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UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL ROSEMARY A. DICARLOS

REMARKS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON

NON-PROLIFERATION

(IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 2231 (2015))

New York, 6 July 2023

Thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

The conclusion of the Plan and its endorsement by the Council eight years ago were the result of intensive negotiations to achieve the common objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security, in a manner that delivers tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people.

When I last briefed the Council on this issue in December 2022, all participants to the Plan and the United States had reaffirmed that a return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan was the only viable option to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Six months later, negotiations to restore the Plan remain stalled.

Diplomacy is the only way to effectively address the Iranian nuclear issue. It is essential that all parties renew the dialogue as quickly as possibleand reach an agreement on the outstanding issues.

In this context, I reiterate the Secretary-Generals appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan and to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

And I echo his call on Iran to reverse the steps it has taken that are not consistent with its nuclear related commitments under the Plan. It is also important for Iran to address concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to annex B of resolution 2231 (2015).

In a welcome development, in March of this year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran issued a joint statement to expedite the resolution of outstanding safeguards issues and to allow the IAEA to implement further appropriate verification and monitoring and reporting activities.

In its report of May 2023, the IAEA reported that, in line with this joint statement, it had installed surveillance cameras at workshops where centrifuge parts are manufactured. The Agency added that it had no further questions regarding the presence of high enriched uranium detected at one location.

This encouraging step notwithstanding, we are alarmed that the Agency remains unable to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in the country.

It estimates that Iran now has a total enriched uranium stockpile of more than twenty times the allowable amount under the (JCPOA). This includes increased quantities of uranium enriched to 20% and 60%. Such a stockpile of enriched uranium is of serious concern.

Madam President,

I will now turn to the restrictive measures set out in annex B, as outlined in the Secretary-Generals fifteenth report on resolution 2231 (S/2023/473).

First, on the nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals were submitted to the procurement channel in the last six months.

The Council, however, received ten notifications, submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B, for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan.

The renewal by the United States of waivers with respect to certain nuclear non-proliferation projects foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B to resolution 2231 for another 180-day period was an important step.

Second, regarding the ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom provided information to the Secretary-General and the Council concerning a test flight of a space launch vehicle conducted by Iran in March of this year.

We also received information from these same Member States about the testing and unveiling of two new ballistic missiles by Iran in May and June, respectively.

The letters received from Member States continue to reflect the divergent views as to whether this launch and missile developments are inconsistent with the resolution.

Third, we examined information related to paragraph 4 of annex B.

This paragraph pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in Council document S/2015/546 which require prior approval of the Council. It includes the list of complete delivery systems and subsystems, as well as the associated components and equipment, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems with a range of 300 km or more.

In the reporting period, we received information from the United Kingdom about ballistic missile parts seized by the British Royal Navy in February 2023, in international waters in the Gulf of Iran.

The United Kingdom shared imagery of the seized components and its analysis that the components were of Iranian origin and transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231.

The Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom conveyed their view that some of the seized components are controlled items listed in the Document S/2015/546 and that their transfer without prior approval of the Council was therefore inconsistent with the resolution.

In their responses, Iran and the Russian Federation stated that there was no evidence linking the intercepted vessel and its cargo to Iran, and no clear indication that the seized components were of Iranian origin.We continue to analyze the available information.

We also received letters from Ukraine, France, Germany and the United Kingdom concerning alleged transfers of unmanned aerial vehiclesfrom Iran to the Russian Federation, in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B.

The United Kingdom and Ukraine also provided photographs and their analyses of the UAVs recovered in Ukraine. The two countries assessed the devices to be of Iranian types Shahed-131, Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6, and that they had been transferred by the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231.

Their assessment was based on comparison with debris of other UAV attacks in the Middle East and with imagery of Iranian UAVs available via open sources.

France, Germany, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States also reiterated their request for the Secretariat to examine the debris of these UAVS in Kyiv or any other suitable location in letters to the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council and in statements to the Council and media.

