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Once again Iranians have flooded their countrys streets to participate in widespread protests sparked by gasoline price hikes, only to be met by a brutal crackdown. But clearly the unrest was about more than the price of gas, reflecting deeper frustration and anger over the general economic malaise caused by a corrupt, repressive government and punishing U.S. sanctions.

During the protests, American officials, including Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo, took to Twitter to express solidarity with the Iranian protesters, even tweeting in Persian and encouraging the reporting of human rights abuses by government officials engaging in violent crackdowns.

Yet, given current U.S. policies, such expressions of sympathy for the Iranian people may be difficult to take seriously. Beyond rhetorical support, there are a number of concrete steps the United States could take if concern for the Iranian people is a genuine priority, as it should be.

The Trump administration could lift its reinstatement of secondary sanctions against Iran that were imposed following its unilateral withdrawal in 2018 from the Iran nuclear agreement. While the intention of the sanctions may have been to bring Iran back to the negotiating table for a better deal, a new agreement has yet to result.

Moreover, the administrations maximum pressure campaign of unprecedented economic sanctions against Iran has hurt the Iranian people more than the Iranian leadership.

Iranian leaders have ratcheted up aggressive regional policies in response to U.S. pressure that has severely curtailed Iranian oil exports including the brazen attack against state oil company Saudi Aramco facilities in September and the shooting down of a U.S. military drone in the Strait of Hormuz in June.

Meanwhile, the pressure is contributing to soaring inflation and unemployment in Iran. The devaluing of the Iranian currency is eroding the savings of average Iranians and leading to prohibitively high living costs. The sanctions are also having serious humanitarian consequences. Human rights reports suggest that, despite exemptions for humanitarian imports, the banking restrictions caused by U.S. sanctions are preventing Iran from financing such imports, leading to shortages of drugs to treat rare diseases and multiple forms of cancer.

The U.S. could change course and allow the rest of the world to conduct commercial and financial transactions with Iran. Easing up on secondary sanctions against close American allies in Europe and Asia could also create a more supportive international environment for stepping up pressure should Iran further renege on its nuclear commitments, particularly since Iran would have no justification for doing so if it continued to receive the economic benefits promised in the original agreement.

While some in the Trump administration may still be hoping that enough economic pressure will lead to the collapse of the regime, trying a different approach may improve the prospects for a new negotiation process with Iran, which Trump has at times appeared to support.

The administration also could lift the travel ban on Iranians who wish to come to the United States. The ban has proved to be one of the most destructive policies harming average Iranians, many of whom have been unable to see family members or seek medical care in the United States because of the restrictions. The ban has also reduced the ability of Iranian students to seek an education in the U.S., exactly the type of next-generation Iranians who could help foster a more positive U.S.-Iranian relationship in the future. While the travel ban is supposed to exempt Iranians seeking student and nonimmigrant visas, many such applicants have been blocked from entering the country.

In addition, the travel ban and related policies have begun to chip away at traditionally positive views of the United States, with recent polling showing that 86% of Iranians now view the U.S. unfavorably. If helping the Iranian people is a key objective, lifting the travel ban would be one of the most important steps this administration could take for both humanitarian and interest-based reasons.

Finally, in an attempt to close off Iranians from communications inside and outside the country, the Iranian government shut down the internet for five days after public protest began in mid-November, a drastic move meant to quell the protesters ability to organize against the government. And yet the Iranian leadership maintained access to the internet during the shutdown. The United States imposed property-based sanctions on the Iranian information minister because of the shutdown, but in the absence of broader U.S. support for Iranians, the step is likely to be seen as a mere gesture that will not fundamentally alter Iranians access to the outside world.

Efforts by the State Department to encourage unhindered Iranian access to the internet, including supporting efforts of ordinary Iranian citizens to circumvent these restrictions on access to information, is a move in the right direction, particularly if pursued in tandem with other measures to relieve pressure on the Iranian people.

