Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

Iran’s economy is a house of cards | TheHill – The Hill

Just how durable is the Iranian economy, really? As the Trump administrations maximum pressure campaign against Iran marks its one-year anniversary, thats the question many policymakers in Washington are asking.

Iranian officials have been eager to supply the answer.According to the countrys Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, U.S. pressure has foundered in the face of Irans heroic revolutionary resistance. America, Khamenei recently intoned, was deluded in thinking that it will bring Iran to its knees by focusing on maximum pressure, particularly through economic sanctions. Other top Iranian decisionmakers have said much the same, taking pains to minimize the impact that U.S. pressure has had on the countrys economic health.

Look a bit closer, however, and it becomes clear that the Islamic Republic is profoundly ailing. This summer, the World Bankestimatedthat the countrys gross domestic product (GDP) is expected to shrink by some 4.5 percent this year alone a much steeper decline than the 3.9 percent economic contraction the international financial institution had initially predicted.

Part of the reason for this decline is undoubtedly American pressure, which has deftly managed to exploit the Islamic Republics myriad economic vulnerabilities. But the true causes of those vulnerabilities are distinctly local in nature.

The problems begin with the Iranian banking system, which is now teetering on the verge of full-blown crisis. A Summer 2019 study by the Peterson Institute for International Economics, a prestigious Washington, D.C. think tank,foundsignificant liquidity and solvency problems among the countrys fragile financial institutions, which are now deemed to be in a precarious position. The problems, moreover, are ongoing. While a collapse of institutions may not be in the offing in the short run, bankingdistress will continue to mount, making the system more vulnerable to an external shock like a military conflict or further slowdown in oil exports, says Adnan Mazarei, a former deputy-director at the International Monetary Fund.

The state of the regimes retirement funds is also dire. Most of the countrys pension funds are now considered insolvent and rely heavily on government subsidies to stay afloat. Last year, Iranian Vice President Eshaq Jahnagiriadmittedthat between 70 and 80 percent of the nations retirement funds and the entirety of its retirement planning for the Iranian military are paid for by the government.

Such a state of affairs would represent a severe economic burden under the best of circumstances, but Irans demographics make the situation simply unsustainable. This is because the Iranian population is aging quickly and rapidly outpacing the ability of the regime to adapt. As of last year, the official number of Iranian senior citizens stood at 7.4 million, or roughly nine percent of the countrys total population of 84 million. But by 2050, that number is expected to skyrocket to 30 million, putting massive strain on the countrys retirement system in the process.

Irans labor market, meanwhile, lies fallow. Last year, the IMFgaugedthat the unemployment rate in Iran was at nearly 14 percent, and rising. According to the IMFs projections, unemployment in Iran is expected to rise sharply for the next half-decade at least, reaching nearly one-fifth of the total population by the mid-2020s. That dire prediction isnt adequately captured by official Iranian estimates, which paint a comparatively rosy picture of the employment situation within the Islamic Republic.

This state of affairs is most acute among young Iranians.According to the Iran Statistical Center, a government agency under the control of the countrys president, the official unemployment rate hit 27 percent among young Iranians last year, and a whopping 40 percent among university graduates. Simply put, the Iranian regime has systematically failed to create enough jobs to accommodate the countrys labor force, thereby adding fuel to thegrowing discontent now visibleon the Iranian street.

All of these problems, in turn, are creating a secondary crisis in Iranian healthcare. The Islamic Republic now faces what could be called a medical brain drain, as more and more doctors and nurses seek an exit from the country. The results are dire. The Iran Student News Agencyhas reportedthat there are just 1.6 doctors and medical specialists per 1,000 Iranians far below the World Health Organizations estimates of the resources necessary for primary care. And, as the countrys currency (and by extension its purchasing power) has cratered, Iranhas also begun to experienceshortages of badly-needed foreign-made medicine.

Irans economy, in other words, is sick, and getting sicker. Of course, Iranian officials have styled the countrys current economic woes as nothing more than the product of malign Western imperialism. A closer look, however, indicates that the true causes of the countrys economic malaise are distinctly local and that the Iranian people have their own government to blame for their current condition.

Ilan Berman is senior vice president at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C. An expert on regional security in the Middle East,he has consulted for the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, and provided assistance on foreign policy and national security issues to a range of governmental agencies and congressional offices.

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Iran's economy is a house of cards | TheHill - The Hill

Fail: Why Iran’s "New" Saeqeh Fighter Isn’t Any Good – The National Interest Online

Key Point: Tehran keeps coming up with fake planes or tries to make older fighter planes look new.

In February 2017 I published an article on the Iranian Saeqeh (Thunderbolt) fighter. Billed as Irans first domestically-built jet fighter to enter operational service, the Saeqeh.

Fast forward and we are again greeted with headlines for yet another 100% indigenously made fighter jet, this time a state of the art two-seater called the Kowsar. And yet it appears identical to an F-5F Tiger II two-seater jet.

