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Forty years ago, a major war between Iran and Iraq set the stage for far-reaching and lasting regional dynamics. The conflict which began in September 1980 when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, and ended in a stalemate in 1988 was the nascent Islamic Republics first major military test. It was an existential battle for the Iranian leadership, coming just one year after the 1979 revolution in Iran. The war claimed at least one million lives.

The legacies of the war are numerous. In the decades since, Iran has developed a marked capacity to mobilize Shiite communities across the region, penetrating previously impervious political and ideological spaces, particularly in Iraq but also in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Moreover, it was in Iraq, during the formative stages of the war, that the Islamic Republic first started to implement a proxy network, one that has expanded region-wide (particularly in Syria and Yemen) in recent years. Finally, in shaping the political and foreign policy outlook of todays leadership in Iran and in Gulf Arab states, the war additionally sowed the seeds for current geopolitical rivalries that have hampered efforts to secure durable regional peace.

A key dynamic during the war and one that would continue in the decades afterward was Irans mobilization of Iraqi Shiite opposition groups. Tehran extended its support to other opposition groups, like the Kurds, but it was particularly focused on spurring a Shiite insurgency campaign within Iraq, encouraging mass defections from the Iraqi military, and trying to trigger an uprising among the majority-Shiite population. That was to no avail. Revolutionary fervor in Iran was instrumental to Tehrans ability to push back against an enemy that had superior technological capabilities and a plethora of backers, including the U.S., its allies in the West, and the Gulf Arab states but it could not inspire a similar response in Iraq.

The opposition groups and fighters Iran backed were immensely divided and lacked battlefield experience or discipline. The international community labeled them fundamentalist Shiite Islamist terrorists, and the Baath regime had an impressive capacity to repress and co-opt, as well as insulate its armed forces from mass defections.

The vast majority of Shiite personnel within the Iraqi army along with Sunnis fought loyally during the war. This was not out of loyalty to the regime, necessarily, but to prevent Iraq from becoming colonized by Iran or from following in its theocratic footsteps. Iran-aligned Shiite opposition groups, for their part, emphasized in their publications that colonization would not happen, and they framed the war not as a religious campaign but a campaign to overthrow the Tikriti gang (a reference to Saddam Husseins hometown and that of many of his closest confidantes and subordinates).

As I have detailed elsewhere, Iraqs Shiites failed to emulate their revolutionary counterparts in Iran and rise up against the Baath regime. In his book The Shiite Movement in Iraq, the late Iraqi sociologist Faleh Abdul-Jabar argued that such opposition movements failed because they did not sufficiently nationalize their cause. Iraqs Shiite Islamist movements were forced into exile and integrated into the Iranian war effort, appearing internationalist with a national sidetrack to audiences back home; for Irans Islamic leaders, the focus was the reverse. As Abdul-Jabar contended, this isolated Iraqs Shiite opposition groups from the mainstream of Iraqi patriotism, which emerged during the Iraq-Iran war and was embraced by the majority of the Shiis who fought Iran.

Despite the best efforts of Iran and its Iraqi partners who even recruited and mobilized Iraqi military defectors and prisoners of war to establish the Badr Brigade militia they did not come remotely close to overthrowing the Baath regime. They were outmatched by Saddams multi-faceted strategy of appeasing and punishing the Shiite community. A charm offensive by the regime included refurbishing and allocating large sums to the holy shrine cities. Saddam stressed the Arab identity of Shiism. He deployed Shiite symbolism throughout the war effort, claiming to be a descendant of Imam Ali and the Prophet Muhammad. Saddam even made Imam Alis birthday an Iraqi national holiday. Indeed, Saddam cunningly became more Shiite as war with Iran continued.

In other words, it has taken some time, failure, and painful lessons for Iran to command the proxy network that it does today. From Tehrans perspective, this has been essential to ensuring that Irans international isolation felt acutely during the war would not become an existential issue again. While Irans nuclear ambitions may yet be curtailed, its vast armed proxy network is perhaps its single most important defense and deterrence capability, and arguably the most transformational legacy of the war. This network, overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has been central to the Islamic Republics ability to contain, deter, or eliminate its external rivals.

It was during the Iran-Iraq war that Iran established its single most important foreign legion: Lebanons Hezbollah. Since its creation in 1982, Hezbollah has achieved a supra-state status in Lebanon, superseding state institutions. It has also become indispensable to Irans expansionist ambitions and critical to Tehrans ability to mobilize, establish, and train militia groups across the region. Hezbollah has itself established affiliates across the region in the years since, with reverberations across conflict theaters. Hezbollah has outgrown its sponsor in this respect.

