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Last week, Iraq hosted a regional summit intended to encourage archrivals Saudi Arabia and Iran to resolve their differences and ease tensions in several countries in the Middle East that have become their proxy battlegrounds. Reconciliation between the two could pave the path for peace in Yemen, save Lebanon from a total collapse, and aid Iraqs, and maybe in time even Syrias, economic recovery.

Although Iraq was applauded for opening its doors to discuss a possible end to the cold war that has been fought between Riyadh and Tehran for hegemony of the Muslim world, no breakthrough was achieved. Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers merely agreed to continue the conversation that started in April just days after the Biden administration began an indirect dialogue with Iran to revive the Iranian nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA].

The Iranian-Saudi talks have stalled, however, because of Irans insistence on consolidating its gains made by using its armed militias; uncertainty over the fate of the JCPOA; and the absence of security guarantees from the United States, upon whom Saudi Arabia is dependent.

Last week, Iraq hosted a regional summit intended to encourage archrivals Saudi Arabia and Iran to resolve their differences and ease tensions in several countries in the Middle East that have become their proxy battlegrounds. Reconciliation between the two could pave the path for peace in Yemen, save Lebanon from a total collapse, and aid Iraqs, and maybe in time even Syrias, economic recovery.

Although Iraq was applauded for opening its doors to discuss a possible end to the cold war that has been fought between Riyadh and Tehran for hegemony of the Muslim world, no breakthrough was achieved. Saudi and Iranian foreign ministers merely agreed to continue the conversation that started in April just days after the Biden administration began an indirect dialogue with Iran to revive the Iranian nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA].

The Iranian-Saudi talks have stalled, however, because of Irans insistence on consolidating its gains made by using its armed militias; uncertainty over the fate of the JCPOA; and the absence of security guarantees from the United States, upon whom Saudi Arabia is dependent.

Irans government is keen for the resumption of diplomatic ties with the Saudis, which would help it entrench its currently contested international legitimacy and possibly lay the groundwork for greater regional engagement, economic and social, that would also bolster the government domestically. Iran wants to show its people that it is not completely isolated, and that the economic straits in which it is suffering are largely a result of American hostilitynot the regimes costly interventions in the Middle East, which have become targets of angry protest.

The government of Irans new president, Ebrahim Raisi, can count on some domestic support for this narrative, especially after Raisis decisive election victory; and of course he has the full backing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and hardline factions such as those that dominate the Revolutionary Guard. But that is unlikely to quell protests in Iran that have complained that the policy of supporting militias from Lebanon to Yemen is too costly when money is short at homeand only attracts further sanctions.

The complication in this scenario is that Raisi intends neither to rein in those militias nor to agree to changes in the nuclear deal. Irans development of long-range ballistic missiles, which the United States would like to include in further talks, raises a particular threat to Saudi Arabia. As long as Iran is not ready to concede on these key fronts, the Saudis simply do not see the prospect of a deal.

Seyed Hossein Mousavian, an Iranian policymaker who served on Irans nuclear diplomacy team in negotiations with the European Union in 2015, summarized Iranian presidents thinking: As I understand, President Raisis approach will be for the P5+1 and Iran to be committed to JCPOA as is and full compliance vs. full compliance,' Mousavian said. That means the broader issues the United States and its allies such as Saudi Arabia (let alone Israel) see as important next steps are not currently on the table.

Simon Henderson, Baker Fellow and director of the Bernstein Program on Gulf and Energy Policy at the Washington Institute, said that he thought Iran would continue to support militias across the so-called Shia crescent. Any adjustment will be for tactical rather than strategic reasons, Henderson said.

Raisis presidential inauguration teemed with a horde of leaders of non-state militias it backs, many of whom have spent years or decades carving away Saudi influence in the region in favor of Irans presence. Their presence and prominence at the event certainly did not boost Saudi confidence in the talks.

Joost Hiltermann, director of the Middle East and North Africa program at the International Crisis Group, said Iran sees these armed partners as critical to its posture in the surrounding region. However, these militias also pursue a domestic agenda that does not always perfectly coincide with Irans regional design, Hiltermann added.

