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The Saudi ceasefire initiative in Yemen will not be approved by the Houthis. There is no surprise there. The Houthis view their own position and the regional situation through Iranian eyes. They are satisfied with what meets Iranian interests and opposed to whatever is inconsistent with those interests.

And since Iran has used the war in Yemen as a card to pressure the United States, because of the danger that the Houthi military movement poses to American interests, it is neither acceptable nor permissible from their standpoint for the Yemeni crisis to be handled in a way that serves all Yemeni parties, including the Houthi side itself, which will certainly not come out as a loser from any negotiations between Yemenis.

The problem with the Houthis is that they identify their interests with those of Iran. They even put these ahead of their own, as they are ideology-driven. They look at their cause in terms of sectarian expediency even if it separates them from others, not in terms of national necessity that unites them with other parties. Therefore, they do not see compliance with Iranian dictates as a deviation from their principles.

However, there is an obstacle that the Houthis will face when they eventually declare their categorical rejection of the Saudi initiative. It is the fact that the initiative has received the blessing of the largest part of the international community, from which Iran is seeking to concessions in a new nuclear agreement.

The international community has become more convinced than before of the need to end the war in Yemen. That is not because of the humanitarian motives which the Houthis advance publicly while working to end the arms embargo, but rather because of genuine world concern at the fate of people in Yemen, who are on the edge of the abyss if they have not fallen into it already.

The United States and the European Union are convinced of the need to end the war. Realising this, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia cut to the chase and announced its peace initiative that removes the Iranian cover from he Houthis. It would also put them in direct confrontation with the world. It is not unlikely that the international community will impose a peace settlement on Yemen, as it has in Libya. Will the Houthis be able to confront the world militarily, for example?

The Houthis, having fallen into the ideological pit that ensured them supplies of Iranian money and weapons throughout the years of their war, cannot think rationally in a way that would guarantee their future within a national framework that brings together all Yemeni parties.

They are just a sectarian gang that was previously defeated in six wars. They have more than once violated signed agreements and continued to do so, taking advantage of the chaos of the Arab spring that led to the collusion of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh whom they later killed. This gang has fought over for many years in defence of Irans interests, acting as Tehrans proxy on the Red Sea.

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Iran and not peace is what matters for Houthis | | AW - The Arab Weekly

As the Middle East splits into three power axes Turkey, Iran, and Israel and its Arab partners this is an opportunity for Israel to close ranks against Iran. But to do so properly, it needs Turkey. And the time is now ripe for Turkish-Israeli reconciliation, for a myriad of reasons.

First, while Turkey and Iran are not enemies, emerging policy incongruencies in the Caucasus, Iraq, and Syria have considerably chilled bilateral relations.

Secondly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is already sending signals to Israel that he wants torekindle ties with the Jewish state. Israel would have leverage should it respond to Turkish overtures, which come from a point of weakness, in large measure due to Americas coldposture towards Erdogan under President Joe Bidens administration.

Thirdly, reestablishing robust diplomatic ties now would further isolate Iran as it jockeys to maximize its position ahead of negotiations regarding its nuclear file. A more united regional front would further cast Iran as a destabilizing pariah state.

Finally, Israel could achieve ancillary national security objectives here: namely, that Turkey rein insupportfor Hamas; that Turkey deescalatetensions in the eastern Mediterranean, where lucrative natural gas findings are in jeopardy due to Turkish belligerence, and that Turkey reverse policies that haveprevented Israels further integration with NATO.

Though Erdogan is indicating his willingness to normalize and hasappointedan ambassador to Israel after a two-year absence, so far, the Jewish state has unflinchingly rejected those overtures, notwithstanding assessments by Israeli intelligence and military brass that Turkey is now anemerging threat.

Israel cites Erdogans continued allowance of Hamas militants on its soil as a red line. Hosting Hamas is understandably problematic as are concerns about possible Turkish opportunism and insincerity given Erdogans multitudinoustiradesagainst Israel and Turkeys pliable relationship with Iran.

But Israels current priority is Iran, its nuclear and precision missile program, and its primary auxiliary force inHezbollah.

If Israels message to the U.S. and the international community is that it will actunilaterally against Iran, then actively engaging Turkey without President Biden moving first is aligned with such messaging. While strategic patience may be appealing to the U.S., Israel should seize the mood of theAbraham Accords to normalize with Turkey, as this window of opportunity may close given the ever-shifting political landscape of the Middle East.

Normalization may require some modest reciprocation in return for Israeli demands. Given the lack of Turkish leverage, demands in this regard would probably neither be prohibitive nor outweigh the likely strategic advantage gained to Israel.

Revisiting talks regardingenergy cooperation cooperation that will not disrupt Israels existing partnerships in the eastern Mediterranean and exploring humanitarian initiatives to improve life for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, an issue of special concern for Erdogan and his political base back home, would likely suffice.

Given its unique historical role and current hard power projection in the region, Turkey will have an independent Middle East policy for the foreseeable future.

