Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

Iran’s Regional Influence And Military Muscle: Growing Military Capabilities And Role As Regional Power OpEd – Eurasia Review

The Islamic Republic of Iran, situated in West Asia, is the sixth-largest country in Asia and the second-largest in West Asia, covering a land area of approximately 1,648,195 square kilometres. With a total population of 89,705,600, Iran shares extensive borders with various neighbouring countries. To the west, it shares a border stretching over 1,400 kilometres with Iraq, while to the northwest lies Turkey. In the east, Irans border spans over 900 kilometres with Afghanistan, and to the southeast, over 900 kilometres with Pakistan. To the north, Iran shares borders with Azerbaijan, Armenia, the Caspian Sea, and Turkmenistan, while to the south, it is bounded by the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman.

Irans strategic importance in the region is derived from its economic, geopolitical, and cultural influence, as well as its military strength and regional alliances. This makes Iran a crucial player in the Middle Eastern region.

Irans military doctrine, which combines ideological and technical elements, underscores its commitment to achieving political goals through military means. Iran defense budget for 2022 was 6.85 billion USD, With a total military personnel count of 1,180,000, including 610,000 active military personnel and 350,000 reserves, Iran possesses a formidable force. Its air force, consisting of 42,000 personnel and 551 aircraft, including 205 combat aircraft, 186 fighter aircraft, and 19 multi-role aircraft, further solidifies its military might. Additionally, Irans substantial UAV count, exceeding 2,000, enhances its reconnaissance and strategic capabilities.

The Iranian navy, with 18,500 personnel and a fleet of 101 vessels, including 07 frigates, 19 submarines, and 942 merchant marines, ensures Irans presence and influence in crucial waterways such as the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. Despite these considerable military capabilities, Irans power projection remains incomplete, primarily due to the asymmetrical nature of modern warfare.

However, these military capabilities are insufficient for Iran to claim regional power. To compensate, Iran has adopted a strategy of Forward Defense, supporting friendly militias and insurgent groups across the Middle East. The Quds Force, a part of the IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), trains and equips such proxies to achieve Irans goals.

Hezbollah, the oldest and strongest political non-state actor in Lebanon, boasts approximately 45,000 fighters. In Iraq, the Badr Organization, formed in 1982, has 20,000 fighters.

Irans partnership with Houthi rebels, a Zaidi Shia Muslim minority in Yemen, allows Iran to strike deep into Saudi Arabia, its Sunni rival in the region. The Houthis have posed challenges for the U.S. Navy in the Red Sea and have not supported Israel in the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Through these proxies, Iran gains security benefits, including assistance in countering foreign intelligence threats, intelligence sharing, and counter-terrorism efforts.

Iran supports Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Badr Organization in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen to project its power in the region, deter Israel and the United States, and secure a more than 1000-kilometer-long land corridor connecting Iran to the Mediterranean Sea.

Irans military capabilities were tested when Israeli F-35 jets carried out an airstrike on an Iranian consulate building in Damascus, Syria, resulting in the fatalities of several high-ranking IRGC officials. In retaliation, Iran launched a significant operation against Israeli territory on April 13th and 14th, deploying 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles, and 120 ballistic missiles. However, the majority of Iranian missiles and attack drones were intercepted by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), along with British and US forces stationed in the region. Approximately 7 missiles struck the Nevatim airbase in Southern Israel.

Additionally, on January 18, 2024, Pakistan launched an operation called Marg Bar Sarmachar meaning death to insurgents effectively striking hideouts inside Iran used by terrorists responsible for recent attacks in Pakistan. The precision strikes, carried out using killer drones, rockets, loitering munitions, and stand-off weapons, demonstrated the professionalism of Pakistans armed forces and the lack of preparedness of Irans armed forces.

Despite its military ambitions, Irans economy grapples with serious challenges, exacerbated by international sanctions and a struggling currency. With one USD equal to 42,075.00 Iranian Rials, Irans economy faces significant hurdles in achieving sustainable growth and development.

Iran has been labelled as a rogue and irresponsible state by the West, posing a serious threat to world peace. Its nuclear program remains under sanctions by the (P5+1) 5 permanent member of United Nation Security Council (UNSC) which includes US,UK, France ,China, Russia and Germany, in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement.

In conclusion, Iran ranks 14th out of 145 countries in the Global Firepower Index in terms of military strength. However, its conventional power is insufficient and dependent on outdated weapons, making it ineligible for regional power status. Iran is a challenger in the region, challenging Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. To achieve regional power status, and to overcome these challenges Iran needs to focus on economic growth through cross-border trades and investments, heavy investment in research and development, and modernization of its weapons and military equipment. Only by addressing its economic vulnerabilities can Iran hope to achieve its aspirations of regional power and secure its position as a key player in the Middle East.

