Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

Number of drug addicts in Iran ‘doubles’ in six years – The Independent

Irans Drug Control Organisation has said that there are now 2.8 million people in the strictly conservative country regularly consuming drugs, according to reports carried by state media.

The figure is up from 1.3 million users in the Islamic Republics 80 million strong population six years ago, spokesperson Parviz Afshar said, with opium fuelling 67 per cent of consumption.

The UN said last year that Iran already has one of the worst addiction crises in the world, affecting people from all walksof society. Economic stagnation and high unemployment - the lingering result of years of US nuclear sanctions - are widely thought to be to blame.

What happened when US officials were asked why they criticised Iran but not Saudi Arabia

Marijuana use now made up 12 per cent, but methamphetamines use,popular among younger Iranians and known as 'glass',had dropped to 8 per cent, Mr Afshar said, quoting figures from the health and social welfare departments.

The actual number of addicts and regular users could be higher, Saeed Safatian, the head of a working group on drugs in the Expediency Council, Saeed Safatian, told the official IRNA news agency, because many will have not admitted to drug use for fear of social opprobrium.

A total of 90 per cent of the worlds opium is produced in neighbouring Afghanistan from poppy resin which is refined to make heroin. Despite the authorities' best efforts to clamp down on trafficking over the 600-mile-long border,Iran often serves as a transit point for export to the rest of the world, the AFP reports.

After the US invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban in 2001, opium production has soared, funding the extremists insurgency.

Since the majority of US and Nato ally troops withdrew from the country in 2014, production has increased even further: the UN says up to 6,000 tonnes of the drug was exported in 2016 thanks to good weather and the intensifying strength of the Taliban, which now controls some 40 per cent of the country.

The global narcotics market is thriving, the UNs crime and drugs agency said last week, with opiates causing tens of thousands of avoidable deaths a year.

The rest is here:
Number of drug addicts in Iran 'doubles' in six years - The Independent

Iran jab on Kashmir – Calcutta Telegraph

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

New Delhi, June 26: Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei today used a Ramazan message to urge Muslims around the world to support Kashmiris against "oppressors and tyrants", reviving a seven-year-old wound and signalling fresh tensions with India.

Khamenei's message, on Twitter, comes amid concerns in Iran that India has slowed down its implementation of the Chabahar port project on the Gulf of Oman following worries that the US under President Donald Trump may withdraw from an agreement between Iran and the West over Tehran's nuclear programme. That agreement had led to a thaw between the West and Iran, which allowed New Delhi to engage with Tehran without the fear of sanctions.

"Muslim world should openly support people of Bahrain, Kashmir, Yemen etc and repudiate oppressors and tyrants who attacked" people during the Ramazan month-long fast that ended with Id, Khamenei said today.

In 2010, when India was gradually reducing oil imports from Iran under American pressure, Tehran thrice referred to the Kashmir crisis in a period of six months. India had then summoned Iran's top diplomat in New Delhi and registered a formal protest.

Valley protests

Violent protests broke out across Kashmir after Id prayers today, leaving dozens injured, but the authorities were relieved as the trouble was smaller than feared. A cop was lynched outside Srinagar's Jamia mosque last week.

Read the original post:
Iran jab on Kashmir - Calcutta Telegraph

Arsham Parsi – Tablet Magazine

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former Iranian president, once declared to the world: In Iran, we dont have homosexuals. In Iran, we dont have this phenomenon. I dont know who has told you we have it. Ahmadinejads remarks at Columbia University were met with much laughter and criticism at the time. Ironically, however, his claim is not far from the truth. This narrative is reflective and representative of the states policies and practice that, in fact, do not support a homosexual subject. Conversely, despite how this subject is named, same-sex relationships have historically existed and continue to subsist/persist even in todays toxic environmentthough silenced and under-recognized. This is precisely because every cultural apparatus, from families to society to the government and judiciary, deny their sexual identity and human rights.

Human-rights campaigners report that over 4,000 members of sexual minorities have been executed since the ayatollahs seized power in 1979. However, it is estimated the number and frequency of executions is much higher due to the fact that queer Iranians are often condemned under the charges of rape, fraud, or treason in order to justify their criminality. These camouflaged charges appear to allow the Iranian government to conceal the punishment of queer citizens, thereby continuing to curtail sexual minorities rights to life and security as well as obscuring from reports the circumstances surrounding their executions.

