPOA, we should not let the quixotic quest for better deals continue to eclipse the practical benefits of curbing and containing dangerous nuclear programs.

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Iran Nuclear Deal: What We Can Learn From the JCPOA - Foreign Policy

Even as the United States and its European allies grapple with Russia's invasion of Ukraine and rising tensions with China, the smoldering crisis over Iran's nuclear program threatens to reignite.

In a sign of European concern, Britain, France and Germany have warned Iran they would trigger a return of U.N. sanctions against Tehran if it enriched uranium to the optimal level for a nuclear weapon, three European officials said.

The threat, made last year in a previously unreported letter sent by the countries' foreign ministers, underscores Western fears that Iran could produce bomb-grade uranium of 90% purity.

Those concerns intensified in February after U.N. inspectors revealed their discovery of uranium particles of 83.7% purity at an Iran nuclear facility built deep underground to protect it from airstrikes.

"Worrisome possibilities include that Iran tested a way to produce near-weapon-grade uranium without detection," said a report by the Institute for Science and International Security, a Washington think tank that closely tracks Tehrans nuclear program.

Iran denies it is seeking nuclear weapons.

A renewed crisis over Iran would come at a bad time for U.S. President Joe Biden, who is focused on maintaining allies' support for the war in Ukraine and on rallying Western countries to push back on China's military and diplomatic ambitions.

But while some White House aides may prefer to keep Iran off the president's desk, officials and analysts suggested they may not have that luxury.

"They are busy with Ukraine, Russia and they don't want, for the time being, to open another front," said a Western diplomat on condition of anonymity. "Therefore, they want to do everything in their power to prevent this [90% enrichment] from happening."

Western officials fear a nuclear-armed Iran could threaten Israel and Gulf Arab oil producers, as well as spark a regional arms race.

Snapback of UN sanctions

U.S. and European officials have been searching for ways to curb Tehran's program since the breakdown of indirect U.S.-Iranian talks on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal between Iran, Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and the United States.

The accord, aimed at keeping Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, required Tehran to accept restrictions on its nuclear program and more extensive U.N. inspections, in exchange for an end to U.N., U.S. and European Union sanctions.

The deal, which had capped Iran's uranium enrichment at 3.67%, was abandoned in 2018 by then-U.S. President Donald Trump, who argued it was too generous to Tehran.

Trump reimposed broad U.S. sanctions, many of which have the secondary effect of forcing non-U.S. firms to stop dealing with Iran or risk losing access to the U.S. market. U.N. sanctions, however, were not reactivated.

The 2015 nuclear deal had set out a procedure for the veto-proof "snapback" of the U.N. sanctions on Iran including an oil embargo and banking restrictions in response to Iranian violations. Any of the states who signed on to the original deal can trigger the snapback.

U.S. sanctions even with their secondary effects have failed to keep Iran from producing ever-purer levels of uranium, and China has flouted those sanctions by buying Iranian oil, making it unclear if the U.N. measures would be any more effective.

But Iran might refrain from enriching to 90% to avoid the public rebuke implicit in the return of U.N. sanctions.

FILE - This file photo released Nov. 5, 2019, by the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran shows centrifuge machines in the Natanz uranium enrichment facility in central Iran.

A senior Iranian nuclear official said Tehran would not take the revival of U.N. sanctions lying down.

"If the other parties under any pretext trigger it, they will be responsible for all the consequences," he told Reuters. "Iran's reaction could range from leaving the NPT (Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) to accelerating our nuclear work."

Leaving the NPT would free Iran to develop nuclear arms.

The Iranian official's threat was more explicit than comments by an Iranian foreign ministry spokesman, who on Monday said only that Iran had told Western powers how it would react.

It remains unclear if the uranium particles of 83.7% purity were created deliberately. But Western officials and analysts say that Iran's production of 90% uranium would demand a significant response.

A U.S. State Department spokesman said Biden "is absolutely committed" to making sure Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon.

"We believe diplomacy is the best way to achieve that goal, but President Biden has also been clear that we have not removed any option from the table," the spokesperson added, hinting at the possibility of military action.

Face a crisis at some point

While Western officials want to leave the door open for diplomacy, tensions with Russia and China make that harder.

Divisions over the Ukraine war which has seen Iran provide military aid to Russia and rising Sino-U.S. tensions further reduce the odds of resurrecting the deal because it is unclear how hard Moscow or Beijing might push for its revival.

If the deal is dead, the West has three broad options: deterrence, military action or a new negotiated arrangement.

Deterrence has a downside: It could give Tehran time to creep toward a nuclear weapons capability.

Dennis Ross, a veteran U.S. diplomat now at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy think tank, suggested Biden may have to do more to make Iran fear the consequences of enriching to higher levels.

