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As Yevgeny Prigozhins mutiny in Rostov-on-Don, Russia, began on June 23, Russian military police in Syria apprehended at least four of the Wagner Groups top leaders and flew them to the Hmeimim air base on the countrys west coast as a precautionary measure. Multiple sources told Foreign Policy via messages over an encrypted messaging app that all were still being kept at a closed facility at Hmeimim; however, no public indication of their whereabouts has yet been made.

Home to several thousand Russian soldiers and contractors, Hmeimim is Russias command and control center in Syria and the logistics headquarters for all Wagner operations abroad.

With its two large landing strips, it is the largest Russian facility outside the former Soviet Union capable of servicing and refueling heavy aircraft transporting large quantities of weapons and personnel. Wagner flights to Libya, Mali, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and even Venezuela depart from Hmeimim via Russian defense ministry aircraft before arriving at their final destinations. Should the Kremlin deny Wagner access to this facility, Prigozhins global empire would grind to a halt.

As in Russia itselfwhere the police and Federal Security Service have raided the groups headquarters and shut down its subsidiariesWagners leaders in Hmeimim have reportedly been given an ultimatum to sign new contracts with the defense ministry or return home. However, following years of attrition within the ranks of Russias proxies in Syria, Wagner forces form one of the core components of whats left protecting Moscows interests in the country, granting Prigozhin significant leverage that will likely delay an abrupt dismantling of his influence.

Currently, Wagner has between 1,000 and 2,000 troops deployed in Syria, who sit at the center of a much larger network of more than 10,000 local private military contractors who help guard oil, gas, and phosphate infrastructure in the countrys desert.

Wagner pays Syrian private military contractors in part from the revenues generated from these facilities, most of which are owned or operated by companies linked to Gennady Timchenkoone of Russian President Vladimir Putins closest confidants who experts claim has overseen the latters personal wealthand Wagner shell companies.

As Russia is one of the worlds largest energy and commodities exporters, revenues earned from Syrias natural resources are negligible to the Russian state. However, for Syrias regime, they are a desperately needed source of foreign currency, and Moscows control over them grants Russia leverage that it can use to ensure that Damascus does not renege on its geostrategic commitments to the Kremlin in any postwar scenario.

These commitments include preserving Russias right to use Hmeimim as a launching pad to project power in Africa and, more importantly, to dock nuclear-capable vessels in Syrias Tartus port. The latter has been one of Moscows greatest geostrategic achievements since the 1970s and enables Russia to project nuclear deterrence along NATOs southern flank.

Regardless as to what individual Wagner leaders decide, ensuring that Russia retains leverage over Damascus means securing the loyalty of the thousands of Syrian private military contractors whom Prigozhin commands. Any pause or reduction in incentives for these forces caused by confusion in Moscow will be seized on by Russias main rival, Iran, which could offer these fighters weapons and better pay.

Despite partnering to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, Russia and Iran have been viciously at odds in Syria since 2017. In 2018, their proxies had violent clashes over control of Syrias phosphate reserves and have continued to battle over other strategic assets.

This struggle to protect its position has worn on Moscow, particularly as its hopes for a political solution to the conflict have fallen flat; Russian companies would likely earn a massive windfall if sanctions on Syria were lifted and Putin has exerted pressure on Assad for years to ensure this. But such a resolution and an injection of Western development aid have failed to materialize.

By 2021, Russia began to cut support to many of its proxies in parts of the country it no longer viewed as strategic, many of which switched their loyalty to Iran to replace lost salaries. This process accelerated following Moscows February 2022 invasion of Ukraine.

The rapid normalization seen in recent months between the Assad regime and Arab League states is itself a last-resort strategy by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Jordan to contain Iran after accepting that Russia may no longer possess the means to do so.

Currently, Wagner mercenaries and their network of contractors at oil and gas sites across Syria are one of several core components of whats left of Russias bare-bones occupation. Supported in part by an independent and sustainable revenue stream, they have so far proved largely resistant to Irans overtures.

