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UPDATE: 1:00 PM CET

In an article entitled The Qalibaf-elimination Project Kickstarted, the state-run Eqtesad News wrote today: The horns of infighting among the principalists are blowing. Every time there is a parliamentary election, a presidential election, or even an election on deciding about the parliaments leadership, the war rises from the bottom of the endless ocean of differences and appears at the surface. This time, the reason for their differences, which is more evident than in the past, is the two upcoming elections, including the election of the Speaker of the Majlis on May 2 and the election of the 12th parliament, which is scheduled to be held on March 1, 2024.

In the meantime, it seems that in both their short-term and long-term goals, the Paydari bloc [the faction close to former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad] is pursuing to remove Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf from politics and power. So far, their great rivals among the principalists, such as Nateq Nouri, and Ali Larijani, have been eliminated with different tactics and excuses, the source added.

UPDATE: 11:30 AM CET

Belgian aid worker Olivier Vandecasteele was arrested on February 24, 2022, in Iran. But was Vandecasteele taken hostage as a token of the implementation of an agreement that Tehran and Brussels had been negotiating for months? In January 2023, he was sentenced to 40 years in prison, a $1 million fine (910,000) and 74 lashes for espionage.

The hacking of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs computer system on Sunday, May 7, by a group of hackers called Ghyam Sarnegouni (From Uprising to Overthrow), close to the Peoples Mojahedin Organization of Iran (an exiled movement thats banned in Iran), is of great interest to Vandecasteeles family.

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UPDATE: 9:30 AM CET

The brave people of Zahedan, the provincial capital of Sistan & Baluchestan in southeast Iran, took to the streets on Friday to remind the mullahs regime of the Iranian peoples utter hatred of their dictatorship. They chanted slogans against the regime in its entirety and voiced their wishes to live in a democracy while rejecting any and all forms of dictatorships, be it the already eliminated monarchy and the current theocratic despotism. People throughout Iran continue to specifically hold the mullahs Supreme LeaderAli Khamenei responsible for their miseries, while also condemning the oppressive Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and paramilitary Basij units, alongside other security units that are on the ground suppressing the peaceful demonstrators.

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While Olivier Vandecasteele is still detained in Iran, new information about the case has leaked, wrote the BelgianDH newspaper on May 8, referring to a Belgian aid worker held hostage by Irans regime since 2022.Theobtained documents reveal the backdrop of the Assadi affair; Olivier Vandcastel has been used as a bargaining chip. The documents confirm the role played by the Iranian regimes Ministry of Intelligence and describe how Brussels and Tehran negotiated their prisoner swap treaty before Olivier Vandesteel was taken hostage in Iran.The career diplomatAsadollah Asadi, the third-highest-ranking official at the regimes embassy in Vienna, was convicted of a state terrorist act as he tried to bomb a gathering of the Iranian Resistance in France in 2018.

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The appointment of Ali Bahreini, Irans ambassador to the United Nations Office in Geneva, as the president of the Social Council of the Human Rights, is a blatant mockery of humanity. On Thursday, May 11, 2023, Ali Bahreini, Irans ambassador to the United Nations Office in Geneva, was appointed as the president of the Social Council of the Human Rights of this organization. The publication of this news has sparked widespread negative reactions both in the international community and among Iranian citizens. While the Iranian government is considered one of the major violators of human rights in the world and has the highest number of resolutions against violations of the people in the Third Committee and the General Assembly of the United Nations, this appointment is seen as a mockery of modern human values.

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The clerical regime puts more pressure on teachers through arrests, summonses, and expulsions. The Security Department and the Administrative Violations Board of the Ministry of Education have practically turned into the arms of security forces over the past year. They have concentrated all their efforts on baseless file-making for activist teachers to suppress their protests.The Coordinating Council of Teachers Associations announced that the Violations Board of the Department of Education of Gilan Province had expelled Ms.Fariba Anami, a brave and well-respected teacher in Anzali, upon an unjust and oppressive order.Fariba Anami has been teaching in high schools in Gilan and Anzali for over 25 years. She is one of the hundreds of activist teachers who have solely pursued the realization of their professional rights.

