Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

Biden admin lauds talks on readmitting US to Iran nuke deal – Associated Press

WASHINGTON (AP) The Biden administration on Thursday welcomed a European Union announcement that the participants in the Iran nuclear deal will meet this week to discuss a possible return of the United States to the 2015 accord.

Fridays virtual meeting of officials from Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia and Iran comes as the U.S. is exploring ways to rejoin the deal that former President Donald Trump withdrew from in 2018. The State Department praised the meeting and said it would be watched closely by U.S. officials.

We obviously welcome this as a positive step and thats precisely because we have been clear for weeks now that we are ready to pursue a return to compliance with our (nuclear deal) commitments consistent with Iran also doing the same, spokesman Ned Price said. Its a positive step, especially if it moves the ball forward on that mutual return to compliance that weve talked about for a number of weeks now.

Earlier Thursday, the EU said one of its top diplomats, Enrique Mora, would chair the meeting. Participants will discuss the prospect of a possible return of the United States to the (nuclear deal) and how to ensure the full and effective implementation of the agreement by all sides, it said.

President Joe Biden has said the U.S. will to return to the deal if Iran comes back into compliance with it. Thus far, Iran has refused to entertain the offer unless the U.S. rescinds sanctions that Trump imposed on it. Iran already rejected an EU proposal for a meeting that included the United States. That proposal came in response to a Biden administration statement that it would accept an invitation to attend such talks.

Meanwhile, the State Department said it had extended a waiver that allows Iraq to continue to buy power from Iran without being subject to U.S. sanctions. penalties. The waiver was renewed for 120 days, an increase in shorter extensions that had become commonplace during the Trump administration.

Price said the extension was granted because of progress Iraq is making in developing its own electricity generation to reduce its reliance on outside sources of power. U.S. and Iraqi officials are resuming a strategic dialogue soon that places energy near the top of priorities and Washington hopes will ultimately allow Iraq to develop its energy self-sufficiency, and we hope to end its reliance on Iran, Price said.

In the interim, renewal of the sanctions waiver is appropriate, until the agreement and development of the Iraqi energy sector can be fully realized and implemented., he said. Price added that the U.S. believed the four-month extension was long enough for Iraq to take meaningful action to promote energy self-sufficiency and to reduce its dependence on expensive Iranian energy.

The Trump administration had only reluctantly approved such extensions because they ran counter to its maximum pressure campaign on Iran. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo had been granting the waivers but reducing their length to push Iraq to wean itself from Iranian electricity.

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Biden admin lauds talks on readmitting US to Iran nuke deal - Associated Press

Israels Shadow War With Iran Moves Out to Sea – The New York Times

JERUSALEM The sun was rising on the Mediterranean one recent morning when the crew of an Iranian cargo ship heard an explosion. The ship, the Shahr e Kord, was about 50 miles off the coast of Israel, and from the bridge they saw a plume of smoke rising from one of the hundreds of containers stacked on deck.

The state-run Iranian shipping company said the vessel had been heading to Spain and called the explosion a terrorist act.

But the attack on the Shahr e Kord this month was just one of the latest salvos in a long-running covert conflict between Israel and Iran. An Israeli official said the attack was retaliation for an Iranian assault on an Israeli cargo ship last month.

Since 2019, Israel has been attacking ships carrying Iranian oil and weapons through the eastern Mediterranean and Red Seas, opening a new maritime front in a regional shadow war that had previously played out by land and in the air.

Iran appears to have quietly responded with its own clandestine attacks. The latest came on Thursday afternoon, when an Israeli-owned container ship, the Lori, was hit by an Iranian missile in the Arabian Sea, an Israeli official said. No casualties or significant damage were reported.

The Israeli campaign, confirmed by American, Israeli and Iranian officials, has become a linchpin of Israels effort to curb Irans military influence in the Middle East and stymie Iranian efforts to circumvent American sanctions on its oil industry.

But the conflicts expansion risks the escalation of what has been a relatively limited tit-for-tat, and it further complicates efforts by the Biden administration to persuade Iran to reintroduce limits on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief.

This is a full-fledged cold war that risks turning hot with a single mistake, said Ali Vaez, Iran program director at the International Crisis Group, a Brussels-based research organization. Were still in an escalatory spiral that risks getting out of control.