Iranians are protesting for better governance that would make the welfare of the Iranian people a priority over the governments costly regional meddling and the enrichment of entrenched leaders. For this reason, Iranians deserve American support.

Instead, current U.S. policies are hurting the cause the Iranian people are fighting for while failing to achieve any strategic objectives. If the U.S. pursued policies aimed at creating a better future for the Iranian people, they may have the added benefit of producing less dangerous Iranian government policies than those we have seen under the mantra of maximum pressure.

Dalia Dassa Kaye is a senior political scientist and director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy at Rand Corp.

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Opinion: With chaos in the streets of Iran, here's how the U.S. could help the Iranian people - Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A senior Pentagon official said on Wednesday there were indications that Iran could potentially carry out aggressive actions in the future, amid simmering tensions between Tehran and Washington.

Tensions in the Gulf have risen since attacks on oil tankers during the summer, including off the coast of the United Arab Emirates, and a major assault on energy facilities in Saudi Arabia. The United States has blamed Iran, which has denied being behind the attacks on global energy infrastructure.

We also continue to see indications, and for obvious reasons I wont go into the details, that potential Iranian aggression could occur, John Rood, the Pentagons No. 3 official, told reporters.

Rood did not provide details about what information he was basing that on or any timeline.

Weve sent very clear and blunt signals to the Iranian government about the potential consequences of aggression, Rood said.

Two U.S. officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said there was intelligence over the past month indicating that Iran was moving forces and weapons in the region.

It was not clear what specifically Iran was looking to do with the movements, they added.

One of the officials said that part of the concern was Iranian activity inside Iraq, which is experiencing anti-government protests.

Last year, Reuters reported that Iran had given ballistic missiles to Shiite proxies in Iraq and was developing the capacity to build more there to deter attacks on its interests in the Middle East and to give it the means to hit regional foes.

The United States has deployed thousands of additional military forces in the Middle East, including bombers and air defense personnel, to act as a deterrent against what Washington says is provocative Iranian behavior.

The U.S. officials said there were ongoing discussions about adding more U.S. troops in the region but that no decision had been made and the situation was fluid. They said the military regularly talked about forces around the world, including in the Middle East.

Iran has been facing weeks of sometimes violent protests against gasoline price hikes.

The unrest, which began on Nov. 15 after the government abruptly raised fuel prices by as much as 300 percent, spread to more than 100 cities and towns and turned political as young and working-class protesters demanded clerical leaders step down.

Tehrans clerical rulers have blamed thugs linked to its opponents in exile and the countrys main foreign foes - the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia - for the unrest.

Reporting by Idrees Ali; Editing by Jonathan Oatis and Peter Cooney

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Pentagon official says there are indications Iranian 'aggression' could occur - Reuters

Video by Alexander Stockton and Adam Westbrook

Parts of Iran are back online, and videos suppressed by the nations internet shutdown are starting to trickle onto social media. In the Video Op-Ed above, Raha Bahreini sheds light on the eye-opening stories that Irans government did not want you to see.

While internet service has been partly restored, many Iranians still do not have internet access on mobile phones, and government officials there have warned that connectivity may be blocked indefinitely. In a call for evidence of government repression during the blackout, the United States State Department says it has received almost 20,000 messages, videos and photographs.

A hike in fuel prices sparked protests across Iran. Ms. Bahreini exposes and analyzes footage of human rights abuses by Iranian security forces, including shootings into crowds of unarmed protesters. And she warns of what may come next incarceration, torture and forced confessions that will further oppress the Iranian people. If the world does not take a stand, Ms. Bahreini fears, Irans internet blackout may foreshadow the nations darkest days.

Raha Bahreini (@RahaBahreini) is a human rights lawyer and a researcher on Iran for Amnesty International.