However, should another pillar in Putins regime fall, that could change, with Wagners Syrian mercenaries following the same path as many other former Russian proxies. Examples abound.

In April 2021, Russia ignored requests for support from a tribal-backed militia fighting U.S.-backed Kurdish forces in northeastern Syria. After being defeated and expelled from their homes, tribal fighters opened their doors to Iran, which flew in large quantities of heavy weapons and equipment and replaced the groups lost salaries.

The Syrian Armys 8th Brigade was once Russias most loyal unit within the armed forces in southern Syria. However, by late 2021, Moscow became frustrated with its failure to send sufficient troops to fight the Islamic State and halved the groups salaries. By 2022, it ceased contact altogether, and now the 8th Brigade fights for Syrias Military Intelligence Directorate, one of Irans most powerful proxies and which is heavily implicated in regional drug trafficking alongside Hezbollah and other groups.

Similarly, in July 2022, National Defense Forces militias in eastern Deir Ezzor led by Hassan al-Ghadban broke with Moscow after the latter failed to pay their salaries for six months. The group shortly after merged with the 4th Division, one of Syrias top elite Iranian-backed units led by Maher al-Assadbrother of Syrian President Bashar al-Assadwhich sits at the top of Syrias drug trade.

Should Russia lose the loyalty of Syrian mercenaries guarding the countrys energy infrastructure, Moscow would no longer be able to guarantee that it could continue coercing Assad to allow the Kremlin to use Syrian territory to threaten NATO and expand throughout Africa.

Following the defeat of the Islamic State in 2018, Russia undertook an aggressive campaign to overhaul and reform Syrias decrepit military, which Moscow hoped to partner with as its main client in a postwar scenario. Syrian generals who spoke Russian were promoted and purged hundreds of senior officers, seized weapons and military IDs from Iranian-backed militias, and arrested their financiers.

The program provoked a wave of violence against Russian forces and their proxies by Iranian-backed groups that refused to disarm and instead accelerated their infiltration of Syrias institutions.

By 2020, Russia had given up. Limited by the economic contraction caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and its failure to achieve any semblance of order, Russias defense ministry scaled back its efforts and turned to its own network of private military contractors to build an irregular force to manage its now narrowly defined interests.

This shift was hastened by Russias belligerent stance toward Turkey, whose proxies Moscow fought two separate conflicts with in 2020, creating an urgent need for new recruits. Between December 2019 and August 2020, Wagner recruited thousands of Syrian mercenaries through more than a dozen private security firms to fight in Libya against the Turkish-backed government alongside renegade warlord Khalifa Haftar.

During the fighting, Wagner seized control of two large oil fields and export facilities and a petrochemical complexkey leverage that the group has used to selectively manipulate energy markets by imposing blockades. During the same period, Wagner-backed militias took part in a shorter conflict against Turkish-backed rebels in Syrias Idlib province that resulted in large territorial gains for the Assad regime.

Following these campaigns, Russia was soon forced to mobilize again, this time against the Islamic State in central Syria. In the eight months from August 2020 to March 2021, the group exploded out of remote parts of the desert and killed more than 460 soldiers and civilians and injured hundreds more. The majority of attacks were concentrated around the countrys gas-processing plants and oil fields, an attempt by the Islamic State to extort payment from the companies that managed their production.

The Islamic States attacks posed a direct threat to Russias core interest, and Moscow exhausted all options in response. The private military contractors used to recruit Syrians to fight in Libya were revived across the country, with recruits trained in Suqaylabiyah, a large Orthodox Christian town on the outskirts of the desert where Russia has recruited its most loyal mercenaries. Russias defense ministry issued an ultimatum to loyal units within the Syrian Army: Send fighters, or stop receiving salaries.

Lastly, for the first time since 2017, Russian units fighting in the desert partnered with Iranian proxies including Afghan Shiite militias. For the first three months of 2021, this combined force supported by Russian air power bombarded the Islamic State, driving many of its fighters to Iraq or Kurdish-controlled parts of northeastern Syria.

