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How fast could Iran build a nuclear weapon?U.S. officials believe Iran is inching closer to obtaining a nuclear bomb and could be just a few weeks away from reaching full breakout capabilities. In a press briefing on Wednesday, Press Secretary Jen Psaki confirmed that Irans proximity to acquiring sufficient fissile material for one nuclear bomb had shortened significantly from about a year to weeks, concerning the White House.

The nuclear breakout period refers to the time needed to produce fissile materials for the bomb, but not necessarily the bomb itself. To achieve a fully functioning nuclear arsenal, Iran must first obtain the technology and materials to build the core of the weapon and to attach it to the warhead of a missile. However, considering Irans history of dodging inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and non-compliance to treaty obligations, the regime could be much closer to achieving a robust nuclear arsenal than assumed.

In the latest IAEA quarterly publication issued in March, inspectors findings amplified the warning that Iran is expanding its arsenal materials exponentially. The report found that Iran has nearly 33 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% purity. According to the Wall Street Journal, Iran is just 7 kilograms short of producing enough weapons-grade nuclear fuel for a weapon.

The Biden administrations annual report on arms control and nonproliferation compliance issued in late April also discussed these alarming findings. The State Department recognized Irans continuous dodging of international inspectors and concealment of its nuclear expansions in at least four locations. According to the report, undeclared nuclear activities and experiments with a uranium metal disc are among the issues that raise significant questions of what Iran may be trying to hide, and whether Iran is in compliance with its safeguards obligations today.

Despite the State Departments admission of Irans copious compliance failures, the White House remains fervent that re-entering a joint nuclear agreement with Iran is a top priority. Under the Obama era 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) guidelines, Tehran was granted sanctions relief in exchange for some cutbacks to its nuclear program. Tehran frequently defied its obligations before the U.S. withdrew from the arrangement in 2018 under the Trump administration. In addition to preventing IAEA officials from inspecting designated sites, Iran expanded its ballistic and cruise missile development programs.

The current nuclear negotiations in Vienna have not slowed the rate of Irans nuclear expansion. Since the talks commenced, Iran has continued to build up its uranium enrichment and fissile materials critical components in a nuclear program. Iran has ramped up its deployment of more powerful centrifuge models, increasing the concentration of raw materials needed to produce a weapon. According to Iran Watch, these new models have increased the size and enrichment level of Irans uranium stockpiled after being installed in production lines.

Irans enlarged and potentially underreported uranium enrichment levels and lack of inspector access to its weapons development sites indicate the rogue states official breakout time is looming. While it seems inevitable they could have the fissile material in a few weeks; its unclear how long it would take them to make a usable warhead. A nuclear threshold state does not necessarily have the capabilities or aim to acquire a nuclear weapon, but Tehrans clandestine efforts reveal a lack of peaceful intent. Therefore, their road to a bomb is likely imminent.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in a wide range of publications including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post and Times of Israel.

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Iran: The Next Nuclear Weapons State? - 19FortyFive

Iran says it has stopped large shipments of flour, sugar and vegetable oil from being smuggled out of the country amid a bread and pasta crisis.

Border Guard Commander Ahmad-Ali Goudarzi said on Thursday that about five tons of flour, four tons of sugar, and 63 tons of vegetable oil have been taken from smugglers at sea and land borders during the past 45 days.

Tasnim news agency also reported on Thursday that 312 tons of flour and 290 tons of vegetable oil were confiscated from businesses hoarding the essential food staple during the past 48 hours.

These statements follow a 2-5-fold government price increases for essential food items such as flour. It is not clear how large quantities of flour or cooking could be diverted from the government-controlled distribution system.

According to the ISNA news agency, pasta, which replaced rice for the lower income classes of society as main source of calories, has also become an unaffordable and expensive product.

The government has been insisting that its oil export revenues have increased and it has secured enough supplies of essential commodities, but prices have soared in recent weeks.

The head of the Flour Producers Association says this year Iran must import 20 million tons of grain including 6 to 7 million tons of wheat --noting that the country has never been so dependent on imports.

