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Trump administration officials, anticipating the defeat of the Islamic State in its de facto Syrian capital of Raqqa, are planning for what they see as the next stage of the war, a complex fight that will bring them into direct conflict with Syrian government and Iranian forces contesting control of a vast desert stretch in the eastern part of the country.

To some extent, that clash has already begun. Unprecedented recent U.S. strikes against regime and Iranian-backed militia forces have been intended as warnings to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and Tehran that they will not be allowed to confront or impede the Americans and their local proxy forces.

[U.S. risks further battles as it steps deeper into Syrian quagmire ]

As regime and militia forces have begun advancing eastward, senior White House officials have been pushing the Pentagon to establish outposts in the desert region. The goal would be to prevent a Syrian or Iranian military presence that would interfere with the U.S. militarys ability to break the Islamic States hold on the Euphrates River valley south of Raqqa and into Iraq a sparsely populated area where the militants could regroup and continue to plan terrorist operations against the West.

Officials said Syrian government claims on the area would also undermine progress toward a political settlement in the long-separate rebel war against Assad, intended to stabilize the country by limiting his control and eventually driving him from power.

The wisdom and need for such a strategy effectively inserting the United States in Syrias civil war, after years of trying to stay out of it, and risking direct confrontation with Iran and Russia, Assads other main backer has been a subject of intense debate between the White House and the Pentagon.

Some in the Pentagon have resisted the move, amid concern about distractions from the campaign against the Islamic State and whether U.S. troops put in isolated positions in Syria, or those in proximity to Iranian-backed militias in Iraq, could be protected. European allies in the anti-Islamic State coalition have also questioned whether U.S.-trained Syrians, now being recruited and trained to serve as a southern ground-force vanguard, are sufficient in number or capability to succeed.

One White House official, among several who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss Syria planning, dismissed such concerns, saying: If youre worried that any incident anywhere could cause Iran to take advantage of vulnerable U.S. forces ... if you dont think America has real interests that are worth fighting for, then fine.

The official said the expanded U.S. role would not require more troops, comparing it to The Rat Patrol, the 1960s television series about small, allied desert forces deployed against the Germans in northern Africa during World War II.

With our ability with air power ... youre not talking about a lot of requirements to do that, the official said. ... You dont need a lot of forces to go out and actually have a presence.

This official and others played down reports of tensions over Syria strategy. No one disagrees about the strategy or the objectives, said a second White House official. The question is how best to operationalize it.

The Pentagon, not the White House, made the decision to shoot down Iranian drones and a Syrian fighter jet in response to their approaches to or attacks against U.S. forces and their Syrian allies, this official said. They shot down an enemy aircraft for the first time in more than a decade. Thats accepting a high level of risk, the official said. ... Weve done quite a lot since April that the previous administration said was impossible without the conflict spiraling.

Ilan Goldenberg, a former senior Pentagon official now in charge of the Center for a New American Securitys Middle East program, agreed that the Obama administration over-agonized about every decision in Syria.

But Goldenberg faulted the Trump administration with failing to articulate its strategy. It has been the worst of all worlds, he said. A vagueness on strategy, but a willingness to deploy force. They are totally muddying the waters, and now you have significant risk of escalation.

I know the president is fond of secret plans, Goldenberg said. But this situation requires clarity about our objectives and what we will or wont tolerate.

Trump promised during his campaign to announce within his first month in office a new strategy for defeating the Islamic State. That strategy remains unrevealed, and for several months Trump appeared to be following President Barack Obamas lead in avoiding Assad, Iran and Russia and continuing a punishing assault on Islamic State strongholds elsewhere in Syria, as well as in Iraq.

In April, Trump broke that mold with a cruise missile attack on regime forces after their use of chemical weapons against civilians. Assad and his allies protested but did little else.

More recently, however, there have been direct clashes between the United States and the regime. Trumps campaign calls to join forces with Russia against the Islamic State have largely disappeared amid increased estrangement between Washington and Moscow and investigations of Trump associates contacts with Russian officials.