It could get more interesting if these groups over-reach in their domestic environments, he said. This could happen especially in Iraq, where the Iran-backed militias, as well as many of the others, could run afoul of popular sentiment when they become predatory and act as especially violent auxiliaries of the state without accountability, or are seen to be fighting on behalf of Iran instead of Iraqi national interest.

In Lebanon, too, criticism of Hezbollah has increased. Although the group still has broad support in its strongholds, it is losing ground in the rest of the country. Most people in Lebanon blame the political elite for rampant corruption and ruining the countrys economy. But many also see Hezbollah as the reason behind the United States and Saudi Arabias reluctance to extract the country from its financial crisis.

These flickerings of regional opposition to the Iranian project, together with the possibility of a breakdown of the JCPOA talks, seem to have given the Saudis the sense their leverage over Iran may grow. They may even hope that Irans intransigence will cause the collapse of the Vienna talks, leaving Iran under sanctions and less able to support its broader regional objectives. Rather than make any concessions to help Iran, Saudi Arabia would prefer to keep it on its trajectory of deepening isolation.

Ali Vaez, Iran project director at the International Crisis Group, said that if the United States-Iran nuclear deal is not restored, Tehran and Washington will remain at daggers drawn, and under those circumstances, Iran-Saudi de-escalation is unlikely, if not impossible.

He added that any resolution between the regional foes would depend on the division of areas of influence. Ultimately, both countries would have to agree on a set of rules and to potentially determine zones of influence in the region, Vaez said.

Analysts suggest that, as far as mutual concessions go, Syria is low-hanging fruit for Saudis and Yemen is the same for Iranians. Saudi Arabia could join the United Arab Emirates in pushing for diplomatic recognition of the Assad regime, while Iran could push its local allies the Houthis into a deal with the Saudi-backed government of Yemen. Compromises could be found for both Iraq and Lebanon.

But Iran sees such an idea as an unnecessary volte-face: Irans local allies, including the Syrian army and Hezbollah, have with Russian backing already routed Sunni-led opposition groups from regime-held territory in Syria; and the Houthis are currently winning the war in Yemen. And Iran has already succeeded in planting proxies inside the governments of both Iraq and Lebanon.

Iran has expanded its influence in the Middle East, and in that sense it has won the unconventional war it has been fighting. But many of the regions countries, including Iran itself, are economically miserable. They are either mired in active conflicts, brought low by the effects of wars and sanctions, or like Lebanon are suffering self-imposed financial crises.The Saudis for now have little to gain from acknowledging Irans victories and cementing them in place. Until that changes, Iranians, as well as the citizens of other nations stuck in the middle of the Saudi Arabia-Iran rivalry, will continue to lose out.

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Saudi-Iranian Rapprochement Is Heading Nowhere - Foreign Policy

Traveling to Iran can be one of the most memorable things you can do in your life. However, it can become one of the most annoying things if your trip does not match your preferences and travel style.

You are going on a vacation to a new country to have a better time than usual. Therefore, it is very crucial to choose your Iran travel type wisely. The variety of Iran travel itineraries can bring forth a wide range of different experiences for travelers.

Iran tourscan be divided into different groups based on the different personalities and travel types. Therefore, you get to choose the type that fits you. So, you are sure you reserve a tour that will be one of those vacations you will remember for good.

Iran Cultural Tours: the Path to the Unheard Stories

Undoubtedly, traveling is far more than spending your vacations in a new place for leisure and recreation. From the moment you step into the destination, you unfold the unheard narratives of its cultures. Thus, some Iran tours intend to take the visitors into a deeper aspect of the Iranian lifestyle, Persian culture, and history. They take you to the gist of the trip on the streets of cities, among locals, in the luxury or local restaurants, and through a time tunnel-like journey in the historical sites. TheseIran cultural toursinvolve a great deal of our Persian culture, history, customs, and everything. So, the range of the things you may want to see is diverse. That is why you should get to know your preferences. Do you prefer more historical sites or more interaction with people? Do you want to spend more time in urban places or natural spots? All the journey moments including diverse nature, historical heritage, local food, magnificent architecture, as well as hospitable people of Iran, are exciting parts of every Iran cultural tour. But, it depends on you and your interests to modify which one is involved and how much.

