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In Lafayette Park, Washington DC, Wednesday, protestors called for President Joe Biden to meet relatives of two American-Iranians jailed in Iran.

The families of Emad Sharghi and Iranian-British-American Morad Tahbaz joined the demonstration at the park, which is across the street from the White House and commonly used for rallies.

Tara Tahbaz, daughter of Morad Tahbaz, told CNN at the rally that the jailed men were not just another name on a list, they're somebody's father, son, husband." She expressed hope that the United States government was using every tool that they have on the table to prioritize them.

State Department Spokesman Ned Price reiterated Wednesday that the jailed Americans a third is Siamak Namazi, whose father Bagher is also not permitted to leave Iran were a separate matter to stalled talks between Iran and world powers aimed at reviving the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.

Price told reporters that Washington had told Iran "in no uncertain terms" that the safe release of these Americans was a priority. The US Secretary of StateAntony Blinken in April urged Tehran to free Sharghi.

"Iran does have a long history of unjust imprisonment of foreign nationals for use as political leverage, Price said Wednesday. It continues to engage in a range of human rights abuses, which include large-scale arbitrary or unlawful detention of individuals, some of whom have faced torture or worse, in some cases execution

Iran, which does not allow consular access for dual nationals, holds citizens of several countries including Germany, Austria, and Sweden, as de facto hostages. There have reportedly been Tehran-Washington contacts aimed at a prisoner exchange that would free Iranians jailed in the US, mainly over breaching American sanctions.

Djalali Death Sentence Confirmed

Quoting an unnamed "informed source" Wednesday, Iran's semi-official ISNA news agency, said the Supreme Court had confirmed a death sentence on Swedish-Iranian scientist Ahmadreza Djalali (Jalali) to be carried out within two weeks. Within hours, Nour News, a website affiliated to the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani, also cited unnamed sources in reporting the decision.

ISNA suggested political pundits believed Sweden had put on trial a former Iranian judiciary official, Hamid Nouri, for crimes against humanity for his alleged role in prison executions in 1988 as a means of pressure on Iran to release Djalali. Iran had confirmed the sentence on Djalali to deter Stockholm from any further such actions, the pundits suggested.

Djalai was convicted in 2016 and given the death penalty on unproven and undocumented espionage for Israel. His wife, Vida Mehrannia,told Iran International November 2020that her husband was a victim of Iran's relations with Europe, fueling speculation that Iran sought by threatening the execution either to secure a prisoner exchange or to influence the trial in Belgium ofIranian diplomat Assadollah Assadi, who was in 2020 sentenced to 20 years for attempted murder.

Expressing concern over Djalai in a tweet Wednesday, Sweden's foreign minister, Ann Linde wrote that Swedish authorities were in contact with Tehran.

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Ordeal Of Hostages Held In Iran Reaches The White House -

The State Department pays $2 million per month to protect former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his special Iran envoy Brian Hook from Iranian assassins.

To put that in perspective, in the first five months of this year, the State Department spent more money protecting the two men than the entire annual budget for American Citizen Services. The Biden administration has not allowed intelligence about Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps assassination plots against the two men from former national security adviser John Bolton and others to stand in the way of nuclear negotiations and financial relief. Even, that is, as Irans supreme leader threatens more assassinations and rebuffs President Joe Bidens offers.

Biden and Secretary of State Antony Blinkens seeming lack of concern only encourages Iran and normalizes such behavior. Privately, they may blame their predecessors drone strike on Quds Force chief Qassem Soleimani for sparking Irans desire for revenge, but this would be mistaken for two reasons: First, the United States targeted Soleimani because he murdered more than 600 American servicemen and was planning more terrorist attacks. Second, many Iranians resented Soleimanis terrorism. He was a murderer, not a patriot.

To demand Iran cease its efforts to assassinate U.S. figures was correct but to continue diplomacy as usual and even float lifting sanctions on the group planning such assassinations is pathetic. It only encourages the worlds foremost sponsor of state terror. Diplomacy only works when all parties accept its norms, but the Islamic Republic has shown nothing but disdain for diplomacy since its 1979 seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

When rogue regimes eschew the norms of diplomacy, it is essential Washington raise the costs.

After Palestinian terrorists murdered 11 Israeli athletes and coaches and a German policeman at the 1972 Munich Olympics, the Israelis quietly undertook an operation to hunt down and kill many of the terrorists involved. While Israels detractors might criticize vengeance, Israels actions both tarnished the terrorists glorification and also ended their ability to conduct follow-on attacks.

Nor have Israelis been alone in such actions. The CIA hunted senior Al Qaeda leaders in the wake of the Sept. 11, 2001, terror attacks. Ultimately, President Barack Obama approved the operation that killed Osama bin Laden in his Pakistani compound. Of Obamas national security team, only Biden objected to that operation. He was wrong then and he is wrong now.

