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Tue, Feb 16, 2021

IranSourcebyFatemeh Aman

Iran's Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif meets with Taliban political chief Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, in Tehran, Iran January 31, 2021. Wana via pool/WANA (West Asia News Agency)/Handout via REUTERS ATTENTION EDITORS - THIS IMAGE HAS BEEN SUPPLIED BY A THIRD PARTY

It could not have been a more striking picture: a Taliban delegation visiting Tehran in late January and being received by senior Iranian officials. They reportedly discussed relations between both countries, the situation of the Afghan migrants in Iran, and the current political and security situation of Afghanistan and the region.

The presence of a Taliban delegation in Iran was shocking to many. However, Saeed Khatibzadeh, spokesman for the Iranian foreign ministry, stated that the Afghan government was notified in advance of the trip. Afghanistans foreign ministry confirmed that Tehran had in fact sought the Afghan governments views in advance. The official Afghan statement went on to say, Iran wants to make sure that a post-conflict Afghanistan will not be a safe haven for terrorist groups [but] will remain a center of regional and international cooperation.

This was not the first time that Taliban leaders had visited Iran. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, director of the Talibans diplomatic office in Qatar, met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in Tehran in November 2019. It was a trip aimed at helping Afghan peace and security.

According to Zarif, who met with the Taliban delegation on January 31, political decisions cannot be made in a vacuum and an inclusive government must be formed in a participatory process and needs to consider all fundamental structures, institutions, and laws, such as the constitution.

Inviting the Taliban to Tehran: A hard sell for Iranian leaders

Since 1996, when the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan, Iranian hardliners have often been called Irans Taliban. In fact, during the 2009 post-election protests known as the Green Movement, Iranian demonstrators chanted, Down with the Taliban, in Kabul or Tehran. Fast forward twelve years later and Iranian authorities had to justify the actual presence of the Taliban delegation in Tehran.

The trip did not sit well in Afghanistan either. The Afghan public does not react well to the perception that their countrys neighbors support the Taliban, which has been responsible for the deaths of countless journalists, students, and other civilians.

Now the Iranian government must sell the importance of Irans involvement in the Afghan peace process and create a more acceptable image of the Taliban in order to portray them as a serious negotiating partner.

Its attempts so far have not been very successful. On January 27, a tweet by Ali Shamkhani, the secretary of Irans Supreme National Security Council, raised an eyebrow among Afghan officials. Shamkhani tweeted that: In todays meeting with the Taliban political delegation: I found the leaders of this group determined to fight the United States. The Iranian Labor News Agency also quoted Shamkhani as saying: Iran will not recognize any group aiming at coming to power through war, emphasizing the necessity of participation of all ethnicities in determining the fate of Afghanistan through an absolutely peaceful process.

The damage was done, however. Iranian and Afghan social media users pointed out the Talibans previous statement [which contradicted Shamkhanis] that the group is in daily touch with American military. Meanwhile, Yasin Zia, Chief of the General Staff of the Afghanistan National Army, criticized Shamkhani on January 28, saying that Unfortunately, your understanding of the ongoing war in Afghanistan is incorrect. The Taliban is not fighting the Americans but the Afghan people. We act decisively against any group of enemies of the Afghan people.

Iran has also tried to offer its services as a potential middleman. On February 2, Special Representative of Irans foreign ministry, Mohammad Ebrahim Taherian, met with Afghan officialsincluding head of the High Council of National Reconciliation Abdullah Abdullah and Afghan Foreign Minister Mohammad Haneef Atmarin Kabul, in what appeared to be an attempt to mediate between the Taliban and the Afghan government. Abdullah praised Irans position toward Afghanistans peace process and its role in securing peace.

Irans changing view of the Taliban

The Iranian government has not always been on cordial terms with the Taliban. In 1998, Iran almost went to war with Taliban-led Afghanistan, when the Taliban murdered nine Iraniansone journalist and eight diplomatsat the Iranian consulate in Mazar-e Sharif. After the US invaded Afghanistan in 2001, Iran cooperated fully with the US and was highly active in the post-Taliban formation of the Afghan government. It mediated between Afghan warlords who seemed irreconcilable to each other and brought them to the reconstruction conference in Bonn. Iran, the country that for many years hosted various Afghan warlords, expelled Gulbuddin Hekmatyar due to his hostility toward the US.

