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This paper uses a global general equilibrium simulation model to quantify the effects of lifting economic sanctions on Iran and the effect of strategic responses to this trade regime change. The analysis highlights individually the countries and groups of countries that play an important role or could affect the outcome of the nuclear negotiations and the major oil exporting countries or country groups. It represents the lifting of Irans economic sanctions in a stylized fashion, emphasizing three components that are likely to have effects in the near to medium term: (i) the lifting of the EU oil embargo, (ii) the reduction in Irans trade costs, and (iii) the liberalization of cross-border imports of financial and transport services.

The lifting of Irans economic sanctions is most beneficial to Irans economy. Its per capita welfare is expected to rise by 3.7 % mainly because of the lifting of the oil embargo imposed by the EU and the liberalization of cross-border trade in financial and transport services. Net oil importers gain while net oil exporters lose as the world price of oil declines by about 13 % due to the additional amount of oil sold on the global market in response to the recovery of Iranian oil exports to the EU. In per capita terms, Israel is the second largest beneficiary of the lifting of Irans economic sanctions, gaining almost 0.5 % in per capita welfare, while the EU and the US gain 0.5 % and 0.3 %, respectively. The losses are steepest for OPEC members, especially the GCC countries which as a group are expected to lose 3.9 % in per capita welfare. Per capita welfare for other OPEC members and Russia declines by 2.8 % and 1.6 %, respectively. Overall, the world benefits most from the lifting of the EU oil embargo and less so from other aspects of the sanction removal as Iran accounts for a negligible share of the worlds non-oil trade.

Net oil exporting countries lose mainly due to the deterioration in their terms of trade. As many of them subsidize oil, the lower oil price will have a compensating efficiency gain, but not enough to reverse the welfare loss. Net oil importing countries gain mostly because of improvements in their terms of trade, but also because cheaper oil enables expansion of their petrochemical production and because in most of these countries oil use is taxed, so the interaction of existing distortions and structural change leads to efficiency gains.

If major OPEC members limit the quantity of oil produced and exported to support the world oil price, they will enhance Irans gains, limit oil exporters losses, and reduce the gains to oil importers. The world would be worse off as the reduction in oil exporters losses would be insufficient to compensate the reduction in oil importers gains.

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Lifting Economic Sanctions on Iran: Global Effects and ...

How is Iran Reacting to Low Oil Prices?

The slump in oil prices has hurt the Iranian economy but by less than other oil producers in the region. The reason is that compared to other oil producers, the Iranian economy is more diversified, and therefore less dependent on oil revenues. Oil accounts for about 30 % of government revenues.

To maintain market share, Irans oil production has increased since January 16, 2016 when implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and lifting of sanctions began. Some 600,000 b/d has been added so far and the government plans to raise it up to 800,000 b/d by the summer of 2016, reaching pre-sanction levels (prior to 2014).

As part of the JCPOA, some $30 billion of frozen assets have been released, allowing the government to access funds and assets abroad. The government has taken some actions to mitigate the impact of low oil prices on its budget including raising taxes on parastatal organizations which were previously exempt.

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Irans Economic Outlook- July 2016 - World Bank

Iran is the second largest economy in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region after Saudi Arabia, with an estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2016 of US$412.2 billion. It also has the second largest population of the region after Egypt, with an estimated 78.8 million people in 2015. Irans economy is characterized by the hydrocarbon sector, agriculture and services sectors, and a noticeable state presence in manufacturing and financial services. Iran ranks second in the world in natural gas reserves and fourth in proven crude oil reserves. Economic activity and government revenues still depend to a large extent on oil revenues and therefore remain volatile.

Iranian authorities have adopted a comprehensive strategy encompassing market-based reforms as reflected in the governments 20-year vision document and the sixth five-year development plan for the 2016-2021 period. The sixth five-year development plan is comprised of three pillars, namely, the development of a resilient economy, progress in science and technology, and the promotion of cultural excellence. On the economic front, the development plan envisages an annual economic growth rate of 8 percent and reforms of state-owned enterprises, the financial and banking sector, and the allocation and management of oil revenues among the main priorities of the government during the five-year period.