It is far-fetched to assume Turkey would ever subordinate its interests to that of the "Israeli-Gulf" axis or dedicate military assets to defending this axis against Iran. Iran is not a direct threat to Turkey, and as bordering states with longstanding ties, the two countries are strong partners intrade and in discrete areas of security such ascounteringKurdish separatist movements.

Having said that, recent events demonstrate a more confrontational dynamic between Turkey and Iran that can be exploited.

In 2020, Turkeys militarykilled scores of Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed fighters in Syrias Idlib province, the Syrian rebel enclave and military redoubt that stands in opposition to the Syrian regime and its Iranian sponsor.

More recently, affiliated Iranian-backed Iraqi militiasthreatenedTurkey for its perceived occupation of Iraqi territory and envoys from both Iran and Turkey weresummoned to their respective offices regarding policydivergences now developing in Iraqi Kurdistan. These Iranian-backed militias, which Israel infrequently attacks along the Syrian border, arecooperating with Turkeys outlawed terrorist enemy, the Kurdistan Workers Party, known as the PKK.

Moreover, Turkey and Iran sat on opposing sides to the 2020Nagarno-Karabakhconflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the latter an ally of Iran. Turkey, and notably, Israeli support to Azerbaijan, mainly in the form ofdrone assistance, rendered this war a one-sided affair in favor of Azerbaijan.

Turkeys increased influence in the Caucasus istroublingfor Iran as the flames of Azeriseparatism in Irans north was stoked by the war between their co-Turkic brethren in Azerbaijan a Shia dominant but relatively secular country that has ties to both Israel and Turkey and an unsteady relationship with Iran. Azerbaijan has offered tomediatetalks between Israel and Turkey to assist in normalization efforts.

Normalization could foment a shift in Turkey, amilitary powerhouse, so that it leans towards the "Israel-Gulf" axis as it applies to the burgeoning regional security architecture taking shape as America recedes from the Middle East. Israel should proceed cautiously, with the knowledge that Turkey needs allies friendly to the U.S. to curry favor with President Biden and that it continues to support the Muslim Brotherhood and offshoots such as Hamas.

Nonetheless, given the unacceptable risk Iran poses to Israel, the shared interest between Turkey and Israel in containing Iran, and the significant issues that can be resolved to Israels benefit through normalization, it would behoove the Jewish State to explore renewing relations, and soon, with its erstwhile ally.

Nicholas Saidel is the Associate Director of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis & Response (ISTAR). Twitter:@nicksaidel

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Israel needs a reset with Turkey to contain Iran - Haaretz

GlobalDatas latest report, Middle East Oil and Gas Projects Outlook to 2025 Development Stage, Capacity, Capex and Contractor Details of All New Build and Expansion Projects indicates that Middle East is expected to witness 615 oil and gas projects to commence operations during the period 2021-2025. Out of these, upstream projects would be 77, midstream would be 143, refinery at 83 and petrochemical would the highest with 312 projects respectively.

Refinery and petrochemical projects together constitute about 64 percent of all upcoming oil and gas projects in the Middle East during 20212025. Midstream sector follows next, with the pipeline segment alone constituting 41 percent of all projects followed by gas processing and oil storage with 22 percent each.

New build projects lead the upcoming projects landscape in the Middle East constituting around 75 percent of the total projects across the value chain. The share of new build projects is especially high in the petrochemicals sector with more than 90 percent. On the other hand, expansion projects dominate the downstream (refineries) sector.

In the Middle East, nearly half of the projects are in construction and commissioning stages and are more likely to commence operations during the outlook period. About 37 percent of the projects are in the planning stages and the rest have been approved or awaiting approval.

Among countries, Iran dominates the upcoming projects landscape in the Middle East accounting for 43 percent of the total projects expected to start operations during the 2021 to 2025 period. However, it remains to be seen how many of these projects actually start operations in the outlook period.

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Iran leads upcoming projects starts across oil and gas value chain in Middle East by 2025 - Offshore Technology

Through pandemics, wars and disasters, the ancient Zoroastrian festival of Nowruz, or New Day in Farsi, has been celebrated continuously for over 3,000 years, predating the regions Muslim conquest. Some 300 million people in Iran and beyond gather around tables replete with ancient symbols of renewal, prosperity and luck: green wheat sprouts, apples, gold coins and oranges or goldfish in bowls of water.

This week, throngs of mask-clad shoppers packed the metro and jockeyed to buy last-minute gifts and sweets at Tehran's storied Grand Bazaar. In the northern Tajrish Square, vendors hawked candles and flowers, calling out wishes for a joyous new year. Even as the infection rates have dropped from peaks reached last fall, the crowded scenes pointed to pandemic fatigue and public intransigence rather than national recovery, especially as Irans vaccine rollout lags.

Still waiting for big shipments from COVAX, the global initiative to provide doses to low- and middle-income countries, Iran so far has inoculated only several thousand health care and front-line workers. Around a hundred people continue to die of COVID-19 each day, according to government statistics. Daily infection counts have hovered at around 8,000 since the discovery of a fast-spreading variant earlier this year.