If anything, it is far less original than the Saeqeh, which has airframe modifications including enlarged strakes and twin vertical tail stabilizers. The Kowsar doesnt appear to have any external changes from the F-5F. How was this jet even worthy of the photo-op with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in the instructors seat for Iranian Defense Industry Day?

It happens there really is a program to build a combat-capable Kowsar advanced jet trainer. It simply wasnt the aircraft on display this summer.

According to Iranian aviation expert Babak Taghvaee, the Kowsar may merely be an avionics testbeda regular F-5F fitted with new avionics (rumored to be of Chinese origin) eventually intended for use in the Saeqeh fighter, spruced up with a fresh coat of gleaming paint for the photo-op. The test-bed used may date all the way back to Iran's first attempt to reverse-engineer the F-5 in the 1990s, the Azaraksh. This was because the real Kowsar-88 wasn't ready yet.

Iran had announced back in 2013 it was developing a Kowsar-88 trainer which could also serve in the light attack role. In 2017, footage of a prototype undergoing taxi trials was unveiled which you can see here.

Though influenced by the F-5, the prototype is a different airplane and is much shorter. Interestingly, it bears a striking resemblance to the Taiwanese AIDC AT-3 jet trainer. Details are scarce, but the actual Kowsar-88 apparently would have a digital glass cockpit using three multi-function displays and uses two J85-13 turbojet engines reverse-engineered from the F-5.

The public has had short memories as President Rouhani also attended a ceremony showing off the Kowsar-88s in July 2017. Even the most uninformed observer can compare this Kowsar to the one displayed August 2018 and see they are not the same airplanes.

According to the European Defense Review, sixteen domestically-built Kowsar-88s are planned to take over training duties currently undertaken by the more capable Saeqeh jets in the next decade. Iran will attempt to acquire additional J85 engines on the black market, but if that fails, will cannibalize the parts from twelve older F-5A and B model aircraft.

Meanwhile, Tehran reportedly plans to deploy fifty single-seat Saeqeh-1 fighters and fourteen two-seat Saeqeh-2 fighters by rebuilding additional rusty old F-5E and F-5F airframes. Depending on the status of international sanctions, Iran may also seek to procure Russian Yak-130 or Chinese JL-10 (aka L-15 Falcon) supersonic trainers.

Versatile trainer/light attack jets continue to be popular with militaries across the globe from Chinas L-15, to the Nigerian Alpha Jets fighting Boko Haram, to South Koreas FA-50 Golden Eagle, which has seen a lot of combat in The Philippines. In addition to being forgiving stepping stones for training fighter pilots to fly more demanding aircraft, advanced jet trainers can perform counter-insurgency and strike missions far more cost-efficiently than a high-performance jet fighter. Supersonic trainers with radar can also perform light air defense duties.

Of course, these are not the sort of aircraft one uses to fight off F-15 Eagles or F-22 stealth fighters, which is precisely the major threat Iranian defense have to worry about coming from the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Instead, programs like the Kowsar reflect Tehrans plans to shore up fighter pilot training and sustain the number of operational airframes capitalizing on the raw material furnished by America prior to the Iranian Revolution if international sanctions curtail foreign procurementas seems more likely since U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

The latest episode with the not-Kowsar fighter illustrates yet again the casual dishonesty of Tehrans propagandists. Iranian industry wanted to display the Kowsar-88 for an expowhich does appear to be a real airplane! However, the actual Kowsar-88 wasnt ready for display this August, so Tehran simply took an old, very well-known jet fighter and claimed it was a new one, in full view of domestic and international audiences that would know better.

The irony is that Tehran doesnt need to be ashamed of its resourceful use of old jet fighters. In the nine-year-long Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s, Iranian fighter pilots fought one of the most intense air wars in recent history defending their home soil. Though higher-performance F-4 Phantoms and F-14 Tomcats shot down dozens of Iraqi fighters (and suffered losses in return), even the F-5s chalked up a number of kills against MiG-21 fighters and Su-20 attack jets.

Sbastien Roblin holds a Masters Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This first appeared earlier in 2019.

Image: Wikimedia.

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Fail: Why Iran's "New" Saeqeh Fighter Isn't Any Good - The National Interest Online

How the US and EU could facilitate a free internet for Iran – DW (English)

US Ambassador Richard Grenell's tweet suggesting that the United Statesand European Union could restore the internet for Iranians has drawn attention.

Grenell followed up with a tweet to cellphone manufacturers and social media companies, encouraging them to join in the task.

In order for the World Wide Web to work well, it requires a constant connection through which data can be sent and received. If the state or the provider cuts off the connection, nothing works.

It's nearly impossible for ordinary users with computers and routers to quickly access familiar internet services if a regime blocks network connections. However, limited communication may still be possible with a fair amount of effort.

The World Wide Web, with its web browsers, is one of many technologies that use the internet. The internet can be used just as well without the World Wide Web.

Before the World Wide Web got going in the 1990s, plenty of people already used the internet to communicate without being online all the time.

