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David Wurmser was a longtime advocate of war with Iraq in the Bush administration. Eventually, he got what he wanted, and it was a total disaster. Now, Wurmser again has the ear of a president this time, Donald Trump and his sights are set firmly on Iran.

An influential neoconservative in President George W. Bushs White House who became a significant force behind the push for war with Iraq in 2003, Wurmser has recently been serving as an informal adviser to the Trump administration, according to new reporting from Bloomberg News. In that capacity, Wurmser helped make the case for the recent drone strike that assassinated Iranian Gen. Qassim Suleimani.

David Wurmser again has the ear of a president this time, Donald Trump and his sights are set firmly on Iran.

Wurmser wrote several memos to then-national security adviser John Bolton in May and June of 2019. In the documents, according to Bloomberg, Wurmser argued that aggressive action by the U.S. such as the killing of Suleimani would, in Wurmsers words, rattle the delicate internal balance offorces and the control over them upon which the [Iranian] regime depends for stability and survival.

The significance of this is two-fold. First, while it was already clear that the neoconservative movement has powerfully influenced the Trump administration, Wurmsers role on Iran is further evidence of the sway that neoconservatism still holds on the U.S. right despite the catastrophic invasion of Iraq and Trumps disavowal of the war. Second, it demonstrates that neoconservatives such as Wurmser still cherish a peculiar theory about Iranian society.

After Bushs reelection in 2005, the hard-right faction of his administration turned its attention to Iran. These officials had always wanted regime change in the Islamic Republic, but now some of them believed that a full-scale invasion would not be necessary to bring this about. A 2005 article in the New Yorker by Seymour Hersh quoted a government consultant who described the perspective of these officials as being that a bombing campaign against Irans nuclear facilities would spur a revolution led by secular nationalists and reformers. The consultant summarized their view: The minute the aura of invincibility which the mullahs enjoy is shattered, and with it the ability to hoodwink the West, the Iranian regime will collapse.

Wurmsers outlook seems not to have changed one bit. In his memos to Bolton, he wrote that the U.S. will not need boots on the ground because Iranians would both beimpressed andpotentially encouraged by a targeted attack on symbols of repression.

This theory, so popular among neoconservatives, has always been bizarre: Nations generally become more right-wing when under attack. For instance, after the destruction of the World Trade Center in 2001, Americans did not demand that Bush be impeached and Dennis Kucinich move into the Oval Office.

We should definitely consider the possibility that the neocons dont know what theyre talking about. And yet, here we are, with those self-same neocons again helping shape our foreign policy in delusional and dangerous ways.

The continued self-confidence of neoconservatives like Wurmser is particularly odd given how all their beliefs were proven disastrously wrong in Iraq.

Wurmser holds a Ph.D. in international affairs and worked for the AIPAC-spinoff Washington Institute for Near East Policy in the mid-1990s. In 1996, he was one of the main thinkers behind a policy document titled A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm that was prepared by an Israeli think tank for then-incoming Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus government in 1996. The paper called for Israel to engage in preemptive attacks on its perceived foes and a focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq.

In 1999, Wurmser wrote a book titled Tyrannys Ally: Americas Failure to Defeat Saddam Hussein, which was pretty much what it sounds like. Chemical, biological, and even nuclear weapons are the pillars of Saddams regime, Wurmser said, adding that the menace from Saddams Iraq will continue to grow if the U.S. did not remove him from power.

After the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the purported wishes of the neoconservatives collided with reality, and reality won.

After the September 11 attacks, Wurmser was appointed to a two-man intelligence unit by then-Defense Undersecretary Douglas Feith. (Feith is perhaps best known for being referred to as the fucking stupidest guy on the face of the earth by Gen. Tommy Franks, who led the invasion of Iraq.) Among Wurmsers ideas was for the U.S. to respond to Al Qaeda by, as the 9/11 Commission later put it, hitting a non-Al Qaeda target like Iraq.

Wurmser then became a senior adviser to Bolton, who at that point was an undersecretary at the State Department and one of the most vociferous champions of a regime change war with Iraq.

