Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

Iran-Backed Charming Kitten Stages Fake Webinar Platform to Ensnare Targets – Dark Reading

Conflicts in the Middle East, Ukraine, and other areas of simmering geopolitical tensions have made policy experts the latest target of cyber operations conducted by state-sponsored groups.

An Iran-linked group known as Charming Kitten, CharmingCypress, and APT42 recently targeted Middle East policy experts in the region as well as in the US and Europe, using a phony webinar platform to compromise its targeted victims, incident response services firm Volexity stated in an advisory published this month.

Charming Kitten is well known for its extensive social engineering tactics, including low-and-slow social engineering attacks against think tanks and journalists to gather political intelligence, the firm stated.

The group often dupes is targets into installing Trojan-rigged VPN applications to gain access to the fake webinar platform and other sites, resulting in the installation of malware. Overall, the group has embraced the long confidence game, says Steven Adair, co-founder and president of Volexity.

"I don't know if that is necessarily sophisticated and advanced, but it is a lot of effort," he says. "It's more advanced and more sophisticated than your average attack by a significant margin. It's a level of effort and dedication ... that is definitely different and uncommon ... to go to that much effort for such a specific set of attacks."

Policy experts are a frequently targeted by nation-state groups. The Russia-linked ColdRiver group, for example, has targeted nongovernmental organizations, military officers, and other experts using social engineering to gain the confidence of the victim and then following up with a malicious link or malware. In Jordan, targeted exploitation reportedly by government agencies used the Pegasus spyware program developed by the NSO Group and targeted journalists, digital-rights lawyers, and other policy experts.

Other companies have also described Charming Kitten/CharmingCypress' tactics. In a January advisory, Microsoft warned that the group, which it calls Mint Sandstorm, had targeted journalists, researchers, professors, and other experts covering security and policy topics of interest to the Iranian government.

"Operators associated with this subgroup of Mint Sandstorm are patient and highly skilled social engineers whose tradecraft lacks many of the hallmarks that allow users to quickly identify phishing emails," Microsoft stated. "In some instances of this campaign, this subgroup also used legitimate but compromised accounts to send phishing lures."

The group has been active since at least 2013, has strong links to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and has not been directly involved in the cyber-operational aspect of the conflict between Israel and Hamas, according to cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike.

"Unlike in the Russia-Ukraine war, where known cyber operations have directly contributed to the conflict, those involved in the Israel-Hamas conflict have not directly contributed to Hamas military operations against Israel," the company stated in its "2024 Global Threat Report" released on Feb. 21.

These attacks usually start with spear-phishing and end with a combination of malware delivered to the target's system, according to an advisory from Volexity, which calls the group CharmingCypress. In September and October 2023, CharmingCypress used a number of typo-squatted domains addresses similar to legitimate domains to pose as officials from the International Institute of Iranian Studies (IIIS) to invite policy experts to a webinar. The initial email demonstrated the low-and-slow approach of CharmingCypress, eschewing any malicious link or attachment and inviting the targeted professional to reach out through other channels of communications, such as WhatsApp and Signal.

Using in-depth spearphishing, CharmingCypress aims to convince policy experts to install malware. Source: Volexity

The attacks target Middle East policy experts worldwide, with Volexity encountering a majority of attacks against European and US professionals, Adair says.

"They are quite aggressive," he says. "They'll even set up entire email chains or a phishing scenario where they're looking for comment and there's other people maybe three, four, or five people on that email thread with the exception of the target they're definitely trying to build rapport."

The long con eventually delivers a payload. Volexity identified five different malware families associated with the threat. The PowerLess backdoor is installed by the Windows version of the malware-laden virtual private network (VPN) application, which uses PowerShell to allow files to be transferred and executed, as well as targeting specific data on the system, logging keystrokes, and capturing screenshots. A macOS version of the malware is dubbed NokNok, while a separate malware chain using a RAR archive and LNK exploit leads to a backdoor named Basicstar.

The group's approach to social engineering definitely embodies the "persistence" piece of the advanced persistent threat (APT). Volexity sees a "constant barrage" of attacks, so policy experts have to become even more suspicious of cold contacts, Adair says.

Doing so will be difficult, as many policy experts are academics in constant contact with students or members of the public and are not used to being strict with their contacts, he says. Yet they should definitely think before opening documents or entering credentials into a site reached through an unknown link.

"At the end of the day, they have to get the person to click something or open something, which if I want you to review a paper or something like that, means ... being very wary of links and files," Adair says. "If I have to enter my credentials at any point in time, or authorize something that should be a major red flag. Similarly, if I'm being asked to download something, that should be a pretty big red flag."