In January 2002, things changed, however. President George W. Bush branded Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, as the axis of evil in his State of the Union address. That may have been the genesis of Irans contact with the Taliban. Fearing a possible attack from the US via Afghanistan, Iran provided the Taliban with improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to assist its insurgent campaign against the US occupation. Iran came to view the Taliban as a way to weaken the Americans but did not support the group at the expense of Afghan stability.

Then came the emergence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) in 2015, a group many times more brutal and violent than the Taliban. As Iran lost confidence in the Afghan governments ability to defeat IS-K, it turned to the Taliban. High level contacts between Iran and the Taliban ensued. For example, former Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour was killed on May 21, 2016 by a US drone attack while Mansour was returning to Pakistan after a long stay in Iran. Later, these contacts became public, with Tehran stating that the Afghan government was always notified of meetings between Taliban and Iranian officials. Interestingly, on December 26, 2018, Shamkhani justified the meetings by describing the threat of the IS-K presence in Afghanistan as serious.

Current Taliban-Iran ties

At this point, neither the US nor the government of Afghanistan can deal with the Taliban alone, as neither has enough leverage. At the same time, it is in the interest of the entire region that Afghanistan not become a haven for terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. A regional solution may be a lasting one that prevents Afghanistan from descending into chaos. Iran would be an essential player in such a project and it would be a political and security win for Tehran if it successfully mediates between the Taliban and the Afghan government. However, it is imperative that the Afghan government remain actively involved and does not feel excluded from Iranian efforts.

The truth is that the Afghan government, despite all its shortcomings, has been elected by the Afghan people. It has made achievements in areas such as womens rights and the rights of minorities that should not be sacrificed, and that, as Abdullah promised, should be reflected in the peace process.

Meanwhile, if the Taliban truly desires to be part of the Afghan governing structure, it must be willing to accept that times have changed since they came to power in 1996. Taliban leaders need to understand that to govern Afghanistan they need to win the Afghan peoples hearts and minds and understand that violent tactics will only increase their unpopularity.

The Taliban have frequently denied responsibility for the increase of violent attacks in Afghanistan over the past several months. However, the Afghan public does not believe their denials. The Taliban is not a unified group with a centralized leadership. There are several different factions within the organization, perhaps with varying understandings of power-sharing. There may be spoilers, both within the Taliban and foreign insurgentssuch as IS-Kwho oppose the peace talks. The Taliban, as a negotiating partner, needs to create visible and verifiable distance from these spoilers.

As the Afghanistan Study Groups February report stated, Iran does not want to see the return of a Taliban regime in Kabul. Iran cannot possibly expect to turn the Taliban into its proxy in the case that Afghanistan descends into civil war and there is a genuine ideological rift between Iran and the Taliban. Moreover, it is in Tehrans interests to have a stable Afghanistan as a neighbor.

Regional cooperation might be the only solution to reach a lasting peace for Afghanistan and, in that regard, Iran may be able to help.

Fatemeh Aman is a non-resident senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. She has written on Iranian, Afghan, and broader Middle Eastern affairs for over 20 years.

Thu, Feb 11, 2021

The de-listing of Iranian economic entities that were designated as terrorist entities could spark a broader debate on the overarching US approach to Iranian support for regional armed factions.

IranSourcebyKenneth Katzman

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Iran-Taliban growing ties: What's different this time? - Atlantic Council

A blame game has intensified in Iran more than two months after the assassination of Iran's top nuclear scientist and the purported mastermind of an alleged atomic-weapons effort, Mohsen Fakhrizadeh.

The 59-year-old Fakhrizadeh was killed on a highway outside the Iranian capital in broad daylight in November in what was regarded as a major security failure.

Tehran has blamed the attack on Israel but also acknowledged the likely role of Iranian infiltrators in the killing of Fakhrizadeh, who officials say was also a deputy defense minister.

Israel, which is suspected of a decade-long series of assassinations of at least four other Iranian nuclear scientists, has not commented.

Iranian Intelligence Minister Mahmud Alavi said in a televised interview last week that a member of the armed forces made the initial preparations for the attack in Absard, some 60 kilometers from Tehran.

But the armed forces hit back, saying the unnamed individual had never officially joined its ranks, since he was fired during training in 2014.