Eventually, Wurmser and company got what they wanted, and the U.S. led an invasion of Iraq in March 2003. At that point, the purported wishes of the neoconservatives collided with reality, and reality won. Hundreds of thousands of people died, the lives of millions have been blighted, and the entire region will be in flames for the indefinite future.

In a 2007 interview, however, Wurmser continued to defend the decision to go to war, though he did question the Bush administrations rhetorical emphasis on democracy in Iraq. Im not a big fan of democracy per se, he said, Im a fan of freedom and one has to remember the difference. Freedom must precede democracy by a long, long time. In the same interview, he stated that if the U.S. failed to trigger a fundamental change in behavior by Irans leaders that America might have to think seriously about going directly into Iran.

In any case, nothing in the past 17 years seems to have made much of an impression on Wurmser; he still maintains a belief in his own skill at precisely calibrated global strategy. Nor has this past calamitous decade and a half prevented him from having the ear of the people who operate Americas killer drones. Notably, the article about Wurmsers current accomplishments, by neoconservative Bloomberg journalist Eli Lake, does not mention any of Wurmsers unfortunate history.

Wurmser did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Read more:
David Wurmser, Key Iraq War Architect, Advising Trump on Iran - The Intercept

Just after the United States killed Iranian military leader Qassem Soleimani, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo justified the attack by claiming: The entire strategy has been one of deterrence. Indeed, history may judge the killing based on whether it provokes a spiral that leads to more Iranian and U.S. attacks or helps convince Iran to become less aggressive. The United States seeks to deter Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon and from regional aggression, like its September 2019 attack on Saudi oil facilities and support for anti-Israel militant and terrorist groups.

Judging the success of deterrence is always easier in hindsight. The Cold War is correctly judged a deterrence success, but nuclear war always seemed around the corner while it raged. In 2006, Israel fought a 34-day war with the Lebanese Hezbollah. In its aftermath, analysts warned of another round, but deterrence seems to have prevented a full-blown conflict in the years since.

On the positive side, both sides in public are moving away from the abyss. President Trump put aside his usual bellicose rhetoric and sounded conciliatory in a speech after the attack. While warning Iran of American strength, he also stressed: We do not want to use it. Irans supreme leader proclaimed its rocket attacks on the United States a slap in the face but focused on the need for the United States to leave the region, not further strikes. Actions seem to be following words. The United States has not carried out additional attacks on Iran, while according to a Pentagon official, Tehran deliberately chose targets that would not result in loss of life though luck and advanced warning from intelligence also played a critical role. On the positive side for Iran, the U.S. killing of Soleimani has angered many Iraqi leaders, and the possibility that U.S. forces will leave Iraq as a result of their wrath is a potential win.

What are the prospects for deterrence with Iran going forward? The good news is that the Soleimani strike seems to have sent a tough message to Iran. The bad news is that many other factors that favor deterrence are lacking. Confused policymaking and rhetoric on both sides diminish the prospects for success.

The deterrence literature is vast (and the particulars are contested), and it has preoccupied some of the greatest names in the study of international relations. Factors identified with success include the credibility of the threats of force, target state vulnerabilities, the role of domestic elites, escalation dominance, the balance of resolve, the role of positive as well as negative inducements, and clarity and cost of signaling.

Some of these factors clearly bolster deterrence of Iran. The United States enjoys vast military superiority over Iran, which has a weak military, and thus can escalate if necessary. Tehran has long had a front-row seat for the display of U.S. military might and has no illusions about the result of a direct military confrontation. Indeed, the killing of Soleimani further showed the prowess of both the U.S. military and intelligence. In addition, a case can be made that it bolstered U.S. credibility, serving as a short, sharp shock. In the past, even horrific accidents like in 1988 when a U.S. warship downed an Iran Air flight, killing almost 300 innocent Iranians highlighted to Iranian leaders the (mistaken) belief that the world would stand by passively while the United States would attack any target. The perception was no doubt reinforced by the U.S. decision to award medals to the Navy officers commanding the ship.

