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LONDON Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei warned the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi on Tuesday against any measures that could weaken the Tehran-backed Shi'ite paramilitary groups, saying such actions would endanger Baghdad's stability.

At a meeting in Tehran, Khamenei said the Shi'ite militias were Iraq's main forces pushing back Sunni jihadist groups, and Baghdad should not trust the United States in the fight against the Islamic State, Iranian state media reported.

The Shi'ite militias, known as Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF) helped Baghdad defend the country against the Islamic State militant group when Iraqi military and police divisions deserted en masse in 2014.

Since then, the Iran-backed militias, estimated to comprise more than 60,000 fighters, have continued to attack the Islamic State, also known as Daesh, which has declared a Caliphate across swathes of Iraq and Syria.

But Sunnis in areas freed from Islamic State control say the Shi'ite militias have carried out looting, abductions and murder.

Some Arab leaders in northern Iraq have asked for the PMF to be dissolved or expelled from their Sunni-majority provinces.

"The Daesh is retreating from Iraq and that is thanks to the governments trust in these young devoted forces," Khamenei told Abadi in Tehran.

"The Americans are against Popular Forces because they want Iraq to lose its main source of strength," he added.

U.S.-backed Iraqi forces have also dislodged Islamic State from Iraqi cities the militants captured, and are about to fully capture Mosul, which used to be their de facto capital in the country.

AFTER SAUDI ARABIA

Abadi met Khamenei a day after his visit to Saudi Arabia, Iran's regional rival, in a Middle Eastern tour that will also include Kuwait.[nL8N1JH2LO]

Iraq lies on the faultline between Shi'ite Iran and the mostly Sunni Arab world. Deep-running animosity and distrust between the two sides is fueled by sectarian divides.

Abadi belongs to the Dawa party, a Shi'ite group with close ties to Iran. But he has managed relations with the Sunnis better than his predecessor, Nuri al-Maliki, and also improved Baghdad's ties with Saudi Arabia.

Khamenei asked Abadi not to trust the Americans in their fight against the Islamic State, as "they and their regional allies (Saudi Arabia) have created Daesh with their money and do not wish to fully eliminate them" in Iraq.

He said Iran was against the presence of American forces in Iraq under any circumstance including training Iraqi forces.

"We should remain vigilant of the Americans and not trust them. The Americans and their followers are against Iraq's independence, unity and identity," Khamenei said.

Khamenei also reiterated Iran's disagreement with any measure that threatened the territorial integrity of Iraq and divides the country.

Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region announced this month that it would hold a referendum on independence, a move that Baghdad's Shi'ite-led government has rejected.

(Reporting by Bozorgmehr Sharafedin; Editing by Richard Balmforth)

BRUSSELS Belgian troops shot a suspected "terrorist" bomber in Brussels Central Station on Tuesday but there were no other casualties and the situation was brought under control after people were evacuated, officials said.

WASHINGTON The U.S. State Department bluntly questioned on Tuesday the motives of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for their boycott of Doha, saying it was "mystified" the Gulf states had not released their grievances over Qatar.

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Iran's leader warns Iraq not to weaken Shi'ite militias - Reuters

The offshore field was first developed in the 1990s, and Total was one of the biggest investors in Iran until the international sanctions were imposed in 2006 over suspicions that Tehran was trying to develop nuclear arms.

Total has decided to return and develop phase 11 of the South Pars project in the Gulf, which will cost up to $5 billion, at a time when President Hassan Rouhani has faced criticism at home over a lack of economic revival following the easing of sanctions under the nuclear deal.

Though one of the world's largest oil and gas producers, most major international giants including Royal Dutch Shell and BP have so far shown limited appetite to invest in Iran, due to uncertainty over contract terms and a sharp drop in global oil prices.

U.S. President Donald Trump's hard line on Iran has further cooled the investment climate, even though his administration extended the wide sanctions relief last month.

"The U.S. waivers have been renewed and they will be renewed every six to eight months.We have to live with some uncertainty," said Pouyanne.