The religious fundamentalism that characterizes the attitude of the Iranian judiciary toward homosexuality is longstanding. To contextualize the strict upholding of such judiciary practices one must first consider the ideology of the Islamic Republic as it is embodied in its religious and political leaders. Within months of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the birth date of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeinithen the highest-ranking political and religious authority in the Islamic Republic of Iran, and its supreme leadercalled for homosexuals to be exterminated. They were to be understood as the parasites and corruptors of the nation who spread the stains of wickedness.

Makwan Moloudzadehs bitter trial and execution is testament to the harshness of this central tenet of regime ideologyone that Amnesty International deemed a mockery of justice. Makwan had been found guilty of multiple counts of anal rape, allegedly committed when he was only 13 years old. The alleged victims in his case withdrew their testimony, claiming to have lied under duress. Makwan also informed the court that his confession had been coerced, and pleaded not guilty. Most important, Makwan was only a minor and under Article 49 of the Iranian Penal Code, minorsthose who have not yet reached maturity [puberty] as defined by Islamic Laware exempt from criminal responsibility.

Nevertheless, according to Article 120 of the Penal Code, in cases of anal sex between men, the judge can make his judgment according to his knowledge, which is obtained through conventional methods. Accordingly, the judge relied on his discretionary powers under Article 120 to rule that Makwan could be tried as an adult. Both the seventh district criminal court of Kermanshah, and later the supreme court, found him guilty and ordered his execution.

Makwan was executed in Kermanshahs central prison Dec. 5, 2007, in the absence of medical evidence testifying to his state of maturity at the time of the crime, and in spite of widespread international uproar. Makwan was invisible throughout the proceedings to those who turned on him, to the prosecutor, the executor, and, most significantly, to the society and the status quo that stood idly by and witnessed it all.

***

Despite the official pronouncements that deny or discount the existence of homosexuals in the Islamic Republic, the existence of legal sanctions, militia actions and relationships indicate that whatever the official pronouncements, thousands of Iranians clearly self-identify as what we would term queers (whatever labels they themselves dare use), while many others engage in consensual same-sex acts. There are, of course, no official statistics regarding the size of Irans queer population. They are visible in a number of Irans larger urban areas such as Tehran, Esfahan, and Shiraz. In the capital city, Tehran, for example, there are public and semipublic spaces known for being meeting places where Iranian queers may discreetly meet or gather. Some of these spaces, such as cafs and restaurants, are associated with the middle class or well-to-do, while others, including several well-known parks, are frequented by queers who have often been rejected by their families and are living on the fringes of society or are even homelessparticularly gay youth and men, as well as transgender individuals, who must resort to prostitution in order to afford basic needs.

Queer Iranians live in an atmosphere of uncertainty, peril, and pressure. There are various factors that contribute to their inhumane living conditions. First and foremost, the religious and patriarchal elements that are characteristic of the present Iranian Republic proscribes homosexuality as something to be feared and controlled. The penal code of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on strict Sharia laws that reserve some of the harshest penalties for those convicted of same-sex sexual conduct. Furthermore, sexual minorities in Iran may face arrest as well as physical and sexual assault during detention, summary prosecution, and corporal punishment due to their consensual same-sex acts. Finally, familial and societal pressures to be other than themselves deprive Iranian queers of their dignity, leaving them stranded and invisible amidst their stark vulnerability.

Iranian queers fight for survival, liberty, and dignity begins first and foremost as a struggle for acknowledgement and existence. Iranian queers are often surrounded by friends and family who encourage and enforce heteronormativity; subjected to a socio-symbolic contract that largely supports homophobic Sharia laws, and are victims of judicial proceedings that falsely prosecute and convict them because of their sexual orientation. The true lives of queer Iranians are readily hidden, sheltered, or censored from public appearances. It is almost as if they do not exist.

As Farshad, an Iranian gay man, put it: Since the moment you realize you are gay or that you belong to an LGBT subgroup, you know that you will be discriminated against. One form of discrimination is that your identity as a human being is denied. They deny your right to be a human being, because you know that if you speak of your rights, terrible things might happen to you. Your family, your society, your government, your friends, and your workplaceall of them might do terrible things to you. Discrimination could be everywhere. Certainly, what I witnessed and experienced has always existed [in the society]. The heaviest discrimination is to live under constant suppression. You cannot express who you are, what you want, or what you believe in, and you cannot talk about your sexual orientation.