In addition, policy experts need to understand that CharmingCypress will continue to target them even if its attempts fail, Volexity stated.

"This threat actor is highly committed to conducting surveillance on their targets in order to determine how best to manipulate them and deploy malware," the company stated in its advisory. "Additionally, few other threat actors have consistently churned out as many campaigns as CharmingCypress, dedicating human operators to support their ongoing efforts."

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Iran-Backed Charming Kitten Stages Fake Webinar Platform to Ensnare Targets - Dark Reading

Iran has further increased its total stockpile of uranium, UN nuclear watchdog report says – El Paso Inc.

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Iran has further increased its total stockpile of uranium, UN nuclear watchdog report says - El Paso Inc.

Misery Index Increase in 25 Provinces of Iran – Iran Focus

Iranian media have reported an increase in the Misery index over the past year in 25 provinces of Iran.

The economic website Eco Iran has announced in a report that in the fall of 2023, the misery index across the country was 52 units.

According to Eco Irans report, this fall, the Misery level in urban areas was 52.3 units, while in rural areas, it was 51.7 units, indicating a 0.6-unit higher Misery rate in cities compared to villages.

The report indicates that the highest level of Misery is in the cities of Lorestan province with 64.2 units.

Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, Yazd, and Sistan and Baluchestan are other provinces with the highest Misery levels in their cities.

On the other hand, the lowest Misery level is in the cities of Tehran province with 44.5 units.

The misery index reflects the difficulty of the economic situation in society, derived from the total inflation and unemployment rates.

Some experts believe that the misery index is distant from the actual situation in Iran because the compilation of inflation and unemployment statistics in Iran involves manipulation of numbers and economic definitions by government institutions. Therefore, independent experts always consider the real situation to be more severe than the figures announced by government institutions.

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Misery Index Increase in 25 Provinces of Iran - Iran Focus

Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline gets a reset, can it overcome sanctions? – Al-Monitor

KARACHI Just months after carrying out tit-for-tat attacks across the Pakistan-Iran border, Tehran and Islamabad are trying to get the stagnant Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline moving. This week, Pakistans Cabinet Committee on Energy has been finalizing the construction of an 50-mile patch of the pipeline from the Iranian border to the Pakistani port city of Gwadar.

Initially conceived as the Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline under plans laid in 1994, it became a bilateral project between Iran and Pakistan after India dropped out in 2008 amid increasing US sanctions on Iran.

Completed on the Iranian side, the pipeline extends nearly 700 miles from the Pars Special Economic Energy Zone to Iranshahr and Bushehr Fars, Kerman, Hormozgan and ends in the Sistan and Baluchestan province on the Pakistan-Iran border. From there on, the pipeline would stretch an additional 500 miles across the Pakistani provinces of Baluchistan and Sindh.

But Islamabad was unable to proceed with the project due to sanctions and financing challenges, despite pledges made in two agreements it had signed in 2009 and 2019. Islamabad was due to complete its section of the pipeline in February-March of this year, or else face a hefty penalty of $18 billion to be paid to Iran. But Tehran has given Islamabad until September 2024 to complete the nearly 500-mile section on Pakistans side.

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Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline gets a reset, can it overcome sanctions? - Al-Monitor

CENTCOM Intercepts Iranian Weapons Shipment Intended for Houthis – US Central Command

Feb. 15, 2024 Release Number 20240215 - 02 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

TAMPA, Fla. A U.S. Coast Guard cutter, forward deployed to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, seized advanced conventional weapons and other lethal aid originating in Iran and bound to Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen from a vessel in the Arabian Sea on Jan. 28.

The U.S. Coast Guard Sentinel-class fast-response cutter USCGC Clarence Sutphin Jr (WPC 1147), assigned to U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, located the vessel, and boarded it in the Arabian Sea. The boarding team discovered over 200 packages that contained medium-range ballistic missile components, explosives, unmanned underwater/surface vehicle (UUV/USV) components, military-grade communication and network equipment, anti-tank guided missile launcher assemblies, and other military components.

The direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer of such aid violates U.N. Security Council Resolution 2216 (as extended and renewed by resolutions 2675 and 2707).

This is yet another example of Irans malign activity in the region, said Gen. Michael Erik Kurilla, CENTCOM commander. Their continued supply of advanced conventional weapons to the Houthis is in direct violation of international law and continues to undermine the safety of international shipping and the free flow of commerce.

CENTCOM is committed to working with our allies and partners to counter the flow of Iranian lethal aid in the region by all lawful means including U.S. and U.N. sanctions and through interdictions.

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CENTCOM Intercepts Iranian Weapons Shipment Intended for Houthis - US Central Command