Mediaboss Marketing

Iranian media have broadcast the first-ever footage of an operational Sejjil medium-range rocket in its underground bunker.

The same February 2020 broadcast includes what apparently is new or at least rarely-seen footage of trials involving the Sejjil.

The 59-feet-tall Sejjil could be a leading candidate to carry atomic warheads, if and when Iran develops them. The new imagery is a reminder that Iran apparently has deployed the Sejjil even before completing the rockets development.

Fabian Hinz, a researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, part of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey in California, circulated the Iranian broadcast on Twitter.

The status of the Sejjil has been under question for a while, Hinz tweeted. Seeing new footage of its deployment and new testing footage is quite a surprise.

Iran in all deploys around 55,000 surface-to-surface missiles. Most of them are shorter-range models such as the Shahab-1 and Fatah-110. The country also possesses Qiam rockets that can travel as far as 500 miles.

Sejjil is the countrys farthest-flying ballistic missile. The rocket reportedly can travel as far as 1,250 miles, in theory allowing Iran to strike targets across the Middle East, Eastern Europe, East Africa and South Asia.

Iran apparently does not possessa rocket that can strike the United States from Iranian soil. But Iran can strike U.S. interests in countries near Iran.

Iranian forces on Jan. 7, 2020 fired around 30 ballistic missiles at two Iraqi bases housing U.S. troops, injuring dozens of Americans but killing no one.

The attacks were Tehrans retaliation for the United States Jan. 2, 2020 assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the head of Irans Revolutionary Guard Corps militia and one of the countrys top military leaders.

A U.S. Special Operations Command MQ-9 drone fired on a vehicle carrying Soleimani and a deputy militia commander at Baghdads international airport, killing both men.

Jeffrey Lewis, a missile expert at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, studied photos of wreckage from the January 2020 strikes and concluded that the rockets involved in the attacks likely were Qiams.

The Qiam like many of Irans short-range rockets is a variant of the Soviet Scud rocket. The Qiams high-explosive warhead reportedly weighs around 1,700 pounds.

The Sejjil by contrast is a purely Iranian design. Along with other advancements, it packs a warhead as heavy as 2,200 pounds.

Its use of solid propellant, in particular, is due to fuel technology advancement made in conjunction with the Zelzal program during the 1990s, the development of which is believed to have been aided by China, the Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies explained.

Though the missile has a similar size, weight and range to the Shahab-3 variants, its use of solid-propellants is a major improvement on the Shahab design. Solid propellants allow for a near-immediate launch time, leaving the missile much less vulnerable during launch.

Because solid-propellant missiles do not have to be fueled immediately prior to launch, they are easily transported. On the other hand, solid propellant missiles have particular performance characteristics that make them more difficult to guide and control.

How Iranian engineers have overcome these hurdles is unknown, but it seems likely that they have modified Shahab guidance systems and/or received considerable foreign assistance.

Because the design is new, Iran will probably have to subject it to a great deal of testing before putting the missile into regular operation, CSIS stated in reference to the Sejjil.

Assuming that the Sejjil project moves at about the same speed as foreign missile development projects, Iran could not have declared the missile operational until at least 2012. However, this still has not formally occurred, CSIS added. The missile has not been tested since 2012, leaving its deployment status uncertain.

If the February 2020 broadcast is any indication, we can more safely assert that at least a few Sejjils are operational in their underground bunkers.

David Axe serves as Defense Editor of the National Interest. He is theauthor of the graphic novelsWar Fix,War Is BoringandMachete Squad.

Image: Twitter.

See more here:
This Is Iran's Deadliest Missile (And It Could Someday Carry a Nuclear Weapon) - The National Interest Online

By Samuel Smith, CP Reporter | Saturday, February 22, 2020 An Iranian flag flies in an Abyaneh mountain village. | Wikimedia Commons/Nick Taylor

The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom is raising concerns over unconfirmed reports that authorities in the Islamic Republic of Iran are threatening the destruction of the tomb of Esther and Mordechai in response to President Trumps Middle-East peace plan.

The tomb is believed by some to be the resting place of the Old Testament queen Esther and her relative, Mordechai. Esther was the queen of the Persian King Ahasuerus. She is credited with helping save the Jewish people from being massacred.