Since 2019, Israeli commandos have attacked at least 10 ships carrying Iranian cargo, according to an American official and a former senior Israeli official. The real number of targeted ships may be higher than 20, according to an Iranian Oil Ministry official, an adviser to the ministry and an oil trader.

The Israeli attacks were first reported by The Wall Street Journal.

Most of the ships were carrying fuel from Iran to its ally Syria, and two carried military equipment, according to an American official and two senior Israeli officials. An American official and an Israeli official said the Shahr e Kord was carrying military equipment toward Syria.

The Israeli government declined to comment.

The extent of Irans retaliation is unclear. Most of the attacks are carried out clandestinely and with no public claims of responsibility.

The Israeli ship attacked last month was a car freighter, the Helios Ray, carrying several thousand German-made cars to China.

As the ship rounded the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow passage off the coast of Iran, a speedboat that had been trailing in its wake accelerated, zipping alongside the freighter. Commandos affixed two timed explosives to the port side of the ship, a meter above the water, according to a person with knowledge of the subsequent investigation.

Twenty minutes later the explosives ripped two holes in the hull.

Several tankers were similarly attacked in the Red Sea last fall and winter, actions some officials attributed to the Houthis, an Iran-backed rebel movement in Yemen.

Iran has denied involvement in all of these attacks which, like the Israeli ones, appeared intended not to sink the ships but to send a message.

You attack us here, well attack you there, said Gheis Ghoreishi, a political analyst who has advised Irans Foreign Ministry on Middle Eastern affairs. Iran and Israel are bringing their covert war to the open waters.

The long-running shadow war between Israel and Iran has accelerated in recent years. Iran has been arming and financing militias throughout the region, notably in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Gaza and Lebanon, where it supports Hezbollah, a Shiite militia and political movement that is a longtime enemy of Israel.

Israel has tried to counter Irans power play by launching regular airstrikes on Iranian shipments by land and air of arms and other cargo to Syria and Lebanon. Those attacks have made those routes riskier and shifted at least some of the weapons transit, and the conflict, to the sea, analysts said.

Israel has also sought to undermine Irans nuclear program through assassinations and sabotage on Iranian soil, and both sides are accused of cyberattacks, including a failed Iranian attack on an Israeli municipal water system last April and a retaliatory Israeli strike on a major Iranian port.

Irans Quds force was blamed for a bomb that exploded near Israels embassy in New Delhi in January. And 15 militants linked to Iran were arrested last month in Ethiopia for plotting to attack Israeli, American and Emirati targets.

The sum is an undeclared conflict that neither side wants to escalate into frontal combat.

Neither Israel nor Iran want to publicly take responsibility for the attacks because doing so would be an act of war with military consequences, Hossein Dalirian, a military analyst affiliated with Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, told The New York Times in a Clubhouse discussion on Thursday. But attacks against ships at this level could not happen without a state behind it.

We are at war but with our lights off, he added.

The dynamic complicates already fraught efforts by the Biden administration to reconstruct the 2015 nuclear deal that imposed limits on Irans nuclear enrichment program in exchange for sanctions relief. President Donald J. Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018, reinstating those sanctions and imposing a raft of new ones.

It jacks up the political price that the Biden administration would have to pay to provide the Iranians with any kind of economic reprieve, Mr. Vaez said. If Iran is engaged in this kind of tit for tat with Israel, while also putting pressure on American presence in the region, it makes restoring the deal much more difficult.

Analysts say that Iran wants to continue to needle Israel and to arm and support its Middle Eastern allies, both to surround Israel with well-armed proxies and to give Iran a stronger hand in any future nuclear negotiations.

Israels leadership believes the previous nuclear deal was insufficient and would like to scuttle any chance of resurrecting a similar pact. An Israeli official said the attacks were part of a broader strategy to strong-arm Tehran into agreeing to tougher and longer curbs on its nuclear ambitions, as well as restrictions on its ballistic missile program and its support for regional militias.

That campaign, The Times previously reported, also included an Israeli attack on a major Iranian nuclear site in July and the assassination of Irans top nuclear scientist last November. Israel has not publicly acknowledged either operation.