Yet there are many factors that may undermine deterrence. Iran has played up the death of Soleimani and huge crowds turned out for his funeral. This in turn raises the domestic political costs of inaction for Irans leaders. Iran, in addition, is hemorrhaging economically, and the huge protests against the regime before the Soleimani killing demonstrate its legitimacy problems, creating an incentive for Iran to push back abroad to shore up its popularity at home. Nor can too much be read into Irans relatively cautious approach so far. Tehran has a history of biding its time for revenge and has in the past waited months or even years to retaliate. Trump too has domestic political concerns, and some reports indicate both that he did the strike to distract from impeachment (wag the dog) and because he wanted to shore up Republican support as it moves to the Senate.

Resolve may also favor the Iranians. Even ignoring President Trumps vacillations on the use of force in the Middle East and on whether or not to negotiate with Iran, Americans are increasingly weary of deploying troops in the Middle East and skeptical of war with Iran. Iran, for its part, sees a friendly regime in Iraq as a vital interest and otherwise is playing a long game in the Middle East. Even more important, the United States has threatened the Iranian regimes survival, its ultimate vital interest.

The role of Irans many proxies also creates complexities. The United States has targeted proxy leaders in Iraq, and they too have vowed revenge. They may target U.S. forces for their own reasons, creating a situation where the United States reacts harshly and either blames Iran for the proxys action or Iran sees the U.S. response as an escalation. Iran, for its part, may fear that Israeli actions or saber-rattling are part and parcel of a broader U.S. campaign, with Israel serving as a cutout a misguided view, but one consistent with Iranian beliefs of the U.S.-Israel relationship.

Nor is the United States offering reassurance, creating off-ramps, or otherwise offering inducements for Iran to be less confrontational. After the latest round of conflict, the United States announced new sanctions on Iran (a largely symbolic gesture given the pre-existing extensive economic pressure on Iran), suggesting pressure will continue if not grow. This hard line fits the Trump administrations policies. In May 2018, in his first major foreign policy speech, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo demanded not only an end to Irans nuclear activities, but also questioned the regimes legitimacy and said that Iran must end its interference in Yemen and Syria and longstanding support for groups like the Lebanese Hezbollah a long and unrealistic list of demands. Nor do Iranian leaders trust U.S. promises. In particular, the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal without a clear Iranian violation undercuts Iranian confidence in U.S. guarantees.

Both Iran and the United States are sending mixed signals, which can be disastrous for deterrence. The Trump administration has increased the U.S. troops presence in the Middle East even while calling for more troop withdrawals. The president threatened to strike Iranian cultural sites, while the secretary of defense quickly disavowed this. Nor has the United States clearly conveyed to U.S. allies what American goals are and where and when the United States will respond in the future. Some Iranian leaders are declaring that their revenge for Soleimani has just begun even as other leaders claim their missile attacks were not meant to kill Americans. Such mixed messages allow the other side to read into them what they want, confirming pre-existing narratives.

The deterrence picture, in the end, is cloudy. Although the last few days have been promising, the contentious politics on both sides and the confused signaling suggests that any peace may be short-lived.

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Is deterrence restored with Iran? - Brookings Institution

Iran is caught in a wretched economic crisis. Jobs are scarce. Prices for food and other necessities are skyrocketing. The economy is rapidly shrinking. Iranians are increasingly disgusted.

Crippling sanctions imposed by the Trump administration have severed Irans access to international markets, decimating the economy, which is now contracting at an alarming 9.5 percent annual rate, the International Monetary Fund estimated. Oil exports were effectively zero in December, according to Oxford Economics, as the sanctions have prevented sales, even though smugglers have transported unknown volumes.

On Tuesday, pressure intensified as Britain, France and Germany served notice that they would formally trigger negotiations with Iran toward forcing it back into compliance with a 2015 nuclear deal a step that could ultimately lead to the imposition of United Nations sanctions.

The bleak economy appears to be tempering the willingness of Iran to escalate hostilities with the United States, its leaders cognizant that war could profoundly worsen national fortunes. In recent months, public anger over joblessness, economic anxiety and corruption has emerged as a potentially existential threat to Irans hard-line regime.

Only a week ago, such sentiments had been redirected by outrage over the Trump administrations Jan. 3 killing of Irans top military commander, Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani. But protests flared anew over the weekend in Tehran, and then continued on Monday, after the governments astonishing admission that it was despite three days of denial responsible for shooting down a Ukrainian jetliner.