The tomb is a popular pilgrimage site for Jews and Christians in Iran.

USCIRF is troubled by reported threats to the tomb of Esther and Mordechai in Hamedan, Iran, USCIRF stressed in a tweet. [USCIRF] emphasizes the Iranian government's responsibility to protect religious sites.

The congressionally-mandated bipartisan and independent international religious freedom watchdog body was responding to a report from the Alliance for Rights of All Minorities in Iran.

The organization posted on social media Sunday that the historic Jewish site is at risk of destruction.

Iranian authorities are threatening to destroy the historic tomb of Ester and Mordechai in Hamedan and convert the site to a consular office for Palestine, the Facebook post claims.

Ester and Mordechai were biblical Jewish heroes who saved their people from a massacre in a story known as #Purim. Their burial site has been a significant Jewish landmark for Jews and history buffs around the world.

According to covering reports, members of Iranian #Basij [paramilitary] attempted to raid the historic site yesterday in an act of revenge against the Israelis Palestinian peace plan by President Trump, the post added.

The United States-based nongovernmental organization watchdog group International Christian Concern reports that reports on Irans plans for the tomb are unconfirmed. But the NGO indicated that the alleged raid by Basij forces occurred last Saturday.

The Jerusalem Post could not confirm the covering reports cited by the alliance.

One initial report appears to have been published on Feb. 7 by Mohabat News, the Iranian Christian News Agency. The report cites a warning issued by the Council for Explaining Students' Mobilization of Hamadan Universities.

Although reports are unconfirmed, it would not be the first time that the tomb of Esther and Mordechai has been threatened.

As the Brooklyn-based Jewish Press reports, a group of Basij members from Abu Ali Sina University threatened to destroy the tomb in 2010 even though the tomb was labeled a national heritage site in 2008.

Additionally, the Jewish Press notes that authorities in Iran downgraded the status of the tomb in 2011 and removed a sign indicating that it was a pilgrimage site.

The threat of the tombs destruction highlights Irans Jewish history and community. But it also runs parallel to several challenges that Iranian Christians face, as many of their charges following arrest are phrased within a framework of terms that connect them to Zionism, ICC explained in a report. The tomb of Esther and Mordechai are important to both Jews and Christians. But for local Christians to speak about the tomb at such a sensitive point in time would put them at great risk for further persecution.

Several sites sacred to Christians and Jews have been targeted over the years by radical Muslims.

In 2014, the Islamic State destroyed the tomb of Jonah in Iraq.

Iran ranks as the ninth-worst country in the world for Christian persecution, according to Open Doors USAs 2020 World Watch List.

In Iran, religious minorities are regularly arrested for worshiping in house churches and Muslim converts to Christianity are severely persecuted.

In early February, two women born into Muslim families who later converted to Christ and led two house churches in Iran spoke at a religious freedom panel discussion in Washington, D.C., where they outlined the experiences they faced.

Maryam Rostampour and Marziyeh Amirizadeh spent 259 days in Irans notorious Evin Prison. Even though they were sentenced to death, the two were released after much international pressure.

We know first-hand how difficult it is for those who attend house churches because they risk their lives to attend house churches, Amirizadeh said. Any time if the government find out, they can raid the gathering, arrest people, torture them and confiscate their property.

Dabrina Bet Tamraz, an Assyrian Christian whose father, brother and mother are imprisoned in Iran, also spoke at the event.

Today, there is not a free church. There is no free evangelical church, nor free Pentecostal, she said.

The only churches that are allowed to function are orthodox or Catholic churches with restrictions. They are not allowed to have books in Farsi. They are not even allowed to, nowadays, print books in our own language. Any Christian literature or Bible even in our own language is not permitted. They are not even allowed to speak to a Farsi person near the church.

Visit link:
Iran threatens to destroy tomb of Esther and Mordechai - The Christian Post

U.S.-Iran dynamics have grown trickier in the wake of the killing of Iranian commander Qassem Soleimani. In this tense context,three key insights emerge: that U.S. strategy is lacking, that the Middle East landscape increasingly favors Iran, and that Washington needs to find ways to de-prioritize the region.