"If you don't do enough to persuade the Iranians of the risks they are running, you will face a crisis at some point because they will go to 90%" or move toward weaponization, he said. "What you are seeing is an effort to walk that tightrope."

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Iran Nuclear Crisis Threatens to Heat Up - Voice of America - VOA News

DUBAI, United Arab Emirates (AP) Iran executed an Iranian-Swedish dual national Saturday accused of masterminding a 2018 attack on a military parade that killed at least 25 people, one of several enemies of Tehran seized abroad in recent years amid tensions with the West.

Farajollah Chaab, also known as Habib Asyoud, had been a leader of the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahwaz, an Arab separatist movement that has conducted oil pipeline bombings and other attacks in Iran's oil-rich Khuzestan province. That group had claimed the 2018 attack in its immediate aftermath.

Cha'ab's execution comes as a Swedish court last year sentenced an Iranian to life in prison over his part in the 1988 mass executions in Iran at the end of its war with Iraq. Tehran, which has used prisoners as bargaining chips in negotiations with the West, reacted angrily to that sentence. Meanwhile, tensions also remain high between Iran and the West over its rapidly advancing nuclear program as well and at least one more prisoner with Western ties faces a possible execution.

The Iranian judiciary's Mizan news agency confirmed Cha'ab's execution by hanging in a lengthy statement. It identified him as the leader of the militant group and alleged without providing evidence that he had ties to Swedish, Israelis and U.S. intelligence services. It accused his group of killing or wounding 450 people over the years, including multiple attacks on government offices and other sites.

It also included state television interviews with Cha'ab, a feature of many Iranian trials that activists long have described as coerced confessions.

It also for the first time clearly identified Iranian intelligence officers as being behind Cha'ab's abduction, saying that its unknown soldiers captured him in Turkey in November 2019. Iran has used similar ruses to capture its enemies abroad, including the exiled journalist Ruhollah Zam who was executed in 2020.

Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom condemned Cha'ab's execution.

The death penalty is an inhumane and irrevocable punishment, and Sweden, together with the rest of the (European Union), condemns its use under all circumstances, he said in a statement.

Swedens Nordic neighbors Finland and Norway also strongly condemned the execution, underlying their stance against the death penalty. I am appalled, said Finnish Foreign Minister Pekka Haavisto.

The Oslo-based group Iran Human Rights separately condemned the execution, referring to Cha'ab's closed-door trial as grossly unfair.

This is an example of the Islamic Republics state terrorism," said Mahmood Amiry-Moghaddam, the group's director. We expect that the EU and Swedish government show adequate reaction to the murder of their citizen. Killing a hostage must not be tolerated.

Tensions already had escalated between Iran and Sweden over the life imprisonment of Hamid Noury, an Iranian convicted in Sweden of committing grave war crimes and murder during the final phase of the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. The end of the war saw mass executions of an estimated 5,000 Iranian prisoners, including those from an exiled opposition group and others.

The 2018 attack in Iran targeted a military parade in Ahvaz in Khuzestan, the chaos captured live on state television. Militants disguised as soldiers opened fire, killing at least 25 people and wounding over 60 others in the deadliest attack to strike Iran in years. A spokesman for the separatist group claimed the assault shortly after in a televised interview. The Islamic State group also claimed the attack, though it offered factually incorrect details about the assault.

In recent months, Iran has carried out other executions after the months of unrest over the September death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini following her arrest by the country's morality police. In January, Iran executed a former high-ranking defense ministry official and dual Iranian-British national accused of spying.

Also facing a possible execution is an Iranian-German national who lived in California, a man Iran describes as planning a 2008 attack on a mosque that killed 14 people and wounded over 200 others, as well as other assaults through the little-known Kingdom Assembly of Iran and its Tondar militant wing. His family long has said he was captured by Iranian intelligence in Dubai, the United Arab Emirates.

Iran is one of the worlds top executioners.

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Iran Hangs Iranian-Swedish Man Over 2018 Attack Killing 25 - Military.com

Imported second-hand iPhones are selling for more than 2,000 US dollars in Iran, an Iranian official has admitted.

The price of the devices brought in from UAE is due to an import ban on the iPhone 14 and production having stopped on the iPhone 13, according to Hossein Rouzbeh, adirector of the Cell Phone Importers Association.

In January,Iranian media reportedthat the Islamic Republic spent $9 billion in foreign currency to import mobile phones over 33 months, with a large slice going on Apple devices.

According to Tasnim news agency, about $2.3 billion was spent on importing just two million luxury phones mainly from US brand Apple. This is less than five percent of the total number of phones bought by Iranians.

The rials plunge against the US dollar in recent months has exacerbated chaos in several of Iran's major markets and brought many businesses to near standstill.

The price of mobile phones rose sharply with many retailers preferring to hold on to their stock in anticipation of a further fall of the rial.