Read more:How Hong Kong protests are inspiring movements worldwide

CrossPointas inspiration?

CrossPoint (also called XP) brought together the function of discussion forums with those of an email program. Simple PCs equipped with one or two telephone modems acted as servers.

These CrossPoint servers only needed to call one another every now and then on a normal telephone line to exchange their data packets.

Internet access was disrupted in Iran in response to protests

The technology works in countries run by authoritarian regimes, too. The Zamir Transnational Network demonstrated that starting in 1991, during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. As long as the servers were able to reach a telephone number in a free country, communication with the internet and the rest of the world was assured. The authorities at the time were able to tap analog phone calls, but the digital gobbledygook was too much for it.

It could still take days for an email to reach its recipient, but it wasfar faster than sending a letter.

Read more:Cybercrime servers hosted in former NATO bunker in Germany

'A sensible way'

The backbone of a contemporary system in Iran and other countries with authoritarian governments would be the hundreds of thousands or even millions of smartphones that people carry around with them.

An app could create a network out of the devices of people who take part: Each of those phones would become a server and connect with other phones nearby. A massive parallel internet would emerge through which users could communicate with each other.Bridgefy, an app that connects smartphones via Bluetooth, has been used by protesters in Hong Kong and Lebanon.

Theoretically, the Wi-Fi function of cellphones could be used the same way to communicate. Then each phone would become a wireless router.

But it wouldn't be straightforward for programmers, said Fabian Marquardt, a researcher of networks and IT security at the University of Bonn. "It is difficult to organize the redistribution of the messages in a sensible way," he said, adding that if the messages are always redistributed to everyone, there's a danger that too much useless data ends up taking up space on too many phones.

Read more:Iran's Khamenei backs fuel price hike, slams 'hooligans'

Secret servers

Users trying to avoid the scrutiny of politically repressive regimes such as China's and Iran's would need to worry about leaving digital traces. With a skillfully designed Bluetooth or WiFi solution, a SIM card might no longer even be necessary. Cellphone users would no longer need to register with telecom providers, and it would become harder to expose them. But they would need to be able to buy phones anonymously.

It is also important that any messenger software they use to communicate have end-to-end encryption.Signalis similar to WhatsApp, the market leader. But, with Signal, no one aside from the recipient can determine who sent a message or what it says. Users' contact lists are also anonymous.

The free internet for Iran that Ambassador Grenell has called for could possibly be implemented with a cleverly designed app that would include a number of secret servers operated inside the country that allow telephone communications abroad.

What about satellites?

If a country blocks all channels of communication abroad, what's left is communication into space. But not every mobile phone user has that option because their devices do not necessarily have the technical means to send such signals.

But opposition figures could be outfitted with compatible devices, such as Iridium phones. Iridium already provides a messaging service. Why not hand out a few hundred devices to trustworthy people in Iran as hubs for everyone connected to the greater network to be able to communicate with the outside world?

SpaceX is building a satellite constellation to provide internet access

Users would have to contend with one limitation: High-quality images or videos would probably cripple the system quickly. Communication would be better restricted to text.

In the future, the Starlink satellite system from SpaceX might be able to bring properly free internet with a high bit rate directly to the people. But users would need special antennas that aren't yet available.

Like satellite dishes, the antennas would need to be installed outside, said Marquardt, the IT researcher. "Anyone who mounts such a thing on a roof in Iran or China has to be prepared for someone eventually knocking on the door and asking what it is," he said.

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How the US and EU could facilitate a free internet for Iran - DW (English)

OPINION | While You Werent Paying Attention, Iran Was Ratcheting Up Tensions in the Persian Gulf – POLITICO

Last weeks announcement was Irans latest move to signal its dissatisfaction with an accord that, in the main, it still adheres to, even though the Trump administration pulled out of it in May 2018 to pursue a campaign of maximum pressureaka renewed sanctions. The administration has pinned its hopes on this policy of forcing Tehran to renegotiate what President Donald Trump had called the worst deal ever. Several days prior to the announcement about the centrifuges, Tehran also blocked an inspector from the International Atomic Energy Association from entering the Natanz nuclear facility for the first time since the nuclear pact, formally known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, was signed in 2015.

None of these actions got much attention. The New York Times buried its story about the increased number of centrifuges on page A8. The Washington Post has relied on Associated Press wire copy, not bothering to publish its own article about Irans actions.

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has warned that Irans move heralds a breakout effort to build a bomb as soon as possible. (Just a year ago, when the administration moved to reimpose sanctions, he expressed confidence that Tehran would not restart those efforts.) Many experts, though, frame the Iranian action as a way to elicit diplomatic intervention by the Europeans and others to keep the JCPOA intact, as well as to intimidate neighbors. Iran still relies too heavily on trade with Europe, Russia and China, all of whom continue to support the JCPOA. A more justifiable fear is that last weeks step presages another use of force in the Gulf that would further ratchet up the tension, as has happened twice before in recent months.