Political Rivalries

The public debate over the incident underscores political rivalries within the Iranian establishment, which has sought to project unity over the nuclear program and recent moves aimed at pressuring the United States to remove sanctions imposed under U.S. ex-President Donald Trump.

Iran's covert and publicly declared nuclear activities have been at the center of a decades-long international dispute over what many Western governments and Israel say is a hidden weapons program.

Pressure has ratcheted up on both sides since Trump withdrew nearly three years ago from a 2015 landmark nuclear deal that offered Iran sanctions relief in exchange for Tehran abstaining from sensitive work like highly enriching uranium, among other things.

Speaking to Iranian state-controlled television on February 8, Alavi said it was impossible for his ministry to also keep intelligence watch over the "armed forces."

While he did not specify any part of the military, the widely feared intelligence branch of the powerful Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps has a history of arrests of dual nationals, academics, environmentalists, and others suspected of disloyalty.

Defending his ministry's actions in the context of the assassination, Alavi said his agents had warned five days before the attack that an "enemy" was planning to kill Fakhrizadeh "at this location," adding that "only the time was not clear."

"Fakhrizadeh was a member of the armed forces," Alavi said, "[and] the individual who made the first preparations for the terror act was a member of the armed forces. We can't to do intelligence work in the sphere of the armed forces."

Separately, Alavi told the semiofficial ISNA news agency that the individual, whom he described as "the main element" who prepared the killing, had been fired from the armed forces and left the country before the November 27 assassination.

He didn't say which branch of the armed forces -- which includes the IRGC, the army, and certain kinds of law enforcement -- the individual had been involved in.

The IRGC's Ansar al-Mahdi division is reportedly in charge of protecting key state figures as well as important sites.

In a statement issued on February 16, the armed forces said that the individual mentioned by Alavi had been discharged six years ago during training due to "moral problems and drug addiction."

The statement said the suspect had been completely cut off from the armed forces and thus "his security crime, like [those of] other members of society, falls within the scope of the mission and responsibilities of the Ministry of Intelligence."

The statement added that Alavi should have been more careful in his live comments so as not to provide any pretext to "the criminal enemies of the establishment, such as the United States and [Israel]" while safeguarding "the important position" of his ministry and "the dignity" of the armed forces.

In a separate statement, the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency criticized Alavi's comments and said that even if all of his claims were true, he could have ordered the Intelligence Ministry to monitor the site of the planned assassination "until the dust settled."

"Wasn't Fakhrizadeh important enough for Alavi to issue such an order?" the hard-line Tasnim asked. It suggested Alavi's comments could instill a sense of state weakness instead of promoting security.

Rohani Under Fire

Hard-liners have used Fakhrizadeh's assassination to attack President Hassan Rohani and his cabinet. Some have alleged that the government had given the UN nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), access to Fakhrizadeh, a claim that was denied within the government.

Shortly after the attack, government spokesman Al Rabiei defended the Intelligence Ministry, saying it had provided information about the target and likely location of the attack to "relevant security bodies."

Without saying names, Rabiei said that following security protocols could have prevented "the crime."

IRGC officials have said that Fakhrizadeh was killed by a "satellite-controlled" machine gun mounted on a pickup truck that later exploded, and that there were no assassins on the ground.

The British weekly Jewish Chronicle reported last week, citing intelligence sources, that Fakhrizadeh was killed by a one-ton automated gun that was smuggled into Iran piece by piece by the Israeli spy agency Mossad.

The Jewish Chronicle did not provide details of its sources or any evidence to back its report.

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Blame Game Intensifies Over Iranian Accomplice To Assassination Of Top Nuclear Scientist - Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty

Days before the presidency of Donald Trump ended, Secretary of State Michael Pompeo offered a rather chilling hypothetical:

Imagine the vulnerability wed have if Iran gave al-Qaida access to its satellite networks.This is a terror organization, buried deeply inside a nation-state with advanced capabilities Imagine that al-Qaida starts carrying out attacks at Irans behest, even if the control is not perfect.Who is to say that this isnt the next form of blackmail to pressure countries back into a nuclear deal?

A robust, fully cooperative relationship between al-Qaeda and Iran is a frightening prospect. Al-Qaeda remains determined to kill Americans and, despite continued counterterrorism pressure, still boasts a network of affiliates ready to do its bidding. Training, direction, and/or advanced technologies from Tehran could allow a group like al-Qaeda to strike the United States, its partners, and allies with greater reach and lethality.