Despite U.S. warnings, regime and militia forces have moved toward the Syrian town of Tanf, near the Iraq border, where U.S. advisers are training Syrian proxies to head northeast toward Deir al-Zour, the regions largest city, controlled by the regime and surrounded by the Islamic State. It is a prize that the regime also wants to claim.

At the end of May, Syrian and Iranian-backed forces pushed southward to the Iraq border, between Tanf and Bukamal, where the Euphrates crosses into Iraq. In Iraq, Iranian-backed militias have, in small but concerning numbers, left the anti-Islamic State fight and headed closer to the border, near where regime forces were approaching.

On at least three occasions in May and June, U.S. forces have bombed Iranian-supported militia forces approaching the Tanf garrison. Twice this month, they have shot down what they called pro-regime armed drones, including one on June 8 that fired on Syrian fighters and their American advisers.

On Sunday, two days before the most recent drone shoot-down near Tanf, a U.S. F/A-18 shot down a Syrian air force jet southwest of Raqqa.

In response, Russia said it would train its powerful antiaircraft defense system in western Syria on farther areas where U.S. aircraft are operating and shut down the communications line that the two militaries have used to avoid each other in the crowded Syrian airspace.

The only actions we have taken against pro-regime forces in Syria ... have been in self-defense, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said this week.

Dunford also made clear that victory against the Islamic State in Raqqa, and in Mosul, where the U.S.-led coalition and Iraqi forces are in the last stages of a months-long offensive, will not mark the end of the war.

Raqqa is tactical. Mosul is tactical, Dunford said. We ought not to confuse success in Raqqa and Mosul as something that means its the end of the fight. I think we should all be braced for a long fight.

In a report Wednesday, the Institute for the Study of War, referring to intelligence and expert sources, said that the Islamic State in Raqqa had already relocated the majority of its leadership, media, chemical weapons, and external attack cells south to the town of Mayadin in Deir al-Zour province.

Neither the U.S.-led coalition and its local allies nor what the institute called the Russo-Iranian coalition can easily access this terrain located deep along the Euphrates River Valley with their current force posture, it said.

At the White House, senior officials involved in Syria policy see whats happening through a lens focused as much on Iran as on the Islamic State. The Iranian goal, said one, seems to be focused on making that link-up with Iran-friendly forces on the other side of the border, to control lines of communication and try to block us from doing what our commanders and planners have judged all along is necessary to complete the ISIS campaign. ISIS is another name for the Islamic State.

If it impacts your political outcome, if it further enables Iran to solidify its position as the dominant force in Syria for the long haul, the official said, that threatens other things, including the defeat-ISIS strategy and the ability to get to political reconciliation efforts.

For us, the official said, thats the biggest concern.

Thomas Gibbons-Neff contributed to this report.

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US on collision course with Syria and Iran once de facto Islamic State capital falls - Washington Post

Since the June 7 terrorist attacks in Tehran, the Iranian government has made dozens of arrests and highlighted the fact that ISIS claimed responsibility. The countrys leaders have driven the narrative that Iran is yet another victim of this global terrorist network even going so far as to launch missiles targeting ISIS operations in Syria. But it is increasingly apparent that, while outside terrorists may have played a role, the governments focus on their involvement hides a more complex truth, with significant implications for U.S. policy.

Through recent news reports weve learned that those rounded-up as part of the attacks are all members of the Kurdish and Baluch ethnic minorities. The conflict with Irans Kurdish and Baluch minorities is not new: Tehran has been battling for close to a decade a much larger insurgency with both groups, without any evidence of direct links to ISIS. Most recently, on the eve of the Tehran attacks, a Kurdish nationalist group with no global terrorist connections killed two Iranian border guards near the city of Urmiya.

Despite this, the U.S. and other western countries appear to be taking Iran at its word that the attacks in Tehran were exclusively the work of ISISand part of the groups global campaign. But in doing so, they risk adopting a skewed view of Irans foreign relations and domestic stability.

Tehrans focus on ISIS as the driving force behind recent terror attacks is right out of the countrys playbook for dealing with ethnic conflict.