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In an interview with Elaheh Azimfar, the representative of the Iranian Resistance in international organizations,Grand-Lebanonexamined the ongoing popular uprising in Iran sparked by the brutal killing ofMahsa Amini.The interview highlights the uprisings underlying causes, extending beyond the mandatory hijab, and emphasizes the Iranian peoples discontent with the religious dictatorship ruling Iran.Azimfar advocates for womens freedom to choose their attire, arguing against the mandatory hijab, and discusses the broader aspirations of the revolution, including womens equality, freedom of speech, and the establishment of a democratic republic.

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Aarhus, DenmarkMay 11, 2023:Supporters of the Peoples Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) and freedom-loving Iranians gathered to show their solidarity with the ongoingIranian Revolution.Supporters of the Iranian Resistance strongly condemned the recent executions by the religious dictatorship regime of the mullahs in Iran, especially the execution of Baloch compatriots. They called for urgent action by the international community to stop the executions in Iran.

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Italy, Piedmont, Cuneo May 6, 2023:The governor and 22 mayors of Italys Piedmont region gathered in Cuneo,Ashrafs sister city, supporting the Iranian peoples uprising and the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI). They declared their full support of the NCRIs President-elect, Mrs.Maryam Rajavi, and herten-point planfor the future of Iran.

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Also, read Iran News in Brief May 13,2023

Read the original here:
Iran News in Brief May 14, 2023 - NCRI - National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)

Iran has been accused by Ukraines president of selling more than 1,000 drones and other weapons to Russia.

Volodymyr Zelenskyrevealed the extent of Tehrans sanctions-busting support for Putin's invasion of Ukrainein an interview with Italian media on Saturday.

Ukraines leader said: Thanks to the sanctions, the number of missiles they [the Russians] produce has decreased several times. However, there are such challenges as Iran which has sold them [Russia] more than 1,000 Iranian-made drones and other weapons.

Forces of the Russian Federation began using drones in its attacks against Ukraine's infrastructure last fall, temporarily depriving millions of Ukrainians of heating, water and electricity during the winter.

Iran first denied it had supplied drones to Russia but in early November foreign minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian admitted the deliveries, while claiming they were sent before the Russian invasion.

Recent intelligence reports suggest that Tehran may be planning also to supply long-range missiles to Russia.

Ukraine says its air force has shot down more than 500 Iranian drones so far, figures confirmed by Western intelligence.

Irans supply of drones to Russia for use in its war on Ukraine has been condemned by the US and its NATO allies and met with sanctions by the US, European Union and other states.

Washington has halted talks with Tehran aimed at resurrecting a deal over Irans nuclear programme, indicating that it expects the Islamic Republics deliveries to Putin to stop before any further negotiations take place.

Read the rest here:
Iran Sells 1,000-Plus Drones And Other Weapons To Russia: Zelensky -

World Analysis

Nahayat Tizhoosh - CBC News

Posted: 3 Hours Ago Last Updated: 2 Hours Ago

It's rare to hear from a dissenting voice from inside Iran, particularly now in the midst of yet another crackdown on anti-regime protesters.

But in April, to the surprise of many, prominent thought-leader Majid Tavakoli held a talkand Q&A on Twitter Spaces from inside the Islamic Republic. The topic: Why haven't the nationwide protests led to political change?

With just a few hours' notice, almost 200,000 listeners tuned in to hear the political activist's critique of the diaspora opposition's inability so far to go beyond the general slogans of the Women, Life, Freedom movement a rallying call for protests in Iran and around the world.

Tavakoli, who first rose to prominence after delivering a powerful speech on the steps of Tehran's Amirkabir University, forever etching him in the minds of Iranians as being at the heart of the 2009 student protests, argued that political change has not occurred due to the absence of a detailed and transparent "plan for victory."

"No one has any type of vision or conceptualization. If I'm going to speak very clearly: without creating an image, the future is unclear," Tavakoli said.