1U.S. strategy vis--vis Iran is convoluted and clunky. The Trump administration has outlined its vision of a fundamentally different Iranian regime through its maximum pressure campaign. Yet it has attempted this policy while simultaneously pursuing contradictory efforts.

On the one hand, the administration has promoted aNational Security Strategyand aNational Defense Strategyfocused on great-power competition with China and Russia. On the other, its tactics for pursuing its objective with Iran lack a clear, unified strategy as illustrated by pulling out of the nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) absent any effort to build a pathway or to lay the groundwork for a new deal while failing to effectively lead and mobilize an international coalition to pressure Iran. The administration haspromulgated vague, contradictory, andad hoc responses to Iranian aggression from leaping up the escalation ladder by killing Qassem Soleimani while confusingly lurching in the aborted response last summer when Iran shot down a U.S. drone.

To be sure, Qassem Soleimani had a proven record of harming U.S. interests in the Middle East over decades, given his leadership of Irans regional activities. One cannot and should not underestimate the (warranted) vitriol that current and former national security policymakers have toward him. Yet it remains unclearwhyhe was killed, as well as why at that time and in that place.

Furthermore, the counter-ISIS fight has been severely disrupted over the last few weeks as the Iraqis, among other coalition members, appear uncertain about cooperation. Above all, the confusing overall U.S. approach is read by the Iranians as feckless, by regional partners and European and Asian allies as fickle, and by other U.S. adversaries like North Korea as presenting opportunities for mischief.

For those who questionwhether missile salvos by the Iranian militaryconstituted thesum totalof Irans retaliation for the Soleimani killing, lets be clear: Though the timing and the target of future action are uncertain, there should be no doubt that further Iranian response will follow. We have reached the end of the beginning of this escalatory cycle. That response could take the form of attacks by Iranian clients such as Hezbollah against soft targets frequented by U.S. military personnel, or directly against U.S. diplomatic or civilian personnel across the Gulf or the Levant, for example. It betrays a fundamental misunderstandingto say Iran has been deterredfrom a further state military response; that is not Tehrans comparative advantage, nor would it ever represent the thrust of its retaliation given the sophisticated and capable clients it has built around the region.

2The Middle East is moving along a trajectory that increasingly favors Tehran. In Syria, Iran has managed with heavy support from Russia and Hezbollah, among others to keep the despotic leader, Bashar Assad, in power. In Lebanon, the new government further empowers Hezbollah and Damascus, and it is unlikely to take real steps to prevent the economy from further tanking or to address protesters valid frustrations. In Iraq, key constituencies are seriously reconsidering the U.S. military presence. In Yemen, the Saudis and the Emiratis spent years battling the Houthis, with little to show for it besides horrific Yemeni losses and Iranian delight.

Across the region, Irans clients are only growing in capacity and capability. It is worth recalling that the regime has always found ways to fund its priorities such as building Hezbollah in the throes of Irans 8-year war with Iraq and will continue to do so. To be sure,domestic discontent inside Iranand in places like Lebanon are certainly unhelpful for the regime in Tehran, as are the sanctions draining the Iranian economy, but overall, the trajectory is increasingly positive for Iran.

However, there are steps the United States can take to adjust this trajectory and regain influence, particularly regarding Lebanon and the Gulf. Hezbollah and Iran would be overjoyed if the United States gave up on Lebanon.The United Statesshould maintain its involvement there, particularly the relationship with the Lebanese military, but must be cognizant that the new Lebanese government is abysmal. It is essential to watch closely as the military and the government sniff around for a new rapprochement, to ensure that the military continues to tackle threats of mutual concern, and to increase force protection for American military and diplomatic officials in Lebanon. The United States should also be willing to excoriate Lebanese leaders who further undermine Lebanese sovereignty, such as sanctioning Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil, who personally facilitated Hezbollahs increasingly broad-based political gains.

Across the Gulf, ratcheting down tensions is a shrewd move. Key Gulf states like the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are seeking accommodation with the Iranians. The United States should also encourage an end to the Saudi spat with Qatar and urge the Saudis to find a path out of the Yemen war. Above all, the United States should normalize the U.S.-Saudi relationship rather than prioritize it, which requires a hard look at U.S. interests vis--vis Riyadh and serious consideration of how best to encourage positive behavior while punishing problematic behavior. All of these steps will both decrease dangerously high pressures while further enabling the United States to focus on the fundamental challenges.

