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Students abducted

Princetons student exchange program first took off in 2014, when a prominent Iranian-American scholar and future Biden administration official, Ariane Tabatabai, connected the Iran centers then-associate director to Mostafa Zahrani, a senior Iranian foreign ministry diplomat with strong ties to his countrys elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). I wanted to introduce you to a friend who is in Princeton, and you will see him in Vienna in three weeks, Tabatabai wrote, ccing Kevan Harris, the then associate director. He is interested in sharing with you a plan to send Iranian students to Princeton and to send American students to Iran.

Harris jumped at this opening, according to correspondence seen by Semafor, and arranged to see Zahrani in Austria two weeks later on the sidelines of the nuclear negotiations that were taking place between Iran, the US, and other global powers. The follow-up took time, but by early 2015, Princeton welcomed its first candidate for the Iran program: a Chinese-American graduate student named Wang Xiyue.

Wang was hesitant about going to Tehran, he told Semafor in recent interviews. He didnt speak Farsi, and his Ph.D. work initially focused on the Soviet Unions role in Central Asia, rather than issues related to Iran itself. He also raised with Princeton his concerns about security, given Irans history of abducting American citizens and the fact Tehran had no diplomatic ties with Washington.

On Dec. 1, 2015, Wang emailed administrators that he felt he needed to be as specific as possible about his scholarship with Iranian officials to protect himself once on the ground. [A]s a US citizen of non-Iranian descen[t], I think it would be preferable for me to be as transparent as possible so that I would not be deported from the country for doing things my visa does not prescribe me to do, he wrote.

But Harris and other Princeton officials reassured Wang about his safety and the importance of learning Farsi in Iran, both for his dissertation and future academic work. Its a good time to go [to Iran] looks like they are in a good mood over there, Harris wrote to Wang in the weeks before his January 2016 departure. Take advantage of it.

Wangs reservations proved to be right. Six months after his arrival in Tehran, Irans intelligence ministry confiscated his US passport. On Aug. 7, 2016, he was arrested on espionage charges and sent to Irans feared Evin Prison, where he spent more than three years, at times in solitary confinement and threatened with death.

Princeton denied that it in any way downplayed the risks of travel to Iran nor pressured Wang into joining the exchange program. Princeton did not direct, and indeed did not have the power to direct, Mr. Wangs travel, university spokesman Michael Hotchkiss told Semafor. And it was Princeton University that undertook a relentless, multi-year and multi-million-dollar global effort to secure his release.

Last year, a second Princeton graduate student, Elizabeth Tsurkov, was abducted by an Iranian-backed militia in Iraq. She hasnt been seen since last November.

Tsurkovs journey to Princeton was an unusual one. The academic and journalist was born in Russia, raised and educated in Israel, and earned her masters degree in social science from the University of Chicago in 2019 with a 3.9 GPA. Throughout this time, she showed a remarkable ability particularly for an Israeli to engage the Middle Easts religious groups, militias, and political movements in hotspots like Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon.

Tsurkov has said in published interviews that she began her reporting through the heavy use of social media. Fluent in Arabic, she employed Facebook, Twitter, and WhatsApp to document the plight of people caught in war zones, and amassed a substantial online following and network in the process. She also used her Russian passport to visit Arab countries that are largely off limits to Israelis.

Tsurkov has acknowledged that her citizenship and religion unnerved some of her contacts. But her colleagues and family said that her writings, which have focused heavily on the plight of victims of regional and sectarian violence including Palestinians have allowed her to gain and maintain the trust of the groups and individuals shes documenting. Among her affiliations is an Israeli-Palestinian think tank that educates Israelis on Islam and their Arab neighbors in a bid to support the peace process.

I think that what drives all of them, at the end of the day, to speak to me is a feeling that I care about them, and I want to properly reflect their perspectives and their views, Tsurkov told the media outlet Al-Monitor in a 2021 podcast.

Tsurkovs doctoral work at Princeton was focused on the patronage systems that underpin political movements in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iraqi Kurdistan and why their members often remain loyal to feudal and sectarian leaders who deliver little economic development in return. In her thesis proposal from 2021, which was approved and funded by Princeton, she outlined the travels shed made, and would continue to make, to Baghdad, northern Iraq, and Lebanon.

Tsurkov was kidnapped on March 21, 2023 from a cafe in the central Baghdad neighborhood of Karrada, just days after undergoing back surgery in an Iraqi hospital for a herniated disc. Both the US and Israeli governments blame the Iranian-backed militia Kataib Hezbollah (KH) for the abduction.

KH was established in 2003 with the direct support of Irans IRGC, and is designated by the US as a terrorist organization. KHs militia forms the largest part of Iraqs national guard, known as the Popular Mobilization Forces, and KH politicians serve in Iraqi Prime Minister Shia Al Sudanis government. US officials say KH also regularly coordinates with the IRGC to attack American military facilities and personnel in Iraq and the wider region. This includes a January drone strike on a Pentagon base in Jordan that killed three American troops.

The Trump administration assassinated KHs founding commander, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in a January 2020 missile strike on his convoy in Baghdad. He was accompanied by the IRGCs most powerful general, Qasem Soleimani, who also died in the attack. Iran has vowed to avenge both of their deaths. KH hasnt contacted the Tsurkov family nor made any demands for her release.

Elizabeths sister, Emma Tsurkov, has publicly criticized Princetons response to the kidnapping mirroring, in many ways, complaints raised by Wang Xiyue. Last August, she penned an opinion piece in the New Jersey Star-Ledger claiming the school had been denying it approved Elizabeths travel to Iraq and was telling the State Department that their grad student had essentially gone rogue. Emma Tsurkov stressed in her article that any divide between the school and Elizabeth was extremely dangerous as it could only fuel charges that she was a spy and hurt her chances of coming home.