The Permanent Representatives of Iran and the Russian Federation disputed the imagery and evidence provided by the United Kingdom and Ukraine of the UAVs, as well as the claim by France, Germany, Ukraine and the United Kingdom that Iran had transferred UAVs to the Russian Federation in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231, noting that the accusations were not substantiated by evidence.

The Secretariat continues to examine the available information.

The Secretariat also received an invitation from the Government of Yemen to examine the debris of a cruise missile used in an attack by the Houthis on the Al-Dhaaba oil terminal last November. The Secretariat is still analyzing the available information.

Finally, the Secretariat did not receive any official information alleging actions inconsistent with the assets freeze provisions of the resolution.

Madam President,

Eight years since the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its endorsement by the Council, we remain convinced that the plan is the best available option for ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Irans nuclear programme, as well as for allowing Iran to reach its full economic potential.

In closing, I would like to thank Her Excellency, Ms. Vanessa Frazier for her leadership as Facilitator for resolution 2231, as well as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

Thank you, Madam President.

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The JCPOA remains the best available option for ensuring a ... - Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

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Iran's protesters are in retreat, but for how long? - Financial Times

By David Daoud

The Blue Line has been relatively calm since the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollahthe deceptive quiet obscuring obsessive preparations for a future conflict both sides believe is inevitable. In furtherance of Irans regional strategy, the Shia organization has been establishing several frontlinesin south Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Syriafrom which to fight the Jewish state directly and through allies. But with Israels attention seemingly focused exclusively on the groups activities across its borders, Hezbollah appears to be establishing another front behind Israeli linesboth within the countrys official boundaries and the West Bank.

Prompted by Hezbollahs recent brazen behavior, the Israeli security establishment seems fixated on detecting signals that indicate whether the group is readying for another direct war or security escalation with Israel. In March, Hezbollah deployed a thousand seemingly unarmed personnel along the border (four hundred were Hamas-affiliated Palestinians). Shortly afterward, the Shia organization facilitated two attacks against Israel but maintained a sufficient distance from their execution to avoid an Israeli reprisal or escalation. In late March, a Palestinian militant infiltrated from Lebanon and planted an explosive bearing the hallmark of Hezbollah manufacturing in Megiddo. Then, in early April, Hamas fired a barrage of thirty-four rockets from Lebanon into Israel.

Following this, Hezbollah staged a massive but relatively routine war game to commemorate Israels withdrawal from south Lebanon. On a smaller scale, it echoed Hezbollahs ten thousand-man simulated invasion of the Galilee in August 2012, which commemorated its 2006 victory over Israel. This time, the group invited reporters to witness masked fighters training to destroy Israel by jumping through flaming hoops, firing from the backs of motorcycles, emerging through plumes of smoke, and blowing up Israeli flags posted on hills. The exhibitionuseless as a battlefield exercisewas pure military theater intended to make headlines, produce images for Hezbollahs martial music videos, and reinforce its supporters belief that Hezbollah can deter, defeat, and destroy Israel. It may also have covered Hezbollahs infiltration of Israeli territory and installation of two outposts in Har Dov/Shebaa Farmstesting the limits of Israeli patience and gradually attempting to adjust the rules of engagement without incurring retaliation.

Critical as some developments may prove, they obscure a more dangerous Hezbollah initiative to establish a proxy foothold behind Israeli lines. Hezbollah has coveted such an option for decades, beginningat leastafter Israel expelled four hundred Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters to south Lebanon in 1992 and readmitted them a year later. These returnees served as a nucleus for Hezbollah and Iran to fight Israel from withinan effort that continued with direct armed assistance to Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafats Fatah (beginning in 1998), and then to several armed groups during the Second Intifada and afterward.

Since then, Hezbollahworking with Irans Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) or separatelyhas spent considerable efforts to enlist Arab Israelis, Lebanese, nationals of Arab countries with foreign passports, and Palestinians to gather intelligence, recruit additional assets, or establish sleeper cells within Israel to plan terror attacks. To that end, the connections between Lebanese and Arab Israeli criminal networks have proven invaluable.