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Opinion | What Iran Did Not Want You to See - The New York Times

The Iranian Armys deputy commander for operations Mahmoud Moussavi made the chilling threat adding proper measures will take place, according to the semi-official Iranian Mehr news agency. He added that the Islamic Republic will never adopt the heinous and illegal measures that some countries take in the seas, however, this does not mean that we will let them do whatever they want. He also said that once the elements involved in the attack have been identified, then proper measures, based on the expediency of the Islamic Republic, will be taken at the right time and place.

Iran is said to be currently dealing with documents that are reported to list the parties involved in the attack that took place in October.

The Sabiti tanker is owned by the National Iranian Oil Company and was hit by two missiles in the Red Sea.

Iran released images showing the shocking aftermath of an attack when it happened, while also warning it would hit back against the perpetrators.

The images showed two gaping holes in the hull of an oil tanker flying the flag of the Islamic Republic.

The alleged attack happened off the Saudi Arabian port of Jeddah.

Iran said that the cowardly attack on its own tanker was caused by a missile strike and vowed not to let it go unanswered.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said Tehran had evidence the tanker damaged in the Red Sea was attacked with rockets fired from boats, warning that those responsible would face consequences.

During a news conference, which was broadcast on Iranian state television, Rouhani said that footage of the alleged attack existed, even though it has not yet been released.

READ NOW:Iran war threat: Tehran boasts of long-range armed drones[NEWS]

Tehran said the ship was hit by two separate explosions and likely by missiles, according to its owner.

The National Iranian Tanker Company released pictures of the vessel that showed holes, one square, both with sharp edges and oil pouring out into the sea.

The attack caused oil to spill from the tanker into the Red Sea, the NITC said, before it was eventually controlled and the vessel began slowly moving back towards Gulf waters.

The attack followed a series of unexplained strikes in May and June on shipping in and around the Gulf, a vital waterway linking oil-producing countries to world markets, as well as drone attacks on Saudi oil installations.

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Iran chillingly warns Tehran will respond to tanker attack at right time, place - Express.co.uk

The events of the last few weeks in Iran indicate that the country may be in for a repetition of the events of 1978 that led to the toppling of the Shah. Anti-government protests in Iran have reached a boiling point with the streets of several of Irans cities and towns reverberating with slogans demanding the overthrow of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. One can hear echoes of the Death to the Shah slogans of 197879 in these frenzied chants. Security forces have repeatedly opened fire, killing people by the dozenspossibly by the hundredsin order to disperse protestors just as they did in the autumn of 1978.

Irans economy is in a tailspin, which is what triggered the protests. It is in far worse shape today than was the case on the eve of the Shahs fall when there was a severe economic downturn because of economic mismanagement and misdirection despite the oil boom of the 1970s. The economic distress of the late 1970s was intimately related to the crony capitalism of the Shahs regime that hurt the traditional merchant class, symbolized by the bazar, as well as the newly developing middle class. It was no coincidence that the religiously observant bazaris bankrolled the movement led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini that overthrew the Shah.

The resemblances of the situation today with the last years of the Shahs rule are uncanny. The economic distress is in part the result of the economic sanctions, especially on the sale of Iranian oil, imposed by the United States since May 2018. Oil is the lifeline of the Iranian economy and accounts for a quarter of the countrys GDP and contributes about three-quarters of Irans public revenue. With oil exports slashed from 2.45 mbd to 0.26 mbd in the past year, the Iranian economy has gone into a severe recession. World Bank projections for 2019 indicate a negative growth rate of minus 8.7 percent in its GDP. The Iranian currency has fallen precipitately since the reimposition of sanctions with the unofficial rate plummeting to 135,000 to one U.S. dollar, thus adding to the financial woes of the Iranian public.

According to the World Bank, Higher import prices from the devaluation are expected to push inflation back above 30 percent in the coming years as inflationary expectations spiral and consumer sentiment falls leading to once again a period of stagflation for Iran. Despite the depreciation and drop in imports, the reduction in oil exports is estimated to almost eliminate the current account surplus which is lower than the earlier sanctions episode as oil prices are almost half of the levels they were in 2012/132013/14. The economys downward trajectory is also likely to put further pressure on the labor market and reverse recent job creation gains.