The Iranian government has implemented a major reform of its subsidy program on key staples such as petroleum products, water, electricity and bread, which has resulted in a moderate improvement in the efficiency of expenditures and economic activities. The overall indirect subsidies, which were estimated to be equivalent to 27 percent of GDP in 2007/2008 (approximately US$77.2 billion), have been replaced by a direct cash transfer program to Iranian households. The second phase of the subsidy reform plan began in Spring 2014 which involves a more gradual fuel price adjustment than previously envisaged and the greater targeting of cash transfers to low-income households. Around 3 million high income households have already been removed from the cash transfer recipient list. As a result, the expenditures of the Targeted Subsidies Organization (TSO) is estimated to have declined to 3.4 percent of GDP in 2016 from 4.2 percent in 2014.

Following a contraction of close to 2 percent in 2015, the Iranian economy bounced back sharply in 2016 at an estimated 6.4 percent. Latest data available for the first half of the Iranian calendar year 2016 (ending in March 2017) suggest that the Iranian economy grew at an accelerated pace of 9.2 percent (year over year) in the second quarter (corresponding to July-September 2016) after a 5.2 percent growth in the first quarter. This brought the overall growth in the first half of 2016 to 7.4 percent, while non-oil GDP grew by a mere 0.9 percent. Despite the dominance of the oil sectordriven by the positive impact of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action implementation on oil production and exports, there are some signs of dynamism in the non-oil sectors as well. The unemployment rate returned to a three-year high of 12.7 percent (or 3.3 million unemployed) in the second quarter of 2016 despite the high growth rate in this period. This increase is largely a reflection of an increase in the labor participation rate to 40.4 percent compared to 35.4 percent in Jan-Mar 2014. Male and female unemployment rates of 21.8 and 10.4 percent respectively, also highlight a widening employment gender gap in the job market compared to 2015.Poverty is estimated to have fallen from 13.1 percent to 8.1 percent between 2009 and 2013 (US$5.5 a day line in 2011 PPP). This was likely due to a universal cash transfer program in late 2010, which preceded the elimination of subsidies on energy and bread. The program appears to have more than compensated for the likely increase in energy expenditures of less-well-off households, thus contributing to positive consumption growth of the bottom 40 percent of the population, even though overall consumption growth between 2009 and 2013 was negative. However, poverty increased in 2014, which may have been associated with a declining social assistance in real terms.

Both external and budget balances improved in 2016. Irans current account surplus witnessed a strong boost due to the robust growth in oil exports. The current account surplus is estimated to have increased to 6.5 percent of GDP in 2016 up from 2.7 percent in 2015 benefiting strongly from the removal of oil sanctions and a recovery in exports. Similarly, the fiscal deficit is estimated to have improved in 2016 due to strong growth in revenues, with the central government budget deficit declining to around 1.5 percent of GDP from 1.9 percent in 2015. The governments proposed budget for 2017 mandates a reduction in the deficit by reducing total expenditures and increasing overall revenue shares of GDP. Annual inflation is estimated to have fall below 10 percent in 2016, for the first time in a quarter of a century due to a less accommodative monetary policy.

In the medium to long term, growth prospects will rely on the pace of Irans reintegration with the global economy in banking, trade and investment and the implementation of key structural reforms. Growth rates in 2017-19 are expected to retreat to slightly above 4 percent. As Iranian banks face the challenge of delays in establishing correspondent banking relationship with large international banks, foreign direct investment inflows to Iran and trade relationships with the rest of the world are restrained. Still, recent developments suggest non-oil sector and investments are likely to play a bigger role in the next few year.

Going forward, implementing the domestic reform agenda is likely to bring the highest growth dividend in the medium to long term. The new governments challenge, after the May elections, will be to prioritize the reforms outlined in the new five-year development plan and steadily implement them. This will involve tackling the structural reform agenda that will boost the non-oil sector growth, through creating a level-playing field for existing and new firms, improving the business environment and the efficiency of labor markets.