Statements from Hezbollah and Iranian officialsin addition to the groups past and current behaviorbetray a three-fold and ambitious objective that goes far beyond periodically igniting scattered chaos within Israel.

Part of Irans regional strategy is to develop its proxies domestic weapons production capabilities. The IRGC has achieved this outcome with Hezbollah in south Lebanonrelying on their Lebanese proxyand with Yemens Houthis, as well as in the Gaza Strip. Sometime after the 2005 Israeli withdrawal and before his assassination in 2008, Hezbollahs then-military commander Imad Mughniyeh spent months in the coastal enclave training Palestinian militants in rocket and launching pad production and tunnel and rocket warfare.

In line with that, Hezbollah and Iran appear set on replicating that outcome in the West Bank. IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami admitted as much in 2022, saying Irans goal was to arm the West Bank the same way that Gaza is armed. As he told Fars News, When something is homegrown, it cannot be stopped. Recent attempts to fire rockets from Jenin on June 26claimed by a Hamas-affiliated group calling itself the [Yahya] Ayyash Detachment West of Jeninand the discovery of a launch pad in June in east Jerusalem, as well as weapons laboratories on July 3 in Jenin, indicate these efforts may have begun producing results.

A second and corollary objective, per Salami in 2014, is to imminently transform the West Bank into an unbearable inferno and hell for Israel. Iran outsourced the task to Hezbollah, whose Unit 133 had been recruiting and funding cells in the West Bank through Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallahs son, Jawad. According to Israeli police and the Shin Bet, Hezbollahs continuous weapons smuggling into Israel and the West Bank has intensified significantly since 2021. This boost immediately preceded the ongoing upsurge of West Bank violence, which began in June 2021, with unrest spreading to cities long considered tranquil, such as Jericho.

As a result of these efforts, groups once thought defunct in the West Bank (ex. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or all across the region (ex. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB)) have experienced a resurgence. New armed groups have also sprung up, particularly in Jenin and Nablus. Fueled by coherent ideologies, some are affiliated with major organizations, like the PIJ Quds Brigades-linked Jenin Detachment and Nablus Detachment, and AAMBs Hezam Al-Nar and Liwa al-Shuhada.

Others are motivated more by frustration, like the so-called Lions Dena shadowy and diffuse entity centered in Nablus. This group emerged independently in August 2022, drawing on the disaffection of Palestinian youths through both the efficacy of the Palestinian Authority and negotiations with Israel. Here too, however, Iran has been fanning the flames. Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar recently noted that Tehran has been using online platforms to encourage recruitment, demonstrating the Islamic Republics exploitation of any available vectorideological motivation or disillusionmentto stir up violence.

Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, Iran and Hezbollah have sought to exploit tensions between Arab and Jewish Israelis to establish what, in Resistance Axis jargon, has been called the unification of the fronts. To that end, Hezbollahs Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem described Israels May 2021 inter-ethnic riots, which overlapped with the clash with Gaza-based Palestinian militants, as a strategic change and historical inflection point. West Bank, Gazan, and Jerusalemite Palestinians had become united with 48 Arabs in purpose, he said, whereby all Palestiniansnot just the segment directly affectedwould now collectively respond to any Israeli attack or encroachment.

Like Qassem, Hezbollahs Executive Council Chairman Hashem Safieddine recently suggested that this development would allow the group to strike Israel from within. Fantasizing about the united fronts giving Hezbollah the ability to almost sow chaos at will within Israel, he said, The day will come when the Resistance takes part in operations within [Israels] 1948 borders, something that Israel couldnt imagine this will cause the [Zionist] regime to crumble from within. Imagine what would happen if the Resistance enters the 48 territories.