First, there was the announcement in April of the initial installation of advanced centrifuges, followed by attacks in June on tankers in the Gulf, which U.S. officials have blamed on Iran, and the downing of a $120 million U.S. drone that Iranian officials acknowledge they were responsible for. Then, in July, Iran declared it would no longer limit its enriched uranium stockpile to 300 kilograms and would purify uranium to levels above the 3.67 percent specified in the nuclear agreement. A little more than two months later, a stunning air attack severely damaged Saudi Arabias massive Abqaiq facility and oil field, taking 5 percent of the worlds daily oil production offline. Although Yemens Houthi rebels claimed responsibility, the United States and most Western governments have attributed the attack to Iran, which backs the Houthis.

It seems evident that Tehran is calibrating its actions to send increasingly strong signals. So far, however, nothing has succeeded in moving the White House; Trump has resisted any pressure to retaliate militarily. The obvious questions now, after last weeks announcement about the centrifuges, are will Iran attack again? If so, where? And what will the response be?

The short answer is we dont know, but theres a pattern at work here. In the aftermath of the Iranian announcement last week, Brian Hook, the U.S. special envoy for Iran, announced another raft of sanctions on 700 individuals, entities, aircraft and vessels, and reaffirmed his confidence that this approach would bring Iran to the negotiating table. Pompeo has been equally categorical about Washingtons determination to keep up the pressure.

This suggests we are on course for another unwanted attack somewhere in the regionand that the administrations policy is delivering the opposite of what is needed. Iran shows no sign of succumbing, despite sanctions that have succeeded beyond what most imagined (Iranian oil exports have plummeted from 2.5 million barrels a day to as little as one tenth of that). And the U.S. refusal to strike back militarily after multiple attacks has undoubtedly emboldened Tehran, while our allies in the region peel off to make their own accommodations with Iran.

The Saudis have begun to recognize that the Iranians might target even more of their oil facilities, and the Emiratis have pondered possible damage (financial or physical) to Dubai, which they have long acknowledged to diplomats as a vulnerability. As both countries recognize that Trump is not inclined to any military action needed to deter Iran, their emissaries have begun quietly speaking with Iran. The UAE has told Washington it does not want a war in the regiona big change for a country whose ambassador in Washington had publicly urged a military strike against Iran a few years ago. Saudi Arabia has even declared that it is communicating with the Houthis, a group it has vilified as an Iranian proxy for years.

This is not what success for the United States looks like. And if anyone on the Trump team had studied the history of the U.S.- Iran relationship, they would know that this strategy wont end well. The Clinton administration was committed to its own maximum pressure campaign and, like Trumps administration, threatened to impose secondary sanctions on U.S. allies that maintained trade with Iran in certain goods and services. This happened against the backdrop of a twilight war between our respective intelligence services and the consolidation of U.S. bases in the region. Tehran, however, did not like the feeling it was being cornered in its own neighborhood. In response, it carried out possibly the most devastating truck bomb to date, using an estimated two or more tons of explosives at the U.S. military barracks known as Khobar Towers. Nineteen Air Force members lost their lives. In the crowning irony of the episode, the Saudis slow-rolled the FBI on assistance in the investigation, denying the U.S. access to suspects because the Saudi leadership was fearful that America would start a war with Iran once it had hard evidence of who was behind the bombing.

The lesson is clear: Iranian policymakers believe they must not give in to coercion but rather lash out. The United States, they seem confident, views the situation as less of an existential matter than they do, and thus wont take drastic action to force them to knuckle under.

What would be the sensible move now for the White House? U.S. policymakers dont typically return to the negotiating table with an adversary whose violent provocations have gone unanswered. But given the likelihood that retaliating for Iranian misdeeds would lead to a broader conflict, and given that the United States still has a degree of leverage because of sanctions, the administration should nonetheless come to the table. There is a possibility that the Iranians have already written off a deal with the Trump administration, as President Hassan Rouhanis rebuff of Trumps entreaties to meet at the United Nations would suggest. But, at a minimum, the Iranians wont talk until there is sanctions relief, and the United States should test them on this score. Trump has flirted publicly with delivering such relief. In the best of all worlds, he would progress from flirtation to engagement and negotiate an updated JCPOA, then declare victory and give regional tensions a chance to dissipate.

Any sign of flexibility, however, would probably anger right-wing legislators who are deeply invested in forcing Iran to its knees, and Trump is unlikely to want to alienate the jurors at his potential impeachment trial. We will be left to hope that the Iranians dont miscalculate and carry out another attack on Saudi Arabia or on shipping that elicits a clamor for retaliation, in which case the biggest worry is that Trump could decide now is the time to strike back at Iran.

It is worth considering whether continuing trouble in the Gulf is something Trump, the master of distraction, could resist amid his impeachment inquiry. His laudable aversion to plunging the country into another Middle East war has been amply demonstrated by his refusal to respond to the bombing of tankers, the destruction of the drone and the attack on Abqaiq. But with impeachment hearings underway on Capitol Hill, would he be so restrained? One can well imagine Trump, a man not known for resisting temptation, might be attracted to the ultimate change of subject.