Last Updated:Apr 01, 2017

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Iran Overview - World Bank

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Anti-government demonstrations that began in Iran on Thursday have now spread to several major cities.

Large numbers reportedly turned out in Rasht, in the north, and Kermanshah, in the west, with smaller protests in Isfahan, Hamadan and elsewhere.

The protests began against rising prices but have spiralled into a general outcry against clerical rule and government policies.

A small number of people have been arrested in Tehran, the capital.

They were among a group of 50 people who gathered in a city square, Tehran's deputy governor-general for security affairs told the Iranian Labour News Agency.

The US State Department condemned the arrests and urged "all nations to publicly support the Iranian people and their demands for basic rights and an end to corruption".

The demonstrations began in the north-eastern city of Mashhad - the country's second most-populous - on Thursday.

People there took to the streets to express anger at the government over high prices, and vented their fury against President Hassan Rouhani. Fifty-two people were arrested for chanting "harsh slogans".

The protests spread to other cities in the north-east, and and some developed into broader anti-government demonstrations, calling for the release of political prisoners and an end to police beatings.

On Friday, despite warnings from authorities, the demonstrations spread further to some of the biggest cities in the country.

They represent the most serious and widespread expression of public discontent in Iran since mass protests in 2009 that followed a disputed election, correspondents say.

What began as a protest against economic conditions and corruption has turned political.

Slogans have been chanted against not just Mr Rouhani but Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and clerical rule in general.

Demonstrators were reportedly heard yelling slogans like "The people are begging, the clerics act like God". Protests have even been held in Qom, a holy city home to powerful clerics.

There is also anger at Iran's interventions abroad. In Mashhad, some chanted "not Gaza, not Lebanon, my life for Iran", a reference to what protesters say is the administration's focus on foreign rather than domestic issues.

Other demonstrators chanted "leave Syria, think about us" in videos posted online. Iran is a key provider of military support to the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

It is also accused of providing arms to Houthi rebels fighting a Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, which it denies, and is an ally of Lebanon's powerful Shia movement Hezbollah.

Iran's Fars news agency, which is close to the elite and powerful Revolutionary Guards security force, reported that many protesters who turned out over economic grievances decided to leave rallies after others yelled political slogans.

President Rouhani promised the 2015 nuclear deal that Iran signed with world powers would boost the economy. However despite the lifting of international sanctions, the unemployment rate is 12.4%.

There have been calls on social media for protests up and down the country, despite warnings from the government against illegal gatherings.

Demonstrations of varying sizes are reported to have occurred in at least seven cities.

Overall, the numbers said to be taking part range from a less than 100 in some places to thousands in others - but demonstrations do not appear to be taking place on a massive scale.

Videos posted on social media appear to show clashes between security forces and some demonstrators in Kermanshah.

Fars news agency reported that protesters there destroyed some public property and were dispersed.

The governor-general of Tehran said that any such gatherings would be firmly dealt with by the police, who are out in force on main intersections.

Officials in Mashhad said the protest was organised by "counter-revolutionary elements", and video online showed police using water cannon.

Analysis by Kasra Naji, BBC Persian

The demonstrations have taken the Iranian authorities by surprise. Impromptu anti-government demonstrations are rare in a country where the Revolutionary Guard and numerous intelligence agencies have a strong grip on the population.

Predictably they are blaming anti-revolutionary elements and foreign agents. But the protests clearly stem from seething discontent in Iran, mainly because of the worsening economic conditions faced by ordinary Iranians.

A BBC Persian investigation has found that Iranians, on average, have become 15% poorer in the past 10 years alone.

Many believe that money that should be used to improve their lives is being spent by Iran's leaders on conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Iraq. Billions are also being spent on spreading religious propaganda and Shia Islam around the world.

But it seems that the hardliners opposed to President Rouhani may have triggered the unrest by holding a demonstration that quickly grew out of control and spread to cities and towns across the country.