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Iran Says It Confiscated Large Quantities Of Smuggled And Hoarded Flour -

BySimon Handler

Since the 1980s, US forces, partner states, and regional waterways have been threatened by Irans increasingly precise ballistic and cruise missiles and naval forces, all of which put US economic and strategic interests at risk in the Middle East. Recent eventsranging from the January 24 Houthi attack on Al-Dhafra Airbase to the March 13 Iranian attack on an alleged Israeli facility in Erbil, Iraqsuggest that the United States deterrence in this manner has been insufficient since at least June 2019, when Iran downed a US unmanned surveillance drone over the Persian Gulf. Therefore, a shift in US strategy is needed to reestablish credible deterrence that denies potential attacks and punishes violations in order for the US and its partners in the Middle East to counter Iranian naval aggression and missile launches.

Challenges to US deterrence against Iran

Deterrence and extended deterrencediscouraging attacks against the US and its partnersare staples of US strategy in the Middle East. In the case of Iranian maritime and missile attacks, however, the challenge of US deterrence is further complicated by the Middle Easts geopolitical context.

US attempts at deterrence by denialdiscouraging Iran from launching an attack due to its unlikeliness to hit its targetface several primary challenges. First, simply put, deterring missile and naval attacks by denial is difficult, given a combination of geographic factors and the technological limitations of defenders. Second, US and partner capabilities in the region arent currently optimized to confront the primary Iranian threats. Third, US partners lack sufficiently integrated network defense to credibly defend against attacks.

The Persian Gulf is geographically condensed, resulting in short flight times for projectiles fired by Iran-linked forces. Consequently, detecting, tracking, and engaging projectiles with varying flight trajectoriessuch as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)is more challenging than in other regions. The proliferation of these projectiles among Irans partners in the Gaza Strip, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen increases the number of directions from which an attack might emanate, challenging the ability of the US and its partners to optimally position radars and batteries.

Furthermore, despite decades of investments in missile defense technology, missile defenders remain at a disadvantage in the offense-defense relationship. Additionally, missile interceptors often cost more than offensive projectiles, making missile defense an unsustainable affair from a resource standpoint. In March 2021, Israel used one of its F-35I Adir aircraftone of the most expensive weapons systems in the worldto intercept an Iranian UAV over an unidentified third country prior to it entering Israeli airspace, illustrating the cost asymmetry associated with countering the Iranian threat.

Deterring Iranian naval forces by denial is similarly challenged by geographic factors. The United States and its partners must maintain maritime domain awareness across the entirety of the Persian Gulf, a vast waterway of global economic importance that facilitates the flow of large volumes of crude oil and liquified natural gas. Here, Iran is capable of using fast boats to seize vessels and a variety of sea mines to quickly close access via the Strait of Hormuzwhich 20 percent of the worlds oil passes throughas self-detrimental as that may be.

Deterring Iran by denial is further complicated by US and partner capabilities, which arent aligned. The Gulf Arab states lack meaningful missile defense and naval capabilities, meaning that the United States plays an outsized role in their security. The United States too often attempts to deter with the presence of a carrier strike group, an asset that, for all its might, is ill-suited to confront Irans asymmetric tactics.

A region as condensed as the Middle East requires tight partner coordination to manage responses to potential Iranian provocations against both US and partner forces. Missile defenders and naval patrols alike should be synchronized in their engagements, as well as on collective self-defense agreements for the eventuality that one partner comes under attack. Maritime security operations that include vessels from various partner states are strengthened when there is clarity about the support that each contributor can expect from others in the event of an attack. Without these predetermined understandings, Iran could more easily fracture US-led coalitions.

Coordination on missile defense is similarly crucial, as a missile may fly over or near one state on its way to another. Predetermined agreements on how inbound projectiles are detected and who is responsible for shooting them down are beneficial. A broad, regional, and integrated missile defense network agreement could be challenging given the differing approaches to Iran taken by the US and states in the region. While the United States has pursued a maximum pressure campaign to counter Iran in recent years, some partners have taken softer approaches. Qatar, home to the largest US military base in the Gulf, made a mockery of further regional integration when, in March, it hosted Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to display models of the IRGCs missiles at the Doha International Maritime Defense Exhibition.