The Israeli offensive against Iranian shipping has two goals, analysts and officials said. The first is to prevent Tehran from sending equipment to Lebanon to help Hezbollah build a precision missile program, which Israel considers a strategic threat.

The second is to dry up an important source of oil revenue for Tehran, building on the pressure American sanctions have inflicted. After the United States imposed sanctions on Irans fuel industry in late 2018, the Iranian government became more reliant on clandestine shipping.

The attacks were carried out by Flotilla 13, an elite commando unit of the Israeli Navy that has been involved in clandestine operations since the early years of the Israeli state, according to the two Israeli officials and the American official.

Israeli officials said that two of the ships it attacked were transporting equipment for Hezbollahs missile program.

One, they said, was carrying an industrial planetary mixer, a device used to make solid rocket fuel for missiles. The device was meant to replace an older mixer that was destroyed in an Israeli airstrike on Beirut in August 2019, the Israeli officials said.

Previous Israeli airstrikes on Iranian convoys and cargo in Syria also targeted equipment for making guided missiles.

The tankers targeted by Israel were carrying Iranian oil to Syria, contravening American sanctions and most likely worth hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Israeli officials said that Syria paid Iran in cash or by providing logistical assistance to Syrian-based members of Irans Quds Force, a branch of the Revolutionary Guards, and to Hezbollah.

President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, also under sanctions, is in dire need of oil. Iran, its economy decimated by American sanctions, needs cash. Hezbollah has also been hit hard by the severe economic and political crisis in Lebanon and a cyberattack on its financial system.

The Israeli attacks are therefore a way to prevent Iran from selling to Syria, and getting money and giving it to Hezbollah, said Sima Shine, a former head of research at Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency.

The attacks typically feature limpet mines and sometimes torpedoes, the American official said. They generally target the ships engines or propellers, one Israeli official said. And they are intended to cripple but not sink the ships, the American and Israeli officials said.

The attacks escalated toward the end of 2020, as Mr. Trumps term drew to close. In response, Irans Revolutionary Guards began to discreetly escort the tankers through the Red Sea, before ships from Russia, an Iranian ally, accompanied them at a distance through the Mediterranean, the American official said.

The attack on the Shahr e Kord occurred when the Russian escort was far enough away for the Israelis to strike, the official added.

The effectiveness of the Israeli campaign is unclear. Some of the targeted ships were forced to return to Iran without delivering their cargo, the American official said.

The Iranians associated with the Iranian Oil Ministry said that in all cases the vessels sustained minor damage, the crews were not hurt and repairs were conducted within a few days.

The American and Israeli officials said there was no connection between the Israeli campaign and a recent oil spill that left tons of tar on the beaches of Israel and Lebanon.

Within Israel, there is concern among maritime experts that the cost of a sea war may exceed its benefit.

While the Israeli Navy can make its presence felt in the Mediterranean and Red Seas, it is less effective in waters closer to Iran. And that could make Israeli-owned ships more vulnerable to Iranian attacks as they pass Irans western shores on their way to ports in the Gulf, said Shaul Chorev, a retired Israeli admiral who now heads the Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center at the University of Haifa.

Israeli strategic interests in the Persian Gulf and related waterways will undoubtedly grow, he wrote in a statement, and the Israeli Navy does not have the capabilities to protect these interests.

Patrick Kingsley reported from Jerusalem, Ronen Bergman from Tel Aviv, Farnaz Fassihi from New York, and Eric Schmitt from Washington.

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Israels Shadow War With Iran Moves Out to Sea - The New York Times

Iran and not peace is what matters for Houthis | | AW – The Arab Weekly

The Saudi ceasefire initiative in Yemen will not be approved by the Houthis. There is no surprise there. The Houthis view their own position and the regional situation through Iranian eyes. They are satisfied with what meets Iranian interests and opposed to whatever is inconsistent with those interests.

And since Iran has used the war in Yemen as a card to pressure the United States, because of the danger that the Houthi military movement poses to American interests, it is neither acceptable nor permissible from their standpoint for the Yemeni crisis to be handled in a way that serves all Yemeni parties, including the Houthi side itself, which will certainly not come out as a loser from any negotiations between Yemenis.

The problem with the Houthis is that they identify their interests with those of Iran. They even put these ahead of their own, as they are ideology-driven. They look at their cause in terms of sectarian expediency even if it separates them from others, not in terms of national necessity that unites them with other parties. Therefore, they do not see compliance with Iranian dictates as a deviation from their principles.