While Iran is commonly referred to as Persia, it actually has a multi-ethnic population. Close to half its citizens are non-Persian minorities, including Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Arabs, Baluch and Kurds the latter make up about 10 percent of the population. These ethnic minorities are located primarily in the countrys border regions and share ties with co-ethnics in neighboring states: Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Pakistan. This geographic proximity has significant bearing on Tehrans regional foreign policy and individual relations with most of its neighbors.

Irans multi-ethnic composition also affects domestic stability. For close to a decade, Iranian security forces have been engaged in domestic armed conflict with Kurdish and Baluch groups. A disproportionate number of Iranian Kurds, including minors, are executed each year. While the offenders are often charged with drug and smuggling crimes, many observers believe the high number of executions is the result of ethnic politics rather than community crime. This was even more evident in spring 2016, when a large number of Iranian Kurds were executed for charges of enmity to God for membership in Kurdish political organizations. While most of Irans Kurds and Baluch are Sunni, the basis of their dissent seems mostly ethno-nationalist and not sectarian.

Iranian government representatives rarely acknowledge dissent or grievances among the countrys ethnic minorities. But when the conflicts spill into the political realm or the public eye, we get a better understanding of the concern they cause. For example, during the recent presidential campaign the leading candidates, Hassan Rouhani and Ebrahim Raisi, both appealed to Irans ethnic minorities and promised to allow greater use of minority languages in an attempt to gain their votes. In addition, Leader Khamenei also warned foreigners against stirring up ethnic minorities in efforts to interfere in Irans election process.

And the impact of internal dissent goes well beyond political rhetoric in February, when members of Irans Arab community held massive demonstrations, they successfully paralyzed the city of Ahvaz for days, which is the center of Irans oil production.

Despite political promises, Irans leaders rarely take steps to address domestic grievances. Instead, they typically blame outsiders for the activities of the ethnic minorities, often depicting them as tools of foreign governments, primarily Saudi Arabia, the U.S., Britain or Israel. And while Iran claims to be an Islamic Republic that does not differentiate between Muslims on ethnic basis, its leaders refuse to allow use of non-Persian languages in the official sphere and the Iranian mediatends to belittle non-Persian groups.

Tehrans focus on ISIS as the driving force behind recent terror attacks is right out of the countrys playbook for dealing with ethnic conflict. Even if the Kurdish attackers cooperated with ISIS, their motivations and goals are very different than other affiliates. And even while dozens of Kurds and Baluch have now been jailed, this conflict is not going away anytime soon. Kurdish, Baluch and other domestic ethnic groups in Iran have extensive grievances and there continues to be fallout from the regular executions of activists from these communities.

Tehrans official statements and ISIS finger-pointing would have us dismiss domestic ethnic tensions as insignificant. But Irans modern history makes it clear that, during periods of greater political turbulence, these tensions impact the country and its wider political developments, such as during the Islamic Revolution. As Western leaders assess developments in Iran, its essential that they account for its multi-ethnic composition and domestic base of terrorism, and the major role these play in the countrys stability and foreign policy.

Brenda Shaffer is a professor with the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown and a fellow with the Atlantic Councils Global Energy Center.

Continued here:
Terror in Iran: The regime is pointing fingers at ISIS to distract from domestic unrest - Fox News

The Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, walks under a picture of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Photograph: Ebrahim Noroozi/AP

Tensions are mounting between Irans supreme leader and the countrys president after the latters landslide victory in last months election.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, 78, has sharpened his criticism of the reformist president, Hassan Rouhani, including humiliating him in a meeting of the countrys most senior officials.

A hardliner keen to preserve his legacy, Khamenei is believed to have tacitly backed Ebrahim Raisi, Rouhanis rival, in the election.

The president, who increased his mandate by 5m votes when he won his second term, fired back this week by saying that the political legitimacy of a religious leader is determined by the peoples will and invitation comments that supporters of Khamenei, whose position as supreme leader is a lifelong appointment, have received with disdain.