If Trump does take action against Iran, it could be a fateful error. Iran could respond by unleashing the militant group Hezbollah against Israel and by stimulating terrorist attacks around the world. Even if he thought he could go no further than an air campaign, Trump would be making a dangerous gamble. As a rule, aggression demands a response. But when the aggression is a predictable reaction to a misguided campaign of pressureand better alternatives are availableits a lot wiser to turn down the heat rather than fan the flames.

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OPINION | While You Werent Paying Attention, Iran Was Ratcheting Up Tensions in the Persian Gulf - POLITICO

How the US and Iran Became Unlikely Allies Against ISIS – The Intercept

In the summer of 2014, with a campaign of shocking violence, the Islamic State established itself as the most fearsome terrorist organization in the Middle East.

In early June, the extremist group stunned the world by taking control of the Iraqi city of Mosul, home to more than 1.2 million people. Days later, ISIS fighters broadcast scenes from a gruesome massacre of more than 1,500 Iraqi army cadets at a former U.S. military base near Tikrit. By the end of the month, ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had declared himself head of a new proto-state, the caliphate, as his fighters continued their genocidal rampage across northern Iraq, killing and enslaving members of the Yazidi minority and seizing Western hostages, among them an American journalist named James Foley.

As the international community groped for a response, ISIS fighters reached the borders of Iraqi Kurdistan, within striking distance of the glass high-rises of the bustling Kurdish capital, Erbil. It was there, from a dusty, remote Kurdish military base nicknamed Black Tiger outside thetown of Makhmour, that ISIS was finally confronted by Kurdish Peshmerga in a battle that began to turn the tide against the extremists.

Makhmour was the first place that we took territory from ISIS, Staff Col. Srud Salih, the Kurdish commander of the Black Tiger base, told The Intercept this summer. The victories of the Peshmerga began from here.

The battle of Makhmour represented another important milestone in the war against ISIS: It was the place where two foreign military interventions began. One was directed by the U.S.-led international coalition, which provided air support and later, heavy weaponry. The other, in the form of ammunition, training, and intelligence support, came from Iran. Over the course of a few short days that August, coalition airstrikes hit ISIS positions in the parched desert hills near Makhmour, leveling the playing field between the heavily armed extremists and the Kurdish fighters.

AKurdish Peshmerga soldier walks past the remnants of an Islamic State position in Makhmour, Iraq, that was hit during the fight between Kurdish andISIS forces in 2014.

Photo: Sebastian Meyer/Corbis via Getty Images

Since the election of Donald Trump, the United States and Iran have grown increasingly fractious, exchanging provocations that have fueled fears of war. But in the early days of the fight against ISIS under President Barack Obama, these longtime rivals were focused on a common goal: halting the Islamic States advance and destroying itsso-calledcaliphate.

While the broad outlines of the conventional war against ISIS have long been known, the details of Irans covert war against the militants have not. A portrait of this secret war emerges from a trove of Iranian intelligence reports provided to The Intercept by an anonymous source. The reports come from Irans Ministry of Intelligence and Security, or MOIS, the countrys primary intelligence agency.

Alongside the U.S.-led military campaign against the Islamic State, Irans MOIS was waging a parallel, clandestine campaign, spying onISIS gatherings, providing covert aid to its enemies, and working to break its alliances with other insurgent factions, according to the leaked documents.

In many ways, the Iranian intelligence campaign against ISIS mirrored the U.S. strategy for dealing with Iraq. In addition to an overt military confrontation with the group and support for Shia militias and the Iraqi Army, the Iranians also worked to cultivate Sunni and Kurdish partners whom they perceived as moderate or at least willing to work with them. From the outset, the MOIS kept its eyes on the day the war would end, when local partners from all sides would be needed to patch together a functional Iraq.

To an extent, the agency played a good-cop role in contrast to the more brutal measures employed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which reports directly to Irans supreme leader. While the MOIS has been pragmatic, subtle, and willing to look past sectarianism, the Revolutionary Guards, throughits Iraqi proxies,has been blamed for carrying out waves of extrajudicial killings and ethnic cleansing. In some cases,ithas been accused of treating entire Sunni communities as enemies, trapping them in an impossible choice between religious extremists and a hostile Iraqi government.

In many ways, the Iranian intelligence campaign against ISIS mirrored the U.S. strategy for dealing with Iraq.

This sectarian conflict came to a head during the brutal violence of the ISIS war. But for those Sunnis whether militants or politicians willing to accept a place in an Iranian-dominated Iraq, the MOIS showed itself ready to help.

According to the leaked Iranian intelligence documents, there was also frustration on the Iranian side about the lack of direct U.S. cooperation with Tehran in the anti-ISIS war effort.The Iranians noted with approval the impact of U.S. airstrikes against ISIS but wanted to coordinate more closely.