Soleimani was not alone in his targeting of Americans; he was simply the most egregious purveyor of that activity. There is nothing in international or U.S. law to prohibit such actions against either senior Revolutionary Guards officers. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, too, could be a legal target given his constitutional role as commander in chief, although from a policy decision, targeting him would be unwise given that he is already an octogenarian at deaths door. Iranian authorities may believe either that Biden does not have it in him to hold terrorists to account or they may calculate that any U.S. action against those with American blood on their hands would enable Irans regime to rally Iranians around the flag.

The Iranians were right about Biden. Elections matter, at least in America. But, so long as Washington does not crow triumphantly as Obama did after bin Ladens death or Trump did after Soleimanis, then Irans ability to distract its public with nationalist opprobrium is limited.

The public may remain under the threat of Iranian terrorism until Biden leaves office, but a new administration could take a new approach, one which would truly convince Iranian leaders and Revolutionary Guard officers that they will pay not only a high price for terrorism but a deeply personal one as well.

Michael Rubin (@mrubin1971) is a contributor to theWashington Examiner'sBeltway Confidential. He is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

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It's time to meet Iran assassination threats in kind - Washington Examiner

How fast could Iran build a nuclear weapon?U.S. officials believe Iran is inching closer to obtaining a nuclear bomb and could be just a few weeks away from reaching full breakout capabilities. In a press briefing on Wednesday, Press Secretary Jen Psaki confirmed that Irans proximity to acquiring sufficient fissile material for one nuclear bomb had shortened significantly from about a year to weeks, concerning the White House.

The nuclear breakout period refers to the time needed to produce fissile materials for the bomb, but not necessarily the bomb itself. To achieve a fully functioning nuclear arsenal, Iran must first obtain the technology and materials to build the core of the weapon and to attach it to the warhead of a missile. However, considering Irans history of dodging inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and non-compliance to treaty obligations, the regime could be much closer to achieving a robust nuclear arsenal than assumed.

In the latest IAEA quarterly publication issued in March, inspectors findings amplified the warning that Iran is expanding its arsenal materials exponentially. The report found that Iran has nearly 33 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% purity. According to the Wall Street Journal, Iran is just 7 kilograms short of producing enough weapons-grade nuclear fuel for a weapon.

The Biden administrations annual report on arms control and nonproliferation compliance issued in late April also discussed these alarming findings. The State Department recognized Irans continuous dodging of international inspectors and concealment of its nuclear expansions in at least four locations. According to the report, undeclared nuclear activities and experiments with a uranium metal disc are among the issues that raise significant questions of what Iran may be trying to hide, and whether Iran is in compliance with its safeguards obligations today.

Despite the State Departments admission of Irans copious compliance failures, the White House remains fervent that re-entering a joint nuclear agreement with Iran is a top priority. Under the Obama era 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) guidelines, Tehran was granted sanctions relief in exchange for some cutbacks to its nuclear program. Tehran frequently defied its obligations before the U.S. withdrew from the arrangement in 2018 under the Trump administration. In addition to preventing IAEA officials from inspecting designated sites, Iran expanded its ballistic and cruise missile development programs.

The current nuclear negotiations in Vienna have not slowed the rate of Irans nuclear expansion. Since the talks commenced, Iran has continued to build up its uranium enrichment and fissile materials critical components in a nuclear program. Iran has ramped up its deployment of more powerful centrifuge models, increasing the concentration of raw materials needed to produce a weapon. According to Iran Watch, these new models have increased the size and enrichment level of Irans uranium stockpiled after being installed in production lines.

Irans enlarged and potentially underreported uranium enrichment levels and lack of inspector access to its weapons development sites indicate the rogue states official breakout time is looming. While it seems inevitable they could have the fissile material in a few weeks; its unclear how long it would take them to make a usable warhead. A nuclear threshold state does not necessarily have the capabilities or aim to acquire a nuclear weapon, but Tehrans clandestine efforts reveal a lack of peaceful intent. Therefore, their road to a bomb is likely imminent.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in a wide range of publications including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post and Times of Israel.

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Iran: The Next Nuclear Weapons State? - 19FortyFive

Iran says it has stopped large shipments of flour, sugar and vegetable oil from being smuggled out of the country amid a bread and pasta crisis.

Border Guard Commander Ahmad-Ali Goudarzi said on Thursday that about five tons of flour, four tons of sugar, and 63 tons of vegetable oil have been taken from smugglers at sea and land borders during the past 45 days.

Tasnim news agency also reported on Thursday that 312 tons of flour and 290 tons of vegetable oil were confiscated from businesses hoarding the essential food staple during the past 48 hours.