Clerics sympathetic to Khamenei argue that the legitimacy of the leader, or the rule of the Islamic jurist (Velayat-e-Faghih) is divine.

Rouhanis comments come after Khamenei delivered a withering speech last week to an audience of senior officials including Rouhani, the judiciary chief and the parliamentary speaker.

Mr President has talked at great lengths about the countrys economy and well, hes said this should be done, that should be done, Khamenei said. But who is he addressing by mentioning the should dos? the ayatollah asked, before responding: Himself.

A video circulating online of that moment shows the audience bursting into laughter while Rouhani smiles uncomfortably.

Khamenei continued: In 1980-1981 the then president polarised society in two camps, and divided the country into opponents and supporters; this should not be repeated.

The ayatollah was referring to the first post-revolutionary president, Abolhassan Banisadr, who was impeached and later exiled after clashing with the clerical establishment. Rouhanis supporters view the leaders comments as a warning that he may face a similar fate.

Ali Ansari, director of the Institute of Iranian Studies at St Andrews University, said Khamenei was attempting to curb Rouhanis rising popularity after his election success.

After the elections Khamenei was unhappy with the results and theyre trying to contain it, Ansari said. Its all standard stuff that we heard in 2000, 2001 when they got a bit panicky and worried about what [former reformist president Mohammad] Khatami would try and do. They want to send a message to Rouhani to get back into your box.

He added: Hes interestingly saying, Im not.

The power struggle has also seen Rouhani forced to defend his success at the ballot box. Addressing a group of university professors, he referred to Ali ibn Abi Talib, the prophet Muhammads son-in-law, a revered Shia figure also respected by Sunnis, who became a caliph only when people showed him support.

We are not following western beliefs when were holding elections and going after peoples votes, he said, insisting that democracy was not a western gift. We belong to a religion in which [Imam Ali] based his leadership on peoples will and peoples vote.

Khamenei, in particular, bought into the anti-Rouhani spin during the campaign period that said his administration was promoting western lifestyle choices and homosexuality in schools false claims that infuriated Rouhani.

Rouhanis predecessors have also found that their relations with Khamenei became more strained in their second term in office, as they jostled to leave their own legacy and test the limits of power under the Iranian constitution and Khameneis supreme authority. Even hardliner Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who was blocked from running in this years election, fell foul of Khamenei during his second term in office.

Referring to the previous administrations of Mohammad Khatami and his predecessor, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Ansari said: Both of them were probably more diplomatic than Rouhani was, but they basically said the same thing.

However, the power struggle between the elected faction and the unelected faction of the Iranian establishment has become even more complicated under Rouhani tenure because of uncertainty over Khameneis succession. There is also uncertainty surrounding Khameneis state of health after his prostate surgery in 2014.

Whats interesting is that Khamenei has been so blunt in his criticism, hes been very personal that meeting where he actually specifically named Rouhani and said get on with your job and stop criticising other people, and everyone laughed about it, said Ansari. Basically, Khamenei has given the green light to hardliners to start containing him, but we have to wait and see how it pans out. Obviously theyre trying to hit him [Rouhani] very hard, and we just have to see how Rouhani responds.

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Rift between Iran's ayatollah and re-elected president widens - The Guardian

As the US influence in the Middle East wanes, it increasingly associates itself with dictatorships like Saudi Arabia, whose dark face and role in supporting terrorism is known to everyone in the region, a high ranking Iranian Revolutionary Guard official told RT.

The United States and President Trump in particular consider only one dimension of convergence with Saudi Arabia, ignoring the ideological and intellectual challenges and costs such ties entail, media adviser to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Commander-in-Chief Hamid Reza Moghadam Far told RT in an exclusive interview.

That was one of Trumps senseless moves. He was just seeking to milk this cow and thinking about only business, Moghadam Far said.

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The first challenge is that Trump goes to such a country as his first trip after being elected That is the behavior shown towards a dictatorial regime in which democracy is meaningless and no elections take place and the people have no presence on the scene. The next challenge is that they claim that they are combatting terrorism. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia has provided the most support for terrorism.