Emma told Semafor that Elizabeth, once in Iraq, was in regular contact with her Princeton thesis advisor, Professor Amaney Jamal, the dean of the School of Public and International Affairs. This included occasional video calls from Baghdad. But the Tsurkov family has been disappointed that Jamal hasnt met with Emma in person since Elizabeths disappearance, something Princeton doesnt dispute.

The school in October, for the first time, publicly took responsibility for Elizabeths research and travel to Iraq, even while raising questions about whether she followed proper procedures going there. Spokesman Hotchkiss told Semafor that Princeton is totally committed to gaining her release by making available reputable outside experts the University has retained and by advocating with US government officials to use their influence to help bring Elizabeth home safely.

He added that Jamal directly communicated her deep concern for Elizabeth and her family to Emma Tsurkov via email and that the school has appointed a deputy dean at the graduate school to serve as a point person. [The administrator] is available for Emma at any time and remains in contact with her, he said.

KH released a proof-of-life video in November in which a visibly exhausted Elizabeth Tsurkov reads a statement in Hebrew claiming she was both an operative for the CIA and Mossad, the Israeli spy agency. (The US and Israel deny this charge.) The student is believed to still be in Baghdad.

Emma Tsurkov is now focused on pressuring Iraqs government to secure Elizabeths freedom, given Baghdads close ties to KH. The family believes Iraq should be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism and have its US aid budget slashed unless it wins Elizabeths release. Emma Tsurkov directly confronted the Iraqi prime minister at a Washington think tank last month on behalf of her sister, publicly accusing him of not doing anything to save her.

The Iraqi government hasnt responded to requests for comment from Semafor.

An Iranian diplomat on campus

Princeton entered the Iran debate in a significant way in 2009, when it agreed to host Hossein Mousavian, a top regime diplomat and former nuclear negotiator, in New Jersey. Mousavian fled Tehran that year after being charged with espionage by then-President Mahmoud Ahmadinejads government, and briefly detained. The Islamic Republic insider would be cleared, but still found himself starkly on the wrong side of his countrys vicious political infighting.

Mousavian was no dissident, though, and used his perch at Princeton to advocate Irans positions on its nuclear program and other key national security issues. A former ambassador to Germany, Mousavian has supported ties with the West in ways that have placed him at odds with the IRGC and other hardline parties in Tehran. He has also sought to improve relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Many of Mousavians dictums on the nuclear file would be adopted by the Iranian government after his close political ally, Hassan Rouhani, succeeded Ahmadinejad as president in 2013 and moved to negotiate directly with the Obama administration over the next two years. The Princeton scholar was a prolific producer of opinion pieces and commentary during this period who liaised, at times, with Iranian diplomats, including Mostafa Zahrani and then-Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, to promote their messaging and engagements in the West, according to the foreign ministry correspondence reviewed by Semafor.

Princeton officials lauded Mousavians ability to advise the US and Iranian delegations to help advance the nuclear deal, which was finalized in July 2015. And in the eyes of Wang Xiyue, the graduate student, this reflected his schools strong ties to the upper echelons of the Islamic Republics leadership. This sense of security was only bolstered, Wang told Semafor, by the fact that one of his advisers at Princetons Iran center, Mona Rahmani, was herself related to an Iranian government official. Her father ran Tehrans interests section in Washington, an Iranian government body that works to support dual US-Iran citizens, from 2010-2015.

My concerns were alleviated by the fact that there were these direct links between Princeton and Iran, Wang said. It looked like there was coordination.

Following his arrest in August 2016, these connections to Tehran proved of little use, Wang outlined in a lawsuit he filed against Princeton in 2021, charging negligence. The university advised Wangs wife to stay quiet and not publicly criticize the Iranian government, he says. And Mousavian told Princetons leadership that his outreach to Zahrani, Zarif, and other Iranian officials would be counterproductive for Wang, given the Princeton scholars own sparring with Tehrans security state. Rahmani, meanwhile, also declined to lobby the regime, the lawsuit states. She left the university in 2017.

Wang says he felt totally abandoned during the more than three years he was incarcerated in Evin Prison. He was released on December 7, 2019 as part of a prisoner exchange negotiated between the Trump administration and Iran. Simply put, after encouraging and convincing Mr. Wang to go to Iran, Princeton chose to put their reputation and political interest ahead of Mr. Wangs personal safety, reads his lawsuit.

Princeton denies that it placed its reputation or ties to Iran ahead of Wangs safety. And the school said it invested enormous resources behind gaining his release. Throughout his ordeal, the University worked in close coordination with his wife and provided extensive financial and other support to Mr. Wang and his family during and after his imprisonment, Princetons legal team at Akin Gump wrote to congressional lawmakers investigating the schools ties to Iran last year.

Princeton reached a financial settlement with Wang last September but denies all charges made against the school in the suit. We have chosen to help them [Wangs family] move on with their lives by avoiding protracted litigation, spokesman Hotchkiss said.

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How Princeton got burned by its outreach to Iran - Semafor

The nuclear fatwa that wasnthow Iran sold the world a false narrative

By KhosroSayeh Isfahani

The idea struck me to introduce the concept of a fatwa [during the 2004 nuclear] negotiations. There was no coordination [in advance], Irans chief nuclear negotiator at the time recounted eight years after the incident. This was nothing short of a stroke of genius in shaping a false narrative about the Islamic Republics nuclear program, which was delivered by a cleric who eventually rose in the ranks and became a two-term president (20132021): Hassan Rouhani.

In a 2012 interview with local magazine Mehrnameh, Rouhani recounted the 2004 talks with the foreign ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and claimed that he told them that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a fatwa and declared it forbidden to acquire a bomb. This fatwa is more important for us than the NPT [Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] and the additional protocol. It is more important to us than any law.