Even under the reformist government of President Mohammad Khatami, the Islamic judiciary remained one of the bulwarks of religious conservatism in Iran, a judicial and legal status that was strengthened under the hardline rule of Ahmadinejad. In fact, the argument against any recognition of civil rights for sexual minorities is reiterated as an unassailable cultural, religious, and ideological cornerstone of the state itself. In January 2012, in a meeting with the head of the human rights commission of the German parliament, Dr. Mohammad Javad Larijani, the international adviser to the Iranian judiciary, referred to homosexuality as a perversion and a form of sexual disease [that is] not acceptable to Iranians. Consequently, any discussion of the rights of homosexuals in Iran with Western officials has been superficial and fleeting. Admittedly, nation states have always responded to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in varying degrees. Yet, Larijanis staunch position to curtailing sexual-minority rights for cultural reasons is deplorable and clearly contrary to the declaration.

In Iran, the penal code proscribes same-sex sexual expression and imposes harsh sentences. A man found guilty of kissing another man with lascivious intent is punishable by up to 60 lashes of the whip (Article 124). Likewise, tafkhiz or nonpenetrative sex and other sexual behavior between two men are punishable by 100 lashes for each partner. Four convictions of tafkhiz may lead to the death penalty (as does sexual penetration). The penal code further stipulates that if two men, unrelated to one another, lie, without necessity, naked under the same cover, they will each be punished by up to 99 lashes of the whip (Article 123).

It is important to note that there are many negative repercussions of the morality laws in Iran. Moreover, the rigorous enforcement of the laws results in disproportionate harm to GLBT people in Iran in comparison with other laws applying to Iranians generally. Sexual minorities are singled out for such treatment and for the deprivation of their human rights.

This is a brief summary of the discriminatory penal code as it is regularly and rigorously enforced. As recently as May of 2012, an Iranian court sentenced four menSaadat Arefi, Vahid Akbari, Javid Akbari and Houshmand Akbarito death by hanging for sodomy. London-based Iranian human-rights lawyer Mehri Jafari pointed out:

There are two important issues in this case: the location of the alleged occurrence [all from the town of Choram in Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad Province] and the interpretation of the Sharia law that a hodud (strict Sharia punishment) is eminent. Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad is one of the most undeveloped provinces in Iran, and it is obvious that a lack of access to lawyers and fair trial can be considered a serious issue in this case. After this announcement, it is very likely that the execution will be carried out soon, and the remote location makes it difficult to exert any influence on the process.

On the observation about access to lawyers, it is worth recalling that judges are enabled to bear in mind their own view of facts, regardless of any defense. They may also consider confessions extracted through coercion that would be excluded in court proceedings in most jurisdictions. Presence of informed legal counsel, a right in such jurisdictions, is therefore not always supportive of human rights as a result.

The law is equally punishing for Iranian lesbians. According to Articles 129 and 131, the punishment for mosaheqehsexual relations between two femalesis 100 lashes for each of the first three offenses, and the death penalty for the fourth. According to a report by Amnesty International, the Iranian Supreme Court issued a quick verdict of execution for Atefeh Rajabi Sahaaleh, the 16-year-old female who had confessed to her crime for the fourth conviction of mosaheqeh. Based on eyewitness accounts, as Atefeh was taken to the crane for execution, she repeatedly asked Allah for forgiveness. When asked later why [the] case was rushed, [the judge] was reported to have said that, in his opinion, there was too much immorality in Neka, Atefehs hometown. The case of Atefeh illustrates the complete discretion conferred to judges in Iranian courts to disregard rules of evidence and render decisions based on personal attitudes toward homosexuality.

People charged with sexual crimes often endure summary trials that do not adhere to principles of fairness. In so-called morals cases, such as those aforementioned, the stringent standards of evidence are likely to be flouted by the judiciary in the name of protecting cultural and religious standards. For example, according to Article 117 of the penal code, the witness of four just men who have observed the act proves the crime of sodomy. Given that judges may draw from their own views of circumstances, this provision opens the way to slander and rumor from others.