The recent naming of Mohammed bin Salman as Saudi Arabias new crown prince might be another outcome of Trumps visit amidst internal disputes among Saudi princes and with other Arab countries.

This replacement is one of the internal political impacts of the [Trumps] visit on Saudi Arabia. I mean the replacement of the crown prince. But Saudi Arabia is facing certain conditions today that I think the development would create further problems for the country, Moghadam Far said, pointing out that this decision would hardly be beneficial for the Saudi people.

While the appointment might push Saudi Arabia into further radicalization, it would unlikely lead to an armed conflict with Iran, Moghadam Far believes, as the Saudi army is not fit for military action.

There is no possibly of conflict. Today many Arab countries are complaining about Saudi Arabias inexperienced and radical moves. They consider Saudi Arabia as callow, Moghadam Far told RT.

A number of inexperienced people who are ruling Saudi Arabia lack the resolve and determination to initiate a war on Iran. They lack the courage and power. I do not think they will come up with such conclusion, even if all global powers support them.

Saudi Arabias policies in the Middle East only bring instability to the region and its alliance with the US only diminishes the already dwindling American power and influence, Moghadam Far believes.

[The US policies] definitely have a negative effect. What matters more, however, is that the US is not as influential a player as it used to be and it can no longer manipulate regional equations. Today, it does not enjoy such a sway at all and its influence in the region has waned, Moghadam Far said.

READ MORE: US stirring up Iranophobia to boost arms sales to Arab nations Tehran

It now has to associate with countries like Saudi Arabia whose negative role in supporting terrorism, whose dictatorship, and whose dark face is known to everyone in the region.

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Tehrans recent Iranian missile attack on Islamic State (IS, formerly ISIS/ISIL) terrorists in Syria should have weakened the resolve of the Saudis and other powers to go to war with Iran. A key message of the attack was to clearly demonstrate Iranian military capabilities to those who doubted them, Moghadam Far said.

In the past, when these missiles were test-fired in Iran, the US and certain western countries used to usually announce that Iran was lying that its launches had been successful and tried to create this impression that Iranians do not have such a capability and their missiles cannot strike their targets with precision, he said.

The strike also demonstrated Irans resolve to fight terrorism, rubbishing usual US accusations that Tehran supports terrorist elements.

As in the past, whenever Americans want to mount pressure on Iran, impose new sanctions and proceed with an issue in the region and beyond, [the US] accuse Iran of backing terrorism, Moghadam Far said.

But I think that todays conditions are such that the worlds public opinion does not accept this. The world has come to realize that the US, despite leading a coalition against [IS] and terrorism in Syria and Iraq, Syria in particular, does not fight terrorism in practice and is in fact is supporting it They cannot both take an opposite stance against terrorism and accuse Iran.

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US seeks to 'milk' terrorism sponsor Saudi Arabia Iran's Revolutionary Guard to RT - RT

BEIRUT Iranian state media on Wednesday called the appointment of Mohammed Bin Salman to the position of crown prince and successor to Saudi Arabia's King Salman as a "soft coup".

"Soft coup in Saudi Arabia/Son becomes the successor of the father," read the headline on the Iranian state TV website.

The move is likely to rattle Iran's leadership, which has been critical of comments by Prince Mohammed last month that the "battle" should be taken into Iran.

Iran, which is predominantly Shi'ite Muslim, and Saudi Arabia, which is mostly Sunni, compete for power and influence across the region. The two countries support opposite sides in the conflicts in Syria and Yemen.

Islamic State carried out attacks on the Iranian parliament in Tehran and the shrine of the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, two weeks ago that left at least 17 dead. Iranian officials pointed a finger at Saudi Arabia, which denied any involvement.

Tension between the two countries increased last month when U.S. President Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia and took a bellicose stance against Iran in an official speech, repeatedly accusing the Islamic Republic of supporting terrorism.

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei labeled the Saudi leadership "idiots" in a speech last month.

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Iran State Media Calls Promotion of Mohammed Bin Salman a 'Soft Coup' - New York Times