Many in Iran find the seasonal symbols on their Nowruz tables in increasingly short supply. Hopes for a rapid return to the nuclear deal are dimming as the Biden administration, grappling with congressional opposition, a litany of higher priorities and pressure to wring more concessions from Iran, refuses to lift sanctions. The U.S. insists that Iran come back into compliance with the nuclear accord first.

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A New Year in Iran, but the country's crises remain the same - North Platte Telegraph

BAGHDAD--Qatar has quickly moved to take advantage of the greater diplomatic margin of manoeuvre created by the Al-Ula summit to enter a race with other Gulf nations for closer ties with Iraq driven by different or conflicting intentions and calculations.

The visit of Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Muhammad bin Abdulrahman Al Thani to Baghdad Wednesday and his meeting with the top Iraqi leaders marked a step in towards exploiting the new diplomatic wiggle room enjoyed by Doha, especially because, in contrast to other Arab Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Qatars relationship with Iran makes it immune to the threat of a push-back by Iranian-backed Iraqi political groups.

Saudi Arabia had established contact with Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, and sent its foreign minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan to Baghdad last year. But the Saudi move was opposed by hard-line pro-Iranian militias. This complicated the Saudi overtures to Baghdad after thirty years of diplomatic rift following the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990.

Qatar however sees Iraq as a prime strategic intersection between regional interests, as Iranians, Turks, Americans and a number of Arab countries compete for influence in a nation that has not yet overcome the repercussions of 2003 US invasion.

Although presented as driven by economic objectives, the latest Qatari move has been widely seen as part and parcel of the Gulf race for influence in Iraq amid the new climate created by the fresh strategic approach of the US Biden administration towards the region.

A Saudi source told The Arab Weekly that Riyadh will not view the Qatari move towards Iraq with great satisfaction.

The Qataris are taking advantage of the space they see available. They are also exploiting Iranian silence and Turkish encouragement, he added, on condition of anonymity. All these are not comforting factors for Saudi Arabia.

The Qatari foreign minister agreed with his Iraqi counterpart, Fuad Hussein, to activate a joint committee for economic cooperation between the two countries. He then headed to Kurdistan in northern Iraq to meet Kurdish leaders.

The Arab Gulf overtures towards Iraq have been met by warmly by Iraqi officials. But the Iraqi public is still awaiting promised tangible benefits from the economic and investment deals by Riyadh and Doha.

Iraqis believe that most of the agreements reached with Saudi Arabia and Qatar are still ink on paper. The general perception is that the failure to implement the various agreements is due to Iranian pressures on the Iraqi government and the opposition of some pro-Iranian political factions to Baghdads rapprochement with its Arab Gulf neighbours.

An Iraqi MP attributed the silence of the Iraqi authorities over their reluctance to carry out Saudi and Qatari projects in Iraq to the Iranian attitudes. These shackle the ability of Iraq to promote its interests with Arab countries, with whom Iran has no inclination to cooperate.

The MP, who declined to be named, doubted that Qatars projects in Iraq would meet a better fate than those of Saudi Arabia, even if Doha believes it enjoys a strategic edge over other Arab Gulf countries when it comes to Iran.

He explained that for Tehran even a partial move of Iraq away from Iranian economic domination could lead to a total detachment from that domination. That kind of shift would seriously damage the Iranian economy, which is still suffering from the impact of US sanctions.

Even if there is room for optimism that Iran could become more responsive to the demands of the international community, the political prospects in Iraq are blurred by the uncertainties surrounding the forthcoming elections and the political shifts that might result from them.

Saudi Arabia and Qatar have previously announced large economic investments in the Badia of Samawah and the Anbar desert, but no start dates have yet been announced.

We discussed the resumption of the work of the joint committee for economic cooperation between Qatar and Iraq as soon as possible, and it was agreed to activate the work of the committee, said the Qatari foreign minister during a press conference held with his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein in Baghdad.

He pointed out that he had held fruitful meetings with Iraqi President Barham Salih and had handed him a written message from the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, which included an official invitation to visit Doha. He also met Kadhimi, and said afterwards there had been a similarity of views about the regional situation between the two countries.

Fuad Hussein said during the press conference that his country will work to activate the Iraqi-Qatari joint committee in charge of economic issues, adding that Iraq will implement all agreements between the two countries.

Iraq and Qatar had agreed in 2013 to form a joint higher committee for political, security, economic, social and cultural coordination. But after ISIS took control of a third of Iraqi territory in 2014, the meetings between the two countries came to a stand still.

Until this week, Sheikh Muhammads January 2020 trip to Iraq was the last Qatari ministerial visit. Sheikh Muhammad worked on that occasion to de-escalate tensions in the region, following the US assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani on January 3, 2020, near Baghdad International Airport.

Iraqi President Barham Salih has emphasised that, The countries of the region bear a great responsibility to overcome the crises and to move beyond the tensions through dialogue, and adopting a political path to resolve the problems of the region,.

During his meeting with the Qatari foreign minister, President Salih called for efforts to ensure regional stability, confront terrorism and extremist ideologies and boost opportunities for economic and commercial cooperation and development.

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Qatar leverages Gulf reconciliation, Iran ties in a race for influence in Iraq | | AW - The Arab Weekly