Tavakoli also questioned the anatomy of the street protests, concluding that gathering publicly, without a clear purpose, could not trigger regime change.

"What does it mean to come to the streets? To break a few windows and doors? Capture a building? Capture Tehran? Should everyone march toward Tehran? Or capture a few cities? We have never talked about this."

The emergence of a revolutionary anti-regime movement has been brewing for years in Iran. When nationwide protests persisted in 2022 in response to the death of 22-year old Mahsa Jina Amini after she was arrested by the regime's so-called morality police, many wondered whether this time could spell the end of the Islamic Republic's rule.

Asef Bayat, scholar and professor of sociology and Middle East studies at the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, agrees the key ingredients for a revolution just haven't happened.

"It needs a continuous collective campaign that is able to put pressure on the incumbent state so that segments of the elites, including the repressive forces, defect or sympathize with the people," he told CBC News.

"Such a movement also needs some kind of organization, some kind of leadership, a vision of the future, and above all the confidence of the people."

Tavakoli, 37, who has been arrested several times since 2006, previously said on Twitter that he has served a cumulative seven years in prison for his writing and activism. He was most recently arrested in the midst of theMahsaAmini protests, and was released on bailearlier this year.

Tavakoli and other analysts suggest that while Iranians want regime change, it cannot be done without a focused and transparent plan by opposition forces outside of Iran.

That's in part due to the regime's ability to keep military forces loyal which analysts have pointed out is a crucial factor for the outcome of any revolt.

"What are your plans for the military? Do you have any guarantees that the military will stay in their barracks? They don't have an answer for that. Who is going to think about this? Who will issue a plan about this?" Tavakoli said.

But, throughout the Islamic Republic's existence, neither the conventional military nor the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has ever taken steps to side with the people by turning against the state. As it did in 2009 and 2019, the IRGC carried out bloody crackdowns on its people in these most recent protests, killing hundreds and jailing tens of thousands fulfilling its duty to safeguard the Islamic regime.

WATCH | Protesting Iranian schoolgirl poisonings:

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Journalist and former political prisoner Nejat Bahrami, who previously served as a deputy minister at the Ministry of Education, says he often heard from high-level officials and senior authorities who said they had no hope of reform from within the system.

"They would signal to me that if there is a trustable alternative outside of the country, they would be more willing to help that force for the collapse of the Islamic Republic to save Iran," Bahrami said.

"Like average people in Iran, many of them are under enormous economic pressure and lead incredibly difficult lives. And they have long distanced themselves from the ideology of the Islamic Republic."

But Bahrami contends they need assurance about the security of Iran's future. He says over the years the regime has instilled doubt into hearts of many that radical political change would cause chaos, uncertainty and civil war.

That's a common tactic, said Abbas Milani, director of Iranian studies at Stanford University.

"One of the most important parts of the playbook of any authoritarian regime from China to Iran is to ensure that a viable alternative doesn't emerge. The argument they always make is: Either us or chaos; there's nobody else," he said.

Milani says regimes like Iran's seem invincible when they're in power, but can fall quickly.

"That's how authoritarianism falls, first gradually then suddenly. The 'gradually' has long started the 'suddenly', I don't know when," said Milani.

But while there have been novel and unprecedented diaspora efforts to unify against the regime under the umbrella of Women, Life, Freedom, there have since also been rifts.

Bayat says people and groups today seem to want to be clear about what they are getting into, because of Iranians' experience during the Islamic Revolution. Exiled Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini swept to power in 1979, reneging on all hiscommitments and created an authoritarian theocracy instead of promised freedoms and prosperity for Iranians.

"I think it is possible to agree on basic minimum principles and work on them as the basis of a united front, albeit with the acknowledgement of differences. The rest is honest and patient negotiations with the intention of working together," Bayat said.

Ali Fathollah-Nejad, director of Berlin-based Centre for Middle East and Global Order, said that for the revolutionary process to progress, there needs to be an acceptable political alternative vision primarily drafted by domestic opposition forces.