If the aforementioned hurdles stem largely from questions about capabilities and coordination, the challenges to deterring Iran by punishment stem overwhelmingly from questions of will. Iran understands that there is little US appetite for another war in the region and the United States is rebalancing to the Indo-Pacific. This stated shift telegraphed Washingtons desire to downgrade its presence in the Middle East. As a result, the United States has avoided direct armed conflict with Iran bar a few exceptions and constrained itself to non-kinetic levers, such as economic sanctions. Because Iran isnt the least bit scared of US regional threats to escalate conflict, the US ability to deter Iran by punishment is currently weak.

Effectiveness of US deterrence

The US has been able to largely deter direct attacks against US forces by making it clear that Iran will pay a heavy price for killing an American. When Iran killed an American contractor in an attack on an Iraqi military base in 2019, the United States responded emphatically with a drone strike that killed Irans most powerful military commander, General Qasem Soleimani. Though Iran responded with a missile strike on a US base in Iraq that resulted in brain injuries to more than one hundred troops, Tehran provided a warning to the Iraqi government and appears to have carefully calibrated the strike to avoid killing US personnel. Some argue that Iran isnt done avenging the killing of its top general and may retaliate in time. However, the Soleimani strike was a clear message to Iran that reestablished escalation dominance and deterrence against direct attacks.

Nevertheless, numerous instances since the assassination indicate that the US has been ineffective in deterring attacks by Iranian partners and proxies against US forces, in addition to providing extended deterrence. For instance, on January 24, Iran-backed Houthi rebels launched two ballistic missiles from Yemen that, were it not for Patriot missile interceptions, would have struck US forces at Al-Dhafra Airbase in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Similarly, a recent wave of Houthi missile and UAV attacks against US partners in the Gulf have inflicted serious damages against sites of economic value, such as an oil facility in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on March 25.

Bolstering US deterrence

To bolster US deterrence, the United States should adopt a multilateral strategy of advancement, reorientation, integration, and domination (ARID).

Given the inherent geographic and technological challenges for both missile and maritime defenders, the United States should focus on developing more sustainable solutions, as well as supporting its partners in their development efforts to shift offense-defense dynamics in their favor.

For example, in February, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett announced that the Iron Beam directed-energy system would roll out within a year. The system will be capable of intercepting short-range missiles, rockets, and UAVs that fly within its seven-kilometer range with an electric pulse rather than an expensive missiletheoretically neutralizing one of Irans most important weapons. Advanced systems like this should be shared with the Gulf Arab states to create a network effect that is critical for missile defense.

Israel has already declared its willingness to share its advanced homegrown missile defense technology with partners like the UAE. This puts aside Israels concerns about losing its qualitative military edge, given the defensive nature of the technologies and warming relations with the Gulf states.

Similarly, the United States should prioritize systems like unmanned surface vehicles for maritime security. The US should also push to accelerate the development of advanced systems like these and roll them out across its network of Gulf Arab state partners.

Additionally, the United States should reorient its assistance from providing what are perceived as flashier capabilities to providing those more equipped to deal with Irans asymmetric approach. For instance, the US has provided fighter aircraft to regional partners, but these serve little purpose in providing a cost-effective solution to Iran-linked missile and maritime threats. Instead, the United States should reallocate military assistance toward naval capabilities like anti-mine warfare vessels, frigates, and corvettes, as well as the human capital development necessary to operate these systems. This resource reorientation will also allow partners to take more ownership over their security and bolster extended deterrence by denial.