In a letter addressed to the Islamic Republic of Iran Customs Administration (IRICA), Iran's Ministry of Industry banned the import of Apple's iPhone 14 and higher models from February 20, 2023.

"iPhone 14 and higher model mobile phones will no longer be registered in Iran and related instructions will be announced at the crossing points of the country, said the letter.

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Second-Hand iPhones Sell For Over $2,000 In Iran -

Syria is positioned to return to the Arab League after members of the group voted to allow the country to return on Sunday.

The member states are interested in some movement to resolve the conflict in Syria, which dates back over a decade to the 2011 Arab Spring and has cost hundreds of thousands of lives and created one of the worlds worst humanitarian crises.

The countries want some kind of movement to help hundreds of thousands of displaced refugees, especially those in Jordan.

Several regional states that have relations with Israel have backed the return of Syria to the league, including the UAE, Jordan and Egypt.

The return of Syria could have ramifications for Israel: Iran threatens Israel from Syria, while also trafficking weapons to Hezbollah. Israel has been conducting its war between the wars campaign against Irans entrenchment in Syria for years now. With a return to the league and the Arab states seeking an end to the conflict there, the spotlight might shift to Israeli-Iranian tensions in Syria.

Iran may seek to shift resources from Yemen or Iraq to Syria, to boost its threats to Israel. It may also try to threaten the forces in Syria of its US ally, the major Western power in the region. Iran may try to use Syrias return as cover to move more weapons to Syria, attempting to provoke Israel, which could put Jerusalem in a complex position.

According to reports, a committee made up of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon will be set up to work with the Syrian government to end the conflict. A statement from the closed-door session of the league said the decision is expected to help ease the suffering of the Syrian people and enable them to realize their legitimate future aspirations. We emphasize the necessity of taking effective and practical steps toward a gradual resolution of the crisis under the principle of one step for one step.

Supposedly, the next steps must also be in line with UN Security Council Resolution 2254, from 2015, which called for a ceasefire. Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Aboul Gheit has said Syrian regime leader Bashar Assad will be able to attend an upcoming league summit.

When invitations for the Arab summit are sent out to member states by the host nation Saudi Arabia then the Syrian President Bashar Assad can attend if he wishes to.

The decision to bring Syria back to the folds of the Arab League has been in the motion for months. In fact, contact with Egypt goes back many years via Syrian official Ali Mamlouk. Over the last year, it has become clear that the UAE and Saudi Arabia were rapidly shifting on the Damascus issue, after both countries had already done some outreach.

The recent earthquake that hit Turkey and Syria provided a catalyst to do more. The goal of these countries Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain which generally work closely together, is to bring stability to the region. They see the era after the Arab Spring as one of chaos that led to the disintegration of Libya and Yemen, enabled extremists to pop up in Syria and Iraq, led to the rise of ISIS and also gave the Muslim Brotherhood the opening to try to take power in Egypt.

The overall perception in Cairo and Riyadh was that the Syrian regime was preferable to the chaos of the Syrian opposition and the civil war. This also led these states to sever ties with Qatar in 2017, viewing Doha as backing extremism.

Critics will view this major shift as symbolic, showing that many regional countries prefer authoritarianism and dont mind shaking hands with the Syrian regime, despite the blood and suffering. This, then, is a new era in many ways.

China brokered normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Jordan is positioning itself to do much more outreach on Syrian issues. Amman has hosted numerous Arab states in recent months, to pave the way for Syria returning to the league. Jordanian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi also worked the phones in recent weeks to bring about this outcome, while Syrian Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad has also been lobbying around the region.

However, this doesnt mean that the Arab states have caved completely. Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry has said he wants to see progress on the demands of the group that the conflict end and reconciliation begin.

Every stage of the Syrian crisis proved that it cannot be resolved militarily and that there are no winners or losers, he said. We are convinced that the only way towards its settlement is a political resolution that has Syrian ownership and without foreign dictates.

Regional media have paid close attention to the decision, including UAE-based Al-Ain and Al Jazeera in Qatar. The shift in the Arab Leagues view wont change every countrys policies overnight; Kuwait and Qatar have generally opposed this move, while Jordan has been cautious, since it wants Syrias role in the regional drug trafficking to end.

Irans media praised the return as a resistance reward, a move that comes right after Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi is fresh from a visit to Damascus. This nearly appears as a seal of approval for Irans role in Syria. Russia will also be pleased with the decision. It may also give Turkey an opening to normalize ties with Syria, continuing its ongoing multi-lateral meetings with Damascus.

The return of Syria to the Arab League is a symbolic turning point, bookending the Arab Spring and part of a new diplomatic era in the region, with the potential to hand over a win to Iran and Russia.

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Syria headed back to Arab League, can Iran use this to threaten Israel? - The Jerusalem Post