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The race for the Islamic Republics 11th parliament is likely to turn into one of the most peculiar competitions ever, as most of the hopefuls fall under one political umbrella, with the rival side effectively pushed aside from the game.

After being swept away due to a widespread purge by the vetting body known as the Guardian Council,Irans Reformist camp initially announced reluctance to issue a list of candidates for such key constituencies as the capital, Tehran, and the central city of Isfahan.

The decision was made following a Feb. 4 meeting of the Reformist Camps Policymaking Supreme Council chaired by Mohammad Reza Aref, a senior Reformist politician who won the first seat in Tehran in the previous polls and earned the title of the parliament majority leader. Under past tradition, a selected group of prominent Reformist candidates would have been proposed to voters by MohammadKhatami the camps leader and former president (1997-2005) whose message of approval has often sparked a nationwide wave of support behind the endorsed hopefuls.

Despite the initial unwillingness and after days of deliberations, the top Reformist council released Feb. 15 a finalized list of 30 for the Tehran constituency from among the limited options it was left with. The alliance is led by Majid Ansari, a former deputy to Khatami and a current member of the Expediency Council. The Executives of Construction Party another key pro-Reform group affiliated with the late President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani issued a different grouping, but one that still has Ansari on the top.

Signs of deeper division were more obvious in the other front, where unlike Reformists, the conservatives are dealing with a crisis of overpopulation. The long list of candidates has, indeed, stirred up tough rivalries among different sectors of the camp. SHANA, a Persian acronym standing for the Council for the Coalition of Revolutionary Forces, as the core decision-making committee of the conservative campissued the names of the selected candidates Feb. 10. Topping the list was Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a powerful politician, who after three failed attemptsin previous presidential elections, appears to be aspiring to become Irans next parliament speaker. Unexpectedly, the SHANA alliance offered no room to hard-line candidates affiliated with ultraconservative cleric Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi.

The SHANA list categorized the candidates into veterans, women, clerics and young people. Still, the absence of such young candidates as Vahid Yaminpour sparked criticism. Yaminpour is affiliated with the Front of the Islamic Revolution Stability (known by its Persian name Paydari). The group is seen as the conservative camps most fundamentalist faction, whose rift with SHANA had already been laid bare in the preliminary debate on the endorsements.

SHANAs most influential figures such as former parliament speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad Adel and former Tehran city council chief Mehdi Chamran appeared to have openly disregarded the candidates linked with Paydari.

However, even Ghalibaf announced in a tweet his disapprovalof the SHANA list. His close aide Mohammad Saleh Meftah also dismissed the selection, which, in his view, failed to include not only young revolutionaries but also economic concerns. The names do not address the expectations, and lets not forget that Ghalibaf is the only one who can be the axis for a fresh list with revolutionary ideals. Meftah, who is the editor of the pro-Ghalibaf digital news outlet Farda News, said he believes that SHANA has named few candidates with an economic specialization.

And Ghalibafs tweet may have eventually worked, as SHANA revisedthe names. Yet the change was too little to persuade the Paydari hard-liners, who dug intheir heels and came out with their own list that excluded Ghalibaf.Shana now seems to have begun to understand that it is no longer widely recognized as the leading actor because it failed to rally camp members behind the flag, includingin recentpresidential, parliamentary and city council elections. This disappointing performance could now even sideline the traditional layers of the camp, opening up the path to a generation of younger faces with a more uncompromising approach compared withtheir forerunners.

But thats not where the pre-election strife among the conservatives comes to an end. A group of candidates affiliated with former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hasentered the battle as the Peoples Coalition. The factions Feb. 10 statement lent generous praise to the performance of the two Ahmadinejad Cabinets (2005-2013). Nevertheless, only three days later an Ahmadinejad adviser put closure to speculation bydeclaring that the ex-president has no intention of endorsing any individual candidate or alliance.

Ghalibaf surveying all these parameters at play as well as the absence of influential rivals such as sitting parliament Speaker Ali Larijani seems to be placing all his concentration on a selection of the most hard-line members of the camp, seeing this as the only way for him to take the helm of parliament.