Now, preserving this network of mercenaries built up throughout 2020 is key to ensuring the smooth running of Syrias energy and phosphate reserves, which has since become Russias main priority. Iran has meanwhile seized the opportunity to chip away at Moscows faltering facade and pick off former proxies that the Kremlin can no longer afford to patronize.

Wagner forces and the Syrians they contract are mercenaries and by definition fight for material gain. Some, such as Orthodox Christians in Suqaylabiyah and neighboring towns, either feel some affinity with Russia or view it as a bulwark against encroaching Iranian Shiite sectarianism. However, should Moscow pull the rug entirely from under Prigozhin, all of Wagners proxies will be forced to make practical decisions.

Of the four Wagner leaders in Syria detained late last month, two were based in Hmeimim, one in Damascus, one in the oil-rich province of Deir Ezzor, and the last in Suqaylabiyah. Should their detention drag out, the Christians of Suqaylabiyah and other groups may find themselves on the receiving end of enticing Iranian offers.

Iran may also soon be in a better position to make such offers. Following months of quiet negotiations, in late June the United States resumed indirect talks with Tehran to explore relaunching the nuclear deal or replacing it with an interim agreement. As a measure of good faith, the United States recently agreed to unfreeze and release $2.7 billion of debt from Iraq to Iranian banks. Tehran has similarly requested that $7 billion in South Korean debt frozen by sanctions be released, offering to free detained U.S. citizens in exchange.

However, Russias current weak position may delay any brash steps to rein in Prigozhins position in Syria. Russias occupation is not driven by profit-seeking, and allowing Prigozhin to continue reaping a modest fortune is a small price to pay to ensure Moscows presence on the Mediterranean is kept intact. Should it do the opposite, the Kremlin risks creating a gap that Irans proxies would soon step in to exploit.

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In Syria, Russia Is Losing Ground to Iran After Wagner Rebellion - Foreign Policy

Both of these incidents occurred in international waters.

At 1 a.m. local time, one Iranian naval vessel approached the Marshall Islands-flagged oil tanker TRF Moss in international waters in the Gulf of Oman. The Iranian vessel departed the scene when U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul (DDG 74) arrived on station. Additionally, the U.S. Navy deployed surveillance assets, including MQ-9 Reaper and P-8 Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft.

Approximately three hours later, the U.S. Navy received a distress call from Bahamian-flagged oil tanker Richmond Voyager while the ship was more than 20 miles off the coast of Muscat, Oman, and transiting international waters toward the Arabian Sea. Another Iranian naval vessel had closed within one mile of Richmond Voyager while hailing the commercial tanker to stop.

McFaul directed course toward Richmond Voyager at maximum speed as the merchant tanker continued its transit. Prior to McFauls arrival on scene, Iranian personnel fired multiple, long bursts from both small arms and crew-served weapons. Richmond Voyager sustained no casualties or significant damage. However, several rounds hit the ships hull near crew living spaces. The Iranian navy vessel departed when McFaul arrived.

In May, the United States increased the rotation of ships and aircraft patrolling the Strait of Hormuz with partners following an uptick in Iranian merchant vessel seizures. The increased force presence supports multinational efforts under the International Maritime Security Construct and bilaterally with partner nations to deter threats to commercial shipping and reassure regional mariners.

I couldnt be prouder of the entire [U.S. Naval Forces Central Command] team, especially the exceptional effort by the McFaul crew, for immediately responding and preventing another seizure, said Vice Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces. We remain vigilant and ready to protect navigational rights in these critical waters.

Since 2021, Iran has harassed, attacked or seized nearly 20 internationally flagged merchant vessels, presenting a clear threat to regional maritime security and the global economy.

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U.S. Prevents Iran from Seizing Two Merchant Tankers in Gulf of Oman - navy.mil

Iran said it had a court order to seize the Chevron tanker its naval forces approached and allegedly attempted to capture early Wednesday morning. 