The United States has made progress on partner integration in recent years, as highlighted by the Abraham Accords, which have resulted in significant open-security cooperation. The United States should continue facilitating efforts, like Israels proposed regional air defense network, to build trust among partners. While an integrated missile defense network faces various political and practical obstacles, the United States can start small by encouraging the integration of a portion of the Gulf states that possess relatively greater cohesion among themselvessuch as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and the UAEand gradually expand as political circumstances allow. The US can also build on recent maritime security efforts, such as the International Maritime Security Constructcreated in the aftermath of various Iran-sponsored attacks, as a coalition of states to maintain security in the Gulf (to benefit from partner capabilities like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance).

The United States and its partners face no shortage of challenges in their efforts to deter Iran-linked attacks, particularly from missile and maritime forces. However, the United States can take tangible steps to strengthen deterrence, including advancing capabilities, reorienting assistance, integrating partners, and signaling a willingness to dominate militarily. In so doing, the United States can curb Iranian aggression and protect US interests in the Middle East.

Simon Handler is a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter @SimonPHandler.

Image: A soldier stands near an Iranian missile during a rally marking the annual Quds Day, or Jerusalem Day, on the last Friday of the holy month of Ramadan in Tehran, Iran April 29, 2022. Majid Asgaripour/WANA (West Asia News Agency) via REUTERS

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Iran-linked missile and maritime threats continue. Here's how the US and its regional partners can bolster deterrence. - Atlantic Council

Ideology & Indoctrination: Manufacturing a More Radical Generation

Another unconventional feature of the IRGC that is consistent with its Islamist militia DNA is the emphasis it places on ideological indoctrination. Since its inception, the Guard has had a formal program of ideological-political training that seeks to radicalize its members, recruits, and their families. Over time the scope of this training has significantly increased and today it accounts for more than half of the required training for both incoming recruits and existing members.

Indoctrination in the IRGC became a key focal point for Khamenei following the 1997 Iranian presidential election after reports emerged that 73% of IRGC members had voted for the so-called reformist Khatami, despite the supreme leader endorsing hardline Islamist Ali Akbar Nategh-Nouri. Khamenei interpreted this as a sign that the Guards second generation (1990-2000) was less loyal to his authority and less ideologically committed. In response, in 2002, indoctrination for all Guardsmen and their families was rapidly increased to 20% of overall training in the IRGC. This figure would increase to 30% by 2007-08 and would account for around 50% after the 2009 anti-regime protests. It is worth noting that ideological assessments are at the core of the IRGCs promotion system, with preference being given to ideological commitment (tahhod) rather than technical expertise (takhasos).

This investment in increasing indoctrination has paid dividends for Khamenei and his hardline followers as the third (2000-10) and forth generations (2010-20) of IRGC members are among the most ideologically radical in the Guard. This extreme zeal has been demonstrated both outside and inside of Iran. The majority of Iranian volunteers who fought in the Syrian civil war to uphold the Assad regime, for example, were third- and fourth-generation IRGC members. The fact that the number of volunteers surged after Khamenei transformed Iranian intervention into a Shia jihad to Defend the Holy Shia Shrines is a strong indication of the ideological commitment of this younger IRGC cohort. Similarly, the unprecedented use of violence against protestors in Iran by the IRGC and Basij in the November 2019 anti-regime protests, which resulted in the killings of as many as 1,500 civilians over several days, compared to the Green Movement protests in 2009, when only 100 were killed over a month, also indicates that the IRGC is becoming more extreme.