In Iraq, the Badr Brigade is currently Iraqs most powerful paramilitary force: It controls the Interior Ministry and has wide-ranging influence across Iraqs institutions. It dominates the 100,000-plus Popular Mobilization Force, and has extended its reach into Syria to help prop up Bashar Assads regime. The organization developed its abilities on the battlefield, its capacity to recruit willing fighters, and its ability to subvert state institutions during the war with Iraq. Hezbollah and the Badr Brigade would not be what they are today were it not for the painful experiences, lessons, and losses of the Iran-Iraq war.

The war shaped the outlook of many of Irans current decisionmakers. Its supreme leader today, Ayatollah Khamenei, was Irans president at the time. Its president today, Hassan Rouhani, was then the commander-in-chief of Irans Air Defense. The leadership of the current IRGC Irans most powerful military force, and an entity that Khamenei helped form made their names during the war. This includes the former head of its elite Quds force, Qassem Soleimani, who spearheaded Irans vast network of proxies over the past two decades, until his assassination by the U.S. in January. More broadly, the war helped solidify the foundational myth of the Islamic Republic. In the aftermath of a revolution that was driven by disparate political forces, the conflict enhanced the new regimes ability to consolidate its hold on power.

Today, Iranian leaders continue to stress how internationally isolated Iran was in the aftermath of its revolution, left on its own as a nascent government to confront Iraqs tanks and chemical weapons and U.S. and Western support for Saddam. Incidents like the mistaken 1988 U.S. downing of an Iran Air flight, which killed almost 300 innocent Iranians, reinforced the notion that the Islamic Republic had no allies and that the West was bent on Irans demise. From Tehrans perspective, this legacy of isolation necessitates its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and, of course, its continued deployment of proxy groups outside of its borders.

The emergence of a Shiite theocracy in Iran and the subsequent eight-year war created regional peace and security contours that shape contestations in the region today. For instance, Tehran instructed its proxies to carry out what were the first major contemporary suicide terrorist attacks, including the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut and Hezbollahs attack on the American Marine barracks in Lebanon. In 1983, members of Iraqs Islamic Dawa Party which was Iraqs ruling party from 2006 to 2018 carried out suicide terrorist attacks in Kuwait, targeting the U.S. and French embassies, and was complicit in a series of other high-profile attacks in the region. Iranian proxies and Shiite Islamist groups were thus among the early adopters of suicide bombs, which since became a standard tool of warfare by jihadi movements.

Thus, Iran took the war to the Gulf Arab states, calling on their Shiite populations to rise up against their governments. Gulf monarchies, in turn, came to see Irans new leadership as an existential threat, which in turn prompted Saudi Arabia to unleash its own proselytizing brand of fundamental Sunni Islam and support for groups that could mount a pushback against Irans encroachment. The Gulf monarchies have since increasingly viewed their relationship with Tehran through the prism of their own restive Shiite communities, communities that have long-standing political, socio-cultural, and religious ties to Shiite centers of power and influence elsewhere in the region. These action-reaction dynamics are a key part of why the contemporary Middle East is divided and why achieving lasting stability in the region has so far proved insurmountable.

Today, the strategic calculus in many regional capitals is rooted in these historical episodes of conflict and tumult, which has diminished the prospects of a durable peace. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it was precisely the legacies, lessons, and a sense of unfinished business that contributed to the multitude of sectarian conflicts. The ongoing battle for Iraqs political order has pitted those Shiite Islamist political actors who were backed or established by Iran during the war against Arab Sunni actors with long-standing relations with the Arab Gulf.

Saddam Hussein and others in Baghdad saw an invasion of Iran as a historic opportunity to transform Iraqs regional standing, making it the true pan-Arab power it had longed to become, as Baath regime records captured by the U.S. after the 2003 invasion indicate. Yet, for Iraq and its Baath regime, the war and its second-order effects had a cumulative, harmful impact. In the decades since, Iraq and its people have experienced bankruptcy, destitution, and more conflict.

As the unfinished business of the war continues to play out, the proxy problem is a key area to watch. Iran started this approach during the war, learned lessons from its failure then, and quickly proved able to successfully promote proxies elsewhere. The reverberations of that approach and of its devastating consequences are central to the challenges facing the Middle East now.

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How the Iran-Iraq war will shape the region for decades to come - Brookings Institution

"You don't see the terror the way you used to see the terror," Trump said.

The Trump administration has tried to reimpose more sanctions on the Islamic Republic since its withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Trump told Limbaugh he would be able to renegotiate a deal blocking the country's nuclear program within a year if he gets reelected.