All in all, given the hard-hitting removal of their rival Reformists, the conservatives seem to feel that there is no threat necessitating the formation of powerful hard-line coalitions or even to make sacrifices toone another. The race is, therefore, expected to be reduced to an internal tug of war merely involving the multiple hard-line factionsjostling for a greater share of seats and influence in the legislative body.

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Iran With election rivals barred, Iran's hard-liners resort to infighting - Al-Monitor

There is a church in the little town of Bethlehem. It was built on the spot where Christians believe Jesus Christ was born. It's called the Church of the Nativity.

If you consult either UNESCO or various travel experts, they'll tell you the church resides in Palestine.

Donald Trump praying in a rally for evangelical voters

(Photo: AP)

But last month, trivia game show Jeopardy determined the church's location to be Israel and not Palestine, as the contestant said, and a firestorm erupted on social media, with the most fervent of pro-Israel and pro-Palestine supporters taking a firm position on both sides of the line.

Lately, another group has entered the muddled picture of Mideast politics, which has become more and more influential both in the U.S. and the Middle East American evangelical Christians.

This group today is one of the most politically powerful voting blocs in the United States, with them holding unprecedented power in Donald Trump's administration.

Their numbers are extraordinary: polls show that in 2016, more than a quarter of American voters identified as white evangelical Christians.

They've turned almost fanatic support for Israel and equally fanatic animosity towards its enemies into a core tenet of American conservative ideology, which is deeply rooted in the group's interpretation of the Bible.

The Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem

(Photo: Courtesy)

One of the main differences between evangelicals and other strains of Christianity lies in their relationship with the Bible.

Conservative evangelicals believe that the Bible is the literal truth. For them, it is a sort of prophetic road map for modern life, with events described and prophesied within the scripture destined to come true.

For evangelicals, the most important prophecy is the second coming, the return of Jesus Christ to Earth. The Bible doesn't mention when this will happen, but it does mention where the land of Israel.

Several senior evangelical pastors meet with Trump on a regular basis. These are the leaders of megachurches with tens of thousands of followers.

Many of these pastors follow the belief of Christian Zionism, the concept that the return of the Jewish people to Israel is just one of a series of events that will trigger the second coming of the Messiah.

According to this theology, God will reward those who help Israel and punish those who don't - a belief that leads directly to a clash with Iran.

For evangelicals, the return of the Jewish people to Israel, the expansion of its borders and its current control of the holy sites in the West Bank is clear fulfillment of biblical prophecy.

The main groups now battling Israel in the region - Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah - are all backed by Iran, making the Islamic Republic a crucial factor in the evangelical vision of the world today and in the future.

According to Christian Zionism, if the U.S. wants to be on the right side of this biblical prophecy, it needs to do everything possible to protect Israel and punish Iran.

This helps to explain why a different Bible story is also important to evangelicals.

The Book of Esther, about an ultimately thwarted plot to destroy the Jews of Persia, is so important to Christian Zionists that they've made multiple movies out of it.

Evangelicals who are very wrapped up in this theology see modern-day Persia - namely, Iran - as this Bible story come to life and played out on the international stage.

Mike Pomepo and Mike Pence

(Photo: AFP)

U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence both identify as evangelical Christians, and both have enormous influence on American foreign policy.

This evangelical support isn't an accident; the Trump administration actively courts it.

After Trump revealed his "Deal of the Century" peace plan last month - a plan that would give Israel unprecedented control in the West Bank - the Christian Broadcast Network interviewed U.S. Ambassador to Israel David Friedman.

"You're talking about opening up the Bible, bringing it back to life in ways that I think your listeners could not have even imagined," said Friedman.

"It's an opportunity for Biblical tourism that I think will grow and flourish in profound ways."

To American evangelical Christians, the Bible isn't just a foundational text, it's a prophetic road map that predicts the future and shapes the way they view the present.

And thanks to their influence with a president who depends on their votes no matter the cost, they are dictating an American foreign policy that they see as affirming those prophecies, however catastrophic.

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Evangelicals to the left, Iran to the right - Ynetnews

Iranian media have broadcast the first-ever footage of an operational Sejjil medium-range rocket in its underground bunker.