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Iran's Regional Influence And Military Muscle: Growing Military Capabilities And Role As Regional Power OpEd - Eurasia Review

Iran hopes to finalize 20-year pact with Russia as Bagheri Kani meets Lavrov – Al-Monitor

TEHRAN Iran's ambassador to Moscow, Kazem Jalali, said on Tuesday his country is working hard to finalize a long-term partnership deal with Russia by the end of 2024, as Moscow and Tehran grow closer in the aftermath of the Ukraine war and the Western sanctions imposed on both.

Jalali, according to an interview published by the official IRNA news agency, said that different Iranian authorities were reviewing the draft agreement before it was to be ultimately signed. The envoy was responding to questions in Iran regarding Russian media reports that the agreement was hanging in the balance due to delays in Tehran. He said the original Russian reports had not used the word "suspension" and instead accused Iranian outlets of "hastily mistranslating and reporting fake news."

Earlier that the same day, Russia's state news agency, Ria Novosti, cited senior Foreign Ministry official Zamir Kabulov as saying that "the process of work on the agreement has been suspended due to problems with Iranian partners." Kabulov had added, however, that "the work will be completed."

An agreement in principle on the 20-year comprehensive partnership was originally made in early 2022 between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his then Iranian counterpart, Ebrahim Raisi, who died in a helicopter crash along with Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian last month.

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Iran hopes to finalize 20-year pact with Russia as Bagheri Kani meets Lavrov - Al-Monitor

Unmasking Iran’s strategy to take over the Middle East – Ynetnews

Iran is spending billions of dollars to enact a four-part strategy to dominate the Middle East. The plan has been in place for years and is now showing clear-cut results.

On September 26, 2020, Commodore Ali Fadavi, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) the regimes sponsor of non-state armed groups provided some figures about Irans effort to erect a "Resistance Front" to confront Israel and oust the United States from the Middle East.

Interviewed on Irans state TV channel Ofogh, he was asked, From the beginning, when we got involved in the Resistance Front, how much do you think we spent? The numbers are very low, a lot less than the war (with Iraq which he put at $19.6 billion between 1980-1988) but the results (have been significant)."

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Iran spent more than $16 billion on support for the Assad regime

(Photo: EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH)

Of course, this and many other statements of Irans officials must be taken with great skepticism. For example, Iranian lawmaker Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh was quoted by Irans media in May of that year as saying that Tehran might have spent between $20 billion and $30 billion just on its involvement in Syria, where Iranian-backed forces and militia have propped up the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

Whatever the exact figures, this question naturally arises what did Iran accomplish through these malign investments?"

The short answer is that Irans money financed a highly productive strategy to project its power in the Middle East at the expense of Israel and the United States. The goal is twofold by carving a zone of influence, the Islamic Republic is seeking to protect the Shia regime from the surrounding Sunni-dominated countries.

Irans money financed a highly productive strategy to project its power in the Middle East at the expense of Israel and the US. By carving a zone of influence, the Islamic Republic is seeking to protect the Shia regime from the surrounding Sunni-dominated countries

It is also bent on exporting its Islamic Revolution in line with the ideology of its founder Ruhollah Khomeini, who wrote We export our revolution to the whole globe because our revolution is Islamic, and until the call of No god but Allah, and Mohammad is Allahs prophet is not reverberated throughout the globe there will be struggle, and until the struggle against the arrogant is found all over of the globe, we will be standing.

Under this vision, which is also codified in the Iranian constitution, there is simply no place for Israel or the U.S. in the Middle East.

To carry out this decree Iran has increasingly used four elements in the pursuit of its grand design:

The use of proxies in war is a practice with long historical roots. The Iranian innovation in this respect is not only the development of multiple proxy forces spread over a large geographical area, but also intensive effort to coordinate between them so they can collaborate operationally during conflict.

Irans proxies have been built up as a deterrent vis-a-vis Israel and the U.S. Hezbollah especially serves as Irans second-strike force in case Israel dares attack its nuclear installations

Iran is using its proxies in two main capacities. First, these terrorist formations are the driving force behind the forging of its regional geopolitical construct. They are also meant to impede any attempt to interfere with Tehrans sinister design as it is being erected.