Yet, a close reading of Iran and al-Qaedas post-9/11 history based on documents captured in Osama bin Ladens Abbottabad compound suggests that the prospect of deep collaboration between al-Qaeda and Iran is remote. Al-Qaedas concerns with Iranian duplicity and ideological embarrassment have often led it to distance itself from Tehran, just as Iran has at times endured harsh words and targeted attacks from the group. In the short term, the reported assassination of Iran-based al-Qaeda operative Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah, also known as Abu Muhammad al-Masri, and his daughter Maryam in Tehran may temporarily render the relationship even more distant. Though Irans accommodation of al-Qaeda is provocative to the West and non-trivial for the group, it pales in comparison to the extensive support Tehran has offered its proxy groups in the region.

The United States should not allow it to distract from or thwart diplomatic efforts to address far more alarming and consequential dimensions of Iranian behavior.

Frenemies From the Beginning

Al-Qaedas uneasy relationship with Iran spans nearly three decades. Al-Qaeda and Iranian operatives met in the early 1990s in Hassan al-Turabis Sudan, which hosted congregations of Islamist militants. During these meetings, the Sudanese ruling party, Iran, and al-Qaeda considered forming a tripartite front against their common enemies and eventually decided to collaborate, politically and militarily to confront Israel and the United States [and] undermine Arab regimes which supported Israel and the United States. Senior al-Qaeda members and trainers later received training in Iran and Lebanon. By 1996, Iran was offering transit assistance to al-Qaeda operatives, and, in 1998, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps provided sanctuary for senior al-Qaeda leader Sayf al-Adl and Abu Muhammad al-Masri, both of whom fled to Iran after the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.

The post-9/11 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent destruction of the Talibans Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan led Iran and al-Qaeda to open negotiations. At the time, the group was desperate to find a sanctuary for senior operatives and their family members. Eventually, Iran approved al-Qaedas safe haven, so long as al-Qaeda members adopted a low profile. Some, such as Saad bin Ladin, remained in Iran and managed al-Qaedas affairs from there. Others traveled elsewhere, with, according to a document recovered in bin Ladens compound, the cooperation of Iranian intelligence.

This brief honeymoon period gave way to a wave of arrests. In late 2002 and through 2003, Iran cracked down on the group with an arrest campaign that targeted not just prominent al-Qaeda operatives but their families. Many of these individuals experienced harsh treatment while in Iranian custody and organized riots, suffered mental illnesses, and carried out hunger strikes. Treatment improved slightly over the years, as Iran upgraded the al-Qaeda prisoners living conditions; allowed some to visit amusement parks, gardens, and swimming pools; and provided some opportunities for limited Internet use.

Even as it held al-Qaeda operatives and families in prison, in 2005, Iran began allowing al-Qaeda facilitator Yasin al-Suri to operate from its territory. Al-Qaeda senior leaders were aware of al-Suris activities, as a document from Abbottabad profiling several middle-level al-Qaeda operatives describes al-Suris role in greater detail. His current work, the document notes, revolves around connecting Abdullah Khans routes with Iran and bringing in brothers from abroad. Al-Suri seems to have curried favor with Iranian authorities, as a late 2009 letter by senior al-Qaeda leader Shaykh Saeed described him as having served as the groups envoy in Iran. In another from early 2010, Shaykh Saeed notes that al-Suri is a very acceptable figure for the Iranians. Several missives from bin Ladens compound describe the importance of al-Qaedas logistical hub in Iran.

Iranian passive support has not come without restrictions on al-Qaeda operatives behavior. In the wake of its arrest campaign in 2002-2003, Iran apparently relayed to al-Qaeda that it was the groups own fault for violating Tehrans conditions, according to a document from bin Ladens compound. Writing in May 2010, a senior al-Qaeda operative described how the Iranians had passed the group a message declaring:

We do not mind that brothers (Arab and non-Arab) come and work in coordinating, collecting money, and other tasks through Iran. But, they should not come through official routes. Rather, they should come via smuggling, and they should not bring in brothers from abroad through official routes, especially airports, but instead through smuggling routes (from Turkey or other countries). [Also,] do not associate with any Iranian (meaning, do not employ Iranians in your work and do not interact with Iranians in your work).