The same February 2020 broadcast includes what apparently is new or at least rarely-seen footage of trials involving the Sejjil.

The 59-feet-tall Sejjil could be a leading candidate to carry atomic warheads, if and when Iran develops them. The new imagery is a reminder that Iran apparently has deployed the Sejjil even before completing the rockets development.

Fabian Hinz, a researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, part of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in California, circulated the Iranian broadcast on Twitter.

The status of the Sejjil has been under question for a while, Hinz tweeted. Seeing new footage of its deployment and new testing footage is quite a surprise.

Iran in all deploys around 55,000 surface-to-surface missiles. Most of them are shorter-range models such as the Shahab-1 and Fatah-110. The country also possesses Qiam rockets that can travel as far as 500 miles.

Sejjil is the countrys farthest-flying ballistic missile. The rocket reportedly can travel as far as 1,250 miles, in theory allowing Iran to strike targets across the Middle East, Eastern Europe, East Africa and South Asia.

Iran apparently does not possessa rocket that can strike the United States from Iranian soil. But Iran can strike U.S. interests in countries near Iran.

Iranian forces on Jan. 7, 2020 fired around 30 ballistic missiles at two Iraqi bases housing U.S. troops, injuring dozens of Americans but killing no one.

The attacks were Tehrans retaliation for the United States Jan. 2, 2020 assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the head of Irans Revolutionary Guard Corps militia and one of the countrys top military leaders.

A U.S. Special Operations Command MQ-9 drone fired on a vehicle carrying Soleimani and a deputy militia commander at Baghdads international airport, killing both men.

Jeffrey Lewis, a missile expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, studied photos of wreckage from the January 2020 strikes and concluded that the rockets involved in the attacks likely were Qiams.

The Qiam like many of Irans short-range rockets is a variant of the Soviet Scud rocket. The Qiams high-explosive warhead reportedly weighs around 1,700 pounds.

The Sejjil by contrast is a purely Iranian design. Along with other advancements, it packs a warhead as heavy as 2,200 pounds.

Its use of solid propellant, in particular, is due to fuel technology advancement made in conjunction with the Zelzal program during the 1990s, the development of which is believed to have been aided by China, the Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies explained.

Though the missile has a similar size, weight and range to the Shahab-3 variants, its use of solid-propellants is a major improvement on the Shahab design. Solid propellants allow for a near-immediate launch time, leaving the missile much less vulnerable during launch.

Because solid-propellant missiles do not have to be fueled immediately prior to launch, they are easily transported. On the other hand, solid propellant missiles have particular performance characteristics that make them more difficult to guide and control.

How Iranian engineers have overcome these hurdles is unknown, but it seems likely that they have modified Shahab guidance systems and/or received considerable foreign assistance.

Because the design is new, Iran will probably have to subject it to a great deal of testing before putting the missile into regular operation, CSIS stated in reference to the Sejjil.

Assuming that the Sejjil project moves at about the same speed as foreign missile development projects, Iran could not have declared the missile operational until at least 2012. However, this still has not formally occurred, CSIS added. The missile has not been tested since 2012, leaving its deployment status uncertain.

If the February 2020 broadcast is any indication, we can more safely assert that at least a few Sejjils are operational in their underground bunkers.

David Axe serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is theauthor of the graphic novelsWar Fix,War Is BoringandMachete Squad.

Image: Twitter.

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This Is Iran's Deadliest Missile (And It Could Someday Carry a Nuclear Weapon) - The National Interest Online

By Samuel Smith, CP Reporter | Saturday, February 22, 2020 An Iranian flag flies in an Abyaneh mountain village. | Wikimedia Commons/Nick Taylor

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom is raising concerns over unconfirmed reports that authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran are threatening the destruction of the tomb of Esther and Mordechai in response to President Trumps Middle-East peace plan.

The tomb is believed by some to be the resting place of the Old Testament queen Esther and her relative, Mordechai. Esther was the queen of the Persian King Ahasuerus. She is credited with helping save the Jewish people from being massacred.

The tomb is a popular pilgrimage site for Jews and Christians in Iran.