Total holds a 50.1 interest in the South Pars project along with state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation, with 30 percent, and Iran's Petropars with a 19.9 percent, he said.

The French group has also made a number of significant investments in recent years in Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Brazil as Pouyanne sees the three-year downturn in the global energy market as an opportunity to clinch deals for cheap resources to secure strong growth.

"REAL IMPROVEMENT"

Total aims to achieve returns of above 15 percent on every new project it is enters into around the world. That includes South Pars, where terms discussed with the Iranian government would be significantly better than in the pre-sanctions period, Pouyanne said.

Investors have complained that previous Iranian contracts allowed foreign companies little profit. Total worked on phases 2-3 of South Pars in the 1990s.

The new Iranian Petroleum Contract (IPC) differs from its predecessor by offering the operator remuneration based on production rather than a simple percentage of the development costs, Pouyanne said.

It also extends over a period of 20 years rather than seven or eight. "The IPC is a real improvement," he said. "We will not go to Iran if there is not a reward which is commensurate."

With U.S. sanctions still in place prohibiting trading with Iran in dollars, Total will finance the project in euros from its own resources.

Gas from South Pars will supply only the fast-growing domestic Iranian market and none will be exported, Pouyanne said. Total will be paid not in cash but in condensate, a very light crude oil which is a by-product of gas production.

South Pars is part of a giant gas reservoir that straddles the territorial waters of Iran and Qatar, where Total is also a major player in gas production as well as in oil and refining.

Tehran has indicated that the development of the project will not be hit by Qatar's diplomatic isolation due to a dispute with Saudi Arabia and some of its Gulf Arab allies.

Total is also considering a petrochemicals project in Iran which would require external financing from Asian banks, although this remains in less advanced stage, Pouyanne said.

(Reporting by Ron Bousso; editing by David Stamp)

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France's Total to Go Ahead With Major Iran Gas Project-CEO - New York Times

Donald Trump predicted back in 2013 that the US would eventually go to war with Iran. At the time, Trump was merely a rich guy and right-wing gadlfy criticizing Secretary of State John Kerry on Fox News, but later, as a presidential candidate then a president, his rhetoric and policies have been strikingly antagonistic.

Trump promised to renegotiate Barack Obama's signature deal with Iran on nuclear weapons during the 2016 campaign, and though he hasn't done that, he has staffed his White House with people hostile toward Iran. That includes Secretary of Defense James Mattis, who has implied that Iran and ISIS are on friendly terms.

Shortly after Trump took office, Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen attacked a Saudi ship, killing two peopleand in pretty a wild leap leap of logic, the White House described it as an Iranian attack. In April, Trump said Iran wasn't "living up to the spirit" of the nuclear deal. During a May trip to the Middle East, Trump appeared to side more aggressively with Saudi Arabia against Iran than past presidents, then continued that anti-Iran rhetoric in Israel.

Over the weekend, a report claiming that the Saudi coastguard had killed an Iranian fisherman, an announcement by Iran that it had fired multiple ballistic missiles into eastern Syria to target ISIS in retaliation for an attack in Tehran, and the shooting down of a Syrian plane by a US-led coalition only heightened tensions in the region.

This state of affairs has some people very worried. In The Independent, businessman and human rights activist Andrew McCleod warned that Trump is on track to nuke Iran inside of two years. That's probably an exaggeration, but how much of an exaggeration?

Related: What Would Happen in the Minutes and Hours After the US Attacked North Korea?

Ahmad Majidyar is director of the Middle East Institute's IranObserved Project. In a recent paper, he described the US and Iran as being on a "collision course" in Iraq and Syria. The idea is that once ISIS is defeated, Iran-backed militias and the US military will no longer have a common enemy. The risk, Majidyar told me, is "some sort of possiblenot very likelyconfrontation by the IRGC-led forces, and US-led forces in Mosul."

But even without the conflict in Syria/Iraq, tensions remain between Iran and the US, tensions that have only been exacerbated by the Trump administration's foreign policy. So the question remains: If the US were to actually bomb Iran itselfas has been advocated by plenty of mainstream Republicans like Arizona Senator John McCainhow and why would that happen? And how exactly would that conflict play out?