Rouhani added that he was referencing comments made by the supreme leader ahead of Friday prayers in Tehran a week prior, when Khamenei said, No, we arent thinking about nuclear weapons. I have said many times that our nuclear weapon is this nation. Our nuclear weapons are these youths. We dont want nuclear weapons. A state that has so many young believers and this unified nation doesnt need nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons, their production, storage, and use, each has a problem. We have also expressed our religious opinion, which is clear, and everyone knows it.

However, Khameneis religious opinion about nuclear arms has always been a carefully crafted message concocted and repeated by himnever in writing but only in speechesin which he has exclusively called the use of nuclear arms haram (forbidden).

The campaign of deceit was initiated when the Islamic Republic saw its survival at imminent risk. In a speech the day after the March 20, 2003 US invasion of Iraq, Khamenei said, We dont want a nuclear bomb. We are even opposed to having chemical weaponsThese things dont agree with our principles.

Over the years, Khamenei and other high-ranking officials have repeated this line while Iranian scientists were busy developing all necessary components for the development of a nuclear weapon and the supreme leader has consistently celebrated these scientists.

Tracking Khameneis comments over the past two decades demonstrates that he never issued a fatwa against building a nuclear weapon, and only tentatively and revocably spoke against the use of weapons of mass destruction.

What eventually became a staple talking point of Iranian diplomats was sold to world powers as the supreme leaders fatwa prohibiting nuclear arms. In reality, it was the last paragraph of his message to the first iteration of the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, which Tehran hosted in 2010.

The segment of the message marketed by the Iranian diplomatic missions as a fatwa reads, We believe that adding to nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction, such as chemical weapons and biological weapons, are a serious threat to humanity. The Iranian nation, which itself is a victim of the use of chemical weapons, feels more than other nations the danger of the production and accumulation of such weapons and is ready to put all its resources in the way of dealing with it. We consider the use of these weapons to be haram (forbidden), and the effort to protect mankind from this great disaster is everyones duty.

The supreme leaders official website includes several pages dedicated to explaining his stance on nuclear arms, with one listing all comments he has made about them. Among the eighty-five quotes, the word haram is used only three times and exclusively about the use of nuclear weapons, not their production or stockpiling. He has also twice called the use of weapons of mass destruction a great sin.

On the same page, the only quote that includes the term fatwa comes from a 2015 speech and reads, We dont want a nuclear weapon. Not because of what they say, but because of ourselves, because of our religion, because of our rational reasons. This is both our religious fatwa and our rational fatwa. Our rational fatwa is that we dont need nuclear weapons today, tomorrow, or ever. Nuclear weapons are a source of trouble for a country like ours.

In sharia law, all acts fall into five categories: wajib (obligatory), mustahab (recommended), mubah (neutral), makruh (disapproved), and haram (forbidden). In the case of nuclear weapons, the supreme leader clearly, and presumably intentionally, has avoided labeling the production and storage of nuclear arms with a religious label, leaving room for a nuclear weapons program.

In addition to beguiling world powers with a false narrative about the nonexistent fatwa, the double-speak commentary by the supreme leader gives powerful factions within the regime enough ammunition to pursue the development of a nuclear weapon.

Furthermore, a point of pride for Shia Muslims is that fatwas are not inherently permanent, and Islamic jurists canand often doreinterpret the scripture in accord with the needs of time. Throughout the history of political Islam, Shia ayatollahs have used fatwas as a political tool against adversaries. For example, in the 1890s, Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi issued a fatwa during nationwide protests after the ruling Qajar Dynasty granted a British merchant a monopoly on the growth, sale, and export of tobacco in Iran. This forced the king to revoke the monopoly; after it served its political purpose, the fatwa was also removed.

Iranian officials have consistently warned that, if push comes to shove, they might openly seek nuclear weapons.

In 2021, then Intelligence Minister Mahmoud Alavi told state television, The Supreme Leader has explicitly said in his fatwa that nuclear weapons are against sharia law and the Islamic Republic sees them as religiously forbidden and does not pursue them. But a cornered cat may behave differently from when the cat is free. And if [Western states] push Iran in that direction, then its no longer Irans fault.

In June 2023, Khamenei warned world powers that they cannot stop his regime if it desires to build nuclear weaponsa threat echoed by Irans former nuclear chief, Ali Akbar Salehi.In February, Salehi boasted that the regime has all components necessary for building a bomb.

With heightened tensions in the Middle East, and amid the Islamic Republics four-decade war with Israel creeping out of the shadows and into the open, the clerical establishment has been testing the waters for openly announcing its nuclear aspirations.

In a March speech at a Quran exhibition, Hojatolislam Mohammad Fuker Meibodi said that the Muslim holy book orders believers to amass weapons that would sow fear in the heart of the enemies. He argued that weapons of the pastnamely swords and cannonswill not achieve that aim and therefore, maybe we should acquire nuclear weapons.

Iranian nuclear scientist Mahmoud Reza Aghamiriwho has ties to the supreme leaders office and currently serves as dean of Shahid Beheshti Universitysaid on state television on April 7 that the supreme leader can tomorrow change his stance on building nuclear weapons and that his regime has the capability to make the leap because building the bomb is not complicated.

Aghamiri is among the top Iranian officials who have publicly endorsed the development of a nuclear bomb. In 2022, he said that Tehran can speed up uranium enrichment to 99 percent, build a nuclear warhead, and use it as both deterrence and a bargaining chip in interactions with the West like North Korea, which, according to him, gets away with bullying the world.