USCIRF is troubled by reported threats to the tomb of Esther and Mordechai in Hamedan, Iran, USCIRF stressed in a tweet. [USCIRF] emphasizes the Iranian government's responsibility to protect religious sites.

The congressionally-mandated bipartisan and independent international religious freedom watchdog body was responding to a report from the Alliance for Rights of All Minorities in Iran.

The organization posted on social media Sunday that the historic Jewish site is at risk of destruction.

Iranian authorities are threatening to destroy the historic tomb of Ester and Mordechai in Hamedan and convert the site to a consular office for Palestine, the Facebook post claims.

Ester and Mordechai were biblical Jewish heroes who saved their people from a massacre in a story known as #Purim. Their burial site has been a significant Jewish landmark for Jews and history buffs around the world.

According to covering reports, members of Iranian #Basij [paramilitary] attempted to raid the historic site yesterday in an act of revenge against the Israelis Palestinian peace plan by President Trump, the post added.

The United States-based nongovernmental organization watchdog group International Christian Concern reports that reports on Irans plans for the tomb are unconfirmed. But the NGO indicated that the alleged raid by Basij forces occurred last Saturday.

The Jerusalem Post could not confirm the covering reports cited by the alliance.

One initial report appears to have been published on Feb. 7 by Mohabat News, the Iranian Christian News Agency. The report cites a warning issued by the Council for Explaining Students' Mobilization of Hamadan Universities.

Although reports are unconfirmed, it would not be the first time that the tomb of Esther and Mordechai has been threatened.

As the Brooklyn-based Jewish Press reports, a group of Basij members from Abu Ali Sina University threatened to destroy the tomb in 2010 even though the tomb was labeled a national heritage site in 2008.

Additionally, the Jewish Press notes that authorities in Iran downgraded the status of the tomb in 2011 and removed a sign indicating that it was a pilgrimage site.

The threat of the tombs destruction highlights Irans Jewish history and community. But it also runs parallel to several challenges that Iranian Christians face, as many of their charges following arrest are phrased within a framework of terms that connect them to Zionism, ICC explained in a report. The tomb of Esther and Mordechai are important to both Jews and Christians. But for local Christians to speak about the tomb at such a sensitive point in time would put them at great risk for further persecution.

Several sites sacred to Christians and Jews have been targeted over the years by radical Muslims.

In 2014, the Islamic State destroyed the tomb of Jonah in Iraq.

Iran ranks as the ninth-worst country in the world for Christian persecution, according to Open Doors USAs 2020 World Watch List.

In Iran, religious minorities are regularly arrested for worshiping in house churches and Muslim converts to Christianity are severely persecuted.

In early February, two women born into Muslim families who later converted to Christ and led two house churches in Iran spoke at a religious freedom panel discussion in Washington, D.C., where they outlined the experiences they faced.

Maryam Rostampour and Marziyeh Amirizadeh spent 259 days in Irans notorious Evin Prison. Even though they were sentenced to death, the two were released after much international pressure.

We know first-hand how difficult it is for those who attend house churches because they risk their lives to attend house churches, Amirizadeh said. Any time if the government find out, they can raid the gathering, arrest people, torture them and confiscate their property.

Dabrina Bet Tamraz, an Assyrian Christian whose father, brother and mother are imprisoned in Iran, also spoke at the event.

Today, there is not a free church. There is no free evangelical church, nor free Pentecostal, she said.

The only churches that are allowed to function are orthodox or Catholic churches with restrictions. They are not allowed to have books in Farsi. They are not even allowed to, nowadays, print books in our own language. Any Christian literature or Bible even in our own language is not permitted. They are not even allowed to speak to a Farsi person near the church.

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Iran threatens to destroy tomb of Esther and Mordechai - The Christian Post

U.S.-Iran dynamics have grown trickier in the wake of the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani. In this tense context,three key insights emerge: that U.S. strategy is lacking, that the Middle East landscape increasingly favors Iran, and that Washington needs to find ways to de-prioritize the region.

1U.S. strategy vis--vis Iran is convoluted and clunky. The Trump administration has outlined its vision of a fundamentally different Iranian regime through its maximum pressure campaign. Yet it has attempted this policy while simultaneously pursuing contradictory efforts.