I posed these hypotheticals to Majidyar as well as international relations scholar Stephen Zunes, and Omar Lamrani, a senior military analyst at the military intelligence firm Stratfor. Here's a map of the locations we discussed, for reference:

While Iran does provoke the US a bit by opposing Saudi Arabiaa close American allyin Yemen, Syria is the likeliest potential flashpoint to any serious US-Iran conflict. According to Lamrani, Iran's dream is to have a steady flow of commercial traffic clear to the west coast of Lebanon, which it plans to achieve by creating a supply route that goes from Tehran to Baghdad to Syria to Lebanon. In Iran's view, the US is blocking this effort.

With this tension in the air, Trump could jeopardize the nuclear agreement by sanctioning Iran in a way Iran thinks is unfair. "The agreement is on tenuous ground, and if it does collapse, and the Iranians [could] go forward with more ballistic missile testing," Lamrani said, adding that fallout from that testing could potentially trigger a war.

(It's important to note here that no one I spoke to felt that an actual war was in any way likely, barring some black swan event to trigger it.)

The main scenario Zunes thinks could result in war is a terror attack perceived as having been sponsored by Iran and carried out against a target such as a US embassy in Europe.

"Iran has cells across the world," Lamrani told me, citing Iran's well-known connections to the terrorist group Hezbollah. He added that Iran would most likely only activate its Hezbollah cells if it were attacked first.

But according to Zunes, a terror attack wouldn't have to be carried out by Iran or one of its proxies. Instead, the whole conflict might be triggered by "an attack by some unknown Salafi groupan al Qaeda, ISIS type," he told me. Frustrated by Iran's belligerent behavior, he says, "Trump could blame [the act of terror] on an Iranian-backed group, and use that as an excuse to attack Iran." This isn't unheard of. There was speculation just after 9/11 that a 1996 attack in Saudi Arabia, pinned on Iran, was actually the work of al Qaeda. (The US still officially blames Iran.)

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"The idea was that we just bomb, and bomb, and bomb, and try to destroy as many strategic assets as possible," Zunes told me.

This was a plan proposed by Republican Senator Tom Cotton in 2015. Rather than an invasion, he said on a radio show, "It would be something more along the lines of what President Clinton did in December 1998 during Operation Desert Fox," a series of strikes on Iraqi military targets.

During this phase of our hypothetical conflict, Lamrani told me, US intelligence will have information at hand designed to make sure the attacks constitute "a very very comprehensive plan," relying on air power, not just cruise missiles fired from the sea. "B-2s with those massive ordnance penetrators" would be involved, Lamrani said, referring to the MOABthe largest non-nuclear bomb ever dropped.

Iran is very adept as using its navy to taunt American vessels. In 2016, speedboats buzzed around the Persian Gulf, forcing a US ship to change course. A couple days later, Trump the presidential candidate said he would blow up any Iranian boats that tried that against his navy. Then they tried it again in March and Trump's navy didn't blow them up.

But the US Navy is very good a blowing things up, and doing so in extremely dramatic fashionsomething Trump obviously knows. "The Iranians are vulnerable when they're all bunched up in their ports, and not at sea," Lamrani told me. "For them to have any chance at all, they have to be very, very fast."

Before the US could even nail down the specifics of its strategy, he said, the Iranians would "disperse their units, so their minelayers are already at sea, dropping mines, and their forces are already attacking before the US brings in all its forces to completely annihilate the Iranians."

If Iran can't knock out a US cruiser with its navy, what can its navy do?

It can interrupt international business. If you think of the Persian Gulf as the hallway that takes you to the vital ports belonging to Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, then the door to that hallway is the 21-mile-wide Strait of Hormuz, where part of the Arabian Peninsula juts off and almost pokes into Iran. Imagine Iran closing that door.

"That's a massive shock to the global economy," Lamrani said. He doesn't think Iran would try anything so drastic given that it would cut off not just the oil trade, but food to countries like Qatar and Bahrain, bringing down the wrath of the entire Arab world.