LGBT Iranians have also reported accounts of physical and psychological abuse during detentionincluding the threat and use of torturein order to extract confessions as evidence of homosexual conduct to be adduced in Iranian criminal trials. In 2002, Irans Guardian Council of the Constitutiona committee of 12 senior clerics who oversee all judicial, governmental, and parliamentary legislationvetoed a bill passed by the Iranian parliament that would put limits on practicing torture and presenting confessions obtained from it in judicial proceedings. Yet the proposed bill also stated that political dissidents and homosexuals were exempt from the proposed limits on torture. With that bill, the Iranian government clearly acknowledged that protection against torture should be provided, but that sexual minorities are undeserving of such fundamental legal protection.

A Human Rights Watch report documents instances in which police and the militia have allegedly physically and sexually assaulted individuals before obtaining an arrest warrant. Several of those interviewed spoke of how they had been sexually assaulted or raped during detention. (It might be added that gay Iranians are also abused by police and morality authorities in public, not just while in detention.) According to a July 2012 email from Ahmad, a queer Iranian who lives in Canada, to IRQR,

I was arrested in a gay birthday party in Iran by basij [the militia]. I was taken to police station and I got raped there while I was in the detention center. The guy told me that I could enjoy my life from now on as a faggot. I find out that I became HIV-positive three months later when I wanted to donate blood.

Farshid, another gay Iranian interviewed by Iran Human Rights Documentation Center, also vividly recalls his rape by two members of the militia. He was initially arrested under the pretext that he was wearing what to the militia was inappropriate clothing. He was eventually taken to an unknown residential apartment where he was severely beaten and raped by two senior officers:

There was a full bathroom on that floor. The bathroom was large and its floor was covered by ceramic tiles. First the younger one raped me. Then the older one did the same. All that time I was very afraid that they would kill me after raping me out of the fear that they could get caught. Nobody had their number or any other information leading to them.

***

Endemic homophobia in Iran also stems from the teachings of Islam as provided in Sunnah and Sharia. When serving as the head of the supreme council of the judiciary, Ayatollah Musavi-Ardebili noted the most severe punishments as befitting the Islamic prohibition against homosexuality. While delivering a sermon at Tehran University in 1990, he remarked:

For homosexuals, men or women, Islam has proscribed the most severe punishments. Do you know how homosexuals are treated in Islam? After homosexuality has been proved on the basis of Sharia, the authorities should seize him [or her] they should keep him standing, and should then split him in two with a sword, cut off his head at the neck or split the head. He will fall down. They get what they deserve.

It is evident, therefore, that the authoritative and flawed practice of justice in the cases of Makwan and Atefeh above is the connected to the prevailing attitudes defining the core of the Islamic Republics religiosity, and to its opposition to what it continuously strives to mount as its irreconcilable exterior: homosexuality.

Discrimination against sexual minorities is arguably one of the main tenets of the legal and ideological discourses of the Islamic Republics regime. These discourses squeeze out minority expression and make the GLBT community virtually invisible, if for no other reason than the absolute prohibition from the communitys very identity. As one essayist has observed, the personal is political:

The logic behind the Iranian governments denial of the existence of homosexuals is simple: if something does not exist it is not eligible for basic human rights. The Iranian government denies LGBT Iranians a voice and does its utmost to prevent them from interacting with each other or speaking out in public.

Implicit in this observation is that certain basic rights, such as freedoms of association, assembly, and speech, are conditional upon conforming to the religious and legal beliefs and codes of the republic, or at the very least upon abstaining from expressing sexual identity and gender.

However, there is a wider current to the homophobic tide in Iran that reflects more than the ideological and legalistic rhetoric of the Islamic Republic regime. This current of public opinion that acts to restrict, conceal, and prohibit Iranian queers flows through the main body of Iranian society and enables homophobic state policies, actions and ideologies. At times, homophobia takes the form of plain-clothed religious volunteers, but most often it surges in places the LGBT Iranians call home, or spaces where they seek understanding and counsel, such as doctors offices or school classrooms.

***

Read more from Tablets special Iran Week.

Arsham Parsi is an Iranian LGBT human rights activist living in exile in Canada. He is the founder and head of the Iranian Railroad for Queer Refugees.

See the original post:
Arsham Parsi - Tablet Magazine

The Iran Puzzle – New York Times

Since the Syrian civil war began in 2011, Iran has been one of Mr. Assads chief allies, deploying thousands of Hezbollah and other Shiite fighters and providing other forms of aid to help him beat back Syrian rebels. Irans interests in Syria are thus markedly different from its interests in Iraq. In Iraq it has fought ISIS. In Syria, its focus has been on helping the Assad regime.

