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Country Summary: U.S. citizens visiting or residing in Iran have been kidnapped, arrested, and detained on spurious charges. Iranian authorities continue to unjustly detain and imprison U.S. citizens, particularly dual national Iranian-Americans--including students, journalists, business travelers, and academics--on charges including espionage and posing a threat to national security. Iranian authorities routinely delay consular access to detained U.S. citizens and consistently deny consular access to dual U.S.-Iranian citizens.

The U.S. government does not have diplomatic or consular relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The U.S. government is unable to provide emergency services to U.S. citizens in Iran.

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If you are currently in Iran:

Last Update: Reissued with updates to COVID-19 information.

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Iran Travel Advisory

IranSource

December 7, 2021

ByAnonymous

Many analysts have interpreted the results of recent Iraqi parliamentary elections on October 10 as a sign of diminishing Iranian influence, but the reality is more nuanced. To reach any conclusion, one needs to examine the power bases of Shia, Sunni, secular and ethnic groups, the orientations of Shia cleric and politician Muqtada al-Sadr, the role and influence of the clerical Hakim family, and the influence and instruments of Iran-backed Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs).

Clearly, parties critical of current Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi lost seats. Among them were the Fatah Coalition of Iran-backed PMUs and their political wings. Other losers were the party led by the moderate Shia cleric Ammar al-Hakim and the Nasr coalition led by the former Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi, neither of which are considered pro-Iran. On the other hand, the Dawa Party of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, known to be close to Tehran, was the third biggest winner and took more seats than it had in the previous parliament.

The final election result announced on November 30 has been interpreted to suggest that the Sadr bloc has increased its popularity while Fatahs support declined, but the vote total reveals a different story. While the Sadrists outperformed their PMU rival in seat count, the two sides received nearly the same number of votes. In fact, Fatah and its allies received slightly more votes than the Sadrists but secured fewer seats, with Fatah receiving an estimated 670,000 votes while the Sadrists received 650,000.

This suggests that ignorance of the new Iraqi electoral law and failure to use its mechanics properly not popularity or proximity to Tehranwas behind Fatahs fewer seats. According to an analysis published by Chatham House, Fatah failed to accurately assess the structure created by new legislation.

There are also questions about the results in Iraqi Kurdistan. Of the two main Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is closer to Iran than the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). The PUK won sixteen seats but has rejected the preliminary results, claiming election rigging by KDP, which took thirty-three seats. The PUKs allegations about election rigging are similar to those made by the Fatah coalition.

The preliminary results have created a dilemma for Iran, which has made no official comments about them. Tehran faces a paradoxical situation: if it doesnt support the claims of the Fatah coalition about election rigging, this will increase the likelihood that the next Iraqi government moves to disarm the PMUs. If, on the other hand, Iran supports the rigging claims, it will be stuck in the middle of domestic wrangling among different political factions and later in the Iraqi parliament.

This is a simple cost-benefit calculation for Tehran, which wont accept losing its influence in Iraq. The Islamic Republics rulers decided long ago that domestic influence in regional countries should be its top priority. So far, they have accepted all the costs for such influence.

Kadhimi assassination attempt

On November 7, there was a failed assassination attempt against Prime Minister Kadhimi. No group has claimed responsibility but suspicion fell on Tehran until American military sources said that, although unspecified Shia militias are believed to have conducted the attack, Iran seems to have lost its control and has not supported the drone attack. Additionally, the Iraqi investigation committee announced on November 28 that the explosives and drones used in the assassination attempt were made in Iraq.

Iranian officials have so far argued that the PMUs have the most to lose from the drone attack. Former Iranian ambassador to Iraq Hassan Danaeifar said that the attack was a sedition to block the trend of democracy in Iraq and to influence the formation of the next government in Baghdad. He added that it was simple-mindedness to blame this on an Iraqi group and that the act cannot be the result of domestic political competitions in Iraq. The secretary of Irans Supreme National Security Council, Ali Shamkhani, ludicrously blamed foreign think tanks for the attempt.

Official Iranian newspapers, including government outlet Iran and hardliner mouthpiece Kayhan, attributed it to the enemies of Iran and Iraq. Javan, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) postulated that Kadhimi himself might have been behind the attack. The common theme among Iranian media of all stripes was that the attack was suspicious and perpetrated by Iraqs enemies, who want Iraq to remain insecure about facilitating their manipulationsan analysis whose irony appears to have eluded the Iranian authors.