IRGC Ideological Worldview

So what are the core tenets of the IRGCs ideology and indoctrination program? The Shia Islamist concept of velayat-e faqih (clerical rule) and clerical superiority underpins the IRGCs worldview. Tied to this is the key ideological pillar of exporting the Islamic Revolution to neighboring Muslim nations (ummah) through what is described as jihad in the path of God. The IRGC rejects the concept of the nation-state as a Western construct and instead divides territories between the dar al-Islam (land of Muslims) and dar al-Kufr (land of infidels). The ummah must be under the authority of the Imam or in his absence, his deputy: the supreme leader, thus legitimizing efforts to export the Islamic Revolution. A quick examination of the IRGCs ideological-political textbooks also reveals the way in which it views the U.S.: as an evil regime hellbent on world domination. This worldview sees the U.S. as the representation of all that is evil (jebeh-e batel) and puts the Islamic Republic of Iran on the side of everything good (jebeh-e hagh). Linked to this notion is the IRGCs other key ideological pillar of eradicating the State of Israel and Zionism. Like other Islamist ideologies, the IRGCs Shia Islamist worldview regards Israel as an illegitimate, oppressive, and usurping entity created in the heartland of the Muslim world to enable the West to achieve its supposed colonial goals. The liberation of Palestine through the destruction of Israel remains one of the IRGCs main objectives, and antisemitism pervades every aspect of its ideology. The IRGC itself has been explicit about its identity and what its members represent. A March 2022 publication entitled what is identity of the Revolutionary Guard outlined three characteristics in order of preference: 1) Guardians of Islam; 2) Soldiers of the Velayat (supreme leader); and 3) Sacrifices for the Revolutionary People. On the latter, the IRGC is clear that it serves the revolutionary people namely, pro-regime supporters and not ordinary Iranians.

It is important to note that the IRGCs Islamist ideology has also practically shaped its military tradition, doctrines, and strategy. More specifically, the Alavi and Ashurai pillars of the clerical regimes Islamist ideology have served as the foundation of the IRGCs overarching military strategy since its inception. Alavi refers to Ali, the first divinely ordained Shia imam, whose forces lost the Battle of Siffin in 657 CE against Muawiyah, the first caliph of the Umayyad empire. The Shia critique suggests that Ali was defeated because his army did not display loyalty to his orders. This is manifested in the IRGCs military doctrine as a demand for total obedience to the supreme leader and his orders (velayat-e madari). The Ashurai pillar is derived from the date on which Imam Hussein, the third Shia imam, led his small band of fighters against the massive army of the Umayyad Caliph Yazid at the Battle of Karbala in 680 CE. Although Hussein knew defeat was preordained, he sacrificed himself and his men to defend true Islam by taking on the Umayyads. The IRGC adopted this logic that oppressors must be challenged, whatever the result into Irans militia doctrine through a belief in acting on areligious commandment regardless of potential outcomes (taklifgarai). These ideological doctrines have been incorporated into the IRGCs overarching military strategy, in part to make up for its lack of advanced military technology and its reliance on human capital.

While all of these pillars of the IRGCs belief system have been assessed to varying degrees, one fundamental value of its ideology that makes up a significant aspect of its indoctrination has yet to be explored: the concept of Mahdism. Mahdism in the IRGC remains a complete blind spot for Western policymakers and experts, and yet its implications could have major consequences.

As a Shia Islamist force the IRGCs worldview hinges on Mahdism: the return of the 12th divinely ordained Shia imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi (or the Hidden Imam), whom Shia Muslims believe was withdrawn into a miraculous state of occultation (hiddenness) by God in 874 CE. The concept of Mahdism is rooted in the belief that Imam Mahdi will one day return to rid the world of evil and injustice. His coming will bring about "one final apocalyptic battle between two armies, in which Shias believe that Mahdi and his forces will prevail over evil.

The concept of Mahdism and the occultation of the 12th Imam emerged during the rule the Abbasid Caliphate (Al-Mutamid al 'llh) from the Shia ulema (clergy) primarily based in modern-day Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon. Muhammad al-Mahdi would assume the mantle of imam over the Shia ummah after his father, the 11th imam, Hasan al-Askar, was killed by the Sunni Abbasid Caliphate in 873 CE. Imam Mahdi was withdrawn into a state of occultation to protect him from suffering the same fate as his father. During this period (874-941) known as the Minor Occultation (gheybat-e soghra) Mahdi would appoint four special deputies (navab-e khas), who would act as his representatives and through which he would communicate and rule. In 941 CE, however, the fourth deputy would announce that after his death there would be no more specific deputies a message he claimed to have received from Imam Mahdi. The death of the fourth deputy in 941 CE would trigger the Major Occultation (gheybat-e kobra), whereby Mahdi would no longer have a specific deputy but all Shia clerics would become his representatives (nayeb-e aam).