Trump claimed during the show that Iran is "dying to have me lose." A number of reports have revealed Iran, China and Russia are vying to influence the presidential election. Bill Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, announced in August that China and Iran were working to undermine Trump's reelection efforts, while Russia was continuing to bolster the president's support.

Microsoft also disclosed last month that Russian and Iranian hackers were targeting hundreds of organizations and actors involved in the presidential race, including both Trump and Democrat Joe Biden's campaigns. And the State Department warned in April that China, Russia and Iran were targeting the U.S. with disinformation related to the coronavirus pandemic.

Russian interference has become a persistent pain point for Trump since his first election efforts in 2016. He has balked at the notion that Russia favored his election, and Trump and his allies have repeatedly tried to shift attention toward other malign actors, such as China and Iran.

Trump's lengthy interview with Limbaugh comes as he reemerges in public appearances since being hospitalized for the coronavirus last weekend. Trump also had lively phone interviews with Fox Business Maria Bartiromo and Fox News' Sean Hannity on Thursday. He's slated to have an on-air interview on Fox News Friday night.

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Trump drops the F-bomb on Iran - POLITICO

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Over the past few months, Iran has been working with China on a sweeping long-term political, economic, and security agreement that would facilitate hundreds of billions of dollars of investments in the Iranian economy. It is also pursuing a long-term partnership with Russia. Politicians in Tehran see the agreements as a necessary means of combating U.S. hegemony and hostility.

Irans new policy of a Pivot to the East involves cultivating strong economic, political, military, and security ties with the giants of the Asian continent, namely, China and Russia. This policy has gained all the more credibility among Iranian officials after the United States ill-advised move to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, colloquially known as the Iran nuclear deal) and pursue a maximum pressure strategy.

The JCPOA was an international agreement between Iran and world powers endorsed by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 2231. But while the Iranians fully implemented the deal, the United States withdrew from it under the Trump administration and the European Union subsequently failed to fulfill its responsibilities under the agreement. The upshot of the U.S. withdrawal and European complacency was a revival of sanctions at a pace and intensity unprecedented over the past 40 years. This has emboldened Irans long-debated strategy of adopting a Look East foreign policy, as the JCPOA experience convinced the Iranians that no matter how much goodwill is demonstrated, the West is both unreliable and untrustworthy.

Meanwhile, Iran has found willing partners to its east. Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are opposed to U.S. military and interventionist policies in the Middle East and seek to eliminate the supremacy of the U.S. dollar looming over the world economy. Although it is not clear whether the three capitals have reached a consensus on a trilateral comprehensive alliance, they are examining serious steps in this direction. Three capitals participated in a four-day joint military exercise in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman in 2019. In July, Irans Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Moscow to extend a 20-year cooperation agreement with Russia. In 2016, China agreed to raise the level of ChinaIran bilateral trade to $600 billion in 10 years, although that goal will be almost impossible to meet now. A comprehensive strategic deal is currently under negotiations.

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Iran and China have similar interests in the domain of energy diplomacy. Securing sustainable sources of energy such as oil and gas is vital to Chinas economic growth and Iran can be a steady supplier. While major Arab oil-producing countries are aligned with the United States, Iran is not under U.S. influence. On the other hand, Washingtons maximum pressure approach has brought Irans oil exports close to zero barrels a day. Exporting oil to China will thus serve Irans interests. For its part, Russia has long been the dominant supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe, but its position in terms of exports has been challenged by the United States. Therefore, the mutual reliance of the three capitals on energy where they all face challenges from Washington is a fact that cannot be denied.

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Iran is a regional power in the Middle East and has founded its foreign policy on the basis of resisting U.S. hegemony. But in the process of resisting numerous forces of U.S. pressure, its economy has suffered from a lack of opportunities that would have otherwise been made available to it opportunities worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Iran has paid the price for its resistance strategy. Now Tehran presents itself as a unique opportunity for countries like China and Russia to build long-term alliances. Irans defeat will be counted as the victory of the United States and its regional allies, and in return, Irans success could be a determining factor in a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East once and for all. Already, following the U.S. failure in wars on Afghanistan and Iraq and partnership with Saudi Arabia in attacking Yemen, it has become clear that the United States is no longer the dominant superpower in the Middle East. The traditional allies of the U.S. are in profound crises and their positions are particularly weakened. There is a vacuum of power in the Middle East that needs to be redressed.

Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing too have common strategic and long-term interests to contain the U.S. unilateralism, and this is one of the important factors in determining the future of the Middle East. There is a ripe opportunity here, as the Trump administrations unilateralist policy and its withdrawal from international treaties (including but not limited to the JCPOA) have all seriously called into question the legitimacy and the credibility of the United States as a world power. Many countries around the world are now considering China as the future successor to the United States in world leadership. For example, even amid souring China-Europe ties, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said the European Union has a great strategic interest in maintaining cooperation withChina. We Europeans will need to recognize the decisiveness with which China will claima leadingposition in the existing structures of the international architecture, Merkel said.

Amid all these considerations, steps continue toward Tehran-Beijing-Moscow alignment. Russia and China rejected the U.S. attempt to extend a U.N. arms embargo on Iran that is set to expire later in October 2020 according to the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal. While its unclear to what extent Russia and China will work to boost the Iranian military, Tehran remains the only option for Moscow and Beijing to balance their arms sales in the region with the Wests. The United States is the top arms supplier to 13 of the 19 countries of the Middle East, supplying nearly half of the regions arms; Europe follows with over 20 percent while Russia and Chinas share combined is about 20 percent.

In short, the United States coercive policies on Iran, Russia, and China will remain the main obstacle for the trilateral strategic alliance. However, the destiny of such a strategic agreement will be an important consideration in future international relations. Iran possesses the worlds second largest natural gas reserves and the fourth largest oil reserves, which position it as a significant weight in the strategic calculations that the Eurasian powers make in their foreign policy toward the Middle East. By strategic engagement with Iran, Beijing and Moscow would have a unique opportunity to reorient both Iran and its regional rivals toward the China-Russia Eurasian architecture.

Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian is Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at Princeton University, Associate Professor at the University of Kashan, and a former spokesman for Irans nuclear negotiators. His bookIran and the United States: An Insiders View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace was released in May 2014. His latest book, A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A New Approach to Nonproliferation, was published by Routledge in April 2020.

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Iran's New Doctrine: Pivot to the East - The Diplomat

Only nine months ago, the United States and Iran nearly went to war. Even with simultaneous public health and economic crises dominating todays agenda, that sobering fact should make Iran an early priority for a new U.S. administration in 2021.

In order to relieve tensions, the next U.S. administration will need to engage Iran in renewed diplomacy. But successful diplomacy with Iran will not come easily. The United States will have to navigate its own and Iranian domestic politics. Israel and some of the Gulf states will greet such engagement with anxiety or outright opposition. Moreover, a legacy of deep distrust divides Washington and Tehran. Nonetheless, the U.S. political transition could present an opportunity, as Iran may either test the possibilities with a President Joe Biden or relent and negotiate with a reelected President Donald Trump rather than face four more years of harsh sanctions.

The United States should start by negotiating a de-escalatory agreement that contains Irans nuclear program and lowers regional tensions. But it should then work both to negotiate a follow-on to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal and to tackle more fundamental regional disagreements. By putting diplomacy in the lead, the United States can address its discord with Iran and calibrate a smart and clear-eyed policy for the Middle East.

The context in which a new administration will assume power in 2021 will be quite different from the one in which the administration of President Barack Obama negotiated the Iran nuclear deal. But the next U.S. administration can take valuable lessons from the Obama administrations experience in negotiating that agreement, as well as from the agreements collapse upon the Trump administrations withdrawal from it.

The deal demonstrated that the United States and Iran can, in fact, reach an arms control agreement, and its particulars furnish a blueprint for future diplomacy, making technical negotiations much easier for both sides. But the trajectory of the 2015 agreement also shows that any accord that does not address Irans destabilizing policies in the Middle East is likely to fail, because Israel, the Gulf states, nearly all Republicans, and some Democrats will oppose it.

Recognizing this reality does not entail making a nuclear agreement contingent on Irans surrendering all of its interests in the Middle East, as it effectively would have to do to meet the 12 demands U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo set forth as a condition for sanctions relief in 2018. Pursuing a grand bargain that comprehensively addresses all nuclear and regional concerns in a singular deal or demands capitulation is a recipe for failure. But doing nothing to address regional concerns is also not sustainable. A more successful diplomatic approach would address both nuclear and non-nuclear concerns from the start, methodically pursuing them separately but in parallel and seeking incremental progress in a number of areas instead of one all-encompassing agreement.

The Trump administrations course with Iran has manifested the extent of U.S. economic power. Washington is far better off working with allies, but it also has the capability unilaterally to relieve and expand significant economic pressure. This demonstrated power gives the United States great leverage, as well as the flexibility to make concessions, knowing they are reversible.