Iran Trekking Tours: the Unknown Wild

Iran is a country of different climates; it has mountains, jungles, deserts, and various plains. This diversity of scenery and experience has madeIran hiking toursa perfect mixture. Besides, Iran trekking tours widen your perspective. They break the narratives portrayed in the media from Iran as a country of deserts. From the greenery of mountains to the many mineral hot springs on the hiking trails, youd get to explore the variety of sceneries that Iran has to offer in different Iran tour packages.

However, trekking mountains are not just about the trails and their natural beauty. Its also about the local life and the stories youll get to explore. In different mountainous regions, you meet the nomads that travel by season. Or youll get to meet hikers from different countries in Iran. They can tell you more about the unseen trekking routes on your way to explore some of the Middle Easts highest summits in Iran! Also, it is always the right time to climb in Iran because it is a 4-season country. You can do it all year round. For instance, you didnt make it to be in Iran in the summer? Dont worry! The south of Iran has a pleasant climate for hiking in winter. Besides, you can head for swimming in the Persian Gulf at the end of your trip!

Iran Damavand Tours: Exploring the Mystic Mountain

Damavand Mountain is a great challenge for all! It is accessible for anyone who is prepared for hiking and trekking. Particularly in the summer, it doesnt need much professional hiking gear. Many people of different ages and various levels of professionalism will climb up the lush trails towards Irans highest peak. Not only Damavand is the highest mountain in Iran, but also it is the highest summit in the Middle East. Its also the highest volcanic summit in Asia. Its the 12th prominence summit in the world. Damavand is known as the ceiling of Iran in the list of 7 volcanic summits of the world. With its extraordinary view and a variety of flora and fauna, Damavand trekking tours will fill any eyes with joy!

Iran Desert Tours: A Trip to the Land of Serenity

The cultural and trekking tours are not mere types of Iran tour packages. Now, its time to get to the special item on our menu: Iran deserts. This vast country can offer you many natural wonders. But you will find out that these golden dunes are as lively as green jungles and blue waters. There are old cities and villages on the verge of drylands where their residents have overcome the severity of deserts and made their lives. The fantastic water supply system, Qanat, or the miraculous Shazde Garden in the heart of the desert are some examples. This ancient lifestyle is an exclusive Iran attraction. Yet, the main story starts when you step on the sands of Lut or Kavir Deserts. The white and mirror-like salt lakes, enormous stone sculptures, dune hills one after the other, and finally the azure sky of the night with the polka dot of stars all over it is all the extraordinary beautiful scenes you'll remember from Iran desert tours.

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All Types of Iran Tours - Tehran Times

President Joe Bidens much-discussed plans to rejoin the Iran nuclear deal are off to a bad start. After six rounds, indirect talks between Washington and Tehran were put on hold last June until Irans new president, Ebrahim Raisi, could take office on Aug. 5. Now, almost a month later, there is still no indication of when the next diplomatic session will take place.

By all accounts, Iranian leaders are eager to alleviate sanctions and revive the Islamic Republics moribund economy. However, they also took a number of steps, such as rapid uranium enrichment and research into uranium metals, that make a return to the deal difficult. Only by correctly interpreting the source of these mixed signals from Tehran will it be possible to determine whether the current impasse in talks can ultimately be overcome.

Iran appears to have embarked on a confusing high-stakes negotiating strategy as a result of both domestic political fissures and President Donald Trumps maximum pressure campaign. Trumps withdrawal from the nuclear deal and renewal of sanctions, along with a series of high-profile assassinations and sabotage attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, increased the popularity of Iranian hardliners and facilitated their return to power. In December 2020, while the moderate Rouhani administration was still in charge of the government, hardliners in Irans parliament (Majles) passed a law that requires Iran to advance its nuclear program in threatening ways until sanctions are lifted. This law, promoted over the objections of the departing administration, substantially limits the flexibility of Iranian diplomats and is a major obstacle to reviving the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The question now is how the hardliners, after taking control of the government, will deal with the consequences of their December law and other escalatory moves. The ball is in Tehrans court, and there is little that Biden and the rest of the world can do besides hold their ground and wait to see what the regime decides.