A 2012 U.S. Treasury designation subsequently revealed restrictions on al-Qaedas behavior. In return for freedom of operation and uninhibited ability to travel for extremists and their families on Iranian territory, the Islamic Republic demanded that al-Qaeda refrain from conducting any operations within Iranian territory and recruiting operatives inside Iran while keeping Iranian authorities informed of their activities. Pompeo similarly emphasized that Iran allowed al-Qaeda to establish an operational headquarters so long as al-Qaida operatives abide by the regimes rules.

Unsurprisingly, the relationship has hardly been harmonious. Al-Qaeda and Iran make for rather awkward allies. Al-Qaeda subscribes to a brand of Sunni jihadism that considers Shiite Muslims apostates. Although al-Qaeda has long viewed the threat of Shiism to be less pressing than that of the United States, it thus hardly views the Shiiite sect favorably. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran, itself a Shiite theocracy, may share deep enmity towards the United States and the Islamic State, but common enemies do not make a friendship.

To avoid alienating his supporters in Saudi Arabia, in the 1990s, bin Laden is reported to have rebuffed Irans advances. At times, al-Qaedas passive rhetoric vis-a-vis Iran has exposed it to criticism from supporters and competitors alike, leading it to ramp up the intensity of its threats toward Iran. Iran seems to have not always appreciated al-Qaedas attempts at intimidation. In one missive, an al-Qaeda operative described the Islamic Republics request that al-Qaeda leaders calm down the campaign against them, as our enemy is the same.

Iran and al-Qaeda have also found themselves in one anothers crosshairs. The virulent anti-Shiite attacks perpetrated by Abu Musab al-Zarqawis organization notwithstanding, al-Qaeda has kidnapped two Iranian diplomats to secure the release of its prisoners. In 2014, al-Qaedas Yemen affiliate claimed a car bomb attack on the Iranian ambassadors residence.

Beyond the wave of detentions in the early 2000s, Iran has also occasionally arrested other al-Qaeda operatives residing on its soil. The Iranian government imprisoned senior al-Qaeda facilitator Yasin al-Suri at least twice: once around June 2008 and another time in December 2011. In 2009, Iran also arrested an al-Qaeda official in Iran, leading the groups work to stop.

Likely due to the unpredictability of Iranian authorities, anxieties over being double-crossed by Iran pervade al-Qaedas internal correspondence. Several Abbottabad documents speculate that Iran might trade al-Qaeda prisoners or was otherwise in cahoots with the West. Al-Qaedas suspicions are particularly apparent in an exchange between senior al-Qaeda leader Attiya Abd al-Rahman and bin Laden in the fall of 2010. After Attiya reported the death of over ten al-Qaeda operatives in a single month, two of whom had recently been released from Iranian custody, bin Laden asked his subordinate, Did you notice that the brothers coming from Iran were targeted due to the Iranians colluding with America to hide chips on them?

Nevertheless, It Will Likely Persist

It would be tempting to view al-Qaedas relationship with Iran as one that is prone to fracture. Al-Qaeda and Iran now find themselves on opposing sides of civil wars in Syria and Yemen. And the death of Abu Muhammad al-Masri on Iranian soil might compound these conflicting objectives and provide the catalyst for a more permanent breakup. The relationships history suggests, however, that more continuity than change will be in the cards.

Al-Qaeda and Iran have long been at odds in the Middle East. In fact, Iran likely opened up communications with al-Qaeda in 2004 due to al-Zarqawis targeting of Shiite holy sites in Iraq. And the relationship has, up to this point, survived despite Iran and al-Qaedas misaligned interests elsewhere. A series of U.S. State Department reports from 2017-2019 describe al-Qaedas functioning Iran-based facilitation network even as the groups regional objectives diverged from those of Iran, just as a 2018 United Nations report highlights how both Sayf al-Adl and Abu Muhammad al-Masri performed their leadership duties from Iran.

Al-Masris death will also likely bring familiar tensions to the forefront, but these have not broken the relationship in the past and probably will not do so in the near term. Just as bin Laden inquired about potential Iranian treachery after operatives released from Iranian custody were killed, so too might al-Qaedas leadership be pondering whether Tehran sold out al-Masri to a foreign government. This is to say nothing of the embarrassment al-Qaeda might incur as media reports pile up detailing al-Masris presence in Iran. The presence and martyrdom of one of its leaders on Iranian territory could provide ammunition for al-Qaedas external critics and again lead al-Qaeda to criticize and threaten Iran.