The demonstrations were most pointedly an expression of contempt for the regimes cover-up following its downing of the Ukrainian jet, which killed all 176 people on board. But the fury in the streets resonated as a rebuke for broader grievances diminishing livelihoods, financial anxiety and the sense that the regime is at best impotent in the face of formidable troubles.

Inflation is running near 40 percent, assailing consumers with sharply rising prices for food and other basic necessities. More than one in four young Iranians is jobless, with college graduates especially short of work, according to the World Bank.

The missile strikes that Iran unleashed on American bases in Iraq last week in response to Gen. Suleimanis killing appeared calibrated to enable its leaders to declare that vengeance had been secured without provoking an extreme response from President Trump, such as aerial bombing.

Hostilities with the most powerful military on earth would make life even more punishing for ordinary Iranians. It would likely weaken the currency and exacerbate inflation, while menacing what remains of national industry, eliminating jobs and reinvigorating public pressure on the leadership.

Conflict could threaten a run on domestic banks by sending more companies into distress. Iranian companies have been spared from collapse by surges of credit from banks. The government controls about 70 percent of banking assets, according to a paper by Adnan Mazarei, a former I.M.F. deputy director and now a senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington. Roughly half of all bank loans are in arrears, Irans Parliament has estimated.

Many Iranian companies depend on imported goods to make and sell products, from machinery to steel to grain. If Irans currency declines further, those companies would have to pay more for such goods. Banks would either have to extend more loans, or businesses would collapse, adding to the ranks of the jobless.

The central bank has been financing government spending, filling holes in a tattered budget to limit public ire over cuts. That entails printing Iranian money, adding to the strains on the currency. A war could prompt wealthier Iranians to yank assets out of the country, threatening a further decline in the currency and producing runaway inflation.

In sum, this is the unpalatable choice confronting the Iranian leadership: It can keep the economy going by continuing to steer credit to banks and industry, adding to the risks of an eventual banking disaster and hyperinflation. Or it can opt for austerity that would cause immediate public suffering, threatening more street demonstrations.

That is the specter hanging over the Iranian economy, Mr. Mazarei said. The current economic situation is not sustainable.

Though such realities appear to be limiting Irans appetite for escalation, some experts suggest that the regimes hard-liners may eventually come to embrace hostilities with the United States as a means of stimulating the anemic economy.

Cut off from international investors and markets, Iran has in recent years focused on forging a so-called resistance economy in which the state has invested aggressively, subsidizing strategic industries, while seeking to substitute domestic production for imported goods.

That strategy has been inefficient, say economists, adding to the strains on Irans budget and the banking system, but it appears to have raised employment. Hard-liners might come to see a fight with Irans archenemy, the United States, as an opportunity to expand the resistance economy while stoking politically useful nationalist anger.

There will be those who will argue that we cant sustain the current situation if we dont have a war, said Yassamine Mather, a political economist at the University of Oxford. For the Iranian government, living in crisis is good. Its always been good, because you can blame all the economic problems on sanctions, or on the foreign threat of war. In the last couple of years, Iran has looked for adventures as a way of diverting attention from economic problems.

However Irans leaders proceed, experts assume that economic concerns will not be paramount: Irans leaders prioritize one goal above all others their own survival. If confrontation with outside powers appears promising as a means of reinforcing their hold on power, the leadership may accept economic pain as a necessary cost.

The hard-liners are willing to impoverish people to stay in power, said Sanam Vakil, deputy director of the Middle East and North Africa program at Chatham House, a research institution in London. The Islamic Republic does not make decisions based on purely economic outcomes.

But Irans leaders need only survey their own region to recognize the dangers that economic distress can pose to established powers. In recent months, Iraq and Lebanon have seen furious demonstrations fueled in part by declining living standards amid corruption and abuse of power.

As recently as November, Irans perilous economic state appeared to pose a foundational threat to the regime. As the government scrambled to secure cash to finance aid for the poor and the jobless, it scrapped subsidies on gasoline, sending the price of fuel soaring by as much as 200 percent. That spurred angry protests in the streets of Iranian cities, with demonstrators openly calling for the expulsion of President Hassan Rouhani.