"A credible political vision not only when it comes to political issues, but also economic issues as to how a future system will be organized," Fathollah-Nejad said.

Tavakoli emphasized that any serious opposition forces, wanting to bring about political change, need to be accountable to the Iranian people by providing details about their plans for a future Iran.

"Even if nothing is worse than the present situation, a political force has responsibilities. You can't say that because nothing is worse than the continued status quo, that whatever happens, happens," Tavakoli said.

"Those of us who stand between the past and the future, those of us who don't want the past, but haven't yet obtained the future. What do we need to do?" Tavakoli continued.

Paying attention to the voices of the opposition within Iran is crucial for the diaspora's understanding, Milani said.

"I read Mr. Tavakoli's tweets regularly. When I read Toomaj Salehi's poems, Narges Mohammadi's writings, Nasrin Sotoudeh's writings the notion that these people are somehow missing something that the opposition outside can teach them, is absurd," said Milani.

Hedie Kimiaee, a journalist who was forced to leave Iran just over a year ago, says Tavakoli'srecent Twitter talk was meant to be a brutal wake-up call for diasporaopposition activists on the realities of the protest movement on the ground in Iran.

"It was like a ray of light overshadowed the atmosphere on Twitter and social media," she said.

But for now, experts have noted Iran seems stuck between its revolutionary moment and a full-out revolution.

Nahayat Tizhoosh Producer

Nahayat Tizhoosh is a journalist with CBC News Network's Power & Politics.

Read the rest here:
Can Iran move from rallies to regime change? Only with a clear plan, says renowned dissident - CBC News

Two Eurocopter AS350 helicopters crashed in northern Iraqs rural Duhok province on March 15, killing the nine heavily armed passengers on board. The deceased were initially identified as members of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) terrorist organization by Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) counter-terrorism officials (Kurdistan 24, March 16). Shortly thereafter, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are affiliated with the PKK but partner with US military forces in Syria, clarified that the deceased were members of its highly-trained Anti-Terror Units (YAT) (Al-Monitor, March 17).

The SDF announcement that the flights were part of a security and military exchange did little to answer these questions, and Washington has remained tight-lipped about the expanding activities of its proxy (NPA, March 20). The incident has, therefore, raised a number of questions that remain unanswered, and largely underexamined, more than a month later:

Regional Security

The French-built AS350 has been used for civil aviation and law enforcement in more than 40 countries and the KRG procured AS350e models in 2016 through The 7 Group Ltd., an Austrian-owned civilian contractor operating in Hungary. The group has operated aviation centers to provide supply, logistics, maintenance, and training centers in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah since 2009, and procured three AS350e helicopters at a price of $1.6 million from Canada for the use of the Sulaymaniyah-based Counter-Terrorism Group (CTG) anti-terrorist unit (7Group, May 7). As CTG has more recently been using MD530 helicopters, the AS350s have been available for other uses.

One such use appears to be ferrying SDF fighters out of Syria. This is no straightforward proposition for two reasons. First, the justification made by the US Department of Defense to Congress for funding to defeat IS in Iraq and Syria (Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund, or CTEF) clearly delineates support to Iraqi forces for the mission in Iraq and to Syrian forces, primarily the SDF, in Syria. No budgetary justification is argued, nor policy approval given, for forces operating in both countries or trans-regionally (CTEF FY24, March 2023).

Second, despite assertions at the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa and in Washington that SDF are local partners in Syria, the PKK-linked elements that comprise most of the SDF consider themselves part of a regional enterprise. They distinguish neither their political arms nor their armed wings in the various countries where they operate (Atlantic Council, January 2016). All are components of a broader network called the Koma Civakn Kurdistan (KCK, or Kurdistan Confederal Community).