The loss of a talented leader like al-Masri may also make the costs of hosting al-Qaeda even more unattractive for Tehran. Spending time and resources monitoring al-Qaeda operatives and enforcing its conditions may no longer be worth it for Iran if it feels al-Qaeda has outlived its utility as a partner. Coupled with the death of Abu Muhsin al-Masri in Afghanistan, the preceding string of al-Qaeda operatives killed in Pakistan, as well as the rumored death of Ayman al-Zawahiri, al-Masris assassination may give Iran the impression that al-Qaeda is a sinking ship and that its bench of veteran operatives has been eroded, with the notable exception of Sayf al-Adl. Any criticism of Iran from al-Qaeda in response to al-Masris death could only add salt to the wound.

Yet, the Islamic Republic may not yet have a view that al-Qaeda is in crisis. There are reasons to doubt claims of al-Qaedas imminent downfall. Moreover, Iran remained engaged with al-Qaeda even as it endured frequent losses of senior personnel in 2010, and the relationship survived the May 2011 death of bin Laden himself.

In the short term, both al-Qaeda and Iran may prefer that the relationship become more distant. When media reports of al-Masris death surfaced, Iran officially denied the presence of al-Qaeda members on its soil. Al-Qaeda may eulogize al-Masri but follow with a denial that he was based in Iran. It might even slip in a few derogatory insults towards the Iranian regime. The detrimental effects will likely stop there.

Conclusion

Addressing Iranian tolerance for al-Qaeda operatives on its soil should start with a proper characterization of Irans relationship with al-Qaeda. Whereas former Secretary of State Michael Pompeos summarization of the relationships past as one of thirty years of cooperation may understate discordant dimensions of this relationship, the United States cannot simply take for granted that turbulence will cause the relationship to break. The relationships history suggests a remarkably resilient, if still thin, form of cooperation, even as al-Qaeda and Irans strategic objectives have diverged and distrust and ideological tension have persisted.

In light of the bounded nature of the Islamic Republics relationship with al-Qaeda, U.S. policymakers should remain clear-eyed about the immediacy of addressing other aspects of Iranian activities. Iranian tolerance for al-Qaeda operatives on its soil has certainly been helpful for the group. But, it is not nearly as important for the West as Irans nuclear program, threats to maritime security, support to regional Shiite militia proxies, and development of ballistic missiles. Any escalation in lethal counterterrorism pressure on remaining Iran-based al-Qaeda cadres could needlessly antagonize Tehran and divert attention from these more pressing threats.

Still, Irans indifference toward the group is dangerous for both U.S. interests and those of its partners and allies. The United States should do what it can to make this relationship as uncomfortable as possible. First, the United States should continue to shine a spotlight on Irans willingness to host al-Qaeda operatives through continued U.S. Treasury designations and Rewards for Justice offers. The United States could also play into al-Qaedas fears of Iranian betrayal. This might include publicly highlighting al-Qaedas own internal reports of the crackdown in the early 2000s and the rather harrowing tales of al-Qaeda prisoners who found themselves in Iranian custody. Should Iran-based al-Qaeda operatives be captured or killed elsewhere, the United States might imply that Iran provided the intelligence lead.

The possibility that al-Qaeda could receive direction and lethal technology from Tehran is alarming. Fortunately, though, al-Qaeda and Irans checkered history suggests it is also highly unlikely. The United States should avoid overstating the extent of this relationship and instead focus the lions share of its time and attention on more vexing dimensions of Iranian behavior.

Dr. Bryce Loidolt is a research fellow at the National Defense Universitys Institute for National Strategic Studies. This essay draws from his recently published article in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism examining the evolution of al-Qaedas relationship with Iran using documents captured in Osama bin Ladens Abbottabad compound. The views expressed here are those of the author and are not an official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Image: Office of the Supreme Leader (Iran)

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Reconsidering al-Qaeda-Iranian Cooperation - War on the Rocks

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice is expectedto certify a class-action lawsuit launched byfamilies ofFlight PS752's victims againstIran, a wing of its militaryand Ukraine International Airlines, according to theirlawyer.

Toronto-based lawyer Tom Arndt said the court heard the certification motion yesterday and today indicated it would be endorsing the proposed lawsuit.