Thats a sign of how much pressure they are under, said Maya Senussi, a Middle East expert at Oxford Economics in London.

In unleashing the drone strike that killed General Suleimani, Mr. Trump effectively relieved the leadership of that pressure, undercutting the force of his own sanctions, say experts.

Within Iran, the killing resounded as a breach of national sovereignty and evidence that the United States bore malevolent intent. It muted the complaints that propelled Novembers demonstrations laments over rising prices, accusations of corruption and economic malpractice amid the leadership replacing them with mourning for a man celebrated as a national hero.

A country fraught with grievances aimed directly at its senior leaders had seemingly been united in anger at the United States.

The killing of Suleimani represents a watershed, not only in terms of directing attention away from domestic problems, but also rallying Iranians around their flag, said Fawaz A. Gerges, a professor of international relations at the London School of Economics.

Mr. Trump had supplied the Iranian leadership time and space to change the conversation, he added. Iranians were no longer consumed with the misguided and failed economic policies of the Iranian regime, but rather the arrogant aggression of the United States against the Iranian nation.

But then came the governments admission that it was responsible for bringing down the Ukrainian passenger jet. Now, Irans leaders again find themselves on the wrong end of angry street demonstrations.

For now, the regime is seeking to quash the demonstrations with riot police and admonitions to the protesters to go home. But if public rage continues, hard-liners may resort to challenging American interests in the hopes that confrontation will force Mr. Trump to negotiate a deal toward eliminating the sanctions.

Iran may threaten the passage of ships carrying oil through the Strait of Hormuz, the passageway for more than one-fifth of the worlds consumption of liquid petroleum. Disruption there would restrict the global supply of oil, raising the price of the vital commodity. That could sow alarm in world markets while limiting global economic growth, potentially jeopardizing Mr. Trumps re-election bid, as the logic goes.

Iran previously had a different pathway toward gaining relief from the sanctions: Under a 2015 deal forged by President Barack Obama, the sanctions were removed in exchange for Irans verified promise to dismantle large sections of its nuclear program.

But when Mr. Trump took office, he renounced that deal and resumed sanctions.

Whatever comes next, Irans leadership is painfully aware that getting out from under the American sanctions is the only route to lifting its economy, say experts.

The nuclear deal was intended to give Irans leaders an incentive to diminish hostility as a means of seeking liberation from the sanctions. Mr. Trumps abandonment of the deal effectively left them with only one means of pursuing that goal confrontation.

They see escalation as the only way to the negotiating table, said Ms. Vakil. They cant capitulate and come to the negotiating table. They cant compromise, because that would show weakness. By demonstrating that they can escalate, that they are fearless, they are trying to build leverage.

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Irans Grim Economy Limits Its Willingness to Confront the U.S. - The New York Times

MUMBAI :Amid mounting tensions between the US and Iran,Iranian foreign affairs minister Mohammad Javad Zarif on Thursday said India will not find a stable and reliable energy partner other than Iran.

He said losing Iran as a reliable source of energy will not make Indian economy more reliable.

"For India's economic growth you need more and more energy and energy security, which has been an area of concern. I can assure you that youcan'tfind an energy partner which is more stable more reliable than Iran.

"We never involved politics in our energy relations. And if we did, we don't have political problem with India. We are the secured source of energy for India," he said at the FIEO meeting here.

India had stopped importing oil from Iranafter the US refused to extend exemption from sanctions since last year.

The minister, who is on a four-day visit to India, further said that India also needs diversification of the sources of the energy.

"Losing Iran as the reliable provider of indian energy needs, certainly does not make India more secured, does not make Indian economy more reliable," he said.

Condemning the Donald Trump government for the recent "terrorist attack" on Iran which killed its top commander Qassem Soleimani,and imposition of the sanctions, the minister said these actions by the US are regrettable.

"These attempts are to ensure that the people of Iran starve. It is regrettable that he (Trump) said if Iranians want to eat they should listen to him. Butwe won't beg to the US to eat.Starvation is crime against humanity and punishable."