Quietist Shia Political Doctrine: From the Safavids to the Pahlavis

Shia Islam was formally recognized as Irans official state religion during the Safavid Dynasty in 1501. Determined to attain religious legitimacy for their rule, the Safavids invited Shia clerics from Iraq, Bahrain, and Lebanon to consolidate Shiism in Iran and bless their leadership. However, even after the Safavids made Shia Islam the official state religion, the Shia political doctrine followed by the majority of the clergy ruled that any form of government during the Major Occultation was illegitimate. According to this notion, the only form of legitimate government was an Imamate (Shia Islamic state) and this could only exist under the leadership of the divinely ordained infallible imams. The consensus among the clergy was that the 12th Imam (or Lord of the Age) would appear upon his own accord, when injustice and evil captures the world. He would be accompanied by 313 special fighters, who would defeat evil in an apocalyptic battle, and act as the Shia ummahs savior against the non-believers. During the occultation, however, the clergys role would be to uphold Shia Islams interests only in the spiritual and religious realm, refraining from any political activism. This quietist political Shia doctrine, which began during the Safavid period, would last up until the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavis rule in 1979.

Irans Islamic Revolution: Preparing for Mahdis Return

The 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini would fundamentally change the Shia political doctrine and Mahdism.

In the years leading up to Irans revolution, then exiled cleric Khomeini developed a theory of Islamic government that would transfer all political power to the Shia clergy. Khomeini outlined his plans for the creation of an Islamic state by reconceptualizing the doctrine of velayat-e faqih to legitimize clerical guardianship of the state. The ayatollah claimed that God had made Islam for it to be implemented as shown by the creation of divine law (sharia). Given that no one knew Islam better than the clergy (Islamic jurists), Khomeini argued, it was natural that they should rule as guardians of the state until the return of the 12th Imam. In the absence of the 12th Imam, velayat-e faqih would transfer all political and religious authority to a supreme clerical leader (mujtahid), who would have custody over the Shia ummah as the imams deputy (nayeb-e Imam) and Gods representative on Earth.

Khomeinis theory also reconceptualized Mahdism, reversing centuries of clerical quietism during the Major Occultation. Rather than silently waiting for the 12th Imams return, Khomeini argued, the 12th Imam was waiting for Shia Muslims to prepare the ground for his arrival. Shia Muslims, in turn, had to be politically active and form an Islamic government to prepare for Mahdis global revolution. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, velayat-e faqih would be enshrined into Irans constitution and would underpin the Iranian state, with Irans supreme leader ruling as the 12th Imams deputy. Under this interpretation, the Islamic Revolution in Iran marked the first stage before the return of the 12th Imam.

Khamenei and the Mahdism Doctrine

Preparations for the return of Mahdi became more serious after Ayatollah Khamenei assumed the mantle of supreme leader in 1989. This appetite was initially shaped by the influence of Ayatollah Mohammed-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi, a hardline Islamist cleric who was one of the main proponents and theorists of Khomeinis reinterpretation of Mahdism. This influence began to manifest itself in the late 1990s where Khamenei developed a doctrine around Mahdism. To prepare for the 12th Imams return, the ayatollah claimed it was necessary to create an ideal Islamic society based on Mahdism (jaameh-e mahdavi). Khamenei further developed this thesis a few years later. To lay the ground for the 12th Imams return, the supreme leader outlined five necessary revolutionary stages: an Islamic Revolution, an Islamic regime, an Islamic government, an Islamic society, and an Islamic civilization. According to Khamenei and his allies, Iran had only achieved the first two stages and was stuck on completing an Islamic government.

Ahmadinejad: The Government of Mahdi

The election of the hardliner Ahmadinejad as president in 2005 turbocharged Mahdism across the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad a member of the Basij was obsessed with the doctrine of Mahdism and finding ways to speed up the return of the 12th Imam. This is perhaps unsurprising given the fact that his spiritual leader was none other than Mesbah-Yazdi. As the new president declared, We have a mission to turn Iran into the country of the Hidden Imam.