Raising the Stakes

As a result of the Iranian parliaments actions, Irans nuclear program has advanced substantially. Iran is now enriching uranium up to 60 percent, far above the nuclear deals cap of 3.67 percent. Further, as part of a multi-stage process to produce fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, Iran is also producing uranium metal enriched up to 20 percent. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently confirmed that Iran has produced 200 grams of this metal, up from 3.6 grams in February.

Uranium metal can be used for civilian purposes or to make the core of a nuclear bomb. While the international community remains skeptical, Iran claims that it aims to produce uranium silicide fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. In practice, the reactor would irradiate uranium silicide pellets to produce medical isotopes, commonly used in diagnostic procedures for cancer and heart disease. However, on the road to producing this sophisticated uranium fuel, Iran must work with uranium metal, and this sort of metallurgy was banned for 15 years under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Russias response offers perhaps the best illustration of how serious Irans escalation is: In a break from its past whitewashing of Irans nuclear behavior, Moscow now believes that Iran seems to be going too far. In a joint statement, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also registered their grave concern, arguing that Irans enrichment and production of uranium metal are both key steps in the development of a nuclear weapon and that Iran has no credible civilian need for either measure.

Raising the stakes further, these new activities are occurring while Iran has suspended a special monitoring agreement with inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency. With its December law, the Majles imposed a deadline to restrict inspectors access to Iranian nuclear facilities absent sanctions relief from the United States. At that point the agency and the Rouhani government negotiated a three-month work-around agreement that reportedly provided inspectors with the means to reconstitute a full picture of Irans nuclear program if the nuclear deal were to be revived. While the agency is flying blind for now, when sanctions are lifted they should subsequently get access to monitoring equipment that continues to watch Irans program in the meantime. The three months ended in May, but Tehran may have unofficially allowed monitoring to continue. Now, however, some of the recording devices need to be replaced and if they are not, the world may never be able to fully account for the activities of Irans nuclear program during this period. The resulting uncertainty could exacerbate existing tensions between the United States and Iran, as well as accelerate anxiety in Israel, which has long threatened a dangerous preemptive strike against Irans nuclear program.

What Is Tehran Trying to Signal?

Contrary to the image often found in U.S. media, Irans foreign policy apparatus is not a monolith, nor can it be simply characterized as a top-down decision-making structure with the supreme leader exercising full authority from above. Ariane Tabatabai, now a senior adviser at the State Department, wrote in 2019 that Irans national security decision-making process can be better characterized as a bargaining process, in which infighting and consensus-building shape policy outputs.

These tensions and disagreements within the system were on full display in the debate over last Decembers nuclear law. Following the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020, Irans parliament voted to manufacture uranium metal, suspend international nuclear inspections, and vastly increase uranium enrichment. Former Iranian president Hassan Rouhani and others associated with his administration have specifically blamed the Majles and the December 2020 nuclear law for the subsequent failure to lift U.S. sanctions. My administration did all the things to lift the sanctions, Rouhani recently argued. If the parliament law had not stopped us, we would have lifted the sanctions almost before Norouz [March 21, 2021]. His spokesman Ali Rabiei also criticized parliamentary interference with the executive branch, saying, The government was from day one consistently opposed to parliaments unusual path.

Now, however, hardliners dominate the government, and it will be their strategy that determines the fate of nuclear negotiations. During the 2020 parliamentary elections, Irans Guardian Council excluded many of the more moderate and reformist candidates from contention, leaving the conservative Principalists faction with a decisive majority. Winning 221 of the 290 seats, they more than doubled their presence in the Majles. Moreover, the Supreme Leader handpicked Raisi to be president, endorsing the new presidents belief that only a powerful government can properly implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. The supreme leader also exerts considerable control over much of Raisis cabinet.

After Raisis election, an implementation committee was formed to help forge an internal consensus on how to approach nuclear negotiations. Created by the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Irans top decision-making body, it consists of representatives from the Rouhani administration, the incoming Raisi administration, and the Majles. It is unknown if the committee has come to a consensus yet. In July, this committee reportedly determined that the draft roadmap that Rouhanis team had negotiated is incompatible with the law passed by parliament in December about resuming Irans nuclear program. The question is whether this is simply political posturing aimed at increasing Raisis leverage or, more ominously, a firm red line from the Iranian regime.