As Irans Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei put it on June 3, the Hamas October 7 onslaught on Israel had happened exactly at the moment the region needed it, when there had been a plan by the U.S., Zionist individuals, their followers and some of the regions countries to change the equation in the region Operation Al-Aqsa Flood [Hamas codename for the October 7 attack] disrupted the Zionist regimes comprehensive plan to dominate the politics and economy of the entire region of West Asia, and there is no hope that they will be able to revive this plan.

Interestingly, the Palestinian Authority Presidency indirectly confirmed Irans proxy strategy of using other agents for its own purposes when it denounced Khamenei's comments the same day. It issued a statement saying that the Palestinians are the first to be affected by this war (in Gaza) which has shed their blood and that Khameneis comments clearly announce that (Irans_ goal is to sacrifice the blood of Palestinians and to destroy Palestinian land.

Secondly, Irans proxies have been built up as a deterrent vis-a-vis Israel and the U.S. Hezbollah especially serves as Irans second-strike force in case Israel dares attack its nuclear installations.

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Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

(Photo: AFP / HO / KHAMENEI.IR)

However, given the current intensification of Hezbollahs attacks on Israels north and the marked increase in the chances of full-scale war breaking out, this deterrent function could be transforming. The escalation may indicate Iran now believes its own capabilities are sufficient to dissuade Israel from such an adventure. Alternatively, Tehran may have concluded that after October 7, Israel is no longer the threat it once was especially as it is preoccupied militarily on several fronts.

Importantly, the use of proxies is not only for the purpose of shielding Iran from possible retribution and affording the mullah's deniability. The maneuver provides a strategic advantage. Proxy use allows Iran to flaunt the rules of war while shirking responsibility as those doing the actual fighting are autonomous subnational groups.

The targets of this strategy, which are uniformly states, are in turn confronted with another difficulty associated with engaging in asymmetric warfare. Accordingly countries, especially those signed on to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, are expected to follow the rules of war even when fighting terrorist armies even though the latter are bound by no such commitment.

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They hope that their opponents become the subject of international censure and possible sanctions. International Court of Justice, Haugh

(Photo: EPA/Koen van Weel)

In addition, Mossad said that Iran is trying to take advantage of the wave of global antisemitism relating to the war in Gaza to recruit a variety of new kinds of proxies to carry out its terror attacks globally.

While Israel has been spending billions on the acquisition and development of ultra-tech weapons to maintain the IDFs qualitative superiority, Iran, operating under severe international sanctions, went the opposite way. It opted to engage in low-tech warfare both in terms of tactics and weaponry. In effect, what is unfolding currently in the Middle East is a veritable test of the familiar quantity vs. quality contest.

Operationally, Irans strategy is based first and foremost on the seemingly unending supply of shahids (martyrs) who are ready, either as true believers or because of mercenary motives, to wage jihad. Armed mostly with cheap personal weapons (e.g. AK-47s, RPGs, IEDs, etc.) they are backed by similarly rudimentary strategic weapons like drones, dumb rockets, anti-tank guided missiles mortars, and (mostly) low-accuracy (or statistical) heavy ground-to-ground missiles. Mobility is provided by Toyota pickup trucks, motorbikes and hand gliders. The armaments are procured en masse so that, while unable to defeat the enemy, the combination of seemingly inexhaustible manpower and firepower can attrite it over time.

For example, aiming strategic arms at civilian population centers is carried out with the clear knowledge that while the damage they inflict directly is often marginal, the fallout these low-tech weapons cause in terms of interrupting ordinary lives in the target communities is consequential.

Aside from their tactical futility, the firings of such rockets and missiles often trigger a powerful response, yet the continued launching of these weapons is meant to signal an unyielding readiness to fight to the finish and be undeterrable despite the power imbalance. The aim is to cause desperation among the enemy ranks as it faces an unending conflict.

Indeed, IDF soldiers fighting in Gaza have discovered Iranian-supplied Russian-made rockets with their safety mechanism disabled to enable attacks on IDF soldiers from short range. True to form, the practice is prevalent even though the removal of the safeguard endangers the operator, and the attacker is often quickly eliminated.

A derivative of the primitive warfare concept is the underground dimension of the conflict which is designed to overcome the dramatic asymmetry in the above-ground capabilities. In essence, the aim is to turn the subterranean theater of operation into the central battlefield to improve the odds against the IDF.

According to the New York Times on January 16, 2024, Israeli defense officials estimated that Hamas tunnels in the Strip measure between 350 and 450 miles (560 and 720 km) in a territory thats just 25 miles long. By comparison, the London Underground is only 249 miles long. Some of Gazas tunnels are wide enough for cars; some are more than 150 feet deep; some serve as munitions depots; others are comfortably command bunkers designed to withstand a prolonged war.