Establishing a front within Israel and the West Bank has immense utility for Hezbollahnow and during the groups promised comprehensive war against the Jewish state. For now, it allows the group to continue bleeding Israel through proxies while maintaining plausible deniability. At a minimum, this will keep the IDF mired in combating low-level, albeit sustained, violence. At worst, Israels ongoing clashes with Palestinian militants increase the possibility of miscalculation or overreaction by one or both parties, potentially igniting a new intifada. Such an outcome appears increasingly plausible as a younger Palestinian generationdisillusioned both with their leadership and negotiations with Israel, and with no memory of the bloodiness of the Second Intifadais increasingly skewing Palestinian society in support of returning to armed confrontation.

The future utility of Hezbollahs frontline within Israel would come into effect during a war. Years into the future, Hezbollah could ignite that war during one of the religiously or nationalistically sensitive anniversaries cluttering the Israeli-Palestinian calendar. By timing a conflict to coincide with a period of heightened religious or nationalistic sentiment (on either or both the Palestinian and Jewish side), the group could activate the cells it has cultivated in the West Bank.

It could also tap affiliates among Arab Israeli criminal networks to carry out a nationalistically motivated attack on a Jewish targeta synagogue in a mixed Arab-Jewish Israeli city, for example. With this simple act, Hezbollah could exploit independently heightened inter-ethnic tensions to initiate a cycle of actions and reactions by Jewish and Arab extremists, just like in May 2021, which could spread to the rest of those communities and throughout the country. By creating disturbances on both sides of the Green Line, Hezbollah will force Israel to divert the attention of its government and security forces from other active fronts, includingmost critically to the groups survivalLebanon, to confront a lethal threat behind its lines.

David Daoudis a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Thu, Apr 30, 2020

IranSource By David Daoud

The Open Letter, Hezbollah's manifesto, reserves its highest level of opprobrium for America, labeling it the main root of evil and declaring the confrontation with America as the yardstick for all of Hezbollahs other activities.

Image: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian gestures as he stands next to Hezbollah officials during his visit to Maroun Al-Ras village near the border between Lebanon and Israel, Lebanon April 28, 2023. REUTERS/Aziz Taher

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Hezbollah and Iran have opened a fourth battlefront: Inside Israel - Atlantic Council

Iran Air has revealed plans to bring seven stored aircraft back into service thanks to the country's new-found domestic maintenance capabilities. The airline hopes to have the aircraft in the skies once more within six months.

Iran Air's CEO, Shamseddin Farzadipour, was quoted by the ILNA news agency as saying, "Our priority is domestic repair, and seven planes will become airworthy in the next six months," before adding that the aircraft would likely be used on busy routes to Iraq, catering for the large market of Iranian pilgrims visiting holy sites in the neighboring country.

As a result of sanctions that make carrying out repair work and sourcing spare parts more challenging, Iran Air has struggled to maintain its fleet of primarily Airbus aircraft. Thanks to a greater focus on domestic maintenance services over recent months, the airline now hopes to be in a position to return seven of its preciously-grounded aircraft to the skies.

Photo: Rebius | Shutterstock

The airline did not state exactly which aircraft would be returning to service, however, data from ch-aviation shows that nearly two-thirds of Iran Air's passenger fleet is currently grounded, including:

Iran Air's active fleet of 11 passenger aircraft is left to operate the airline's route network across the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. At the end of July, the carrier will increase the frequency of its longest route, Tehran (IKA) to London Heathrow (LHR), from three to four per week. Iran Air's other intercontinental destinations include Milan (MXP), Paris (CDG), and Hamburg (HAM).

Photo:Mehdi Photos | Shutterstock

Recognizing the need for investment in its aviation infrastructure, the Iranian Government has put aside funds to support the country's airlines in their efforts to get their aircraft back in the skies. A number of other Iranian carriers have reportedly already managed to return aircraft to service in this way, with Qeshm Air and Aseman Airlines bringing back an Airbus A320 and Boeing 737, respectively, in February this year.

In addition, the program has been expanded to offer maintenance and repair services to foreign airlines also struggling with sanctions. Unconfirmed reports last year suggested that a number of Russian aircraft had already been in Iran for maintenance work.