It is in Syria where the interests of Iran and the United States are most sharply at odds, and in Iraq where they most nearly converge. American and Iraqi security forces have just about driven ISIS from Mosul, a major Iraqi city. In Syria, America is also seeking to crush ISIS, but is doing so in concert with Syrian opposition forces, not Mr. Assad, whom it has long opposed.

As in Iraq, the fight against ISIS is going well; ISIS is close to being routed from its headquarters in the city of Raqqa. But the prospect of victory has opened the door to new tensions between American-led forces and Iranian-Syrian forces. That has manifested itself in a series of encounters this month in which the United States shot down a Syrian warplane, came close to shooting down another and downed two Iranian-made drones that were nearing American-backed troops on the ground. Iran, meanwhile, used ballistic missiles against ISIS targets.

ISIS now controls only about half the territory it once held in Syria, and, as the space shrinks, the various combatants are concentrating on a smaller area, along Syrias eastern border with Iraq and Jordan and in the Euphrates River Valley, home to oil reserves and water.

Administration officials suspect that Iran is more interested in controlling territory in these areas than defeating ISIS, and that the presence of Iranian and Syrian government forces could impede the American-led effort to finish ISIS off in Raqqa. It could also obstruct American plans to establish outposts in the Syrian and Western Iraqi desert so that fleeing ISIS fighters can be killed or captured, thus preventing them from hunkering down and later re-emerging as a threat, these officials say.

Adding to the combustible environment is Russia, the other major Assad defender, which threatened to retaliate to what Washington called its recent self defense moves by treating American planes as targets. Despite this, administration officials, reflecting a president who shares Saudi Arabias hard-line anti-Iran views, seem to consider Iran a bigger problem than Moscow and one that could threaten Israel, Jordan and other allies.

Could Mr. Trump stumble into a wider war in Syria? There are reasons to worry. He has yet to offer a comprehensive plan for dealing with Syria, including the diplomacy needed to develop a political solution to end the civil war, which could create a more stable country less vulnerable to extremist groups.

The fear is that Mr. Trumps demonizing of Iran, and his unwillingness to engage its government, could result in a broadening of the American military mission from defeating ISIS to preventing Iranian influence from expanding. This would be dangerous. Iran is a vexing state to be smartly managed, not assumed to be an implacable enemy.

Continue reading here:
The Iran Puzzle - New York Times

Trump Is Tripping Over Iran and Russia’s Red Lines in Syria – Foreign Policy (blog)

In the past five weeks, U.S. forces in Syria have struck directly at the Assad regime and its allies in Syria no less than four times. On May 18, U.S. warplanes struck regime and allied militia forces that breached a 34-mile exclusion zone around a U.S. outpost in southeastern Syria. Then on June 8 and June 20, the United States shot down Iranian-made drones as they approached the outpost.

But the most dramatic event so far was the June 18 downing of a Syrian air force Su-22 by a U.S. Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet. This took place after regime forces attacked a town held by the U.S.-aligned Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) near Tabqa, in northern Syria. The Su-22 dropped bombs near the SDF fighters, ignored U.S. warnings, and was then shot down.

The downing of the Su-22 threatened to bring Washington and Moscow into conflict in the war-torn country. In the aftermath of the incident, Russia announced the end of deconfliction arrangements with U.S. forces and that it had decided to treat future U.S. flights west of the Euphrates River as hostile.

Syria is quickly devolving into a free-for-all. There is a high possibility of further friction among regional powers, as the Russians, Americans, and their various clients scramble to realize mutually incompatible objectives specifically in the areas of eastern Syria held by the now collapsing caliphate of the Islamic State.

So how did events in Syria reach this pass, in which direct confrontation between United States and Russia is no longer unthinkable? And what might happen next?

Syria has been divided into a number of de facto enclaves since mid-2012. But a series of events over the past 15 months has served to end the stalemate in the country, ushering in this new and dangerous phase.

Russias entry into the conflict in September 2015 ended any possibility of rebel victory and the overthrow by arms of the regime. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad with invaluable help from Russia, as well as Iran and its various militia proxies went on to clear the rebels out of the key cities of Homs and Aleppo. A diplomatic agreement establishing four de-escalation zones then consolidated regime control of western Syria.