Hard-liners are expected to win Irans June 2021 presidential election, but Hassan Rouhani, the pragmatic president whose team negotiated the 2015 nuclear deal, will remain in office for the first six months of 2021. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is Irans ultimate decision-maker; even so, the Rouhani administrations continued presence may offer a narrow window of opportunity for an early de-escalation, given its experience negotiating the original deal and the relationships it has with American negotiators. If the Iranian regime is looking to reengage Washington, Rouhanis team might be best positioned to deliver on that intent. And if Khamenei is on the fence, Rouhanis team may be able to convince him to reengage.

Neither Biden nor Trump will conclude a historic agreement during the short time Rouhani remains in office, but to fail to cement any progress would be to lose a possible opportunity. The United States should spend those six months forging an initial arrangement that de-escalates regional tensions and arrests Irans nuclear progress. It should consult extensively with its partners in doing so.

To set the conditions for such an arrangement, Washington will need to undertake modest, unilateral confidence measures right away. At a minimum, it should abolish the travel ban from Iran and ensureeven expandexceptions to U.S. sanctions that allow Iran to address the humanitarian needs arising from the COVID-19 crisis.

The United States and Iran should attempt then to reset the cycle of escalation with an informal calm for calm agreement. Iran would put a stop to the proxy attacks on U.S. forces in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East, as well as mine and missile attacks on oil tankers and critical infrastructure. The United States would cease the bellicose rhetoric and do what is in its power to restrain provocations such as some of the mysterious explosions inside Iran in recent months.

The U.S. government must then decide how to pursue the nuclear component of this early arrangement. A Biden administration may try to get the United States and Iran to reenter the 2015 agreement. Such an approach may be the simplest to negotiate. It would also most meaningfully roll back Irans nuclear program, and it could help the United States repair transatlantic relations. However, returning to the deal could permanently alienate the agreements opponents, which include Israel, Saudi Arabia, and congressional Republicans. That fallout could in turn complicate future diplomacy with Iran. Irans internal politics may also foreclose the possibility of a simple reentry so close to elections, as hard-liners would not want Rouhanis faction to have such a victory.

A new U.S. administrationin this case more likely Trumps than Bidens could instead pursue a different short-term agreement: one that would lack the scope of the original nuclear deal but that would require Iran to freeze its nuclear program or partially roll it back in exchange for limited sanctions relief. This arrangement would be similar to the deal French President Emmanuel Macron tried to forge in 2019 between Iran and the United States, or to the 2013 Joint Plan of Action, which preceded the final agreement. Opponents to the 2015 agreement may find this option more acceptable, because it would leave more sanctions in place at the start. And because the deal would be straightforward, with relatively few steps to implementation, it might help Iran and the United States avoid getting bogged down in detailed negotiations. On the other hand, it would not roll back Irans nuclear program as far, and it would require opening an entirely new negotiation, which would likely necessitate a 30-day congressional review period.

Whether the United States returns to the 2015 Iran nuclear deal or negotiates a more limited alternative will depend ultimately on the Iranian position. And either a Biden or a Trump administration should be open to testing all possibilities.

An initial de-escalation deal would forestall any crisis from unfolding before the Iranian election. In so doing, it would buy time for the United States to develop a comprehensive strategy in consultation with its partners and Congress. The parties could then begin engaging on parallel tracks: one focused on further de-escalating regional tensions and the other on hammering out a follow-on nuclear arrangement. The tracks will be separate, but not entirely independent.

Iran, the United States, other regional actors, and members of the P5+1 need a framework in which to engage one another, and the United States should offer its support for and participation in a facilitated, active, multilateral dialogue on issues of import to the region. For regional partners, American efforts to participate in such a dialogue would signal an important U.S. commitment. For Iran, the inclusion of multiple international players would signal that the United States is not simply out to impose its views.

The overall objective should be to sustain a process that might produce durable solutions. But initial goals should be modest and can start with practical, narrow dealmaking. A highly structured forum with lengthy agendas and formal interventions is less likely to succeed than a more flexible one with multilateral meetings and smaller contact groups. The key is for the United States, in concert with the P5+1, to invest serious diplomacy in such a dialogue.

The dialogue would lay the foundation for constructive engagement even while contributing to the Middle Easts long-term stability. Through it, the regions states could seek an agreement to not interfere in one anothers internal affairs. At the same time, they could adopt cooperative measures to address COVID-19, other health issues, natural disasters, and climate change. The dialogue could pursue naval de-escalation in the Gulf through multilateral mechanisms. And it could address arms control by limiting conventional offensive arms, including missiles, curtailing nuclear enrichment for civilian purposes, and devising common inspection regimes. Some difficult issues are unlikely to yield early progress, but they should be part of the program nonetheless. These include ending the civil wars in Syria and Yemen and reducing tensions between the United States and Iran in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Simultaneously, the United States and the P5+1 should engage Iran in follow-on negotiations regarding its nuclear program. The first priority in this regard should be for Iran to extend the expiring sunset provisions in the 2015 nuclear deal, in exchange for greater sanctions relief from the United States. Such relief could include allowing for U-turn transactions, in which Iranian funds held in foreign banks can pass through the U.S. financial system, or relaxing some limited aspects of the direct U.S. embargo.