Israeli officials also reportedly estimate that there are 5,700 separate entrances to the tunnels many of them with access from civilian houses and some directly beneath hospitals, which in some cases were also used as a Hamas command center, according to U.S. intelligence.

The tunnels investigated by the soldiers of the Yahalom Unit in Jabaliya

(IDF)

In total, Hamas has turned the Gaza Strip into a gigantic military fortress purpose-built to attack Israel, endure Israeli retaliation, and interpose civilian lives and infrastructure as part of its means of defense.

Hezbollah, Irans main proxy is believed to have a similarly extensive tunnel network if not a more elaborate one.

Further, the principle of quantity over quality also inspires the Iranian strategy of confronting Israel with a multiplicity of resistance fronts both above and underground. The fronts encompass myriad forms with the overarching objective of toppling Israel, including by targeting its links to its strategic allies.

An open letter dated May 25, from Irans Khamenei to students protesting the Gaza war on U.S. campuses, attests to the Iranian strategy of seeking to proliferate the number of fronts aimed to undermine Israels superiority, including by subverting its sources. Khamenei wrote the students have now formed a branch of the Resistance Front (against) the brutal Zionist terrorist network

The Western-crafted rules of warfare are the cornerstone of the Islamist battlefield tactic which systematically uses them to its advantage. It is unclear to what extent Islamists break the rules of warfare as an indication of their general rejection of the Western world or because of tactical necessity given the asymmetry in the military balance. Still, it is indisputable that Iran-sponsored jihadist armies like Hamas and Hezbollah take the Western norms of conflict as signaling their enemys weakness and irresolution if not downright dimwittedness.

As long as the enemy adheres to the canons of war, the resistance can leverage the same rules as force multipliers. If, on the other hand, the rules are breached, they are hoping for an international outcry that would force a halt to military operations

As the Gaza campaign and the ongoing attrition war against Hezbollah have proven any notion that the IDFs military superiority can afford such giveaways is sorely mistaken and ends up costing soldiers lives. On the contrary, the self-imposed restraints exercised by the IDF are exploited by its Islamist enemies as a strategic equalizer that bolsters their chances vis-a-vis a formidable opponent.

Indeed from the Islamists perspective, it is a win-win situation. As long as the enemy adheres to the canons of war, the resistance can leverage the same rules as force multipliers. If, on the other hand, the rules are breached, which is almost inevitable given the terrorist armies favorite tactic of using the population as human shields, they are hoping for an international outcry that would force a halt to military operations. The pause is invariably used to regroup and rearm for another try.

Thus, in their strategy, Irans terrorist armies take full advantage of the laws of warfare applying only to sovereign states. The IDFs prolonged campaign in Gaza in the pursuit of demolishing Hamas military capabilities could thus be an important test of a counter-strategy, if realized.

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The results of Hamas embedding among the civilian population

(Photo: Omar Al Qatta / AFP)

Given this systematic militarization, it will not be an exaggeration to conclude that the rules of warfare, through their wholesale and deliberate upturning, provided the basis for Hamas battlefield doctrine and for turning the entire Gaza Strip into a terrorist encampment both above and underground. Paradoxically, this also indicates the IDFs adherence to the rules, otherwise, the entire Hamas posture of embedding among the civilian population would have come to naught even if conceived.

This is perhaps the most important principle as it is designed to assure the unending pursuit of the goals irrespective of cost. Simply put, confronting superior military forces like the IDF without the religious-ideological indoctrination of its adherents would normally not be even conceived, let alone tried. In effect, what terrorist armies lack in armaments and professionalism, Iran is supplanting with motivation aimed to generate zealousness and undetectability.

In line with this reasoning, the IRGC trains recruits and Shia militias in an expansionist and combative worldview, encouraging them to give their lives in pursuit of a cause that purportedly seeks to correct injustices toward Muslims beyond Irans borders.

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Khamenei called on American students protesting the Gaza war on their campuses to become familiar with the Quran.

(Photo: Alex Kent / GETTY IMAGES NORTH AMERICA / AFP)

As Khamenei himself wrote in 2016, If in the Revolutionary Guard there is not strong ideological-political training, then (the) IRGC cannot be the powerful arm of the Islamic Revolution.

The Iranian leader must have been satisfied when he heard Hussein al-Mousawi, a spokesperson for Nujaba, one of Irans proxies in Iraq, telling Reuters on June 4, We, as a resistance, do not fear the consequences as long as we are in the right

From the outset, the fight against Israel and the West in general is cast in religious terms as a war against infidels who wronged the Islamic nation (Ummat al-Islam). Khamenei's comments immediately following the October 7 monstrosity summed up the crux of this thinking thoroughly when he said the attack shows the power of Islam.