Ahmadinejad would give special importance to the Jamkaran Mosque, which hosts the Well of Jamkaran, where some Shia Muslims believe the 12th Imam will return. Ahmadinejads administration would allocate$17 million in state funds to Jamkaran Mosque as well as expand its facilities, transforming it from a small mosque to a multimillion-dollar shrine. His administration would also spend around $8 million on refreshments for pilgrims visiting the Jamkaran Mosque for the celebration of Mahdis birthday. Ahmadinejad would go as far as constructing the Jamkaran Highway to connect Jamkaran Mosque directly to Imam Khomeini Airport in Tehran. In a meeting with the supreme leader, the president reportedly insisted on its construction so that in case Imam Mahdi reappears he could travel directly from Jamkaran to Tehrans airport without getting stuck in traffic.

While Ahmadinejads assertions were perhaps comical for audiences beyond Irans Islamist support base, the number of pilgrims to Jamkaran would reach in the millions during his presidency. The Ahmadinejad period would also result in the significant growth of grassroots heyats (Islamist institutions) and ideological preachers (maddahs or eulogists) across Iranian society. Maddahs are usually not clerics and have no religious education; rather, they are individuals who perform Shia mourning processions such as self-flagellation ceremonies and are known for their ability to evoke religious emotion. After the Islamic Revolution, maddahs became a central component of the ideological radicalization of IRGC and Basij members, and were instrumental in preparing Iranian soldiers often volunteers to launch martyrdom-seeking, human-wave attacks during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88). Whereas the traditional Shia clerical establishment devotes more attention to Imam Ali and Imam Hussain, the maddah culture and class are fixated on Mahdism and praise for the Hidden Imam. The apocalyptic and revolutionary environment is fundamental to heyati and maddah culture. After the 2009 unrest period, the IRGC began to organize, mobilize, and promote maddahs by establishing the Basij Maddahs Organization, with the goal of monopolizing the heyat network across Iran.

The combination of increasing poverty and desperation would provide fertile ground for the emergence of a new form of state-backed radicalism among Irans hardline Islamist constituency, not least the youth. This new form of radicalism can be described as a Cult of Mahdism. This would go as far as proclaiming that Ahmadinejad was Shuayb bin Salih and Khamenei was Seyed Khorasani two individuals, who, according to historic Shia Islamic narrations, appear before Imam Mahdis return.

The Emergence of the Cult of Mahdi

The aftermath of Irans 2009 anti-regime protests, triggered by the rigging of that years presidential elections, would result in the Islamic Republic doubling down on its hardline Islamist ideology. To mitigate against future waves of protests, it was believed that the regime needed to nurture a more ideologically zealous generation of youth. This would provide fertile ground for radical proponents of Mahdism to fill. The rise of Ali Akbar Raefipour, the anti-Semitic conspiracy theorist and staunch advocate of Mahdism, would be a direct consequence of this. Raefipours extreme interpretation of Mahdism would gain huge traction among Irans Islamist youth (javanan-e hezbollahi) the core constituency from which the IRGC recruits. The rise of Raefipour was the direct result of support from the Ahmadinejad government and the IRGC. Today, his organization, the Masaf Institute, which states it has a goal of acquainting Muslims with Mahdist topics and teachings, is the direct recipient of IRGC financial support.

Perhaps more importantly, the post-2009 landscape also injected a new dose of radicalism about Mahdism into Khameneis close circle. This inner elite of hardline clerics began to view, understand, and communicate all contemporary world events in the context of Mahdism and its apocalyptic end of the times worldview (akhar al-zaman). Hojatoleslam Alireza Panahian, a hardline cleric in the Office of the Supreme Leader, close confident of Khameneis son Mojtaba, and an ideological trainer for the IRGC, would be instrumental in this regard. Like a younger version of Mesbah-Yazdi, Panahian would become one of the regimes key propagandists about Mahdism, placing particular emphasis on the warning signs of the nearing of the end of the occultation. For example, in 2020, he claimed the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic was the preamble to the reappearance of Mahdi, drawing parallels between COVID-19 and the all encompassing plague that Islamic scripture describes as a sign of the nearing of the end times. Such predictions were by no means restricted to Panahian though. In fact, in March 2022, Ayatollah Golpayegani, the head of the Office of the Supreme Leader, asserted support for Putins invasion of Ukraine and described it as a prelude to the reappearance of the Lord of the Age (Imam Mahdi).