The Americans insistence on not cooperating with Iran in the war against ISIS and not participating in the meetings of the 10 countries of the region the Arabs and Turkey as well as the Western and Arab countries extreme positions on the presence and role of Iran in Iraq has had a negative influence, onesecret report noted.

Although the Iranian contribution was ultimately more modest than that of the Americans, Iran was nimbler in backing the Iraqi Kurds. Irans security institutions are often able to make decisions and act more quickly in an emergency than their U.S. counterparts, who have to navigate a web of bureaucracy, a Kurdish analyst who was present during the battle, and asked for anonymity to discuss issues related to Iran, told The Intercept. When ISIS attacked Makhmour, the Iranian help came first. It took a day or two after the battle began for the Americans to join in with air support.

The punishing American airstrikes made a vital difference in Makhmour, where the Kurdish Peshmerga ultimately triumphed over ISIS and droveit out of the area. But in the weeks and months before the battle, some of the Peshmerga who fought in Makhmour had received assistance from Iranian advisers connected with the MOIS.

Members of the Peoples Protection Units, or YPG, explore one of the many tunnels made by ISIS during its occupation of the border city of Sinjar, Iraq, in 2015.

Photo: Paolo Pellegrin/Magnum Photo

In its propaganda videos and statements, ISIS liked to project an image of complete ideological discipline and authoritarian control. But from early on, the organization appears to have been penetrated by both Iranian and Kurdish intelligence.

On the evening of September 18, 2014, a case officerfrom the MOIS left his base and headed to the home of an asset living in Erbil. At the time, ISIS was still near the height of its power, andthe city was teeming with foreign military and intelligence officials helping coordinate the war effort against the militants. The MOISofficer took precautions to avoid surveillance as he made his way to the meeting. I left the base by foot an hour before holding the meeting and after twenty minutes walking on foot and carrying out the necessary checks, took two taxis through the neighboring streets to the site of the meeting, he wrote in his report.

The Iranian spy had two goals that night: to learn as much as possible about how Iraqs Sunni leaders viewed the ISIS threat and to create a detailed and precise biography of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi through his classmates and people who had been imprisoned with him. The meeting was one of many being conducted by MOIS officerstrying to develop an operational picture of ISIS. In a December 2014 rendezvous with a source in the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniyah, another MOISofficer received a flash drive containing information about ISIS, according to one of the reports. The officer instructed the source, who isonly identified as a senior deputy official in Iraqi intelligence, to send the Iranians daily reports on ISIS activities.

A screenshot, taken on July 5, 2014, of a propaganda video released by al-Furqan Media allegedly shows Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi addressing worshippers at a mosque in the militant-held Iraqi city of Mosul. U.S. forces killed Baghdadi last month in northern Syria.

Image: AFP via Getty Images

The MOISs intelligence sources about ISIS were not limited to outsiders; they had penetrated the groups leadership as well. A report provided to the MOIS by a source in Mosul contains an account of internal deliberations from a December 2014 meeting of senior ISIS leaders, including Baghdadi. At the time, ISIS was bracing for an attack from the Iraqi Army, Shia militia groups, and the Kurdish Peshmerga on the groups territories in Nineveh Province. The attack was planned for the early months of 2015, and ISIS leaders feared that it would be heavily backed by both the U.S.-led coalition and Iran.

The prospect of facing so many adversaries at oncebred justified paranoia inside the militant group. It also raised fears that ISIS leaders with past ties to the Iraqi government of Saddam Hussain might feed intelligence to the groups enemies, or even defect. Some ISIS amirs who have a Baathist record have established relations with the Kurdish Democratic Party to flee to the Kurdish region and not fall into the hands of the Shia Iraqi army, the MOIS source said, according to the intelligence report, which cites a meeting of the Central Council of the Caliphate presided over by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

In at least one case, the militant groups fears had already come to fruition. ISIS commanders in two districts north of Mosul had made contact with American and Kurdish forces, given them GPS coordinates of ISIS positions, and revealed the groups attack plans, according to the MOIS report.

In response, ISIS had cut all telephone and internet connections for commanders in those areas, and the group wanted to further limit the communications of other front-line commanders. One of the districts named in the MOIS document, Zumar, was the site of heavy coalition air activity in support of a Peshmerga offensive during this period.

A sharia court determined that greater control should be exercised over contacts between ISIS amirs and that all means of communication, especially at the fronts, should be cut, the MOIS source reported.

Sunni fighters opposing the Islamic State take positions at the frontline near the ISIS-controlled village of Haj Ali in the southern Mosul countryside on Nov. 19, 2015.

Photo: Moises Saman/Magnum Photos

As Iran worked to weaken the Islamic State, it embarked on a strategy that, deliberately or not, echoed the U.S. playbook for dealing with Iraq. Nearly a decade earlier, the United States had defeated Al Qaeda in Iraq the precursor toISIS by arming Sunni tribal groups opposed to the extremists. This tribal rebellion, termed the Awakening, was credited with helping fracture Al Qaedas tiesto other Sunni Arab militants. The Awakening helped stabilize the country during the final years of the U.S. occupation, allowing a tenuous new political order to take shape.