"These are also attempts made so that they (the US) can increase the prices of oil and energy. Now the US is the biggest exporter of oil and they want to take Iranian share in Asia through the sale of their shale gas, which is much more expensive and much less reliant energy. We need to find a response to this. But I want to tell you that Iran can continue to provide economical and reliable oil to India," Zarif said.

He further said Iran can also supply gas through land pipeline or sea pipeline as also LNG.

"We just adopted a legislation expanding Chabahar port as a free trade zone that is a new possibility for India to use the port as a source for production of and export of LNG," he said.

The minister also said that the two countries can collaborate and complement each other in various other areas as well.

"We have, like India, young and talented human resource and there are more Iranian graduate engineers here in Iran. If we bring our resources together we can ensure we can have the cutting edge technology," the minister said.

He said both the countries have complementary economies. "Iran and India have possibilities for cooperation in various fields. There are almost no areas of economy where we compete. We can complement each other with India's great advances in many ways," Zarif said.

He added that for the bilateral trade to continue to be viable, Iran needs money coming in so that it can buy Indian rice, technology and other products and the main source of that money is oil.

"I have, at various meetings with the Prime minister Narendra Modi, security adviser and the Indian foreign minister, said and discussed possibilities of trade. We don't want to put our friends in difficult situation. But we need to find mechanism for improving the trade," he added.

He said the bilateral trade between the two countries has seen a sharp decline in 2019 mainly impacted by oil exports.

While it stood at $17 billion in 2018, it fell to $7 billion in 2019 and will go further low if money dries up, Zarif said.

"There is an interest in long and short term perspective. We are not being able to buy commodities from India. Therefore it is in our interest to find mechanism for trade. We hope India will pick up our oil and gas. This will give India a much bigger bargaining power. We can also start a more developed system of barter. We need to innovate to think about barter where we can provide anything for anything. We need to start working in the right direction," he added. PTI PSK MR MR

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Iran expects India to source its oil, devise new barter trade: Iranian minister - Livemint

The exchanges were all the more notable because until Tuesday night, foreign policy had been a side show in the 2020 campaign. But the targeted killing of the Iranian commander Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani this month ended the moment when the six Democratic candidates could avoid addressing some of the most complex and intractable conflicts that they would inherit if elected. Most seemed to be hoping the subject would soon return to more familiar ground, like universal health insurance or universal background checks for gun sales.

It should have been the moment for Mr. Biden to shine: A former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he was among the most experienced in the Obama Situation Room during debates over increasing troop levels in Afghanistan and secretly carrying out cyberattacks on Irans nuclear facilities.

He had a moment to look decisive, especially in contrast to Senator Bernie Sanders of Vermont, who was the most vociferous about extracting the United States from what he called endless wars. Again, it echoed a phrase that Mr. Trump has often used or at least did until his decision to kill General Suleimani all but assured a greater American troop presence in the Middle East for years to come.

Mr. Biden was clearly the one with the best grasp of the global situation, but he seemed unsteady at moments, even when describing events in which he was deeply involved. He argued that he was the one who led the effort against surging tens of thousands of troops into Afghanistan, without noting that Mr. Obama ignored his advice and ordered a surge anyway. On Iraq, he claimed he was the one who engineered the withdrawal of 156,000 troops from Iraq without noting that it was Mr. Bush, just before leaving office, who ordered a troop withdrawal.

But it was on North Korea a nation that, unlike Iran, is already believed to have nuclear weapons, with American intelligence agencies putting the number at 30 to 60 that the candidates seemed softer. Curiously, none vowed that the North would have to give up its weapons, a statement that just a decade ago was a staple of any foreign policy discussion by leading presidential candidates, even if it seemed like a pipe dream.

Instead, the candidates seemed to silently acknowledge that disarming the North was all but a lost cause. Instead, they focused on negotiating tactics, without ever quite saying what the goal would be. Mr. Biden vowed he wouldnt meet Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, without any preconditions, but never described what those might be.

What was most striking about the discussion was that the candidates talked about the use of diplomacy and military coercion as if they were alternatives, rather than mutually reinforcing tactics to accomplish a strategic end.

Original post:
The Democrats All Disagree With Trump on Iran. Then It Gets Mushy. - The New York Times