However, there is an obstacle that the Houthis will face when they eventually declare their categorical rejection of the Saudi initiative. It is the fact that the initiative has received the blessing of the largest part of the international community, from which Iran is seeking to concessions in a new nuclear agreement.

The international community has become more convinced than before of the need to end the war in Yemen. That is not because of the humanitarian motives which the Houthis advance publicly while working to end the arms embargo, but rather because of genuine world concern at the fate of people in Yemen, who are on the edge of the abyss if they have not fallen into it already.

The United States and the European Union are convinced of the need to end the war. Realising this, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia cut to the chase and announced its peace initiative that removes the Iranian cover from he Houthis. It would also put them in direct confrontation with the world. It is not unlikely that the international community will impose a peace settlement on Yemen, as it has in Libya. Will the Houthis be able to confront the world militarily, for example?

The Houthis, having fallen into the ideological pit that ensured them supplies of Iranian money and weapons throughout the years of their war, cannot think rationally in a way that would guarantee their future within a national framework that brings together all Yemeni parties.

They are just a sectarian gang that was previously defeated in six wars. They have more than once violated signed agreements and continued to do so, taking advantage of the chaos of the Arab spring that led to the collusion of ousted President Ali Abdullah Saleh whom they later killed. This gang has fought over for many years in defence of Irans interests, acting as Tehrans proxy on the Red Sea.

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Iran and not peace is what matters for Houthis | | AW - The Arab Weekly

Israel needs a reset with Turkey to contain Iran – Haaretz

As the Middle East splits into three power axes Turkey, Iran, and Israel and its Arab partners this is an opportunity for Israel to close ranks against Iran. But to do so properly, it needs Turkey. And the time is now ripe for Turkish-Israeli reconciliation, for a myriad of reasons.

First, while Turkey and Iran are not enemies, emerging policy incongruencies in the Caucasus, Iraq, and Syria have considerably chilled bilateral relations.

Secondly, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is already sending signals to Israel that he wants torekindle ties with the Jewish state. Israel would have leverage should it respond to Turkish overtures, which come from a point of weakness, in large measure due to Americas coldposture towards Erdogan under President Joe Bidens administration.

Thirdly, reestablishing robust diplomatic ties now would further isolate Iran as it jockeys to maximize its position ahead of negotiations regarding its nuclear file. A more united regional front would further cast Iran as a destabilizing pariah state.

Finally, Israel could achieve ancillary national security objectives here: namely, that Turkey rein insupportfor Hamas; that Turkey deescalatetensions in the eastern Mediterranean, where lucrative natural gas findings are in jeopardy due to Turkish belligerence, and that Turkey reverse policies that haveprevented Israels further integration with NATO.

Though Erdogan is indicating his willingness to normalize and hasappointedan ambassador to Israel after a two-year absence, so far, the Jewish state has unflinchingly rejected those overtures, notwithstanding assessments by Israeli intelligence and military brass that Turkey is now anemerging threat.

Israel cites Erdogans continued allowance of Hamas militants on its soil as a red line. Hosting Hamas is understandably problematic as are concerns about possible Turkish opportunism and insincerity given Erdogans multitudinoustiradesagainst Israel and Turkeys pliable relationship with Iran.

But Israels current priority is Iran, its nuclear and precision missile program, and its primary auxiliary force inHezbollah.

If Israels message to the U.S. and the international community is that it will actunilaterally against Iran, then actively engaging Turkey without President Biden moving first is aligned with such messaging. While strategic patience may be appealing to the U.S., Israel should seize the mood of theAbraham Accords to normalize with Turkey, as this window of opportunity may close given the ever-shifting political landscape of the Middle East.

Normalization may require some modest reciprocation in return for Israeli demands. Given the lack of Turkish leverage, demands in this regard would probably neither be prohibitive nor outweigh the likely strategic advantage gained to Israel.

Revisiting talks regardingenergy cooperation cooperation that will not disrupt Israels existing partnerships in the eastern Mediterranean and exploring humanitarian initiatives to improve life for Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, an issue of special concern for Erdogan and his political base back home, would likely suffice.