Like Al Qaeda before it, the Islamic State belonged to a broad coalition of Sunni Arab factions that were ideologically diverse but united in their opposition to an Iraqi government they viewed as sectarian, corrupt, and beholden to Iran. Many of the most powerful non-ISIS factions could be described as ideologically neo-Baathist in their shared longing for a restoration of the pre-2003 order in Iraq.

The groups initially cooperated, but by the summer of 2014, deadly firefights were reported between ISIS and Sunni militants who did not acceptthe groups leadership of the insurgency against Baghdad. Iran was ready to capitalize on these divisions. By the fall of 2014, the MOIS was surveilling and communicating withdisaffected insurgents, with the goal of reconciling them with the Iraqi government and turning them against ISIS.

But the Iranians found that the Sunni militants could be deceptive, the MOIS documents show. In September 2014, the agency intercepted a communication from some of these militants to their followers that included derogatory statements about Iran and called on fighters to take advantage of a recent halt in Iraqi government airstrikes to escalate their insurgency.

We should try to weaken their position and show how untrustworthy they are in claiming that they have changed and become moderate and care for Iraq.

Since we are supposed to meet Baathists next week, and considering the principles fixed by the honorable General Director to get answers from them naturally some of the answers are clear from the text of this statement, a MOISofficer wrote dryly. We should try to weaken their position and show how untrustworthy they are in claiming that they have changed and become moderate and care for Iraq. Put this statement in front of them and then ask them to be explicit and clear in their view.

Iranian officials closely monitored efforts by Sunni Arabs to organize themselves politically throughout the war, including at several meetings held at the Sheraton and Rotana hotels in Erbil in late 2014. An Iranian spywho attended a two-day meeting at the Sheraton in September reported that a former Baath Party member nowliving in the United States came to the meeting bearing an intriguing message: The Americans were willing to support political autonomy for Sunni-majority regions of Iraq once the fighting had ended. The MOIS was deeply concerned about Iraq breaking apart along sectarian lines and viewed any effortsthat might lead to such fragmentationwith suspicion.

Three months later, in December, a delegation of Iraqi politiciansincluding former parliament speaker Salim al-Jabouri traveled to Iran for negotiations with high-ranking Iranian officials. The trip went well,according to a MOIS report, but there was a tense moment whenmembers of the Iraqi delegationwere berated by Ali Shamkhani, secretary of Irans Supreme National Security Council. Shamkhani told the visitors that Sunnis in Iraq had already received much more than you deserve, includingthe leadership of numerous ministries, seats in the Iraqi parliament, and control of a large number of militia fighters. Whether you want it or not, he told them, Iran would cleanse Iraqof the presence of [ISIS].

Some members of the Iraqi delegation wereoffended by Shamkhanis remarks, according to the cable.

Initial efforts by the highly unpopular Nouri al-Maliki-led Iraqi government to coax some Sunni tribes nominally allied with ISIS back onto its side with money and weapons had limited results. But a change of leadership in Iraq coupled with the brutality of life under ISIS did eventually lead some Sunni insurgents to explore switching sides. By 2015, the Iraqi government was said to be holding secret talks inQatar and Tanzania with anti-ISIS Sunni insurgents, reportedly mediated by the United States and other countries in the Middle East.

Mohammed Haji Mahmoud, center, with his son Atta, far right, on the front near Kirkuk on Nov. 26, 2014. Atta was killed the following day.

Photo: Archives Hama Haji Mahmoud/The PhotoLibrary of Kurdistan

On the morning of December 7, 2014, a delegation of Iranian intelligence officers paid a condolence visit to the headquarters of the Kurdistan Socialist Democratic Party, a small movement based in the Kurdish city of Halabja. In addition to the Kurdish Regional Government, Iran cultivated ties with marginal parties like the KSDP that lackedstrong connections and military support from Western powers part of a broader strategy of projectinginfluencethrough textured personal and political relationships across the Middle East. Such ties, sometimes pragmatically cultivated on a nonsectarian basis, have given Iran an advantage in its conflicts with the United States, Israel, and the Gulf Arab countries.

The head of the KSDP, Mohammed Haji Mahmoud, also known as Kaka Hama, is a legendary Kurdish nationalist who spent decades in the mountains of Kurdistan helping lead a resistance movement against the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. When ISIS attacked Kurdistan in 2014, Mahmoud himself joined battles at the front.

In late November of that year, Mahmouds son was killed fighting ISIS near Kirkuk. A week and a half later, spies from the MOIS showed up at Mahmouds office.

A delegation of colleagues of the consulate went to the political office of KSDP and recited [prayers] and offered our condolences and paid our respects to Mohammed Haji Mahmoud over his martyred son who achieved martyrdom in the suburbs of Kirkuk in an attack against ISIS, according to a secret Iranian intelligence report. An Iranian official present expressed the ministrys grief over the death of Mahmouds son and wished his family patience and tranquility.