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Iran's Revolutionary Guard and the Rising Cult of Mahdism: Missiles and Militias for the Apocalypse - Middle East Institute

Irans progress towards an ICBM. How close are they? Iran possesses the largest and most diversified ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East. While this threshold certainly poses a significant threat to its neighbors, Irans capability to produce an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is not entirely on the imminent horizon. However, the tremendous improvements to Irans weapons lethality and precision in the last decade should warn that the regimes ambitions are not limited. The current state of Irans ICBM progress is better dissected in three parts- the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp. (IRGC) space program, collaboration with North Korea, and proxy warfare in the region.

Amidst the joint U.S.-Iran nuclear talks in Vienna this February, Iran unveiled its Khaybar Sheikan missile. With a reported range of 1,450 kilometers, this weapon could reach both U.S. bases in the region and Israel. A month earlier, Iran tested an engine for a solid-fuel rocket needed to launch satellites. The pure solid-fuel rocket design typically corresponds to ballistic missile systems. While these developments have been showcased publicly, the extent of Irans weapons programs is likely underground or hidden.

The unveiling of the new Khaybar Sheikan missile fell close to the anniversary of Irans National Space Technology Day, which commemorates the 2009 launch of its domestic-grown liquid-fuel Safir rocket. Based on North Koreas Nodong liquid-fuel rocket, the Safir was ultimately intended to carry nuclear weapons. While technical issues and challenges with the Safir have minimized its significance, Irans space program has become more alarming in recent years.

In April 2020, Iran launched its first successful military satellite, Noor-1 (light), carried by its own Qased three-stage space launch vehicle (SLV). This launch marked a turning point in Irans weapons development program for two reasons. First, Noor-1 was launched in coordination with the IRGC military space program. All space launches up this point had been carried out by the Iranian Space Agency, so the militarys coordination with the launch indicates broader resources are being poured into this sector. Second, the launch displayed a solid-fuel capability that could make Irans ballistic missile designs more lethal and sophisticated in the future.

Advancements in Irans space program could correlate to its potential ICBM capabilities in the long run. The regimes long-range missile designs will use the technology developed in its solid-fuel space programs to build launch vehicles and the guidance system for targeting and navigation. While inserting a satellite into orbit suggests a decently sophisticated guidance system, the successful reentry and warheads targeting is another matter.

While Irans exact progress in ICBM development cannot be characterized due to its lack of transparency, the states extensive proxy activities showcase its reliance on missile and rocket technology. Iran serves as a prominent hub for weapons proliferation, supplying militias and proxy groups all over the region with a constant flow of missiles and rockets. While Yemens Houthi rebels have been equipped with increasingly advanced ballistic and cruise missiles in recent years, Iraqs Shiite militias have received explosive-laden drones and rockets.

Iran relies heavily on its missile and rocket development programs to maintain its position as the largest proliferator in the region. The regimes prioritization of its weapons arsenal, covert activities, and advancing space program indicate while Irans ICBM capabilities may not be an imminent threat, it is certainly the regimes ambition. Currently, Iran doesnt possess any nuclear warheads, let alone those capable of use on an ICBM, but they are closing in on a viable warhead. If Iran takes a year after its nuclear breakout time to create a bomb, the regime would undoubtedly pour much of its resources into ICBM development to create a capable delivery system for their weapon.

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in a wide range of publications including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post and Times of Israel.

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How Soon Could Iran Have an ICBM? - 19FortyFive