The Maritime Search and Rescue Center of Iran’s Hormozgan Province told the country’s state-run news agency the Iranian navy had an order to seize the Bahamian-flagged Richmond Voyager oil tanker, Reuters reported. 

The tanker was traveling in international waters near Muscat, Oman, en route to the Arabian Sea when it issued a distress call, the U.S. Navy Fifth Fleet said. An Iranian vessel came within a mile of the Richmond Voyager, ordered it to stop and fired at it. 

The American guided-missile destroyer USS McFaul arrived on the scene and turned the Iranian vessel away. An Iranian vessel had earlier approached another oil tanker with a Marshall Islands flag in international waters, but the USS McFaul deterred it, according to the U.S. Navy.

Iran said the Richmond Voyager, which it said had collided with an Iranian vessel, did not stop after the incident, leading to the owner of the Iranian ship requesting that it be seized. Iran said the collision injured five people. 

Chevron has said its crew members were safe, and the vessel was operating normally, according to Reuters. 

The U.S. Navy has said no one on the Richmond Voyager was injured in the incident, but bullets hit the ship’s hull near the living quarters. 

Iran successfully seized two oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz in the spring. The Navy said Iran has harassed, attacked or seized about 20 internationally flagged merchant vessels since 2021.

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Iran says it had court order to seize Chevron tanker - The Hill

Trkiyes presidential elections were arguably one of the regions most closely watched political events in 2023. Following his victory in the May 28 runoff election, President Recep Tayyip Erdoan has secured another five years in office.

Trkiyes recent foreign policy has been characterized by reconciliation and normalization efforts on multiple fronts. These have included renewed relations with Egypt, with a symbolic handshake between Erdoan and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, as well a presidential visit to the United Arab Emirates and a meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman for the first time since murder of Jamal Khashoggi in Istanbul. It is likely that these diplomatic efforts will continue as Erdoans new term begins; indeed, the presence of Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan at Erdoans inauguration ceremony and Sisis congratulatory message, along with the official elevation of Egyptian-Turkish diplomatic relations, are the first signs of this ongoing trend.

Following his election victory, Erdoan also received congratulations from Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who emphasized that ongoing Turkish-Iranian collaboration would create even more favorable conditions for regional peace and stability. Despite key foreign policy disagreementsincluding their divergent positions on Russias invasion of Ukraine and the future of Syrias leadershiprelations between Iran and Trkiye under Erdoan have remained close. During Erdoan's visit to Tehran last year, for example, eight agreements were signed between the two countries in the areas of trade, security, science, and sports.

Although it is expected that Trkiye will continue to work with Iran going forward, the relationship will largely depend on a Turkish-Syrian rapprochement.

While Trkiye severed its ties with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2011 and has consistently backed Syrian opposition groups, Trkiye will likely eventually resume full relations with the ruling Syrian regime. This is, in part, due to domestic pressures: the future of 3.4 million Syrian refugees in Trkiye was one of the key issues in the recent elections, and over the past year, Erdoan has pushed for their repatriation. So too do Trkiyes military operations to prevent a Kurdish-led state in the north of Syria require collaboration with the Assad regime. Therefore, we might see shuttle diplomacy between Ankara and Damascus, with Hakan Fidan, the former Turkish director of national intelligence and the new foreign minister, playing a key role.

Growing normalization between Trkiye and Syria was also evident before the recent elections. Moscow hosted a meeting between the defense ministers of Russia, Iran, Syria and Trkiye on April 25, as well as the first official meeting of foreign ministers on May 10. There, according to former Turkish foreign minister Mevlt avuolu, the ministers discussed the importance of collaborating to combat terrorism, facilitate the safe return of refugees, and safeguard Syrias territorial integrity.

Recent diplomatic developments in the Middle East, including Syrias readmission into the Arab League and growing rapprochement between Saudi Arabia and Iran, might help to promote reconciliation between Trkiye and Syria at the highest levels. However, the Assad regime has emphasized that any reconciliation will depend on the full departure of Turkish troops from Syrian territory.