3The United States must find a way tomeaningfully deprioritize the Middle East.Although the real geopolitical challenge going forward is posed by China, the United States remains trapped in Middle East purgatory.On the tombstone of the post-9/11 wars will be written some elaborate combination of perplexity over why they have lasted so long; haziness over their focus; and ambiguity and anxiety over the balance sheet of what they achieved, prevented, and exacerbated.

And yet Americas over-militarized approach to the region continues. At least20,000 new U.S. military forceshave been sent in recent months, bringing thetotal estimate of U.S. military personnel in the Middle East to 80,000. This increase notably comes at a time when theU.S. diplomatic presence is plummeting in places like Iraq.

The administrations maximum pressure campaign is resulting in maximum focus on Iran. There are, of course, attendant opportunity costs for doing so. The geopolitical challenge posed by China the primary threat to global order is receiving too little time, attention, and resources.

While the United States should depart Middle East purgatory, it should not do so in a way that benefits the Russians. The Russians, not the Americans, have committed to consistent diplomatic offensives across the region. However, the United States can deprioritize the region without exacerbating Russian influence by deepening its diplomatic posture, convening like-minded and productive coalitions, and making it harder for Russia rely on the benefits of a regional security order managed by the United States.

The dynamics of the U.S.-Iran relationship are inextricably linked to regional stability and security. The U.S. government should examine the following areas of concern:

Strategy and execution:Given that U.S. strategy toward Iran and the Middle East is convoluted, the administration should clarify what it is trying to achieve, why it is trying to do so, and above all, how it will do so.

Questions to consider include: What is the administration seeking to achieve in its policy vis--vis Iran and the broader Middle East? How does it plan to implement this strategy particularly given the profound opportunity costs in light of the high price of geopolitical competition with China and Russia? And, how is its messaging effectively supporting strategy execution?

Counter-ISIS campaign and coalition: The conflagration between the United States and Iran has imperiled the fight against ISIS and fueled discontent among some Iraqis.

Questions to consider include: How and in what ways has the counter-ISIS campaign and coalition been degraded by the latest escalation between the U.S. and Iran? What role can Congress play to deepen U.S. engagement and consultation with key coalition members above all, the Iraqi government?

A deal in disarray: Detonating U.S. participation in the nuclear agreement rather than considering ways to improve it has resulted in the United States dividing itself from its fellow signatories while Iran pursues its own agenda.

Questions to consider include: What pathways may succeed for building a level of agreement between Iran and key international actors to minimize its nuclear program?

U.S. regional presence and purpose: For two decades, the United States has overwhelmingly relied on a military approach to the Middle East and a flawed one at that. The administration is doubling down on that approach as the militarys posture has skyrocketed, despite little evidence that the swelling numbers of U.S. troops are effectively deterring threats. If the U.S. military is forced to suddenly depart from Iraq, the U.S. governments ability to influence and act will be severely handcuffed, to say nothing of the welcome that its departure would receive from ISIS and Iran. And in critical places like Syria, the militarys mission is worryingly opaque and colored by announcements of and occasionally execution of precipitous redeployments without serious consultation of this body or of key coalition members. Above all, this emphasis on a military approach has come at the expense of a diplomatic approach as the U.S. diplomatic presence regionally particularly in Iraq has been severely degraded. The U.S. militaryposture in the region should be streamlined, particularly forces across the Gulf in places like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, increasingly rely on warm rather than hot bases, and the various headquarters should be substantially reduced.

Questions to consider include: Under what conditions does the administration plan to redeploy the 20,000 new U.S. military personnel deployed to the Middle East? How does the administration plan to generate those conditions for withdrawal? How can the United States right-size its regional military posture and appropriately tailor it to countering likely threats?How can it effectively streamline its Middle East military posture in light of the global context? How can it grow and rely on a more robust diplomatic presence in the region?

In sum, the lack of Middle East security and stability is threatening to monopolize U.S. national security resources. There are no simple solutions. However, some steps are overdue in leading U.S. strategy toward the Middle East in a more coherent and sustainable direction.