The move comes after the court found the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in default last month for failing to submit a statement of defence.

Habib Haghjoo who lost his daughter Saharnaz Haghjoo and his eight-year-old granddaughter Elsa Jadidiwhen PS752 was shot down said he's "thrilled" the lawsuit is moving ahead. He said the point of the lawsuit is to seek justice, not compensation.

"Now the fight can begin," he said. "I believe this could at least be some ointment on our wounds, a bit of comfort if we get a ruling against the Iranian regime and airlines. They took our loved ones. We want them to be liable and accountable. It is important."

The lawsuit alleges the Islamic Republic of Iran and theIslamic Revolutionary Guard Corpsan elite wing of the country's military designated as a terrorist organization by many countries kept the airspace open and planes flying during a period of intense military activityin order to collectoverflight fees.

CBC News has reported that, in recent years,Iran has usedits geographical location next door to Iraq and near Syria to providesafe passage for foreign airlines connectingbetween Europe and Asia, orbetween Asia and other areas of the world. Like many countries, Iran charges airlines an overflight fee for using its airspace but its prices are more than double whatCanada charges.

Iran's airport authority reported to Iranian media it earned more than $140 million in overflight revenue between March 2018 and March 2019.

For three days after the aircraft crashed outside Tehran on Jan. 8, 2020,Irandenied shooting it down. In response to mounting international pressure and evidence, Iran later admitted the IRGC "mistakenly" shot down the jet just hours after Iran's forces fired missiles at Iraqi bases where U.S. troops were stationed.

That surface-to-air missile attack was retaliation for the United States' killing of Iran's top military leader, Gen. Qasem Soleimani.

The lawsuit alleges the airline was negligent fornot grounding its aircraft the morningPS752 was destroyed. Several airlines rerouted their flights, but Flight PS752 departed "despite the known risks," the law firm said in a press release when it launched the lawsuit.

The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration had issued an official notice at the time ordering American commercial aircraft to avoid Iran and the airspace from the Gulf of Oman to the Mediterranean.

Airlines from Canada, Australia andSingapore "also steered clear," according to a Canadian report on Flight PS752 released in December. Ukraine International Airlines is one of the companies that continued to operate in the airspace that Iran kept open.

Iran has maintained that a series of human errors and other issues led to the accidental firing of missiles which misidentified the commercial plane as a hostile target.

But Canada's former minister of foreign affairs Franois-Philippe Champagne has said he doesn't believe human error was to blame. Canada has submitted a long list of questions for Iran to answer includingthe question ofwhy the airspace was kept open when missiles were being fired.

Ralph Goodale,Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's special adviser on Flight PS752,hassaid that"given the extraordinary nature" of Iran'sdescription of events, "it is understandable that victims' families find Iran's explanations difficult to accept."

"To remove doubt and relieve anxiety, Iran bears a heavy burden of responsibility to be completely comprehensive and transparent in substantiating its explanations with credible, compelling evidence, which has not yet been forthcoming," Goodale wrote in a December report.

Canada's Transportation Safety Board (TSB) announced yesterday it received a draft of Iran's final report on its safety investigation. Ukraine which has access to the report since its plane was involved appointed a TSB representative as a technical adviser so thatCanada could provide feedback on the findings.

The TSB said itcan't comment further on the contents of the Flight PS752 report until Iran releases it publicly. Countrieshave until the end of the month to provide feedback.

Iran's president announced in December the country's cabinet set aside $150,000 in compensation for each of thevictims' families. Canada has said it rejects that offer and willonly accept compensation through appropriate negotiations with a group of countries affected by Flight PS752.

Haghjoo called the $150,000 offer a "huge insult to families."

"They kill our loved ones and now want to buy us or expect us to get over it with this money," he said.

See more here:
Court expected to clear Flight PS752 victims' families to sue Iran, airline - CBC.ca

Tehrans strategy has been to use its Shia militias to assist the PKK and exploit the terror group against Turkey, which it views as a threat in Iraq.

Immediately after Turkey started Operation Claw-Eagle 2 in northern Iraq to rescue 13 Turkish prisoners in the hands of the PKK, the US-designated terrorist group Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba published a statementthreatening to attack Turkey just as they did the US if Turkey does not change its position.