These statements follow a 2-5-fold government price increases for essential food items such as flour. It is not clear how large quantities of flour or cooking could be diverted from the government-controlled distribution system.

According to the ISNA news agency, pasta, which replaced rice for the lower income classes of society as main source of calories, has also become an unaffordable and expensive product.

The government has been insisting that its oil export revenues have increased and it has secured enough supplies of essential commodities, but prices have soared in recent weeks.

The head of the Flour Producers Association says this year Iran must import 20 million tons of grain including 6 to 7 million tons of wheat --noting that the country has never been so dependent on imports.

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Iran Says It Confiscated Large Quantities Of Smuggled And Hoarded Flour -

BySimon Handler

Since the 1980s, US forces, partner states, and regional waterways have been threatened by Irans increasingly precise ballistic and cruise missiles and naval forces, all of which put US economic and strategic interests at risk in the Middle East. Recent eventsranging from the January 24 Houthi attack on Al-Dhafra Airbase to the March 13 Iranian attack on an alleged Israeli facility in Erbil, Iraqsuggest that the United States deterrence in this manner has been insufficient since at least June 2019, when Iran downed a US unmanned surveillance drone over the Persian Gulf. Therefore, a shift in US strategy is needed to reestablish credible deterrence that denies potential attacks and punishes violations in order for the US and its partners in the Middle East to counter Iranian naval aggression and missile launches.

Challenges to US deterrence against Iran

Deterrence and extended deterrencediscouraging attacks against the US and its partnersare staples of US strategy in the Middle East. In the case of Iranian maritime and missile attacks, however, the challenge of US deterrence is further complicated by the Middle Easts geopolitical context.

US attempts at deterrence by denialdiscouraging Iran from launching an attack due to its unlikeliness to hit its targetface several primary challenges. First, simply put, deterring missile and naval attacks by denial is difficult, given a combination of geographic factors and the technological limitations of defenders. Second, US and partner capabilities in the region arent currently optimized to confront the primary Iranian threats. Third, US partners lack sufficiently integrated network defense to credibly defend against attacks.

The Persian Gulf is geographically condensed, resulting in short flight times for projectiles fired by Iran-linked forces. Consequently, detecting, tracking, and engaging projectiles with varying flight trajectoriessuch as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)is more challenging than in other regions. The proliferation of these projectiles among Irans partners in the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen increases the number of directions from which an attack might emanate, challenging the ability of the US and its partners to optimally position radars and batteries.

Furthermore, despite decades of investments in missile defense technology, missile defenders remain at a disadvantage in the offense-defense relationship. Additionally, missile interceptors often cost more than offensive projectiles, making missile defense an unsustainable affair from a resource standpoint. In March 2021, Israel used one of its F-35I Adir aircraftone of the most expensive weapons systems in the worldto intercept an Iranian UAV over an unidentified third country prior to it entering Israeli airspace, illustrating the cost asymmetry associated with countering the Iranian threat.

Deterring Iranian naval forces by denial is similarly challenged by geographic factors. The United States and its partners must maintain maritime domain awareness across the entirety of the Persian Gulf, a vast waterway of global economic importance that facilitates the flow of large volumes of crude oil and liquified natural gas. Here, Iran is capable of using fast boats to seize vessels and a variety of sea mines to quickly close access via the Strait of Hormuzwhich 20 percent of the worlds oil passes throughas self-detrimental as that may be.

Deterring Iran by denial is further complicated by US and partner capabilities, which arent aligned. The Gulf Arab states lack meaningful missile defense and naval capabilities, meaning that the United States plays an outsized role in their security. The United States too often attempts to deter with the presence of a carrier strike group, an asset that, for all its might, is ill-suited to confront Irans asymmetric tactics.

A region as condensed as the Middle East requires tight partner coordination to manage responses to potential Iranian provocations against both US and partner forces. Missile defenders and naval patrols alike should be synchronized in their engagements, as well as on collective self-defense agreements for the eventuality that one partner comes under attack. Maritime security operations that include vessels from various partner states are strengthened when there is clarity about the support that each contributor can expect from others in the event of an attack. Without these predetermined understandings, Iran could more easily fracture US-led coalitions.

Coordination on missile defense is similarly crucial, as a missile may fly over or near one state on its way to another. Predetermined agreements on how inbound projectiles are detected and who is responsible for shooting them down are beneficial. A broad, regional, and integrated missile defense network agreement could be challenging given the differing approaches to Iran taken by the US and states in the region. While the United States has pursued a maximum pressure campaign to counter Iran in recent years, some partners have taken softer approaches. Qatar, home to the largest US military base in the Gulf, made a mockery of further regional integration when, in March, it hosted Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to display models of the IRGCs missiles at the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition.