On the one hand, the administration has promoted aNational Security Strategyand aNational Defense Strategyfocused on great-power competition with China and Russia. On the other, its tactics for pursuing its objective with Iran lack a clear, unified strategy as illustrated by pulling out of the nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) absent any effort to build a pathway or to lay the groundwork for a new deal while failing to effectively lead and mobilize an international coalition to pressure Iran. The administration haspromulgated vague, contradictory, andad hoc responses to Iranian aggression from leaping up the escalation ladder by killing Qassem Soleimani while confusingly lurching in the aborted response last summer when Iran shot down a U.S. drone.

To be sure, Qassem Soleimani had a proven record of harming U.S. interests in the Middle East over decades, given his leadership of Irans regional activities. One cannot and should not underestimate the (warranted) vitriol that current and former national security policymakers have toward him. Yet it remains unclearwhyhe was killed, as well as why at that time and in that place.

Furthermore, the counter-ISIS fight has been severely disrupted over the last few weeks as the Iraqis, among other coalition members, appear uncertain about cooperation. Above all, the confusing overall U.S. approach is read by the Iranians as feckless, by regional partners and European and Asian allies as fickle, and by other U.S. adversaries like North Korea as presenting opportunities for mischief.

For those who questionwhether missile salvos by the Iranian militaryconstituted thesum totalof Irans retaliation for the Soleimani killing, lets be clear: Though the timing and the target of future action are uncertain, there should be no doubt that further Iranian response will follow. We have reached the end of the beginning of this escalatory cycle. That response could take the form of attacks by Iranian clients such as Hezbollah against soft targets frequented by U.S. military personnel, or directly against U.S. diplomatic or civilian personnel across the Gulf or the Levant, for example. It betrays a fundamental misunderstandingto say Iran has been deterredfrom a further state military response; that is not Tehrans comparative advantage, nor would it ever represent the thrust of its retaliation given the sophisticated and capable clients it has built around the region.

2The Middle East is moving along a trajectory that increasingly favors Tehran. In Syria, Iran has managed with heavy support from Russia and Hezbollah, among others to keep the despotic leader, Bashar Assad, in power. In Lebanon, the new government further empowers Hezbollah and Damascus, and it is unlikely to take real steps to prevent the economy from further tanking or to address protesters valid frustrations. In Iraq, key constituencies are seriously reconsidering the U.S. military presence. In Yemen, the Saudis and the Emiratis spent years battling the Houthis, with little to show for it besides horrific Yemeni losses and Iranian delight.

Across the region, Irans clients are only growing in capacity and capability. It is worth recalling that the regime has always found ways to fund its priorities such as building Hezbollah in the throes of Irans 8-year war with Iraq and will continue to do so. To be sure,domestic discontent inside Iranand in places like Lebanon are certainly unhelpful for the regime in Tehran, as are the sanctions draining the Iranian economy, but overall, the trajectory is increasingly positive for Iran.

However, there are steps the United States can take to adjust this trajectory and regain influence, particularly regarding Lebanon and the Gulf. Hezbollah and Iran would be overjoyed if the United States gave up on Lebanon.The United Statesshould maintain its involvement there, particularly the relationship with the Lebanese military, but must be cognizant that the new Lebanese government is abysmal. It is essential to watch closely as the military and the government sniff around for a new rapprochement, to ensure that the military continues to tackle threats of mutual concern, and to increase force protection for American military and diplomatic officials in Lebanon. The United States should also be willing to excoriate Lebanese leaders who further undermine Lebanese sovereignty, such as sanctioning Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, who personally facilitated Hezbollahs increasingly broad-based political gains.

Across the Gulf, ratcheting down tensions is a shrewd move. Key Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are seeking accommodation with the Iranians. The United States should also encourage an end to the Saudi spat with Qatar and urge the Saudis to find a path out of the Yemen war. Above all, the United States should normalize the U.S.-Saudi relationship rather than prioritize it, which requires a hard look at U.S. interests vis--vis Riyadh and serious consideration of how best to encourage positive behavior while punishing problematic behavior. All of these steps will both decrease dangerously high pressures while further enabling the United States to focus on the fundamental challenges.