See more here:
Three key insights for US policy in light of recent escalation with Iran - Brookings Institution

In a video animation released in December 2017 the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, oversees an invasion of Iran after Iranian boats attack a Saudi humanitarian ship. At the end of the video, Saudi troops storm a military compound where a haggard, trembling Qassem Suleimani, the commander of the Quds force, surrenders on his knees. The video, created by an outfit calling itself Saudi Strike Force, was produced in multiple languages including Mandarin and has been viewed more than 1.5m times.

Clamouring for tough action against Iran, then for de-escalation has characterised the Saudi-Iran rivalry since 1979

In real life, Suleimani is now dead, killed not by the Saudis but in a US strike on 3 January outside Baghdad airport, having just returned from Lebanon and Syria on one of his many missions as the architect of Irans regional power base.

Saudis on Twitter were gleeful and official Saudi media were jubilant, declaring in al-Riyadh newspaper that a new decade had started for the region as Irans dark shadow receded. If Saudi officials celebrated, they did so quietly, relieved Suleimani was dead, and even more relieved they didnt have to do it themselves, but wary of Iranian retaliation. There were calls for quick de-escalation, and within three days the crown princes brother and deputy minister of defence, Khalid bin Salman, travelled to Washington DC for meetings at the White House.

This pattern of clamouring for tough action against Iran and then calling for de-escalation has characterised the Saudi-Iran rivalry since the Iranian revolution of 1979. That year is remembered mostly as the moment when Iran and the US became enemies in the wake of the US embassy hostage crisis in November. But the relationship between Tehran and Riyadh was also transformed. The two countries, once friendly rivals and pillars of US efforts to contain Soviet influence in the region, became enemies when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the ultimate leader of the revolution, began to challenge the Saudis in their role as leaders of the Muslim world and custodians of the two holy sites of Islam, Mecca and Medina.

The rivalry has become an intrinsic part of US-Iran enmity over the past 40 years, creating a threesome in which Saudi Arabia plays the role of indispensable counterweight to Tehran. But Saudi Arabia both thrives off this state of affairs and feeds it. As much as the kingdom fears Iran, its status as Americas special friend in the region has become tied to the continuation of the regime in Tehran.

This explains why Riyadh was so angry with Barack Obama for pursuing detente with Iran, worried it would undermine its own place in the region. This dependence has become even more important at a time when the US-Saudi relationship is fraught with tensions over the alleged hacking of Amazon president Jeff Bezoss phone by bin Salman and the killing of the Washington Post columnist and Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. All of Saudi Arabias faults and excesses seem to be excused as long as the Trump administration is focused on pressuring Iran.

But Saudi Arabia now finds itself with a conundrum. The kingdom wants Iran beaten up but not broken, and it relies on others to do the job because it is not up to the task not militarily and not from a strategic planning perspective. However, Saudi Arabia has found that the Trump administration may be a fickle friend when it comes to defending the kingdom in case of an Iranian attack, as happened in September 2019, when a suspected Iranian drone struck Saudi oil facilities. The US responded with a lot of heat but little fire: there was no US retaliation on behalf of Saudi Arabia. And though the Trump administration has since deployed thousands of additional troops to the kingdom, the Saudis still felt vulnerable. This is why, within a month of the attack on the Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities, the Saudis were exploring indirect talks with Iran, with the help of Iraq and Pakistan, to try to reduce tensions.

After the killing of Suleimani, the Saudi calls for de-escalation fit the same pattern. Having watched with alarm as Iran expanded its influence in the region over the past few years, thanks in large parts to Suleimani, the kingdom will now be hoping theres an opportunity for them: no matter how many of Suleimanis stratagems have been institutionalised, his successor will not be as efficient. Is there room to engage with Shia leaders in Iraq who would like to distance themselves from Iran? Is this the moment to squeeze a compromise out of Hezbollah in Lebanon, Irans mostly successful proxy?

The Iranian commander had become the young crown princes nemesis, one who in all probability inspired some jealousy and admiration for having achieved what bin Salman felt the kingdom has never quite mastered: a regional strategy that inspires both fear and respect with a solid network of loyal proxies and allies.