Such rhetoric has only intensified in Iran following the April 13 attack against Israel in retaliation for the April 1 killing of Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commanders in Syria. Anticipating a response from Israel, which eventually arrived on April 19, Iranian officials warned against the targeting of nuclear facilities in the country.

On April 18, Ahmad Haghtalab, the IRGC commander in charge of nuclear security, said, If the false Zionist regime decides to exploit the threat of attacking our countrys nuclear sites to pressure Iran, revision of Islamic Republics nuclear policies and doctrine and dropping of previously announced considerations in possible and perceivable. Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting reported his comments, sharing a video of him pronouncing the nuclear threat.

Javan, an influential daily close to the IRGC, wrote on the same day that it was the first time a senior IRGC official issued such a threat, and noted that state media were forcefully highlighting the comments, signaling coordination with top decision-making bodies.

The daily argued that every states primary goal is survival no matter the cost and that, before launching the April 13 attack against the nuclear armed Israel, Tehran had prepared itself for engagement at highest level or at least is seeking to establish a new equilibrium.

Javan warned Israel to take the warning serious because all technical hurdles have been removed and with a wave of the hand from Imam Khamenei and the regime can build a nuclear bomb.

Pro-reform daily Hammihan wrote on April 20 that the Islamic Republics attack against Israel from Iranian soil has created a new norm of confrontation between the two nations. According to the daily, in this new context, proxy forces cannot provide the deterrence Iran needs. The daily argued that if Iran is pushed towards acquiring a nuclear weapon or adopting nuclear ambiguity, it would benefit from increased deterrence.

On April 22, a member of the National Security Commission of the parliament, Javad Karimi Ghodousi, wrote on X (formerly Twitter), If [supreme leader] issues permission, we would be a week away from testing the first [nuclear bomb].

As an officer of the IRGC, Ghodousi has high security clearance. Through his key position in the parliament, he is privy to military decisions made at the top of the food chain. This attracted much attention when, ahead of the April 13 strike against Israel, he tweeted that the attack was happening in a matter of hours.

In an apparent effort to soften heightened rhetoric, on April 22, the spokesperson of the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Naser Kanani said, Nuclear weapons have no place in Irans defense and military strategy.

Iran-based security analyst Alireza Taghavinia, a frequent guest of state television, reacted to the mixed signals out of Tehran, writing on X, General Haghtalab has fulfilled his assigned duty. [MP] Karimi Qudousi has sent the necessary pulse. The Foreign Ministrys spokesperson has also fulfilled his inherent duty. Politics has complexities and subtleties that not everyone can understand.

Ghodousi doubled down on the comments on April 23, in a video saying that the International Atomic Energy Agency is aware that the Islamic Republic needs half a day or maximum a week to build a nuclear warhead.

The nuclear threat has been echoed by people privy to the supreme leaders thinking as well. On May 9, Khameneis top foreign policy advisor Kamal Kharrazi warned that if Israel threatens the existence of the Islamic Republic, Tehran will change its nuclear doctrine. We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Irans existence be threatened, there will have no choice but to change our military doctrine, Kharrazi told Al Jazeera Mubasher.

A Persian proverb advises that, before shouting an insult, it is best to first murmur it to test the waters. The crescendoing chorus of Iranian officials, from IRGC generals to members of parliament to scientists advocating for the development of a nuclear weapon as deterrent is another sign of how a nuclear weapons program may emerge from the shadows. Unsurprisingly, all Iranian officials signaling this possible change in policy have pointed to the so-called fatwa and its impermanent natureanother sign of the move being orchestrated by the upper echelons of the clerical establishment.

Eyeing tectonic shifts in global power dynamics, the eighty-five-year-old Khamenei, who has unchecked powers and delusions about divine intervention on his behalf, is besieged by crises at every corner. In response, he appears to be shedding his decades-old habit of being a cautious gambler. Now a cornered cat, the ailing ayatollah, in a rush to solidify his legacy, is more likely than ever to embark on a path toward a nuclear weapon to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic.

KhosroSayeh Isfahaniis an advocate, journalist, and Internet researcher with years of experience working in Iran, including work related to the LGBTQI community.

Image: Supreme Leader attending an IRGC Aerospace Force exhibition on November 19, 2023, Tehran, Iran. (Khamenei.ir)

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The nuclear fatwa that wasn'thow Iran sold the world a false narrative - Atlantic Council

History is littered, the British writer and politician Enoch Powell said, with the wars which everybody knew would never happen.

A full-blown conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel once seemed implausible. But last month, the long-running shadow war between the two nations burst into the open in a series of unprecedented drone and missile strikes, raising the specter of a fight that would contain enough advanced technology, paramilitary forces and mutual acrimony to incinerate large parts of the Middle East, collapse the global economy and entangle the United States and other major powers.

Now the two sides appear to have hit pause, but for how long? As long as Iran is ruled by an Islamist government that puts its revolutionary ideology before the national interest, the two countries will never know peace, and the Middle East will never know meaningful stability.

Iran and Israel are not natural adversaries. In contrast to other modern conflicts between Israel and Palestine, Russia and Ukraine, China and Taiwan Iran and Israel have no bilateral land or resource disputes. Their national strengths Iran is an energy titan and Israel is a tech innovator are more complementary than competitive. The nations also have a historical affinity dating back over 2,500 years, when the Persian King Cyrus the Great freed the Jews from the Babylonian Captivity. Iran was the second Muslim nation, after Turkey, to recognize Israel after its founding in 1948.

Their modern animosity is best understood through the lens of ideology, not geopolitics. It began with the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the dogmatic Shiite cleric who led the 1979 revolution that transformed Iran from a U.S.-allied monarchy into an anti-American theocracy. Khomeinis 1970 treatise Islamic Government, which became the basis of the constitution that governs the Islamic Republic, is laced with tirades and threats against wretched and satanic Jews. Then, as now, antisemitism often lurked below the surface of anti-imperialism.