But if you're a container ship captain, Lamrani said, a war in the area is enough to keep you out of there unless you know it's safe. So one way or another, until the US shows up with ships to clear the strait, "Technically, the threat, and the position of their anti-ship missiles, is going to be a de facto block," he told me.

The United States operates a lot of bases in the region. Iran can't do much to stop the units stationed at these bases from launching assaults, but it could at least hurt them back with its medium-range non-nuclear missiles. Iran could use one of the missiles that really freaked out Israel last year with its 2,000-kilometer range. That range means major US bases in Qatar, Bahrain, and Iraq are vulnerable.

But of course, attacking the US by attacking those countries would have consequences. "If the Iranians are suddenly launching missiles, obviously that brings those countries into conflict as well," Lamrani told me.

According to Zunes, Israel would want to stay out of this nasty little war, but it wouldn't be able to. Hezbollah would take the opportunity, he thinks, to attack Israel from its strongholds just past Israel's border in Lebanon. "Whether or not Israel is involved," Zunes told me, "Hezbollah would unleash a huge range of missiles on Israel." Some analysts think Israel could even get invaded by Hezbollah ground troops next time a conflict gets sparked.

Tom Cotton can insist all he wants that this conflict wouldn't escalate into a ground invasion, but the experts I spoke to think at least a few boots would probably touch Iranian soil. The Iranian nuclear program, Lamrani said, is "so big and dispersed" that "it's hard to imagine a full US strike that does not lead to significant conflict between Iran and the United States."

Zunes also imagines "a few commando type operations to blow up a few strategic facilities," as well as to target nuclear scientists. "They'd try to kill as many nuclear scientists as they could," he told me. "The civilian death toll would be pretty high, because a lot of these things are in urban areas."

One factor to consider is that Trump appears to have de-prioritized rules of engagement that would spare civilians in Syria in Iraq, leading to a drastic spike in civilian deaths, according to human rights groups.

But let's not forget that Iran has its terror-sponsoring fingers in a whole lot of geopolitical pies. Iran's moderate president, Hasan Rouhani, might advocate for diplomacy, but if the Supreme Ayatollah disagrees, Rouhani doesn't get any say in the matter. Nor does Rouhani control Iran's powerful Revolutionary Guard Corpsand they're the ones tied to Hezbollah and the Houthis in Yemen. Lamrani points out they're also tied to "Iraqi and Syrian militias, plus cells in Afghanistan, and even beyond the region."

"It can become very messy very very quickly, and spread the conflict across the world," Lamrani told me.

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What Would Happen in the Hours and Minutes After the US Bombed Iran? - VICE

The Drive

US Fighter Jet Shoots Down Syrian Warplane New York Times A handout provided by an official Iranian news site shows a missile launched by the Revolutionary Guards Corps from western Iran, toward Islamic State bases in Syria. Credit Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting, via Agence France-Presse Getty Images. Iran Launched An Unprecedented Ballistic Missile Attack On Syrian CityThe Drive Iran's Missile Launch and US Downing a Syrian Jet - ExplainedHaaretz Iran fires missiles at militant groups in eastern SyriaThe Jerusalem Post Fox News -International Business Times all 220 news articles »

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US Fighter Jet Shoots Down Syrian Warplane - New York Times

The threat posed by the Iranian regime was one focus of a recent Academic Exchange (AE) retreat of International Relations specialists and international lawyers. Even with the reelection of President Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian regime poses a two-pronged threat to the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. For one thing, Iran is poised to gain on the ground in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. The need to counter Irans ground game is the catalyst for President Trumps efforts to collaborate with Persian Gulf states. Countering Iran seems even more urgent after news that Iran has sponsored Shia militias in the Syrian Golan Heights, abutting Israel (see report here). Moreover, Iran is also fighting a war of ideas, contesting the Wests legitimacy.

The U.S., Israel, and Persian Gulf states should recognize that countering Iran has two components: 1) gains on the ground from tangible measures, including sanctions and, where necessary, the use of force, and, 2) gaining the moral high ground of legitimacy in the war of ideas. Tensions between these two elements are inevitable, but manageable.