Given its unique historical role and current hard power projection in the region, Turkey will have an independent Middle East policy for the foreseeable future.

It is far-fetched to assume Turkey would ever subordinate its interests to that of the "Israeli-Gulf" axis or dedicate military assets to defending this axis against Iran. Iran is not a direct threat to Turkey, and as bordering states with longstanding ties, the two countries are strong partners intrade and in discrete areas of security such ascounteringKurdish separatist movements.

Having said that, recent events demonstrate a more confrontational dynamic between Turkey and Iran that can be exploited.

In 2020, Turkeys militarykilled scores of Hezbollah and other Iranian-backed fighters in Syrias Idlib province, the Syrian rebel enclave and military redoubt that stands in opposition to the Syrian regime and its Iranian sponsor.

More recently, affiliated Iranian-backed Iraqi militiasthreatenedTurkey for its perceived occupation of Iraqi territory and envoys from both Iran and Turkey weresummoned to their respective offices regarding policydivergences now developing in Iraqi Kurdistan. These Iranian-backed militias, which Israel infrequently attacks along the Syrian border, arecooperating with Turkeys outlawed terrorist enemy, the Kurdistan Workers Party, known as the PKK.

Moreover, Turkey and Iran sat on opposing sides to the 2020Nagarno-Karabakhconflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, the latter an ally of Iran. Turkey, and notably, Israeli support to Azerbaijan, mainly in the form ofdrone assistance, rendered this war a one-sided affair in favor of Azerbaijan.

Turkeys increased influence in the Caucasus istroublingfor Iran as the flames of Azeriseparatism in Irans north was stoked by the war between their co-Turkic brethren in Azerbaijan a Shia dominant but relatively secular country that has ties to both Israel and Turkey and an unsteady relationship with Iran. Azerbaijan has offered tomediatetalks between Israel and Turkey to assist in normalization efforts.

Normalization could foment a shift in Turkey, amilitary powerhouse, so that it leans towards the "Israel-Gulf" axis as it applies to the burgeoning regional security architecture taking shape as America recedes from the Middle East. Israel should proceed cautiously, with the knowledge that Turkey needs allies friendly to the U.S. to curry favor with President Biden and that it continues to support the Muslim Brotherhood and offshoots such as Hamas.

Nonetheless, given the unacceptable risk Iran poses to Israel, the shared interest between Turkey and Israel in containing Iran, and the significant issues that can be resolved to Israels benefit through normalization, it would behoove the Jewish State to explore renewing relations, and soon, with its erstwhile ally.

Nicholas Saidel is the Associate Director of the Institute for Strategic Threat Analysis & Response (ISTAR). Twitter:@nicksaidel

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Israel needs a reset with Turkey to contain Iran - Haaretz

Iran leads upcoming projects starts across oil and gas value chain in Middle East by 2025 – Offshore Technology

GlobalDatas latest report, Middle East Oil and Gas Projects Outlook to 2025 Development Stage, Capacity, Capex and Contractor Details of All New Build and Expansion Projects indicates that Middle East is expected to witness 615 oil and gas projects to commence operations during the period 2021-2025. Out of these, upstream projects would be 77, midstream would be 143, refinery at 83 and petrochemical would the highest with 312 projects respectively.

Refinery and petrochemical projects together constitute about 64 percent of all upcoming oil and gas projects in the Middle East during 20212025. Midstream sector follows next, with the pipeline segment alone constituting 41 percent of all projects followed by gas processing and oil storage with 22 percent each.

New build projects lead the upcoming projects landscape in the Middle East constituting around 75 percent of the total projects across the value chain. The share of new build projects is especially high in the petrochemicals sector with more than 90 percent. On the other hand, expansion projects dominate the downstream (refineries) sector.

In the Middle East, nearly half of the projects are in construction and commissioning stages and are more likely to commence operations during the outlook period. About 37 percent of the projects are in the planning stages and the rest have been approved or awaiting approval.

Among countries, Iran dominates the upcoming projects landscape in the Middle East accounting for 43 percent of the total projects expected to start operations during the 2021 to 2025 period. However, it remains to be seen how many of these projects actually start operations in the outlook period.

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Iran leads upcoming projects starts across oil and gas value chain in Middle East by 2025 - Offshore Technology