We must protest and make the people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world, Khomeini wrote. Since they are a cunning and resourceful group of people, I fear that God forbid they may one day achieve their goal and that the apathy shown by some of us may allow a Jew to rule over us one day.

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Opinion | Iran and Israel Werent Always Enemies - The New York Times

In the shadow of the Gaza conflict, armed groups aligned with Iran have stepped up a campaign aimed at pushing the U.S. to end its military deployments in Iraq and Syria. After mounting a series of direct attacks on U.S. bases in south-eastern Syria, which prompted a wave of retaliatory strikes, Iran shifted its focus to loosening the already shaky hold of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are allied with Washington, on lands east of the Euphrates River. Portraying the SDF as an occupying army aligned with a foreign power in a region predominantly inhabited by Arab tribes, Iran has been able to rally local groups to perpetrate attacks on this U.S.-backed force. While both Iran and the U.S. seem keen to avoid a wider escalation of regional conflict, the situation in eastern Syria is likely to remain volatile, at least until Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire in Gaza. Pressing for an end to that conflict and, in the meantime, pushing the SDF to build bridges with alienated Syrian communities are ways for Washington to help defuse tensions in the region.

On 18 October 2023, a day after hundreds of people were killed at the al-Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza in an explosion that Arab media overwhelmingly blamed on Israel but for which Israel denied responsibility, drones and missiles were launched at U.S. military bases at al-Tanf and the Conoco gas field, both in eastern Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an alliance of Iran-aligned formations that includes Kataib Hizbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, claimed responsibility for the attacks, which they labelled revenge for Gaza.

Part of the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation), an amalgam of Iraqi militias that assembled in 2014 to fight the Islamic State, or ISIS, and were integrated into the Iraqi security apparatus in 2016, these armed groups now also operate in Syria. Working outside the Iraqi state structure with the support of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, they are stationed in government-controlled areas west of the Euphrates alongside other Iran-aligned groups. For nearly a year until the 18 October barrage these groups had not struck U.S. troops, instead observing a unilateral ceasefire they had declared in support of the newly formed Iraqi government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa Sudani. The October strikes were also the first shots of some 150 they would take at U.S. assets in Syria and Iraq by the end of January 2024.

The U.S. bases air defence systems fended off nearly all the attacks, which caused injuries but no fatalities among U.S. forces. Retaliation was slow in coming, but in November and December the U.S. started hitting the armed groups in question in Iraqi cities and near government facilities. Strikes on Iranian-backed groups in eastern Syria and the killing of a senior Revolutionary Guards commander in Damascus in late December, both unclaimed but attributed to Israel, turned up the heat.

Worse was to come for U.S. forces in the area. A drone attack on 28 January 2024 on Tower 22, a U.S. base in Jordan near Rukban that provides support for U.S. military operations across the border in Syria, killed three U.S. soldiers and injured 40. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. U.S. officials stated that the bases air defence system mistook the incoming drone for a U.S. device returning from a mission and therefore failed to intercept it. Since it was the first attack ever by Iran-backed groups on U.S. forces in Jordan, which has long been free of the violence characterising the Syrian and Iraqi theatres of conflict, the strike in itself marked a clear provocation. Sources in the group claim that it did not anticipate killing U.S. soldiers at Tower 22, expecting that the bases air defences would take down the drone, as had happened many times before. But by claiming U.S. lives, even if that was not the expected outcome, the attack crossed a threshold that made a forceful U.S. response all but a foregone conclusion.

The Iran-affiliated armed groups were clearly aware they had overstepped their bounds. They promptly evacuated bases in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Esmail Qaani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards elite Qods force, reportedly arrived in Baghdad within hours to tell the Iraqi groups to de-escalate, apparently concerned that the U.S. might retaliate against Iran directly. On 30 January, Kataib Hizbollah issued a statement announcing it would suspend attacks on U.S. troops. Other groups, such as Harakat al-Nujaba, vowed to continue their campaign but nevertheless scaled down their attacks significantly.

In an initial response on 3 February, the U.S. attacked 85 locations in Syria and Iraq. Revolutionary Guards commanders and affiliated militia members had had nearly a week to evacuate, so many of the ammunition and weapons warehouses the U.S. hit were reportedly empty, but the combined death toll still reached 51. The 34 fatalities in Syria included members of Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani groups linked to Iran. The strikes in Iraq killed sixteen Hashd members unaffiliated with the Iran-backed groups, as well as a civilian. In a second response on 7 February, a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad killed senior Kataib Hizbollah commander Abu Baqir al-Saadi. In the aftermath of these retaliatory strikes, the Iraqi armed groups continued to harass U.S. positions in Syria, albeit with lesser frequency and training their sights more on bases near the gas and oil fields in the east. On 25 February, Harakat al-Nujaba announced a temporary suspension of hostilities against U.S. forces, vowing to continue attacks on the U.S. until the end of the Gaza war. After a 30-day halt, Iraqi groups resumed only sporadic attacks on U.S. bases in eastern Syria.

The Tower 22 attack marked an inflection point, with Iran and its Iraqi allies seemingly opting to dial back the intensity and scope of direct attacks on U.S. troops in its aftermath to avoid a wider escalation that could jeopardise their long-term interests. That said, the influx of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria has continued. Since the end of January, the Iran-backed groups have shifted their focus: rather than solely attacking the U.S. military, they have rallied Arab tribal militias against the SDF as a way to weaken the latters hold on local power while bolstering their own position in eastern Syria. This strategy has involved a growing division of labour. Those Iran-backed groups composed of fighters from outside Syria have targeted U.S. bases, while Arab tribal militias based in government-held areas and backed by the Revolutionary Guards and the Syrian government have stepped up attacks on the SDF. During February and March, these tribal militias fired rocket-propelled grenades at SDF positions along the Euphrates and attempted incursions into territory held by the group on a near-daily basis.