Lets start with the legitimacy tourney. Here, the U.S. and its allies have some work to do. Consider one action that has recently triggered substantial U.S. litigation: President Trumps revised executive order (EO) pausing travel from six countries, including Iran. Ive written before about why I believe the revised EO is legal (see my analysis here and Josh Blackmans New York Times op-ed here), but nevertheless constitutes bad policy. The EOs effects on Iranian nationals vividly demonstrate the policy point. Iranian immigrants to the U.S. confer substantial advantages on the U.S. population, through service as doctors and other professionals (in addition, a significant number of doctors in the U.S. hail from Syria, another one of the six countries listed by the EO, as this New York Times story shows). While Irans moves in the Middle East are indeed troubling, there is no reason to think that Iranians who wish to emigrate to the U.S. endorse those moves. Indeed, a Homeland Security study of terrorist-related crimes committed by foreign-born individuals in the U.S. shows precious little activity in this sphere by persons born in Iran (only three out of approximately ninety cases).

While the policy rationale for pausing admissions from any of the six countries is modest, the weakness of the justification regarding Iran is salient. The Administration may be right as a legal matter that the Iranian regimes role as a state sponsor of terror justifies a pause in admissions to ensure that U.S. immigration authorities are receiving accurate data from Iran. However, the collateral damage of the EO for Iranian people and the U.S. individuals who benefit from services provided by Iranian doctors and other professionals provides a strong basis for rethinking the EOs policy underpinnings. Count the EO as a victory for Iran in the legitimacy tourney.

The U.S. and its allies are heading for another defeat on the legitimacy front in the Saudi intervention against Iran-sponsored Houthi rebels in Yemens civil war. As Mike Newton and Ryan Goodman have rightly indicated, the Saudis have engaged in repeated violations of established law of war norms, including violations of the rule of proportionality. That rule bars attacks with expected harm to civilians that is excessive given the military advantage anticipated, when judged from the perspective of a commander prior to the attack. The U.S. has been trying to rein in Saudi forces for well over a year. I believe the U.S. has been sincere; some of the nations most capable military lawyers have invested substantial time and effort in working with the Saudis on compliance with the law of war. However, the results of this tutelage continue to be disappointing. At some point soon, unless the Saudis substantially improve their compliance, the U.S. may bear both policy and legal responsibility for Saudi violations. Although the jury is still out, score this as a preliminary win for Iran in the legitimacy tourney.

As to the score on the ground, consider the activities of pro-Iran Shia militias such as Harakat al-Nujaba on the Syrian Golan Heights. As I can testify based on a recent visit to the portion of the Golan Heights now held by Israel, this area presents commanding views of both Syria and Israel. Prior to the 1967 war, Syrian forces regularly shelled Israeli towns from positions on the Golan Heights. For good reasons, Israel is determined not to be put in this vulnerable position again. That is why Israel is intensely concerned about al-Nujabas announcement that it is moving militia units into the portion of the Golan Heights still controlled by Syria. Israel has made it clear that, if necessary, it will take military action to prevent opening up this new front in the Syrian conflict. The militia activities continue, although their precise scope is unclear.

Suppose Israel were to use force to hold the Shia militia at bay. How would Israeli action fare under international law? Three theories could support Israels action. It could be, (1) merely another episode in a continued state of war with Syria since 1967, (2) a response to a material breach by Syria of the 1974 post-Yom Kippur War disengagement agreement, or, (3) a form of self-defense under the U.N. Charter.

Theory (1) receives support from the preeminent international law scholar Yoram Dinstein, who outlined the theory in his essential treatise, War, Aggression and Self-Defence. This theory allows each party to the armed conflict substantial leeway, since no triggering action by one party would be required as a justification for the other partys action. It is logically true that if a state of war continues to exist, Israel would be within its rights in taking military action against Shia militias on Syrias portion of the Golan Heights. The Shia militias commander has made it easier for Israel to situate the militias activities within the Israel-Syria conflict. Speaking of his militia, which has collaborated in Syria with Irans Quds force, al-Nujaba leader Akram al Kabi said earlier this year that the group would undertake to liberate the portion of the Golan annexed by Israel if Syria so requested.