The Ball Is in Irans Court

It remains likely that the hardliners running Iran see a resumption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, with any concessions and sanctions relief that can be squeezed out of Washington, to be in their best interest. However, negotiations require flexibility and can easily be derailed by existing red lines. The December law was a show of force by hardliners while the Rouhani administration was in office. Hardliners are now in control of the negotiations and are realizing that their maximalist stance is not going to achieve much. Unhappy with the status quo, they would like to see a breakthrough but seem to be hesitating over what strategy to adopt. This has led to a short-term approach that combines radical escalation and very partial compliance. The result, so far, is confusion, delays, and stalemate.

If Raisi and his government stick to maximalist demands like making sanctions relief irreversible while moving ahead with their escalatory measures, a return to the deal may soon become impossible. Iran would likely continue to advance its nuclear program, which could lead the United States to retaliate with more punitive economic sanctions. If tensions do escalate, it is possible that Iran could further reduce cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency and its nuclear program could be referred back to the United Nations Security Council. At this point, Russias position on whether Iran had gone too far would become crucial.

Where Will Biden Go From Here?

The Biden administrations initial optimism about reviving the nuclear deal is rapidly waning. Bidens point man on the issue, Robert Malley, now assesses the future of the deal as just one big question mark. Senior U.S. diplomats appear set on rejecting any concessions to Irans escalatory negotiating strategy. As one official said, If they think they can get more, or give less to return to a deal it is illusory. Furthermore, the Biden administration will be wary not to waste additional domestic political capital on foreign policy, especially after Afghanistan. According to U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, We have clearly demonstrated our good faith and desire to return to mutual compliance with the nuclear agreement The ball remains in Irans court and we will see if theyre prepared to make the decisions necessary to come back into compliance.

This is the right approach. For now, U.S. negotiators should continue to wait and see whether Iran is willing to return to talks in Vienna. Ultimately, compromises on both sides will be necessary. But there are several reasons why it would not make sense to preemptively offer the hardliners a better deal. First, Iran is now far from the guidelines of the original deal. Enriching uranium to 60 percent, even if this is in response to an act of sabotage against the Natanz nuclear facility, demonstrates the pursuit of capabilities with no civilian purpose. Second, Washington should not give the hardliners an easy win. Allowing them to use their undemocratic election to accumulate greater leverage would undermine the administrations efforts to promote more moderate interlocutors in Iran. Finally, the better deal Iran wants may not be possible. Tehran would like to see Biden guarantee that a future U.S. president cannot reimpose sanctions. But the nature of American democracy means that this isnt a promise that Biden can make.

Despite all of the obstacles, reviving the nuclear deal should theoretically be easy. Iran wants sanctions relief, and the United States wants constraints on Irans nuclear program. While both the United States and Iran have accumulated bargaining chips, further escalation is possible, and it will be up to the new Iranian government to decide how to move forward and manage its own domestic politics. There is room for compromise on the timing and sequencing of a return to compliance with the nuclear deal. But hard decisions should be made now before the situation needlessly spirals out of hand.

Samuel M. Hickey is a research analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. His areas of focus include the geopolitics of nuclear power developments in the Middle East, nuclear security, missile defense, and non-proliferation.

Manuel Reinert is a Ph.D. candidate at American University, consultant with the World Bank, and adjunct faculty at Georgetown University.

Image: Permanent Mission of Iran to the United Nations (Vienna)

Read more:
What's Iran's Nuclear Deal? - War on the Rocks

Nuclear talks between the U.S. and Iran adjourned last month and could resume after Iranian President-elect Ebrahim Raisi takes office in August. But Irans behavior during the interregnum shows what it thinks about President Bidens arms-control overtures.

Federal prosecutors said last week that an Iranian intelligence network planned to kidnap a U.S. citizen in New York and bring her to Iran. A dual U.S.-Iranian national, Masih Alinejad has reported extensively on human-rights abuses by the Islamic Republic. The journalist has built a large following on social networks while pushing for a tougher American approach to Tehran.

The prosecutors, who indicted four Iranian nationals, said Iranian intelligence has targeted others in Canada, the United Kingdom and elsewhere. Last year Tehran executed Ruhollah Zam, a France-based Iranian exile abducted while traveling in Iraq. Europe has previously imposed sanctions on Iran for planning terrorist attacks and murders on the Continent.