Targeting the SDF has a clear strategic logic: keeping the conflict local, thus posing limited risk of U.S. retaliation. (After a drone attack by Iraqi groups near the U.S. base at the Omar oil field on 5 February killed seven SDF members, the U.S. refrained from escalating.) The Arab militias oppose the Kurdish-dominated SDFs rule over large parts of eastern Syria and have branches extending deep into SDF-controlled territory, where their kin say they are suffering under Kurdish rule. Mistrust of SDF governance is prevalent among Arab communities in these areas, which believe that the group gives Kurds preferential political and economic treatment. Arabs also resent the SDFs compulsory recruitment practices, adding to the sources of discontent that have allowed the Syrian government and Iran to make inroads in these communities.

Targeting the SDF has a clear strategic logic: keeping the conflict local, thus posing limited risk of U.S. retaliation.

Iran-backed groups and the Syrian government brand the SDF an occupying army aligned with a foreign power in a bid to boost recruitment of fighters from among the tribal groups. U.S. support for Israel in the Gaza war has provided additional fodder for their enlistment campaign. Many Arabs in eastern Syria are wary of non-Arab Iran, which they suspect of having an intent to convert the locals, who are mostly Sunni Muslims, to Shiism. But for the time being, a shared sense of outrage over Gaza and Muslim solidarity has superseded these doubts.

Iran has focused its recruitment efforts on the vicinity of Khasham, a town east of Deir al-Zor, the only government-controlled area on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. By raising a loyal militia, Tehran seems to hope to secure a river crossing to facilitate lucrative smuggling and infiltration into SDF-held areas near the Conoco gas field and the U.S. base there. In November, Iran-backed groups opened recruitment offices in this area, offering monthly salaries of 1.5 million Syrian pounds ($107 at the black-market rate), twice the amount paid to Iran-backed militia fighters elsewhere in Syria, and closer to the two million pounds ($143) the SDF gives its recruits. Tribal fighters receive training at Revolutionary Guards bases in al-Bukamal and al-Mayadeen, and are equipped with light and medium weapons, including rocket-propelled grenade launchers and DShK machine guns.

Adding to the SDFs predicament is the fact that a third regional power Trkiye is bent on destroying it, viewing the group as an arm of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which Trkiye, the U.S., the EU and some other states consider a terrorist organisation. Trkiye has targeted critical infrastructure in SDF-held areas in northern and north-eastern Syria in three distinct waves of intense shelling in October, December and January in response to PKK attacks on the Turkish army in northern Iraq. Its heavy bombardment has disrupted water and electricity provision, and reduced oil and gas production, which is the main source of income for the SDF-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. An all-out Turkish invasion aimed at defeating the SDF would likely trigger mass civilian displacement, especially of Syrian Kurds.

While the wave of Iran-backed militia attacks on U.S. bases since October is a response to Israels war in Gaza, they appear aimed at achieving three complementary strategic objectives for Tehran. First, they raise the political and strategic cost that Washington incurs by keeping U.S. troops deployed in Iraq and Syria, which it officially justifies as part of the continuing campaign against ISIS; they thereby serve Irans long-term goal of rolling back the U.S. presence in both countries. Iran seeks to achieve this objective by wearing down U.S. forces, with a view both to inciting U.S. politicians to call for troop withdrawal and to shaping the Iraqi domestic debate.

Iran seeks to achieve this objective by wearing down U.S. forces, with a view both to inciting U.S. politicians to call for troop withdrawal and to shaping the Iraqi domestic debate.

Admittedly, in their immediate aftermath, the attacks seem to have had the opposite effect: in mid-January, the U.S. sent 1,500 additional troops to both countries, reinforcing the 2,500 it already had in Iraq and the 900 stationed in Syria. But over time the tit-for-tat cycle in the Iraqi and Syrian theatres could erode U.S. support for future deployments, even as Iran holds the campaign at a level that does not expose it or its Iraqi allies to serious retaliation. Political debate in Washington could play a key role in this respect. Even limited additional harm to U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria could bring Congressional scrutiny of the domestic legal authority and rationale for their continued deployment, a scenario that the White House clearly wants to avoid, particularly in an election year. During his term in office, Donald Trump, the Republican challenger to President Joe Biden, ordered and then partly walked back a U.S. withdrawal from Syria. He may well seek to exploit casualties in Syria to lambast the Biden administrations Middle East policies, despite the likelihood that he would face resistance to this position from within his own party.

Tehrans primary means of compelling a U.S. withdrawal, however, is through shaping the political debate in Iraq. The U.S. counterstrikes on Iran-aligned Hashd groups have embarrassed the Sudani government, under whose command they nominally fall since they form part of the Iraqi security structure. They threaten to disrupt the delicate balancing act of a prime minister who has tried to placate the armed groups pushing for an expedited U.S. departure at the same time as working to mollify other constituencies, like the Kurds, Sunni Arabs and some Shiites, who fear an even greater Iranian presence in the event that the U.S. leaves abruptly.

Pressured by Iran-aligned parties, on whose support it depends, the Sudani government has moved forward with attempts to terminate the mandate of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq. These efforts intensified after U.S. retaliatory attacks extended beyond strikes on pro-Iranian armed groups to targets closer to the government. U.S. drones hit Hilla city on 26 December and Baghdad on 4 January, causing casualties not only among these groups, but also in the Hashd and federal police forces. The government, which until then had defended the partnership with the U.S., condemned it for violating Iraqi sovereignty and launched talks with the Biden administration to phase out the international coalition. If its slow-moving efforts, which neither side appears keen to accelerate, succeed, they could also undermine the international legal basis for the presence of U.S. troops in Syria, since the principal U.S. justification for military operations there is the defence of Iraq from ISIS.