If negotiations on regional issues make progress, the United States should show flexibility on sanctions relief. Likewise, a stalemate in regional diplomacy should affect the nuclear discussions. But neither track should be allowed to hold the other hostage. Some discussions, such as those regarding Irans missile program or regional agreements on civilian nuclear use, may overlap them both.

For this strategy to work, the United States will have to convince Israel, the Gulf states (especially Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates), and the U.S. Congress to play constructive roles. The United States should assure its partners in the Middle East that while Irans nuclear program remains a priority, Washington will put greater emphasis on the regional issues than it did in the past. It should signal from the start that it is aiming not naively to transform Iran or the region but to construct practical deals, supported by U.S. diplomacy, that de-escalate tensions.

Congress may pose the greatest difficulty to a Biden administration that seeks to reengage. A Trump administration can rely on Republicans to fall into line if it reengages with Iran and on Democrats to welcome de-escalation. Biden, however, would need to persuade Congress that his administrations approach will address concerns about nuclear deal sunsets, ballistic missiles, and regional issues and to emphasize that it can and will reimpose sanctions if necessary. A Biden administration could consider creative ways to maximize Republican buy-in: say, by developing a bipartisan gang of members who are leaders on national security, from whom the administration would solicit views on Iran and who might even observe some of the negotiations. If bipartisan support for engaging Iran proves elusive, Biden will have to take steps to harden any agreement against reversal.

Putting U.S. policy toward Iran on a firmer footing is an extraordinarily complex task that will require delicately aligning numerous players. The U.S. political transition in 2021 could offer either a President Biden or a President Trump a critical opportunity to do just thatbut each would have to break with the past. Biden would need to move Democrats away from a nuclear-only strategy and put greater focus on the region. Trump would have to revise his pressure-only approach and engage in serious negotiations. Both would have to put diplomacy in the lead.

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Read the original here:
On Iran, the Next Administration Must Break With the Past - Foreign Affairs Magazine

Editors Note: Under President Trump, the United States has stepped up pressure on Iran, and the clerical regime has pushed back against U.S. allies and U.S. forces in the region. These confrontations have led to fears that a war between the United States and Iran might break out. Michael Eisenstadt of The Washington Institute for Near East Policy argues the United States and Iran have not been on the brink of war and, in fact, Iran has a gray zone strategy designed to put pressure on the United States and its allies but avoid an all-out conflict.

Daniel Byman

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A popular narrative to emerge during the past year of Iran-U.S. tensions is that on several occasionsparticularly after the killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani in JanuaryIran and the United States were on the brink of war. This narrative has been promoted by Iranian officials who encourage the beliefas part of their efforts to deter the United Statesthat a local clash could easily escalate to an all-out war. It has likewise been promoted by President Trump, who stated in a private talk to TV anchors in February, with typical bravado, that war with Iran was closer than you thought. And it has been promoted by a variety of journalists, academics and think tank analysts. Yet, this widely accepted version of events distorts reality, precludes a clear-headed understanding of Iranian and U.S. actions, and hinders an effective policy response.

The counterpressure campaign that Iran launched in May 2019 against Americas maximum pressure policy (the ostensible goal of which is a better deal with Iran covering nuclear, regional and military issues) has relied on activities in the gray zone between war and peace. These include covert or unacknowledged attacks on petrochemical infrastructure and transportation in the Gulf, proxy attacks on U.S. military personnel in Iraq, and clandestine cyber operations. Indeed, Iran is perhaps the worlds foremost practitioner of gray zone operations (although China and Russia have also long employed this modus operandi). For nearly four decades, Americans have struggled to understand and to respond effectively to this asymmetric way of war.

Actors operating in the gray zone test and probe to determine what they can get away with. They engage in covert or unacknowledged proxy activities to preserve deniability and avoid becoming decisively engaged with the adversary. They rely on incremental action to create ambiguity regarding their intentions, and to make their enemies uncertain about how to respond. And they arrange their activities in time and spacepacing them and spacing them geographicallyso that adversary decision-makers do not feel pressured to act rashly. This enables them to challenge stronger adversaries and advance their own agendas while managing risk, preventing escalation and avoiding war. In gray zone competitions there is no well-defined brink that marks the transition from peace to war. Rather, these are murky, ambiguous, slow-motion conflicts characterized by occasional escalatory peaks and deescalatory troughs.