The KCK is a separatist transnational organization extruded from the PKK (Umran Center, May 7). It defines its structure as based on four functional elements: leadership, legislative, executive, and judiciary. The KCK links the PKK-controlled Turkey Assembly, the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK) in Iran, the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party (PDK) in Iraq, and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) in Syria. The KCK program rests on four foundational elements: Abdullah calan as the founder and leader of the KCK, Kongra-Gel (Kongra-Gel Kurdistan-Kurdistan Peoples Assembly) as its legislative body, an Executive Council as executive organ, and a judicial body consisting of the High Court of Justice, Administrative Courts, and Peoples Courts. Article 36 of the KCK Contract identifies the PKK as the ideological power of the KCK system, and stipulates that each member of a constituent organization within the KCK should accept the PKK as an ideological guide. Kongra-Gel (sometimes referred to as the Kurdistan National Council) operates politically in Europe, and the KCK Executive Council organizes political and military activities in Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria. The KCK Executive Council oversees political-military wings operating in Turkey and northern Iraq (PKK-HPG), Iran (PJAK-YRK), Syria (PYD-YPG), and the PDK party in Iraq. The KCK is thus a regional ideological movement and political-military organization. The PYD/YPG is an organic part of the whole; it never renounced the KCK, and its participation in the SDF under US lead has not ended its role in the KCK project.

The US claim of strictly local and limited relations with the YPG via the SDF is unconvincing to Ankara or non-PKK circles in Syria and Iraq. Attempts by the US to facilitate regional operations by SDF components, or to press Kurdish unity without reference to the broader KCK project, are nave at best, and are considered a threat to US treaty allies, the Turks, and non-PKK Kurdish movements, such as the KDP. This accounts for much of Erbils critical response to the helicopter incident (Rudaw, March 18). In Sulaymaniyah, the opposition Goran party has also objected to increasingly blatant PUK-PKK coordination because the party sees that cooperation as a possible trigger to intra-Kurdish fighting and more direct Turkish military interventions in PUK-controlled areas (Basnews, April 8).

Why Sulaymaniyah?

What makes Sulaymaniyah interesting for the SDF? The city is controlled by the PUK, which is a rival to the KDP and is cooperative with the PKK. The PKK heartland lies north of Sulaymaniyah, in the Qandil mountain complex (see Terrorism Monitor, September 21, 2006). The PKK kidnapped two Turkish intelligence officers in the Dukan district of Sulaymaniyah in August 2017, and executed them together with other Turkish hostages in February 2021 during an attempted Turkish rescue operation.

Turkey believes that the hostages were taken by the PKK with the help of PUK officials. Turkey subsequently deported the PUK representative in Ankara. Turkish intelligence increased activities near Sulaymaniyah, and stepped up the frequency and range of drone strikes on PKK targets nearby. Turkeyalos suspended all flights to and from Sulaymaniyah province on April 3 and linked decision to the intensification of PKK/PYD activities (mfa.gov.tr, April 5). A Turkish drone strike near the Sulaymaniyah airport last month closely missed a convoy carrying both the SDF commander and US personnel, similar to an incident in Syria last November. This was intended perhaps to forcefully signal to Washington that strengthening the PKK-PUK axis comes with risks (The National, April 15; CNN, November 2022).

Ankara interprets PYD/YPG collaboration with the PUK as an attempt to expand influence beyond Syria and gain legitimacy and leverage for the PKK/KCK network vis--vis other Kurdish groups in Iraq. Turkish Intelligence Chief Hakan Fidan hosted KRG Deputy Prime Minister Qubad Talabani in Ankara on April 11 (Rudaw, April 11). He conveyed that relations between Ankara and Sulaymaniyah would not normalize until collaboration between the PUK and PKK ceases. At Ankaras request, security forces Erbil shut down the headquarters of the Kurdistan National Congress (Kongra-Gel) on April 9.

The View from Erbil

Officials in Ankara and Erbil have known of the helicopter route between northeast Syria and Sulaymaniyah for the past two years, but did not know who was using it until the recent crash (Middle East Eye, March 21). KRG Prime Minister Masrour Barzani called the flights unauthorized and blamed them on a group within the PUK (Sabah, March 19). To Erbil, this is just the latest in a series of provocations against the KDP conducted by the PKK, the PUK, or both.