Irans second strategic objective is to expand its own footprint in eastern Syria, which it uses as a gateway to the Levant, funnelling arms to Hizbollah in Lebanon as a means of deterring Israel. Its main goal in this regard would be U.S. withdrawal from al-Tanf, which sits on a major highway between Iraq and Syria and represents a significant obstacle to Iranian power projection. While the al-Tanf base does not block Iranian movement of troops and materiel across Syria as such, the base and its surrounding 55km deconfliction zone prohibits the entry of U.S. opponents and counters Irans ability to establish a permanent presence that connects its strategic hubs in eastern Syria with those in the south of the country.

Irans third strategic objective is to rehabilitate the Syrian government. To this end, it seeks to destabilise SDF rule in northern and eastern Syria. Co-opting Arab tribes, particularly in areas with major oil and gas deposits, may allow Iran to build up a support base that could enable Syrian government forces, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, to retake the most valuable part of eastern Syria without a fight.

At the same time, the latest round of violence in eastern Syria has exposed the limits to what Iran can do there. It has highlighted the absence of a capable local proxy force comparable to its allies in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. To compensate for this limitation, it has relied on a division of labour between foreign and local groups to do its bidding, but this approach has seen only partial success. Tehran has been able to stir up Syrian Arab militias against the SDF, and these groups have served to undermine the already tenuous control and legitimacy of the Kurdish-led administration in a resource-rich and predominantly Arab tribal region, while wearing down the SDFs forces with skirmishes across the Euphrates. But these militias still lack infrastructure, organisation and materiel, and the lack of ideological alignment between the militias and Iran also makes them unlikely candidates for a full-blown partnership like that of Iranian clients elsewhere.

To put pressure on the U.S., Iran still relies heavily on groups from outside Syria, particularly those belonging to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. But this gambit is risky. Any serious escalation in eastern Syria involving these Iraqi groups risks U.S. retaliation on Iraqi soil, whereas relying on a Syrian proxy force to conduct attacks on U.S. bases would contain the conflict within Syrias borders. Worsening conflict could have serious knock-on effects on Irans partners and interests in Iraq, as well as jeopardise that countrys hard-won but fragile stability a scenario that interestingly is as unpalatable for Tehran as it is for Washington.

For the U.S., Irans pursuit of its strategic objectives could compromise its position in eastern Syria. Retaliation for the Tower 22 attack appears to have been partially successful in deterring attacks, as shown by the Iran-aligned armed groups decision to tone down attacks. The new status quo nevertheless remains precarious. The relative calm in the attacks aftermath yielded to alarm at the threat of a wider regional conflagration following Israels 1 April strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which prompted Irans first-ever direct attack on Israel on 13-14 April. Washington moved to de-escalate, helping reduce tensions once more. But events in Gaza, or intensified Israeli attacks on Iranian assets in Syria, could trigger a new round of escalation in eastern Syria. Iran-aligned groups are primed to continue harassing U.S. troops in Syria in either eventuality, although possibly in ways that do not expose these groups and Iranian interests to violent retribution.

Iran-aligned groups are primed to continue harassing U.S. troops in Syria in either eventuality, although possibly in ways that do not expose these groups and Iranian interests to violent retribution.

Likewise, the tribal groups campaign against the SDF, which in contrast to attacks on U.S. troops carries little risk of retaliation for Iran, will almost certainly continue and may even accelerate. A progressively weaker SDF will leave U.S. bases in the most resource-rich areas of eastern Syria the oil and gas fields east of al-Mayadeen and Deir al-Zor in an increasingly hostile environment in which they would find their presence difficult to sustain.

There are things that could help lower the temperature in the area. Reaching a durable ceasefire in Gaza would almost certainly help slow the anti-U.S. momentum across the region that Iran and its allies are exploiting, as evidenced by Iran-backed groups cessation of hostilities during the temporary halt in hostilities in November. A truce would also improve the climate for negotiations over the U.S. presence in Iraq. But Washington would also be well advised to pay attention to the condition of the SDF, particularly in the triangle south of the M7 highway, which connects Deir al-Zor to Syrias northeast, with its significant hydrocarbon deposits. The U.S. should apply pressure on its partner to address the grievances of the local Arab population that have made some of its members vulnerable to co-optation by Iran. It may need to mediate between the Arabs and the SDF, as it did in September 2023, when it brokered an end to intense clashes triggered by the SDFs arrest of a tribal leader. Both the U.S. and the SDF should also give serious consideration to the areas future, and do some contingency planning. Despite the Biden administrations clear intent to maintain the U.S. military presence in Syria, U.S. politics remain unpredictable. A precipitous U.S. withdrawal would leave the SDF dangerously exposed to assault by Trkiye and/or the Syrian government, potentially initiating a new round of violence in Syrias volatile east.

Read more:
How Iran Seeks to Exploit the Gaza War in Syrias Volatile East - Crisis Group

Many Western leaders press allies and partners not to hit back hard when their enemies attack. After the foiled Iranian attack on Israel last month, for example, U.S. President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to take the win instead of retaliating. Ukraine has been similarly pressured by its Western supporters not to strike targets in Russiasuch as oil refinerieseven if their unobstructed functioning directly aids Russia on the battlefield. Restraint has become the Wests guiding strategic principle, seemingly preserving a modicum of international stability by keeping wars from escalating out of control.