In the event that Trkiye and Syria resume diplomatic relations, Iran, which is exerting a significant amount of effort to ensure that Assad remains in power, will not want to be excluded from the negotiations. These would help to determine the favorable conditions for a partnership between Ankara and Tehran, because the benefits of such a Turkish-Syrian rapprochement would be wide-ranging. Trkiye could take necessary steps to decrease the international isolation towards Syria, for example, and help to revive economic and security relations across the region.

Undoubtedly, if Raisi pays his first official visit to Trkiye, the future of Turkish policy towards Syria would be one of the first points of discussion. In an era of reconciliation between longstanding enemies across the Middle East, it would not be surprising to see Trkiye normalize ties with Syriaa major geopolitical shift with positive implications for bilateral Iran-Trkiye relations.

Ahmet Furkan Ozyakar holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Exeter. His work focuses on Irans foreign policy and public diplomacy. Follow him on Twitter @ahmetozyakar.

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Erdoan's Reelection and Regional Reconciliation: Are Iran and ... - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

The Justice Department today announced the filing of a forfeiture complaint against over 9,000 rifles, 284 machine guns, approximately 194 rocket launchers, over 70 anti-tank guided missiles and over 700,000 rounds of ammunition that the U.S. Navy seized in transit from Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to militant groups in Yemen.

The government of Iran, through its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, remains bent on smuggling weapons of war to militant groups in violation of U.S. sanctions and international law, said Assistant Attorney General Matthew G. Olsen of the Justice Departments National Security Division. As this seizure demonstrates, the Department of Justice will work in lockstep with our U.S. Government partners to deny the Iranian regime the means to undermine our nations interest and threaten the security of our people.

The U.S. Attorneys Office has again taken action to prevent Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps from spreading violence and bloodshed across the world and threatening the security of our nation and allies, said U.S. Attorney Matthew M. Graves for the District of Columbia. As proven before, where we have jurisdiction, this office will use all the tools available in our power to prevent criminals and terrorists from threatening global stability.

It is paramount this significant amount of seized weapons and ammunition aimed to cause global devastation never reach its intended destination, said Special Agent in Charge Derek W. Gordon of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Washington, D.C. HSI Washington D.C., with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the assistance from U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, will continue to identify, disrupt and dismantle Irans illicit flow of weapons at every level. Offenders who violate U.S. export laws will be brought to justice, as we are committed to protecting our nation worldwide.

According to court documents, the noted weapons came from four interdictions of stateless dhow vessels: two from 2021 and two from 2023. These interdictions led to the discovery and seizure of four large caches of conventional weapons, including long arms and anti-tank missiles, and related munitions all of which were determined to be primarily of either Iranian, Chinese or Russian origin.

This action follows the governments March 2023 forfeiture action against over one million rounds of ammunition enroute from Iran to Yemen. The network for both actions was involved in the illicit trafficking of advanced conventional weapons systems and components by sanctioned Iranian entities that directly support military action by the Houthi movement in Yemen and the Iranian regimes campaign of terrorist activities throughout the region. The forfeiture complaint alleges a sophisticated scheme by the IRGC to clandestinely ship weapons to entities that pose grave threats to U.S. national security.

This forfeiture action is a product of the U.S. governments coordinated effort to enforce U.S. sanctions against the IRGC and the Iranian regime and are merely allegations.

The HSI Washington Field Office and the DCIS Mid-Atlantic Field Office are leading the larger investigation of the Iranian weapons-smuggling network, with substantial assistance from the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in conducting the seizure. This team was also responsible for the March 2023 forfeiture action, which remains pending in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.

Assistant U.S. Attorneys Stuart D. Allen, Brian P. Hudak, Rajbir S. Datta and Anna D. Walker for the District of Columbia and Trial Attorneys S. Derek Shugert and Joshua Champagne of the National Security Division are litigating the case, with support from Paralegal Specialists Brian Rickers and Angela De Falco.

The burden to prove forfeitability in a forfeiture proceeding is upon the government.

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United States Files Forfeiture Action Against Over Nine Thousand ... - Department of Justice