Security officials in Erbil suspect the PKK of running an extensive intelligence network within KDP-ruled areas, and the PKK has attacked KDP forces on several occasions in recent years (MENA Affairs, August 2021). The PKK has sabotaged the oil pipeline from Iraqi Kurdistan to Turkey, which is the economic lifeline of the KRG (TRT, November 11, 2020). The KDP-led Parastin security agency has accused the PUKs CTG, a US-partnered organization, of assassinating a former CTG member in Erbil last October (Rudaw, October 12, 2022). This comes as the PUK has boycotted joint governmental meetings with KDP officials, marking a return to dual administration rather than a unified KRG, with more fragmentation likely (Amwaj, January 26).

The PKK and PUK, which were friendly for decades, have become increasingly intertwined in recent years. Senior PKK figures public endorsed PUK candidates running for the Kurdish parliament (Rudaw, September 2021). The PUK, weakened by political infighting, has become more dependent uponand cozy withIran. The PKK, similarly, is considered by KDP officials to be heavily controlled by Iran (Al-Monitor, August 4, 2022).

The Iran Angle

The PUK-KDP struggle is inextricably linked to the broader Iranian effort to subordinate political forces in IraqShia, Kurdish, or Sunnito its own will. Iran has engaged in a campaign of intimidation against the KDP in recent years that includes missile and rocket attacks against political figures, administrative offices, and energy facilities. This has coincided with a successful attempt to intimidate Iraqi nationalist Shia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, with whom the KDP was allied (GIS Reports, July 2022).

The PUK has tied its destiny to that of the pro-Iran bloc in the Iraqi parliament, the al-Fatah faction, which has been linked to attacks on US and KDP targets in northern Iraq. Power struggles among Talabani scionsLahur, Qubad, and Bafelnotwithstanding, the PUK has evinced unambiguous readiness to work with the PKK, and Iran-backed, sanctioned Shia Iraqi groups, to redress its weakness vis--vis Erbil (Haaretz, July 27, 2021). Lahur, the founder of the PUK CTG and architect of US cooperation with the PKKs Syrian franchise, was ousted from leadership positions last year at the behest of his cousins (Al-Monitor, November 3, 2022). Bafel, who has emerged as the primary PUK leader, has prioritized ties with Tehran and Baghdad over Erbil to a degree that drove speculation that he intends to split Sulaymaniyah off from the unified KRG altogether (MEI, March 13).

Closer ties between the YAT and the PUKs CTG thus come at the same time the PUK leadership is steering sharply away from a unified KRG and towards the Iranian orbit. Iran, for its part, has pursued a years-long strategy of using the PUK, the PKK, and its clients in Baghdad to weaken the KRG, decrease its autonomy, and, ultimately, cleave Iraqi Kurdistan away from the West (TWI, February 2017; Brookings, December 2020).

Conclusion

Washington has responded to the deepening KDP-PUK rift by issuing anodyne calls for Kurdish unity, but has done so without addressing the underlying Iranian strategy (ESTA, January 17). By pressing convergence between the PKK-affiliated YPG in Syria and the PUK in Sulaymaniyah while neither addressing Iranian influence over both nor ending PKK attacks against Turkey and the KDP, US military and diplomatic officials are reinforcing an axis that rests upon Iranian power. The rationalization that a stronger PUK with better ties to the YPG serves US efforts against the Islamic State may be true in the narrow sense, but at what cost (SDF, April 9)?

The immediate cost includes triggering Turkish escalation against the PKK and YPG in PUK-controlled areas of northern Iraq. The medium-term cost includes exacerbating KDP-PUK tensions, and destabilizing the most solid US ally in northern Iraqthe KDPby strengthening forces aiming to supplant it. The longer-term cost includes granting Tehran and its friends in Baghdad political primacy in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, as long as they tolerate US military presence focused solely on pursuing Islamic State remnants.