Irans gray zone strategy works by leveraging a number of differences in the way that Tehran and Washington think and operate. The most important of these differences is conceptual. U.S. decision-makers have tended to conceive of war and peace with Iran (as well as with other significant state actors such as China and Russia) in stark, binary terms and have frequently been constrained by fear of escalationcreating opportunities for Iran (and others) to act in the gray zone in between. (The main exception hereby and large a relatively recent oneis in the cyber domain.) By contrast, Tehran tends to see conflict as a continuum. The key terrain in gray zone conflicts, then, is the gray matter in the heads of those American policymakers who believe that a local clash could somehow rapidly escalate to an all-out war. The result is often U.S. inaction, which provides gray zone operators such as Iran greater freedom to act.

Tehrans interest in avoiding war and its preference for operating in the gray zone are not grounded in a transitory calculation of the regimes interests; it is a deeply rooted feature of the regimes strategic culture that is reflected in its way of war, as well as the Islamic Republics strategy under Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This is one of the enduring legacies of the Iran-Iraq War, which killed nearly a quarter-million Iranians and left the country with still-unhealed wounds. Iran is determined to never again repeat that experience. Likewise, for the United States, the long and costly wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have seared in the nations consciousness a strong desire to avoid future Middle Eastern forever wars.

Thus, Tehrans entire modus operandi is intended to prevent escalation and avoid war. During the first seven months of the counterpressure campaign that it launched in spring 2019, all of Irans attacks were nonlethalby design. Iranian forces placed limpet mines on the hulls of oil tankers, targeted unmanned U.S. reconnaissance aircraft, and conducted precision strikes against sparsely staffed Saudi oil facilities. When these initial steps did not induce Washington to respond militarily, or to lift or ease the economic sanctions imposed after it left the nuclear deal with Iran in 2018, the Islamic Republic escalated in the space left by U.S. inaction with a series of progressively larger rocket attacks in Iraq by its Kataib Hezbollah (KH) proxy, until an American was killed there in late December. This set in motion a series of eventsa U.S. counterstrike that killed 25 KH militiamen, violent demonstrations in front of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad by pro-Iran proxies (evoking dark memories of the 1979-1981 Tehran embassy hostage crisis and the 2012 murder of U.S. Amb. Christopher Stevens by Libyan terrorists), and tweeted taunts by Khamenei that America cannot do a damn thingthat prompted the United States to target Soleimani and KH commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in early January.

Yet, when Iran retaliated five days later with a missile strike on Al-Asad air base, it gave advance warning to the Iraqi government so that Americans there had time to shelter. (U.S. intelligence had also picked up warning signs of an imminent missile strike.) Afterward, both the United States and Iran signaled publicly that they considered the current round over, although rocket fire against U.S. personnel and facilities in Iraq has continued since then. Khamenei subsequently warned that the Islamic Republic will never forget the martyrdom of Hajj Qassem Soleimani and will inevitably strike a similar blow against the U.S.

This sequence of events should demonstrate that the United States and Iran were not on the brink of war in January, for several reasons. First, events following the killing of Soleimani indicate that risk and escalation management were priorities for both Tehran and Washington; nothing that has happened since alters this assessment. Second, for more than 40 years, Iran and the United States have avoided wardespite Iranian-supported kidnappings and attacks in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq that have killed hundreds of Americans; clashes at sea toward the end of the Iran-Iraq War that killed scores of Iranian sailors; the accidental U.S. shooting down of an Iranian passenger jet in 1988 that killed all 290 passengers; and numerous other incidents. And finally, since 2017, Israel has launched hundreds of strikes on Iranian military infrastructure in Syria, killing at least eight members of the IRGC (according to Iranian sources), without sparking a war.

Yet, history is replete with examples of war through miscalculationand both the United States and Iran have each miscalculated at least once already. The U.S. maximum pressure policy crossed an Iranian redline dating to the 1980s, which states that if Iran cannot export oil, it will work to prevent any other Gulf state from exporting oil either. In trying to drive Tehrans oil exports to zero, Washington backed Iran into a corner and incentivized it to lash out with a military counterpressure campaigna response for which the United States was inexplicably unprepared. Likewise, Iran crossed a U.S. redline by killing a U.S. citizenand by organizing violent protests by its Iraqi proxies in front of the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad in December 2019, it likely contributed to the U.S. decision to target Soleimani and Muhandis. These episodes show, however, that while miscalculations are possible, they need not spark uncontrolled escalation or an all-out warthough it remains to be seen whether the killing of Soleimani was a master stroke or yet another miscalculation.