The bombast of the 2017 animation, which showcases Saudi Arabias extensive and expensive military arsenal, reflects the fantasy that Prince Mohammed indulged in when he first rose to power between 2015 and 2017, trying his hand at an uncharacteristically muscular Saudi foreign policy as he launched wars and embargoes. The video starts with a sentence from an interview that Prince Mohammed gave to the Saudi state television, al-Ekhbariyya, in May 2017 during which he said: We will not wait until the fight is in Saudi Arabia we will bring the fight to Iran.

By now, the crown prince has been sobered somewhat by the realisation that his swagger has delivered nothing on the regional front except a devastating war in Yemen and a useless embargo on Qatar. Even worse, it was Iran that brought the war to Saudi Arabia with the Aramco attack.

Now that the US is showing its teeth with the killing of Suleimani and more sanctions on Iran, Saudi Arabia may feel reassured, but it cannot be certain whether there is a new, coherent Trump policy or this is a one-off that will leave them exposed again the next time Iran lashes out.

As protests continue in Iran and the Trump administration ramps up pressure on Tehran, choking it economically, talk of regime change or collapse is in the air again. Saudis are also watching with trepidation. At the end of the video animation, Saudi forces are welcomed as saviours in Tehran as citizens wave the Saudi flag a fantasy if ever there was one. In real life, not only would Saudi troops be unwelcome in Iran, but actually the kingdom needs the current Iranian regime to survive.

Kim Ghattas is a senior fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and author of Black Wave

Read more:
The painful truth for Saudi Arabia: it needs the Iranian regime to survive - The Guardian

An Israeli cybersecurity firm has identified a new type of ransomware that it believes was created by Iran and has the ability to lock up or even delete industrial control systems.

Tel Aviv-based Otorio, a cybersecurity firm which specializes in industrial control systems (ICS), said that the ransomware called "Snake," like others of its kind, encrypts programs and documents on infected machines. But it also removes all file copies from infected stations, preventing the victims from recovering encrypted files.

Snake searches for hundreds of specific programs -- including many industrial processes that belong to General Electric Co. -- to terminate them and allow it to encrypt the files, Otorio said.

"Deleting or locking targeted ICS processes would prohibit manufacturing teams from accessing vital production-related processes including analytics, configuration and control," Otorio said in a statement. "This is the equivalent of both blindfolding a driver and then taking away the steering wheel."

Multiple calls to the Iranian Foreign Ministry went unanswered.

In a statement, a General Electric representative said, "GE is aware of reports of a ransomware family with an industrial control system specific functionality. Based on our understanding, the ransomware is not exclusively targeting GE's ICS products, and it does not target a specific vulnerability in GE's ICS products."

GE would work with customers to provide support as needed, the representative said.

Otorio researchers began investigating the appearance of a new ransomware in mid-December and soon realized it was one of the first designed to target the industrial sector. As they dug further, the researchers found that Bahrain Petroleum Co. -- known as Bapco for short -- was potentially vulnerable to this new cyber threat.

Not only does Bapco use GE equipment, its name was found in the malware's code, Otorio said.

"There are findings and fingerprints inside the malware that when taken into account with the circumstances surrounding this campaign make it highly unreasonable that Snake was carried out by a different actor other than Iran," the Otorio report said.

Boosting the researchers' confidence that the Snake originated in Iran was an alleged separate attack on Bapco carried out in parallel with the finding of Snake.

"It is highly unlikely that a Gulf-area company will be attacked by two different potent actors, each targeting a different part of the organization at the same time," the researchers said in an email.

Multiple calls to Bapco went unanswered.

Otorio Chief Executive Officer Danny Bren, former joint chief of cyber defense in the Israeli military, said that an Iranian choice of Bapco as a potential target wouldn't be incidental.

"The target was picked carefully because they want to change oil prices," he said. "This is financial warfare. The world is putting a lot of financial tension on Iran and they are reacting with the same tool."

Former U.S. officials and security experts have expressed concern that Iran may be considering a cyber-attack against the U.S. or its allies after an American airstrike in Baghdad earlier this month killed Qassem Soleimani, the Iranian major general who led the Islamic Revolutionary Guard's Quds force. Iran holds an arsenal of malware, and Otorio said Snake was likely created before the general's assassination.

Go here to see the original:
'Snake' ransomware, targeting industrial processes, is linked to Iran - The Union Leader