On November 8, Tehran sent IRGC Quds Force Commander Esmail Qaani to Baghdad, where he met with Kadhimi and other top officials. Qaani insisted that Iraq needed stability and security at present, that all acts that threaten Iraqi security must be avoided, and that it is essential that the demands of Iraqis that have protested the election results are taken into account but only in the framework of the current laws. Following his meetings, the PMUs and Iraqi government agreed to de-escalate tensions.

The Sadr factor

Muqtada al-Sadr is a critic of both Iran and groups backed by the United States and Saudi Arabia. This may mean that pressures may increase not only to neutralize the influence of Iran-backed PMUs and their political wing, but also to push for a full withdrawal of US forces from Iraq. Iraqi media have suggested that a significantly large number of the MP-elects also support these demands regardless of their political affiliation.

Many expected the election to end the political stalemate in Iraq, but Baghdad continues to face a multitude of crises. This atmosphere means that its politics remain open to outside influence and interference. The form of manipulations may change given the composition of the new parliament, but the content will remain as foreign countries exploit the different parliamentary trends, Iraqs general shortcomings, and cracks in its system.

Tehran has realized that the PMUs are now marginalized in parliament and the future cabinet, but not at the social level. Therefore, Iran may push its agenda in Iraq less through the PMUs and more through existing diplomatic and economic leverage, such as the supply of energy, gas, foodstuffs, construction materials, tourism, and the religious and ethnic closeness of the two peoples.

This, of course, doesnt mean that the PMU and Fatah coalition will be of no use to Tehran. However, Tehran will work with the groups that control the parliamentary majority. If the PMUs decide to focus more on political action and less on military activities, they may still have a chance of enlarging their electoral base for a return to power. In the meantime, Irans best options are to work with other groups such as Malikis faction, moderates such as Hakim, and allies like the PUK, in addition to the small Fatah faction in parliament.

The author, who is well versed in the Iranian political scene, asked to remain anonymous.

Tue, Dec 8, 2020

IranSourceBySina Azodi

Irans interest in developing a nuclear deterrent is often attributed to the Islamic Republic. However, in reality, this interest predates the 1979 revolution and reflects a deep-seated desire for national prestige and development, as well as a need to deter regional rivals.

Wed, Sep 1, 2021

IranSourceBySina Azodi and Mohsen Solhdoost

Rising tensions between Israel and Iran have reached an alarming stage in recent weeks. What used to be a shadow war of covert operations, sabotage, and proxy conflict is turning into a more direct military confrontation between the long-time regional adversaries.

Thu, Feb 11, 2021

IranSourceByKenneth Katzman

The de-listing of Iranian economic entities that were designated as terrorist entities could spark a broader debate on the overarching US approach to Iranian support for regional armed factions.

Image: A woman holds a picture of Sadr's movement leader Moqtada al-Sadr, as his supporters celebrate after preliminary results of Iraq's parliamentary election were announced in Baghdad, Iraq October 11, 2021. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani/File Photo

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Iran's allies lost seats in the Iraqi elections. Now Tehran is recalibrating its strategy. - Atlantic Council

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan said Tuesday that the US and Russian presidents had a good discussion on Iran in their teleconference on Ukraine.

Russia and the United States actually worked well together, even in tense circumstances, back in the 2014, 2015 period to produce the joint comprehensive plan of action. This is an area where Russia and the United States can continue to consult closely to ensure that Iran never acquires [nuclear weapons], Sullivan said.

After seven rounds of multilateral negotiations in Vienna to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran has presented new demands unacceptable to the United States and its three European allies who signed the 2015 agreement.

Essentially, Iran is asking for all sanctions imposed since former president Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement be lifted first before it commits itself to the limitations of the JCPOA again.

The last round of the Vienna talks ended on December 3, with no clarity as to when they will resume. Iran said Tuesday that talks will restart on Thursday, but so far others have not confirmed this.

Russia and China, Irans diplomatic supporters, are also signatories of JCPOA and the US needs their support to put pressure on Iran. Anecdotal information says that both Moscow and Beijing were taken aback by Irans positions in the Vienna talks last week, but it is not clear how far they are ready to lean on Tehran.

Sullivan stopped short of providing a clue as to what Russia is prepared to do at this juncture to persuade Iran to adopt a more reasonable negotiating posture.