If the aforementioned hurdles stem largely from questions about capabilities and coordination, the challenges to deterring Iran by punishment stem overwhelmingly from questions of will. Iran understands that there is little US appetite for another war in the region and the United States is rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific. This stated shift telegraphed Washingtons desire to downgrade its presence in the Middle East. As a result, the United States has avoided direct armed conflict with Iran bar a few exceptions and constrained itself to non-kinetic levers, such as economic sanctions. Because Iran isnt the least bit scared of US regional threats to escalate conflict, the US ability to deter Iran by punishment is currently weak.

Effectiveness of US deterrence

The US has been able to largely deter direct attacks against US forces by making it clear that Iran will pay a heavy price for killing an American. When Iran killed an American contractor in an attack on an Iraqi military base in 2019, the United States responded emphatically with a drone strike that killed Irans most powerful military commander, General Qasem Soleimani. Though Iran responded with a missile strike on a US base in Iraq that resulted in brain injuries to more than one hundred troops, Tehran provided a warning to the Iraqi government and appears to have carefully calibrated the strike to avoid killing US personnel. Some argue that Iran isnt done avenging the killing of its top general and may retaliate in time. However, the Soleimani strike was a clear message to Iran that reestablished escalation dominance and deterrence against direct attacks.

Nevertheless, numerous instances since the assassination indicate that the US has been ineffective in deterring attacks by Iranian partners and proxies against US forces, in addition to providing extended deterrence. For instance, on January 24, Iran-backed Houthi rebels launched two ballistic missiles from Yemen that, were it not for Patriot missile interceptions, would have struck US forces at Al-Dhafra Airbase in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Similarly, a recent wave of Houthi missile and UAV attacks against US partners in the Gulf have inflicted serious damages against sites of economic value, such as an oil facility in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 25.

Bolstering US deterrence

To bolster US deterrence, the United States should adopt a multilateral strategy of advancement, reorientation, integration, and domination (ARID).

Given the inherent geographic and technological challenges for both missile and maritime defenders, the United States should focus on developing more sustainable solutions, as well as supporting its partners in their development efforts to shift offense-defense dynamics in their favor.

For example, in February, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett announced that the Iron Beam directed-energy system would roll out within a year. The system will be capable of intercepting short-range missiles, rockets, and UAVs that fly within its seven-kilometer range with an electric pulse rather than an expensive missiletheoretically neutralizing one of Irans most important weapons. Advanced systems like this should be shared with the Gulf Arab states to create a network effect that is critical for missile defense.

Israel has already declared its willingness to share its advanced homegrown missile defense technology with partners like the UAE. This puts aside Israels concerns about losing its qualitative military edge, given the defensive nature of the technologies and warming relations with the Gulf states.

Similarly, the United States should prioritize systems like unmanned surface vehicles for maritime security. The US should also push to accelerate the development of advanced systems like these and roll them out across its network of Gulf Arab state partners.

Additionally, the United States should reorient its assistance from providing what are perceived as flashier capabilities to providing those more equipped to deal with Irans asymmetric approach. For instance, the US has provided fighter aircraft to regional partners, but these serve little purpose in providing a cost-effective solution to Iran-linked missile and maritime threats. Instead, the United States should reallocate military assistance toward naval capabilities like anti-mine warfare vessels, frigates, and corvettes, as well as the human capital development necessary to operate these systems. This resource reorientation will also allow partners to take more ownership over their security and bolster extended deterrence by denial.

The United States has made progress on partner integration in recent years, as highlighted by the Abraham Accords, which have resulted in significant open-security cooperation. The United States should continue facilitating efforts, like Israels proposed regional air defense network, to build trust among partners. While an integrated missile defense network faces various political and practical obstacles, the United States can start small by encouraging the integration of a portion of the Gulf states that possess relatively greater cohesion among themselvessuch as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAEand gradually expand as political circumstances allow. The US can also build on recent maritime security efforts, such as the International Maritime Security Constructcreated in the aftermath of various Iran-sponsored attacks, as a coalition of states to maintain security in the Gulf (to benefit from partner capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).

The United States and its partners face no shortage of challenges in their efforts to deter Iran-linked attacks, particularly from missile and maritime forces. However, the United States can take tangible steps to strengthen deterrence, including advancing capabilities, reorienting assistance, integrating partners, and signaling a willingness to dominate militarily. In so doing, the United States can curb Iranian aggression and protect US interests in the Middle East.

Simon Handler is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @SimonPHandler.

Image: A soldier stands near an Iranian missile during a rally marking the annual Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan in Tehran, Iran April 29, 2022. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

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Iran-linked missile and maritime threats continue. Here's how the US and its regional partners can bolster deterrence. - Atlantic Council