3The United States must find a way tomeaningfully deprioritize the Middle East.Although the real geopolitical challenge going forward is posed by China, the United States remains trapped in Middle East purgatory.On the tombstone of the post-9/11 wars will be written some elaborate combination of perplexity over why they have lasted so long; haziness over their focus; and ambiguity and anxiety over the balance sheet of what they achieved, prevented, and exacerbated.

And yet Americas over-militarized approach to the region continues. At least20,000 new U.S. military forceshave been sent in recent months, bringing thetotal estimate of U.S. military personnel in the Middle East to 80,000. This increase notably comes at a time when theU.S. diplomatic presence is plummeting in places like Iraq.

The administrations maximum pressure campaign is resulting in maximum focus on Iran. There are, of course, attendant opportunity costs for doing so. The geopolitical challenge posed by China the primary threat to global order is receiving too little time, attention, and resources.

While the United States should depart Middle East purgatory, it should not do so in a way that benefits the Russians. The Russians, not the Americans, have committed to consistent diplomatic offensives across the region. However, the United States can deprioritize the region without exacerbating Russian influence by deepening its diplomatic posture, convening like-minded and productive coalitions, and making it harder for Russia rely on the benefits of a regional security order managed by the United States.

The dynamics of the U.S.-Iran relationship are inextricably linked to regional stability and security. The U.S. government should examine the following areas of concern:

Strategy and execution:Given that U.S. strategy toward Iran and the Middle East is convoluted, the administration should clarify what it is trying to achieve, why it is trying to do so, and above all, how it will do so.

Questions to consider include: What is the administration seeking to achieve in its policy vis--vis Iran and the broader Middle East? How does it plan to implement this strategy particularly given the profound opportunity costs in light of the high price of geopolitical competition with China and Russia? And, how is its messaging effectively supporting strategy execution?

Counter-ISIS campaign and coalition: The conflagration between the United States and Iran has imperiled the fight against ISIS and fueled discontent among some Iraqis.

Questions to consider include: How and in what ways has the counter-ISIS campaign and coalition been degraded by the latest escalation between the U.S. and Iran? What role can Congress play to deepen U.S. engagement and consultation with key coalition members above all, the Iraqi government?

A deal in disarray: Detonating U.S. participation in the nuclear agreement rather than considering ways to improve it has resulted in the United States dividing itself from its fellow signatories while Iran pursues its own agenda.

Questions to consider include: What pathways may succeed for building a level of agreement between Iran and key international actors to minimize its nuclear program?

U.S. regional presence and purpose: For two decades, the United States has overwhelmingly relied on a military approach to the Middle East and a flawed one at that. The administration is doubling down on that approach as the militarys posture has skyrocketed, despite little evidence that the swelling numbers of U.S. troops are effectively deterring threats. If the U.S. military is forced to suddenly depart from Iraq, the U.S. governments ability to influence and act will be severely handcuffed, to say nothing of the welcome that its departure would receive from ISIS and Iran. And in critical places like Syria, the militarys mission is worryingly opaque and colored by announcements of and occasionally execution of precipitous redeployments without serious consultation of this body or of key coalition members. Above all, this emphasis on a military approach has come at the expense of a diplomatic approach as the U.S. diplomatic presence regionally particularly in Iraq has been severely degraded. The U.S. militaryposture in the region should be streamlined, particularly forces across the Gulf in places like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, increasingly rely on warm rather than hot bases, and the various headquarters should be substantially reduced.

Questions to consider include: Under what conditions does the administration plan to redeploy the 20,000 new U.S. military personnel deployed to the Middle East? How does the administration plan to generate those conditions for withdrawal? How can the United States right-size its regional military posture and appropriately tailor it to countering likely threats?How can it effectively streamline its Middle East military posture in light of the global context? How can it grow and rely on a more robust diplomatic presence in the region?

In sum, the lack of Middle East security and stability is threatening to monopolize U.S. national security resources. There are no simple solutions. However, some steps are overdue in leading U.S. strategy toward the Middle East in a more coherent and sustainable direction.

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Three key insights for US policy in light of recent escalation with Iran - Brookings Institution