Meanwhile, Reuters reports that an Iranian commander has encouraged Iran-backed militias to step up attacks on U.S. targets in Iraq and Syria. Shiite militias have attacked U.S. positions in Iraq at least 26 times since President Biden took office, estimates Behnam Ben Taleblu of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Mr. Biden ordered retaliatory airstrikes on the armed groups twice this year. But two American service members were wounded this month during a rocket barrage after the last pinprick U.S. retaliation.

Irans violations of the 2015 nuclear deal also continue. Lame duck President Hassan Rouhani says the country can enrich uranium to weapons-grade purity, or about 90%. So far it has stopped at 60%, but thats well above the 3.67% allowed under the deal. The government is stockpiling other illicit material and ignoring its inspection obligations to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Even Russian diplomat Mikhail Ulyanovadmitted, Iran seems to be going too far.

Read more from the original source:
Irans Answer to Bidens Diplomacy - The Wall Street Journal

Early this month, one Iranian and one Israeli tweet created a storm in the already troubled waters of the Mediterranean Sea.

On June 26,the Iranian Embassyin Lebanon wrote a vaguely worded tweet with a picture of an Iranian ship and said that Iran did not need Americas approval to send fuel to Lebanon. The tweet implied the ship carried fuel and was headed to Lebanon. Fearful of U.S. sanctions, Lebanons energy ministry quickly denied ever requesting to import Iranian fuel, but not before speculation was rife that an Iranian tanker was on its way to the port of Beirut.

Early this month, one Iranian and one Israeli tweet created a storm in the already troubled waters of the Mediterranean Sea.

On June 26,the Iranian Embassyin Lebanon wrote a vaguely worded tweet with a picture of an Iranian ship and said that Iran did not need Americas approval to send fuel to Lebanon. The tweet implied the ship carried fuel and was headed to Lebanon. Fearful of U.S. sanctions, Lebanons energy ministry quickly denied ever requesting to import Iranian fuel, but not before speculation was rife that an Iranian tanker was on its way to the port of Beirut.

Then, on July 6, IntelliNews, a blog on Israeli defense and intelligence affairs,tweetedthat Iran had dispatched Arman 114, an Iranian-flagged ship carrying Iranian crude, to Lebanon. Hezbollah is conducting a logistical operation to smuggle Iranian fuel into Lebanon, the tweet read. A few days earlier, Hezbollahs chief Hassan Nasrallah had pledged to import fuel from its patron Iran to emerge as the savior of a country reeling under a devastating shortage of the essential commodity.

Together, the tweets seemed to suggest the expansion of a war between Israel and Iran that had until now mostly taken place in the shadows. For years, Iran and Israel have engaged in tit-for-tat attacks on each others ships in, and beyond, the Mediterranean. The conflict has mostly concentrated on Iranian oil tankers bound for oil-starved Syria. Now it seems the fight is spreading to involve a Lebanon that increasingly seems on the verge of economic collapse.

Arman 114 finally anchored at the Baniyas port in Syria on June 13. TankerTrackers, an online service that tracks and reports shipments of crude oil, said that it had been tracking Arman 114 along with two other ships carrying Iranian crude and confirmed Baniyas, not Beirut, turned out to be their final destination.Latest satellite imagery confirms that all three Iranian tankers went to Baniyas, Syria as planned,TankerTrackers tweeted. But the Iranian Embassys tweet seemed to be mere posturing. It appears the embassy used a stock photo of a ship and in reality there was none en route to Lebanon.

Immediate worries of an escalation between Israel and Iran were warded off but Israels strategy to target Iranian oil tankers is still very much active. Irans determination to respond in kind and attack Israels commercial vessels or those of Americas allies in the Gulf, has not weakened either.

Arman 114s smooth journey illustrated the ease with which Iran has been defying U.S. sanctions. It also displayed that despite U.S. and Israeli awareness of the movement of specific Iranian oil tankers violating sanctions, neither country can stop all such transactions. The United States is constrained by international law and, like Israel, must fear Iranian retaliation. Iran controls the Strait of Hormuz, a 21-mile-wide strategic waterway through which 20 percent of the global oil supply passes.