As well as bringing back older aircraft, Iran Air also intends to modernize its aging fleet - something that is much needed, given the average age of the carrier's fleet currently stands at 25.7 years old.

Photo: Vytautas Kielaitis | Shutterstock

Iran Air has a number of outstanding orders with Airbus, including 32 A320neos, 28 A330neos, and 16 A350s. The orders date back to 2016, but only a handful of aircraft were delivered before the US imposed sanctions on Iran in 2018.

What do you think of Iran Air's plans to bring seven of its stored aircraft back into service? Have you flown on the airline? Share your thoughts and experiences by commenting below.

Source: ch-aviation.com, Tasnim News Agency

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Iran Air Looks To Unground 7 Aircraft - Simple Flying

Irans admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) this week further aligns the Islamic Republic with Russia and China, though it is unclear how much membership in the bloc will benefit the Islamic Republic.

Iran became a full member of the SCO on Tuesday at the organizations virtual meeting hosted by India, 18 years after it acquired observer status in the security and trade cooperation organization. Its application to become a full member was accepted in 2021. China, Russia, India, Pakistan and several Central Asian states are members of the SCO. The organization has additional dialogue partners and observers across the continent.

The membership comes as Iran is seeking better ties with Russia and China as well as Central Asia to break international isolation and sanctions from the United States and Europe. To this end, Iran's non-oil trade with SCO member states rose 31% to more than $17 billion from March to August of last year, according to the official Islamic Republic News Agency.

Becoming a full member of the SCO may be more symbolic than practically important to the Islamic Republic, however, according to Ryan Bohl, a Middle East analyst at the US risk intelligence firm RANE.

Iran's entry has greater symbolic significance in terms of alignment than it does of pragmatic importance. The SCO remains a loose-knit bloc of powers rather than a tightly bound alliance like NATO, Bohl told Al-Monitor.

The SCO has sometimes been called the anti-NATO, but its power is relatively limited, according to a September 2022 report from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Differences between member states have constrained the blocs policy coordination and regional integration since its inception. This is partly due to its insufficient bureaucratic capacity and its institutional design, wrote Nicole Grajewski for the think tank. The SCO is also governed by consensus, which limits substantive cooperation, the report said.

Bohl said the SCO has not developed into a vehicle with direct, tangible benefits for Iran, but Tehran may benefit in other ways from being part of the bloc, including by boosting Irans chances of joining the BRICS alliance. Iran notably attended the BRICS meeting in South Africa last month.

Iran may also enjoy better defense ties and possiblybetter arms deliveries with China and Russia thanks to its membershipin the bloc, he said, adding that cooperation between Iran and China on drones could also increase.

Iran supplies drones to Russia for use in the invasion of Ukraine, while China is a leader in global drone technology. Al Jazeera reported in January that China was the top exporter of combat drones in the past decade, citing data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

Iran's entry signals that Tehran sees itself increasingly as aligned with a Russo-Chinese-led world order, which itself is an alteration to Iran's older, more nonaligned and Pan-Islamic worldview, Bohl argued.

Iran is not the only Middle Eastern state seeking stronger ties with the SCO. In March, Saudi Arabias Cabinet approved a decision to join the organization. Last May, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait became dialogue partners of the SCO.

Saudi Arabia and the UAEs desires to boost relations with the SCO will likely depend on their relations with Iran, according to Bohl.

Saudi/Emirati aspirations to increase their SCO ties will depend on how well they're getting along with Iran. Right now, with a more dovish atmosphere between them, if the Saudis and Emiratis want to move beyond dialogue partners, they have a diplomatic runway to do so, he said. But if there is a resurgence in hostilities, it would almost certainly mean that the Saudis and Emiratis would freeze their advancement process in the SCO, if not withdraw entirely.

The UAE resumed normal relations with Iran last year, while Saudi Arabia did so in March in a deal brokered by China. Saudi-Iranian relations have improved steadily since then, and Iran reopened its embassy in Riyadh last month.

Read the rest here:
Iran's membership in Shanghai Cooperation Organization further ... - Al-Monitor