Shortly after, another Shia militia controlled by Iran, Asaib al Khayf, publisheda video of the launch of a missile targeting the Turkish military base in Bashiqa, Iraq. Moreover, Shia militias attackedthe Erbil airport and killed one civilian contractor, and injured nine others, amongst them one US service member.

In the meantime, Iran-backed Shia militias sent reinforcementsto the Sinjar region torpedoing the agreement between Iraqs central government and the Kurdish Regional Government of Iraq (KRG).

All of these incidents are part of Irans strategy to shield the PKK and exploit the terror group against Turkey.

Irans aid to the PKK

The Iranian relationship with the PKK is nothing new. The PKKs main bastion in northern Iraq is the Qandil Mountains, of which a part is located inside Iran. PKK's high cadres survived Turkish airstrikes by taking refuge on the Iranian side.

Despite Turkish pressure, Iran never engaged in a real attempt to crack down against the PKK. In contrast, the KDP-aligned Kurdish Demoratic Party of Iran (KDPI) was heavily targeted by the Iranian security forces.

Even though Iran has problems with its own Kurdish minority, according to the thinking in Tehran the PKK is Turkish and, therefore, Turkeys problem. The scale of PKK attacks against Turkey on the one hand and its disinterest in Iran on the other, shows that Irans assessment is right.

Therefore, Iran has always been sympathetic to the PKK and only engaged in limited military cooperation with Turkey. Every time the PKK was under heavy pressure by Turkey, Iran came to its aid.

In the past, this aid was to provide a safe-haven to the PKK but nowadays it is manifested via Iran-led Shia militias from Syria to Iraq.

In Syria, when Turkey and the Syrian opposition launched Operation Olive Branch against the YPG/PKK in Afrin, it was Iran that had to send soldiers, weapons, and ammunition against the Syrian National Army and the Turkish Armed Forces. At that time, Turkish drones successfully conducted strikes against the Iranian militias trying to go into Afrin.

In Iraq, the Shia militias have gained a lot of strength and influence. US policy had the side-effect of empowering Iran in Iraq, which is now used by Iran to threaten Turkey, undermine the Sinjar agreement, and prevent the PKK from collapse.

Contending threat perception

The region of Sinjar has become a hotbed for the PKK after many Yazidis were unable to return home and stayed in KRG camps. The Turkish government conducted precise drone attacks against the PKK in Sinjar in an attempt to curb the region of the groups presence. Under the Sinjar deal between the KRG and Baghdad, the Baghdad government would take control and expel the PKK and Shia militias in the region.

In the meantime, Turkey managed to block off the PKKs supply routes into Turkey and eliminated several PKK camps near the Turkish border. These developments would minimise PKK presence to just the Gara and Qandil Mountains.

When Turkey started a rescue operation, Iran feared that Turkey would clean the Gara mountains from the PKK and that the group would be on the verge of collapse. That fear prompted Iran to show some teeth against Turkey via its proxies.

The open threat by Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and their comparison of Turkey with the US indicate that for Iran, Turkey is an equal competitor to the US in Iraq. Moreover, the attack of the smaller and lesser-known Shia militia towards the Turkish military base is an Iranian attempt to warn Turkey by maintaining plausible deniability.

Turkey and Iran have been engaged in a rivalry over Iraq both in the past and the present. From the Iranian perspective, elimination of the PKK would mean that Turkey could use its resources to compete with Iran for influence in Iraq. Additionally, the large Turkish minority in Iran is a source of concern for Iran. Therefore, Iran wants to keep Turkey at bay by guaranteeing the survival of the PKK.

If Turkish moves against the PKK were not enough, the active cooperation of the KRG with Turkey to block PKK supply routes within northern Iraq and the KRGs pressure vis-a-vis Sinjar made it worse for Iran. Iranian proxies also warned the KRG by attacking the Erbil airport, a heinous attack condemned by the US, Turkey, and many other states.

Turkeys perception of the threat posed by the PKK is viewed as more imminent than the one posed by Shia militias. More than ever, it is clear that if Ankara wishes to eliminate the PKK threat, it has also to focus on the presence of Iranian-controlled Shia militias in Iraq.

The attitude of Irans militias and the simultaneous attacks against the KRG, Turkey, and the US indicate that all the three governments have to work together to limit Iranian aggression in Iraq.

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Why Iran is shielding the PKK in Iraq - TRT World