The US counter-terrorism approach of By-With-Through explicitly abjures responsibility for the politics of a given military theater by relying on local actors for access and partnered operations (JFQ, April 11, 2018). It may be effective at limiting US force requirements and political commitments. In this instance, however, it also appears to have the perverse result of strengthening the political goals of Tehran and the transnational PKK/KCK movementa curious strategy indeed.

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US Counter-Terrorism in Kurdistan: Strengthening Iran's Allies at ... - The Jamestown Foundation

Syria owes Iran $50 billion according to leaked documents from Irans Foreign Ministry, with fears for Assads possible assassination creating fear in Tehran the money may never be recouped.

The revelations came after the hacktivist group Uprising till Overthrow', affiliated with the Albania-based opposition Mujahideen-e Khalq (MEK) group, hacked the Islamic Republics Foreign Ministry servers, disabling 210 sites and onlineservicesand leaking a large batch of documents.

Minutes from a meeting of Irans Supreme National Security Council show Syrias debt goes back to a long-termagreement signed between the two countries in January2019, under former president Hassan Rouhani.However, the debt has been building for much longer, with roughly $11bn worth of oil given to Damascus from 2012 to 2021.

A combination of aid in the form of military support and cash, the total amount of debt to Iran is estimated to be about$50 billion, though the document said the final amount is still being calculated.

In the first six months of the Iranian year 1400 (from March 2021 to September 2021), whenPresident Ebrahim Raisi was in office,one million barrels of oil were sent to Syria but the Syrians allegedly demanded two million barrels per month.

The commander-in-chief ofIransRevolutionary Guards Hossein Salami proposed a 1.5 million barrel exportfor the second half of the yearupon the suggestion by Esmail Qaani, commander of IRGCs Quds Force a division primarily responsible for extraterritorial military and clandestine operations, read the document.

Esmail Qaani, commander of IRGCs Quds Force

One of the paragraphs of the document referred to Supreme Leader Ali Khameneis urgency to cash in on Syrias debts, fearing a repeat of its investment in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

One of the first Muslim countries to provide support for the Bosnian Muslims in the Bosnian War (199295), theIRGCsentmore than five thousandtonsof arms to the Bosnian Muslims.In spite of massive investment, Tehran's leverage in Bosnia and Herzegovina has decreased significantly, proving a poor asset for the regime.

The document stressed the necessity of having all terms agreed by the two nations parliaments to prevent Irans expulsion from Syria under any circumstances as may happen if Irans proxy leader, President Bashar al-Assad, should be assassinated, a concern raised in the documentation.

It stated that the new term of Assad issensitive and could lead to his elimination, urging that if the document is notfinalized soon,"billions of dollars of Irans assets willbe put in serious danger.Syria is a key strategic asset for Iran as it wields power through its proxies across the region.

The extent of Iranian military expenditures and financial aid to Syria to keep Assad in power is unknown but is believed to have run into billions ofdollarsat the expense of the Iranian people.

But Syria is in the midst of a massive regional power-shift, causing concern to Tehran. In the last month, Assad and hisaideshave met with key figures in countries including the UAE and Turkey as several regional powers see the benefits of bringing Assad, one of Iran's regional puppets, in from the cold, in a bid to lure him away from Tehrans destabilizing influence.

Last week, Syria was also readmitted to the Arab League after more than a decade in isolation, though Qatar said it would not resume diplomatic ties with Syria until its domestic crisis is resolved.

Iranian parliament member, HeshmatollahFalahatpisheh, announced in May 2020 that the country had invested$30 billionin Syria and must recoup it. With reconstruction costs estimated at $250-$400 billion, Syria urgently needs to improve economic ties with regional countries.

Most recently, Iran has been using the earthquake disaster to smuggle weapons and military equipment into Syria to arm its regional proxies within shipments marked as humanitarian aid.

It is not the first time the Uprising till Overthrow' succeeded in hacking and deactivating several regime websites and services. In June 2022, ithackedover 5,000 security cameras of state bodiesand 150 websites belonging to TehranMunicipality,displayinganti-regime slogans on thewebsitesand releasing internal data.

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Syria Owes $50 Billion To Iran, Leaked Document Reveals -