Many Western leaders press allies and partners not to hit back hard when their enemies attack. After the foiled Iranian attack on Israel last month, for example, U.S. President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to take the win instead of retaliating. Ukraine has been similarly pressured by its Western supporters not to strike targets in Russiasuch as oil refinerieseven if their unobstructed functioning directly aids Russia on the battlefield. Restraint has become the Wests guiding strategic principle, seemingly preserving a modicum of international stability by keeping wars from escalating out of control.

Even if Israel and Ukraine dont heed them, such requests to practice restraint are dangerous. They incentivize the attacker to be more aggressive, not less. By conveying to Russia or Iranand by extension, Chinathat Western partners will be pressed to absorb the attack and fight a strictly defensive war on their own territory, Western policymakers achieve the opposite of what their risk aversion intends: They elevate the risk of a widening war. They are making aggression relatively cost-free for imperial powers, to be fought only on the attacked countrys land or thwarted by expensive defensive means. Paradoxically, restraining allies that have been attacked is destabilizing; the Western attempt to control escalation ultimately makes it more likely.

Take, for example, the recent case of Irans onslaught on Israel. Deterrence clearly failed as Iran directly attacked Israel for the first time using a substantial and layered package of missiles and drones. Iran chose to attack despite a standing Israeli policy to punish every attack on its territory and citizensand despite the effective denial technologies fielded by Israel. It was the largest drone and missile attack in recent history, more substantial than anything Russia has launched against Ukraine in a single night.

But whereas deterrence failed, Irans missiles and drones were almost completely intercepted by Israel with the aid of the United States, Britain, France, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Only a few missiles fell on two Israeli air bases, causing minimal damage; one civilian was wounded by shrapnel in the Negev desert. Such a failure should cause relief and be a source of celebration. After all, what could have been horrific devastation in Israel turned into an embarrassing turkey shoot for Iran. Punishment for such a failed attack, the argument goes, was not warranted: Defense was a success, the strategic interaction was over. Restraint ought to prevail.

Undoubtedly, the restraint advocated by many in the West is appealing. It may bestow a veneer of moral superiority to a country willing to suffer attacks without responding in kind. Tit-for-tat, after all, seems childish, and revenge even worse. In the case of a successful defense such as Israels interception of Irans missiles, retaliation may even look unnecessary.

But erecting the air defense necessary to deny such attacks comes at great cost, and the shield is not perfect. The resources necessary to develop, deploy, and operate a complex, multilayered defensive system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones are substantial. Irans attack probably cost it around $100 million, whereas the bill for Israels defense during that single night probably reached something in the $1 billion range. Israel is estimated to have incurred more than half of these costs, with most of the rest borne by the United States. The fiscal equation clearly favors the attacker.

Beyond the sheer expense, there is the unquantifiable cost in potentially greater insecurity. The more successfully a defensive system protects a countryeven as it fails to deter the attacker in the first placethe less credible the threat of punishing retaliation will be. This invites the attacker to strike again, while the defender is pressured to absorb the attacks without responding in kind. Given how cheap drones and even ballistic missiles have become, Iran can seek to saturate Israeli defenses and increase the likelihood that missiles get through. Alternatively, too many attacks could bankrupt the target. And yet, Biden seems to think that one failed Iranian attack will deter further assaults. Israel demonstrated a remarkable capacity to defend against and defeat even unprecedented attacks, he said in a statement, sending a clear message to its foes that they cannot effectively threaten the security of Israel.

The Biden administrations approach to Russias attack on Ukraine is analogous. U.S. defense official Celeste Wallander recently said that Ukraine holds itself to the highest standards of observing the laws of armed conflict. Although the laws of war say no such thing, the administration considers Russian oil refineries out of bounds for Ukraine to strike, with the Ukrainians supposed to limit themselves to the exchange of fire on the front line. Behind the moralizing, the administration seeks to control any escalatory dynamics by holding the Ukrainians backalbeit not entirely successfully. The logic or hope behind this reasoning is that a restrained Ukraine will limit Russian escalation and contain the war. A more aggressive Ukraine that strikes deep inside Russia, or so this argument goes, will only result in greater Russian escalation against Ukraine and perhaps even against countries supporting Ukraine. The unmistakable message to Moscow is that Washington and other Western capitals would rather see Ukraine under military duress than Russia under attack. The same thing holds for the red lines the West imposes not on Ukraine but on itselfGerman Chancellor Olaf Scholz refusing to provide Ukraine with Taurus long-range cruise missiles, for exampleall of which emboldens Russia even further.

The Biden administrations obsession with restraining front-line allies and partners is misplaced. Taking offensive actions off the tableby not providing the appropriate weapons, by sending them under the strict condition that they only be used on Ukraines territory, or by telling Israel to take the winis highly likely to produce the opposite of the intended effect. By limiting Russias and Irans risks and costs, it lowers the bar for further aggression.

The repercussions of this faulty Western understanding of escalation go far beyond Europe and the Middle East. With its pressure on Israel and Ukraine, Washington is sending a signal to China that a potential attack on Taiwan will be met only by defensive measures such as intercepting incoming missiles and that force will only be wielded along a thin line of contact. Maybe Taiwan will be told to take the win if not much damage is done in an initial Chinese strike or that the highest standards require it to refrain from striking Chinese ports or logistical nodes.

It is dangerous to believe that a regional equilibrium will be maintained simply by pouring a lot of money into defensive systems and denial technologies. Front-line states must have the abilityand support of their alliesto strike the enemy behind the apparent safety of its borders and not just absorb its attacks. For deterrence to be restored or strengthened, these states have to be able to retaliate with offensive actions.

Stability does not arise exclusively out of the ability to parry the enemys blows, but out of the credible promise of hurting him back.

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Biden's Escalation Fears on Russia and Iran Have Dangerous Consequences - Foreign Policy