Mahmoud, far left, on the front near Kirkuk on Nov. 26, 2014.

Photo: Archives Hama Haji Mahmoud/The PhotoLibrary of Kurdistan

In January, about six weeks after their condolence visit, MOIS officers met with Mahmoud again. According to their report, the Kurdish leader thanked the Iranians for providing special military and security training to some 30 of his partys Peshmerga fighters based in Sulaimaniyah. The training, according to the report, had been conducted in honor of Mahmouds son, and the Iranian-backed fighters had been sent to a front near Makhmour, where they helped rout ISIS. They played a good role in defeating the takfiris, Mahmoud told the Iranians, using an Arabic wordtodenoteextremists, and they put into practice the lessons they had learned.

The MOIScase officer who wrote the report expressed satisfaction with Mahmouds comments. God willing, we will benefit from the existence of these brothers in future training in Iraq toward the struggle with ISIS.

Mahmoud could not be reached for comment forthis story.

Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters fire at ISIS militant positions from the frontline in Khazer, west of Erbil, on Aug. 14, 2014.

Photo: Safin Hamed/AFP via Getty Images

The Iranians would turn out to be less than durable friends to the Iraqi Kurds. Their dealings bear some resemblance to the United States own tortured relationship with Kurdish militants in neighboring Syria.

Not long after the war against ISIS began, Tehran started shifting the bulk of its support to the Iraqi central government and its allied Shia militias. The major break came in 2017, when Iraqi Kurds held a referendum on the question of full independence, their long-held dream. Kurdish voters overwhelmingly approved the referendum, but the vote alarmed Iran and other countries in the region that feared Kurdish secession.

Instead of independence, the referendum led to war between the Iraqi government and Kurdish forces. In a reversal of their role during the ISIS war, the Iranians worked against the Kurds, and the Iraqi offensive snuffed out any imminent hopes for Kurdish self-determination. In October 2017, the Peshmerga lost the town of Makhmour again this time to an Iraqi government advance backed by Iran.

Gen. Bahram Arif Yassin was one of the Peshmerga commanders who led the fight against ISIS in northern Iraq. On a grassy hilltop in front of his home in the Kurdish city of Souran, surrounded by his military staff, he reflected on the bitter aftermath of the ISIS war and Kurdistans thwarted independence bid. We expected support after the sacrifices we had made on behalf of the whole world fighting ISIS, Yassin said. Instead, we were opposed by surrounding countries that did not respect the Kurdish peoples voice.

When the independence vote happened, even Turkey didnt close its borders to us, Yassin continued. Iran did.

Although Makhmour remains under Iraqi control today, the sprawling Black Tiger base in the hills outside the town is still manned by Kurdish Peshmerga forces who are based in a few prefabricated bunkers. A giant Kurdish national flag flies from a pole above the base and a large hangar contains Humvees and other armored vehicles provided by the U.S.-led coalition. Modified vehicles taken from ISIS during the battle for Makhmour broil under the glaring sun. Among them are captured Iraqi army pickup trucks retrofitted with rusted armor plates and artillery pieces emblazoned with the black flag of the Islamic State.

Captured ISIS vehicles at the Black Tiger base outside Makhmour in June 2019.

Photo: Murtaza Hussain/The Intercept

The Peshmerga are still fighting ISIS militants hiding in the arid, brown Qara Chokh mountain range nearby, and Kurdish forces say they are grateful for periodic U.S. airstrikes on ISISpositions. Kurdish commanders at the base who fought in the Makhmour battle still consider the U.S.-led coalition their best ally, they said. The support Iran supplied to the Iraqi Kurds against ISIS in 2014 is a distant memory, overshadowed by Irans contribution to the more recent Iraqi conquest of Makhmour.

Irans MOIS predicted this rupture with the Kurds, though the reasons for the split were not what they had expected. The September 2014 report that bemoaned the lack of coordination between the U.S. and Iran in the fight against ISIS also noted that Tehrans global isolation might force the Kurds to keep their distance from Iran when the warwas over. Our country might undergo a bitter experience yet again, the document said, revealing the officers suspicion of even close Kurdish allies, as well as a note of pathos about Irans place in the world.

Ultimately, however, a combination of factors led to Irans renewed isolation. The U.S. decision to pull out of the Obama-era nuclear deal ended Irans brief rapprochement with the West. But it was Irans decision to work against Kurdish independence that squandered any goodwill the Iranians had won during the war against ISIS. Today, Iran finds itself cornered once more.

The destruction of the Islamic State may also prove to be a transient victory. Recent reports have suggested that the militants are quietly regrouping in Iraq, biding their time for a future resurgence. If the extremists do return, the United States and Iranian intelligence may find themselves once more in the strange position of tacitly working together two enemies drawn into alignment by crises in Iraq that both helped generate, but neither seems capable of ending.

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How the US and Iran Became Unlikely Allies Against ISIS - The Intercept