Sullivan was asked if a return to the JCPOA means releasing frozen funds and lifting sanction, allowing Iran to carry on with its activities in the Middle East, a point that critics of the administrations policy of returning to a purely nuclear deal with Iran have voiced.

Sullivan replied with the argument that the nuclear deal has no impact on Irans proxy forces in the region. Trumps withdrawal from the agreement did not rein in pro-Iran groups in Lebanon or Yemen, and the opposite is also true. Nothing about the nuclear deal stops the United states capacity to deal with those proxies and we are prepared to do so., the national security advisor said.

When Trump abandoned the nuclear agreement one his demands was that Tehran change its malign behavior in the region and stop grooming and supporting militant forces.

The Biden Administration has also expressed concern over Irans regional policies and its ballistic missile program but has argued that the JCPOA should be restored first, and other matters pursued later. But critics say that once the nuclear deal is revived the US must lift key sanctions, which would give Tehran a financial lifeline, leaving no incentive for further talks.

The Biden Administrations Iran strategy is also based on close coordination with European allies, unlike Trump who abandoned the JCPOA against the advice of allies. Sullivan reiterated that allies are important.

The more Iran demonstrates a lack of seriousness at the negotiating table, the more unity there is among the P5+1, and the more they will be exposed as the isolated party in this negotiation. So really the ball is in Irans court as to whether it wants to show up and demonstrate that its going to be serious or not, Sullivan maintained.

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Sullivan Says Good Discussion With Putin On Iran As Talks Stall - Iran International

Irans customs department says exports of steel and metals have increased this year compared with last year, reaching $4.5 billion, amid US sanctions on Iran.

The spokesman of the Customs Organization, Ruhollah Latifi, told local media that in the first 8 months of the current Iranian calendar year exports have already topped all last years sales by $800 million.

Latifi announced that that exports of steel, iron, iron ore and construction steel constitute 14 percent of all exports that total $31 billion, in the eight-month period. Exports of metal products and iron ore last year was $3.7 billion, he said.

The World Steel Association last month said that Irans production fell by 15 percent in October, following smaller declines earlier this year. The declines were due to shortages of electricity.

Iran has been suffering from an power shortages in recent years as its natural gas production, feeding power plants, fails to keep up with domestic demand. Lack of investments and technology resulting from years of various sanctions have gradually reduced output in operating gas fields.

Export of non-oil products has become more important for Iran as US sanctions have reduced oil exports its main revenue-generating commodity.

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Iran Says Exports Of Steel, Metals Have Increased This Year - Iran International

JNS.org An investigation into a major security breach at the home of Israeli Defense Minister Benny Gantz, surrounding a cleaner at his house who had not been vetted by the Shin Bet security agency and is being indicted for allegedly offering to spy for Iran, has ended with a written reprimand for two high-ranking Shin Bet officials, the agency announced on Tuesday evening.

Shin Bet head Ronen Bar appointed an external committee to probe how suspect Omri Gorenwho had multiple criminal convictionswould have been employed at Gantzs home. The committee was comprised of three retired Shin Bet officials, including two former department heads and a former division leader.

The committee submitted its findings to Bar, along with recommendations for action to be taken. The committee described the affair as a professional failure, citing lack of coordination at the professional level and in work procedures.

On the basis of the investigations findings, Bar decided to issue a written reprimand to two senior officials in the organization.

December 8, 2021 10:50 am

Meanwhile, the Shin Bet has evaluated security arrangements for the individuals for whom it is responsible, and tightened background checks and testing procedures for anyone employed in close circles of officials provided with Shin Bet security.

Bar also issued instructions to add additional levels of intelligence and operational security when it comes to the officials whom it secures.

However, Bar did praise the rapid action taken to locate and arrest Goren within 48 hours of the time that he allegedly contacted a hostile entity.

Despite the success in thwarting [the plot], we failed to prevent it, Bar said. If the process had worked, a person like this would never have been working near a protectee. The failure that took place in this isolated incident allowed us to take an in-depth look at the processes and mechanisms involving the issue of those employed close to protectees.

The probe gave us a chance to examine professional work processes in the service, he added. The conclusions of the investigative committee, as well as an in-depth process of learning lessons, have already been translated into actions on the ground that will significantly reduce the chance of incidents like this happening again.p

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Shin Bet Head: 'We Thwarted But Failed to Prevent Iran Spy Plot' - Algemeiner