Crony capitalism with religious foundations controlled by the regime, and especially by the IRGC, controlling a large part of the economy and monopolizing certain crucial sectors has added to the peoples economic woes especially since their combined budgets of these foundations account for over 30 percent of central government spending that benefits a small segment of the elite. Additionally, according to World Bank estimates, the unemployment rate was over 12 percent as of April-June 2018 with youth unemployment over 28 percent in June 2018. One can reasonably expect this to have climbed higher with the reimposition of economic sanctions in May 2018 that has had a tremendous negative impact on the Iranian economy.

One of the byproducts of the Iranian economic downturn was the decision in November to increase the price of gasoline on an average by 50 percent. The Iranian public had become accustomed to a heavily subsidized price of oil and its sudden increase by such a hefty margin acted as the trigger for the protests that broke out almost immediately following the announcement of this decision. However, these economic woes build upon the frustration generated by political repression.

The current protests, as distinct from those of 2009 following the regime-engineered re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, have been spontaneous and largely leaderless. No faction of the regime has been involved in the current demonstrations and thus they cut across the hardline-moderate divide. They also cut across class and ethnic divides with people of all classes joining in the protests and different ethnic groupsthe majority Persians as well as the minority Arab population of Khuzistanparticipating as well. Initially largely motivated by economic factors they have now taken on major political overtones demanding the removal not only of Rouhani and his government but of the supreme leader and the coterie of clerics around him as well.

The response of the regimes security forces has been swift and brutal with hundreds of unarmed protestors shot down in cold blood reminding observers of the events of 1978 in the lead up to the fall of the Shah. It seems that this brutality has had the effect of galvanizing the opposition to the regime just as it did in 1978, thus perpetuating the cycle of violence and resistance that reminds one eerily of the months preceding the Shahs fall.

The major unanswered question now is: Will the current protests have the same result as those of 1978 or will the regime be able to suppress them with the use of brutal force? It is difficult to answer this question with any degree of certainty especially because of a near-total news blackout imposed by the regime. The forces at the regimes command are not only well trained in suppressing dissent, but they are also ideologically committed to the system of clerically-dominated rule. Moreover, their commanders realize that the fall of the mullah-dominated regime could mean not only an end to their power and perks but to their physical existence as well. This is the lesson they have absorbed from the fall of the Shah, which led to the systematic decimation of the officer corps that had been loyal to him. They know they are fighting for their lives and not just for the perpetuation of clerical rule. This explains in large part the ferocity demonstrated by the regimes security apparatus in suppressing the demonstrations.

This means that the regime is likely to survive in the short term, but only in the short term. Its legitimacy has been irreparably damaged by the disproportionate and brutal use of force that it has unleashed on largely unarmed protestors. Hardly anyone in Iran now buys the argument that the governing powershardliners and moderates alikeare either defending Islam or the country against foreign enemies. Furthermore, unlike in earlier periods of turmoil, the regime does not have the surplus economic resources to buy off dissenters by offers of subsidies, a practice that the regime had engaged in time and again when oil prices remained high and the volume of oil exports was high as well. The drastic fall in the volume of oil exports has removed the financial buffer on which the government had depended earlier for its survival.

The regime may be able to survive this round of protests and demonstrations but both its legitimacy and its ability to hold on to power have been severely damaged, eroding almost beyond repair its capacity to manage future rounds of protests. There may not be a repetition of 1979 this year, but the protests have surely paved the way for its reprise in the not too distant future.

Mohammed Ayoob is University Distinguished Professor Emeritus of International Relations, Michigan State University, and a senior fellow for the Center for Global Policy. His books include The Many Faces of Political Islam and, most recently, Will the Middle East Implodeand editor of Assessing the War on Terror.

Image: Reuters

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Is Iran Near Collapse? - The National Interest Online