There are other ways the parties could stumble into a wider conflict. Tehran might be tempted to spring an October surprise (for example, perhaps the assassination of a U.S. official or a humiliating military strike) to sabotage Trumps prospects for a second termalthough this could backfire and give the president a boost at the polls due to a rally-round-the-flag effect. It might also provide a pretext for a tough U.S. military response. Should the president lose reelection, Tehran might be tempted to launch a strike before Inauguration Day as a parting shot to avenge the death of Soleimani. And should Trump win a second term, Tehran will have to decide whether to initiate a military crisis to catalyze diplomacy that might yield a more comprehensive deal with Washington, or avoid provoking a triumphant and at times erratic president. But these scenarios would all involve the limited use of force by Iran, and it seems unlikely that Trump would suddenly abandon a core principle of his presidency and get the United States involved in yet another Middle East forever war just prior to an election, after failing in a bid for reelection or at the start of a second term. Should Iran strike before or shortly after U.S. elections, though, an unnerving series of ripostes remains a possibility. Some members of the administration might even welcome an election-eve crisis with Iran.

Moreover, should Khamenei become incapacitated or pass away, IRGC hardliners might opt for a more risk-acceptant approach toward the United States: They might launch a spectacular attack to avenge Soleimanis death and goad the United States to withdraw its remaining troops from the region. The ascension of IRGC hardliners to positions of leadership in the post-Khamenei era would likely presage an era of heightened U.S.-Iran tensions and conflict.

Another possible path to escalation might be provided by alleged U.S. (and Israeli) covert operations in Iran and against Iranian interests in the region. These might include activities such as the sabotage in June 2019 of an underwater oil pipeline off the Syrian coast used to transfer crude oil from Iranian tankers to the refinery at Baniyas, the preflight explosion of an Iranian satellite launch vehicle in August 2019, and a claimed attack in October 2019 on an Iranian oil tanker in the Red Sea. The United States may have also played a role in the sabotage of Irans principal uranium enrichment facility at Natanz, which reports have attributed to Israel.

In addition to these instances of apparently deliberate sabotage, there have also been a series of fires and explosions at industrial sites throughout the country in the past three months. Such events are quite common in Iran, due to the countrys crumbling infrastructure and lack of a safety culture. According to a study by the United States Institute of Peace, the number of such events that occurred from May to mid-July of 2019 (at least 97) is about the same number as have occurred in the same period this year (at least 83). So, while some of these incidents might be a result of sabotage or cyberattacks, it seems likely that most were not.

Yet, seemingly well-sourced reports from the United States and Israel bolster the impression that the two countries may be conducting their own narrowly focused, low-level gray zone campaigns against Iran through sabotage and cyberattacks on nuclear infrastructure and strategic research and development facilities. Whether this is true or not is unimportantperceptions are what matters. And herein lies the rub: Gray zone campaigns are generally most successful when a degree of deniability is preserved. When officials effectively confirm gray zone activities through media leaks or by other meanswhether for personal, political or propaganda purposesthey obviate some of the advantages of gray zone operations. And when covert actions that humiliate the regime are combined with further pressure on Tehransuch as U.S. efforts to snap back U.N. sanctions in the wake of failed efforts to extend the ban on arms transfers to Iranthe potential grows for Iran to up the ante if and when it retaliates. But escalationeven if unlikely to lead to waris not in the American interest, as it risks highlighting the limits of U.S. deterrence as well as Washingtons inability to protect its personnel and assets, its unwillingness to defend its allies, and the degree to which it may be constrained by domestic and foreign policy concerns. With U.S. presidential elections a little more than a month away, there is precious little chance of negotiating a new deal with Iran at this point. Increased pressure creates a heightened risk of escalation for little practical gain.

So, while claims that Iran and the United States were on the brink of war make for dramatic headlines, they do not reflect reality. To succeed in gray zone competitions, the vocabulary and mental models derived from Americas conventional warfighting experience must be put aside, as they obfuscate rather than illuminate, and preclude the kind of clarity of thought required to avoid further escalation with Iran. At the same time, U.S. policymakers should have learned from recent experiences with Iran not to underestimate the adversary or to overestimate their own ability to deter destabilizing actions. The enemy always gets a vote, and the potential gain proffered by a contemplated course of action should be weighed against the potential for escalation and harm to Americas reputation and credibilityas well as to U.S. deterrence going forward.

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Were Iran and the United States Really 'on the Brink'? Observations on Gray Zone Conflict - Lawfare