This development has enabled the regime to divert forces to the effort to reassert control over the east of the country. As it does so, the regime is encroaching on a conflict from which it had previously been largely absent: the war between the U.S.-supported, Kurdish-dominated SDF along with other, Arab rebel clients further south and the now retreating jihadis of the Islamic State.

The confluence of interests between Damascus and Tehran on this battlefield is clear. Iran, whose proxies form the key ground forces available to the regime, wants to secure a land corridor through eastern Syria and into Iraq. The Assad regime wants to re-establish a presence on Syrias eastern border.

Regime forces are thus now advancing eastward on two axes: one from the town of Palmyra and the second from south of Aleppo. It was friction along the second axis, as regime forces closed up against areas controlled by the SDF, that caused the events leading to the downing of the Syrian Su-22.

A geographically inevitable contest of wills is developing between the regime and its associated forces as they drive east into Islamic State territory and U.S.-associated SDF and Arab rebel fighters, who also seek to control the former Islamic State areas. Moscows forces are an integral part of this regime push east, with Russian air power and Russian-supported ground forces especially present in the Palmyra offensive.

For a while, it seemed as though the United States and its allies had the upper hand. In mid-2016, the United States established a base in the Tanf area at which U.S. and allied special forces personnel have been training the Maghawir al-Thawra (Revolution Commandos) rebel group. This raised the possibility that these Western-supported Arab forces might link up with SDF fighters in the north. Together, they would then clear the Islamic State out of the Euphrates River valley, complete the conquest of Raqqa, and establish that they control the territory in question before regime forces could make an advance.

In order to decisively preempt this possibility, Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Hezbollah, and Assad regime and Iraqi Shiite militia forces on June 9 made a lunge for the Syria-Iraq border along a line north of Tanf, effectively dividing U.S.-supported elements from one another. Maghawir al-Thawra was trapped south of the new line established by the regime side, as the SDF still engaged the Islamic State far to the north. The rebels, if they wish to progress further, now need to break through regime lines to do so. That would be inconceivable without U.S. help.

Iranian and pro-Iranian regional media were quite frank about the intentions behind this sudden move. A report in the IRGC-linked Fars News Agency described the thinking behind it as follows: America wants to link the northeastern part [of Syria, which is controlled by the Kurds] with the southeastern part, which is why it has stepped up its activity in the al-Tanf area. The Syrian army and its allies, the article went on to say, defied American red lines in a military advance designed to thwart this strategy.

This is where the war currently stands. The latest reports suggest that the United States is in the process of beefing up its presence in the Tanf area. A new base is being built at Zakaf, 50 miles northeast of the town, according to pro-U.S. rebels. The United States has moved its High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) into southern Syria for the first time. Capable of firing rockets and missiles to ranges of nearly 200 miles, the system constitutes a significant increase in U.S. firepower on Syrian soil.

So where is it all heading? The downing of the Su-22 may serve, for a while at least, to demarcate the zones of U.S. and Russian air activity over the skies of Syria. But the real contest is the one on the ground. And here, the prize is the eastern governorate of Deir Ezzor, the site of a large part of Syrias oil resources. Does Russian President Vladimir Putins warning about American air activity west of the Euphrates mean that this area will need to be ceded in its entirety to the regime? Will the United States agree to this?

The Russians have no crucial interest of their own causing them to back the ambitions of the Iranians in the east. But for as long as the going is relatively easy, it appears that Putin also feels no special compunction to rein in his allies. Perhaps both Moscow and Tehran simply assume that American interest in the area is limited and hence that Washington will not take risks in order to counter red lines set down by other players.

The crucial missing factor here is a clearly stated U.S. policy. Trump can either acquiesce to the new realities that Russia seeks to impose in the air, and that Iran seeks to impose on the ground, or he can move to defy and reverse these, opening up the risk of potential direct confrontation. There isnt really a third choice.

Fars News Agency concluded its recent report in the following terms: The imbroglio in eastern Syria has only begun, and stormy days are ahead of us. In the face of much uncertainty, this point at least seems crystal clear.

DELIL SOULEIMAN/AFP/Getty Images

Twitter Facebook Google + Reddit

Read the original here:
Trump Is Tripping Over Iran and Russia's Red Lines in Syria - Foreign Policy (blog)