Farzin Nadimi, an associate fellow with the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an expert in the security and defense affairs of Iran and the Persian Gulf region, said technically a ship in international waters cannot be stopped unless it violates international maritime law or unless the flag state allows it. If it is known to carry contraband such as drugs, or weapons of mass destruction, there are U.S. laws that allow stopping and searching in the high seas, or under some circumstances such action can even be justified under universal jurisdiction, Nadimi said. The U.S. Congress can also pass a law, or the president may issue an executive order sanctioning individual tankers and ask other countries to stop them as soon as they enter their territorial waters, or face sanctions themselves.

Nadimi added that Iran has one of the largest tanker fleets and a lot of experience in how to conceal the movement of its oil cargoes. Iran regularly changes the flags on its ships, renames tankers, and turns off their automatic identification systemsto avoid being tracked. Moreover, according to aU.S. Treasury report,Iran deployed a range of front companies with help from Hezbollah to be able to sell its oil despite the sanctions.

Even when we could track movements of Iranian tankers there was a lack of will within the U.S. government to stop them, not only because of constraints of international law but also because the U.S. was just worried about Irans retaliation in the Persian Gulf, Nadimi said. Iran has proved it can do some nasty things, he added, alluding to alleged Iranian attacks on Saudi, Emirati, and other vessels. Iran even seized a British-flagged tanker, the Stena Impero, in July 2019, in retaliation for Gibraltar seizing a Syria-bound Iranian oil tanker, the Grace 1, two weeks earlier.

Experts say that while U.S. sanctions have succeeded in blocking the movement of money through banking channels, they achieved little success in stopping Iran from selling crude at reduced prices for cash. Energy analysts have seena steady risein Irans oil exports since late last year. According to United Against Nuclear Iran, an advocacy group and a critic of the 2015 nuclear deal, Syria received the second-most oil barrels from Iran since December 2020; many times more were exportedto China.

Under recently unseated Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel was accused of attacking a dozen Iranian ships, mostly those carrying fuel to Syria and some supplying arms to Irans proxies, but none headed toward China. In April this year, Israel attacked an Iranian vessel called MV Saviz that was anchored in the Red Sea and suspected to be a floating armory for Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen. From the Israeli perspective it was an Iranian naval outpost in the Red Sea that endangered safe navigation of Israeli cargo.

Israels new Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has held even more hawkish views than his predecessor and has reportedly suggested that Israel must attack Iran whenever its proxiesHezbollah or Hamasblow up anything inside Israel. Less than a month after he came to power, Iran accused Israel of targeting a nuclear facility in Karaj reportedly producing centrifuges to replace those damaged in Israels previous covert attacks at the Natanz nuclear facility in Iran.

Many Israeli analysts believe that Israels covert hits inside Iran and overt airstrikes in Syria on Irans arms depots serve Israels strategic interests better than naval attacks. The growing consensus among experts seems to be that Bennett must take only calculated risks in the maritime arena while continuing with land, air, and cybersecurity sabotage of Irans nuclear apparatus. They are unsure, however,whether Bennett, who is eager to come across as even more unforgiving of Iran than Netanyahu, would listen.

Eran Lerman, a former deputy national security advisor for the office of the Israeli prime minister, said that Bennetts policy would differ from Netanyahus only in his dealings with Bidenwith whom he would aim to keep differences behind closed doors instead of making a public spectacle of themwhile maintaining a tough stand against Iran. His intention would be to not undermine the Biden administration but to retain Israels right to act freely, Lerman said.

Others said Israel must avoid getting dragged into a dangerous navalconflict. Shaul Chorev, a retired Israeli rear admiral who heads the Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center at the University of Haifa and previously led the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, advises caution. Attacking Iranian tankers neither discourages Iran from enriching uranium nor from bankrolling Hezbollah and other proxies, Chorev said. A naval conflict comes at a high cost to us too, especially inareas in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea which are outside the range of the Israeli Navy and its ability to protect Israeli-owned vessels sailing in this region.

Meanwhile, the people of Lebanon continue to struggle with fuel scarcity. If the naval war between Israel and Iran expands, that struggle will last a while longer yet.

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Iran and Israel's Naval War in the Mediterranean Is Expanding - Foreign Policy