The difficulty with the continued-war theory is its disconnect from facts on the ground. While the relationship between Israel and Syria over the past 43 years has not exactly been harmonious, sustained military encounters have been rare. Against that relatively uneventful backdrop, it seems counterintuitive to insist that a turn toward force does not require some triggering event. While this theory is buttressed by Professor Dinsteins estimable support, it may be another loser in the legitimacy tourney.

Option (2) arguing that Syrian consent to Shia militias activities in the Golan constituted a material breach of the 1974 disengagement agreement suffers from a different problem: its inconsistency with the U.N. Charter framework governing the use of force. Article 2(4) of the Charter bars the use of force against another state. Absent Security Council authorization, the only exception is the use of force in self-defense against an armed attack, pursuant to Article 51. Some distinguished commentators, including Professor Dinstein, have argued that a material breach theory is viable despite the Charter (including in the case of the 2003 Iraq War). However, other experts strongly disagree. (See Sean Murphys rebuttal here.) The U.N. played a substantial role in implementing the 1974 Israel-Syria disengagement agreement by providing peacekeepers (including four Austrians who died when a mine exploded in the demilitarized zone created by the agreement; see Robert Morrisss piece [behind pay wall] here). It seems incongruous to accept the U.N.s help, but then reject the U.N. Charters framework governing the use of force. Score another loss in the legitimacy tourney.

On balance, the best option is theory (3): arguing that Israeli action against al-Nujaba would constitute self-defense. International law, going back to then-Secretary of State Daniel Websters 1841-42 correspondence with the British regarding their targeting of the U.S.-owned steamship The Caroline for aiding Canadian rebels, has held that a state can use force to thwart an imminent attack, as long as that force is necessary and proportionate to address the threat. (For current glosses relevant to nonstate actors, see UK Attorney General Jeremy Wrights January 2017 speech, the important 2012 article by Sir Daniel Bethlehem and this insightful piece by the U.S. Naval War College International Law Departments Alan Schuller.)

In the self-defense context, the uneventful climate of the past 40-plus years on the Golan would favor Israel. Dropped into this atmosphere of relative calm, the presence of a powerful Shia militia would itself be a marked departure from the status quo. Since Israel has not signaled any aggressive designs on Syrian territory, the mere presence of the militia suggests the kind of massing of troops that is consistent with the early phases of an attack. Intelligence information obtained by Israel that is consistent with this apparent hostile intent would reinforce the case, already strengthened by al-Nujaba leader Akram al Kabis stated plan to liberate the portion of the Golan controlled by Israel (which annexed that portion in 1981). The combination of forces massed on the ground and specific manifestations of hostile intent moves the current situation in the Syrian Golan Heights closer to the situation that prevailed just prior to Israels Six Day War fifty years ago, when Egypts President Gamal Abdel Nasser massed troops in the Sinai, instructed U.N. peacekeepers to quit the area, and blockaded the Straits of Tiran.

Of course, the reading of imminence outlined here is not free from controversy. (See the recent post by Charlie Dunlap here on alleged Israeli airstrikes in Syria targeting Hezbollah arms shipments and Kevin Jon Hellers response here). However, relying on a self-defense justification would acknowledge the primacy of the U.N. Charter and put Israel on solid footing along with the U.S. and United Kingdom. Score this as the West holding its own in the legitimacy tourney.

In sum, containing Iran requires both action on the ground and maintaining legitimacy under international norms. In some areas, such as the inclusion of Iranian nationals in President Trumps revised refugee EO and U.S. assistance to Saudi efforts in Yemen, the West has suffered blows to its legitimacy. Israels response to Shia militias in the Syrian Golan Heights presents another test. Careful attention to the justification for the use of force will be central to containing the Iranian regimes regional ambitions and recouping ground on the legitimacy front.

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Containing Iran and Maintaining Legitimacy - Lawfare (blog)