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Iranian cities hit by anti-government protests - BBC News

Recent Updates:

Statement Relating to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action "Implementation Day" of January 16, 2016

Implementation Day Statement:

In connection with reaching Implementation Day, today the Department of the Treasurys Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued several documents. Specifically, OFAC posted to its website: Guidance Relating to the Lifting of Certain Sanctions Pursuant to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Implementation Day; Frequently Asked Questions Relating to the Lifting of Certain U.S. Sanctions Under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Implementation Day; General License H: Authorizing Certain Transactions relating to Foreign Entities Owned or Controlled by a United States Person; and a Statement of Licensing Policy for Activities Related to the Export or Re-Export to Iran of Commercial Passenger Aircraft and Related Parts and Services. The aforementioned documents are effective today, January 16, 2016.

In addition, OFAC has submitted for publication in the Federal Register a final rule adding a general license under the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 560, relating to the importation into the United States of Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs, including pistachios and caviar ; this general license will be effective upon publication in the Federal Register.

OFAC has also published to its website additional information regarding actions to give effect to other JCPOA commitments, including removals from the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, the Foreign Sanctions Evaders List and/or the Non-SDN Iran Sanctions Act List, as appropriate. In addition, OFAC has made available on its website a list of persons identified as blocked solely pursuant to Executive Order 13599 ("E.O. 13599 List"), which consists of persons that OFAC previously identified as meeting the definition of the Government of Iran or an Iranian financial institution.Information regarding these changes to OFACs sanctions lists is available on OFACs Recent Actions website.This information will be published subsequently in the Federal Register.

Implementation Day also marks the close of the Joint Plan of Action of November 24, 2013, as extended (JPOA), including the provision of sanctions relief pursuant to the JPOA. Effective Implementation Day, all specific licenses that: (1) were issued pursuant to OFACs Second Amended Statement of Licensing Policy on Activities Related to the Safety of Irans Civil Aviation Industry, and (2) have an expiration date on or before July 14, 2015, are hereby authorized to remain in effect according to their terms until May 31, 2016.

Important Advisories and Information

Frequently Asked Questions

List of CISADA and NDAA Prohibitions or Conditions

On October 9, 2012, the President signed Executive Order (E.O.) 13628, which provides for, among other things, the implementation of certain sanctions set forth in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (TRA). Section 1 of E.O. 13628 provides that the Secretary of the Treasury, pursuant to authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), shall take action to implement certain sanctions set forth in Section 6 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996, as amended (ISA), when the President, the Secretary of State, or the Secretary of the Treasury imposes such sanctions on a person pursuant to provisions of ISA, the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, as amended, or the TRA. Section 6 of ISA includes both blocking and non-blocking sanctions. Click here for additional information on the NS-ISA List.

In order to implement the non-blocking provisions of Section 6 of ISA, OFAC developed the NS-ISA List. OFAC implements the blocking sanction under Section 6 of ISA by adding persons subject to that sanction to the List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons with the identifying tag [ISA]. Pursuant to the United States commitment set out in Section 4.8.1 of Annex II and Section 17.3 of Annex V of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action of July 14, 2015, the Secretary of State determined, effective on Implementation Day, that the sanctions previously imposed on all the persons that had been named on the NS-ISA List as of the day prior to Implementation Day should be terminated. On Implementation Day, OFAC gave effect to the Secretary of States determination, and as a result, the NS-ISA List is, as of Implementation Day, currently empty.

SpecificGuidance on the Iran Sanctions

Interpretive Guidance

OFACissues interpretive guidance on specific issues related to the sanctions programs it administers. These interpretations of OFAC policyare sometimes published in response to a public request for guidance or may be released proactively by OFAC in order to address acomplex topic.

Applying for a SpecificOFAC License

Executive Orders, Statutes, Rules and Regulations Relating to Iran

Executive Orders

Statutes

Code of Federal Regulations

Federal Register Notices

United Nations Security Council Resolutions

The provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010), and 2224 (2015) have been terminated subject to re-imposition in the event of significant non-performance of JCPOA commitments.

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Iran Sanctions