Not surprisingly he also called on American students protesting the Gaza war on their campuses to become familiar with the Quran.

The Iranian power projection strategy exhibits a deep appreciation of the psychological dimension of the fight both in terms of ones own troops and the stamina of the enemy. Consequently, Irans proxy attacks seek entirely different aims than the military objectives pursued by Israel and other Western opponents. While the IDF and modern armies in general aim to destroy an enemys ability to fight, Islamists are fighting to undermine Israelis will to fight. In turn, primitive weapons that inflict indiscriminate damage are not only sufficient but preferable as they are meant to terrorize the civilian population.

Victimhood is celebrated and numbers of dead and wounded are often fabricated to accentuate sacrifice and stoke the fires of hate toward the occupiers of al-Aqsa. The goal is to mobilize the population and assure its commitment to the cause.

Khamenei, in fact, told Hamas Haniyeh during their meeting in Tehran on March 26, The propaganda and media activities of the Palestinian resistance have been very good so far, and ahead of the Zionist enemy [Israel], and more action should be taken in this field.

Yet, hitting hi-tech targets and those symbolizing the prowess of the IDF (e.g. Merkava tanks or hi-tech intelligence gathering installations and sophisticated drones) is a priority. The message is that these assets are just a faade of power and will not bring victory or stand up to the warriors of Allah on his divinely mandated missions.

In this vein, the introduction by the Israeli army of some robotic-operated weapon systems, specifically the unmanned M-113 armored personnel carriers (APC), into the Gaza war to transport explosives, was propagandized as evidence of its soldiers cowardice. Accordingly, the use of robots signifies an IDF attempt to evade a direct engagement with the gallant soldiers of Hamas.

Iranian regime reduces presence in syria

(ILTV)

On May 31, the military spokesperson of the Houthis in Yemen Brig. Gen. Yahya Saree claimed his forces launched a missile attack in the direction of the U.S. aircraft carrier Eisenhower in the Red Sea in response to U.S. and British strikes on Yemen. The fact that a U.S. defense official told Reuters they were not aware of any attack on the Eisenhower is, of course, utterly immaterial. The aim is to convince the believers and their enemies of the power of the resistance and its endurance regardless of the odds, as well as to demonstrate the flimsiness of the usurping oppressors most powerful weapons.

After all the Houthis official slogan is Death to America/Death to Israel/Curse Upon the Jews/ Victory to Islam.

The culmination of this psychological warfare is the routine of posting a victory photo involving shooting at an IDF position or the firing of some leftover rocket at an Israeli community after the fighting had been concluded. While outsiders may scoff at the practice, Irans Islamist armies are unflagging in their determination to use the practice to prove they had won the engagement even if the act itself causes little damage and a harsh Israeli reprisal is forthcoming. The idea is to communicate to various audiences that a superior force like the IDF is, in fact, incapable of defeating the resistance, let alone defending Israel. Given the immense power imbalance, terrorist armies are fully aware that to claim victory they only need to survive (usually with the help of third powers.)

Clearly, Iran and its Islamist proxies are heavily reliant on propaganda and indoctrination as a central element in their arsenal. It is a critical component meant to compensate for their military deficiencies when it comes to confronting a powerful enemy like Israel and which an activist power projecting strategy would normally require.

As a testimony to their manipulative and deceitful practices, Islamists do not rely solely on indoctrination, however. Just in case the martyrdom glorifying doses proved an insufficient motivator, the addictive, synthetic amphetamine-type stimulant captagon, known as the Islamic State drug, was reportedly used by jihadists to prevent fear and fatigue during fighting in Syria and Iraq. Hamas terrorists who carried out the October 7 massacre were found to be under the influence of the drug with pills of captagon having been recovered from the pockets of many who were killed inside Israel.

It must be recognized that Iran has developed a successful strategy to carve for itself an expanded zone of influence in the Middle East. In effect, the Islamic Republic has already captured four Middle Eastern countries Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen since it took power in 1979all without itself engaging in war.

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(Illustration: TICP, Uri Fink and Vladik Sandler)

Still, Irans regional scheme may now face its first real test. In the wake of October 7, Israel, through its wars against Hamas and Hezbollah, is effectively threatening to block and possibly roll back the entire Iranian geopolitical design. Israel is currently acting to dismantle the tangible aspects of Irans power projection strategy, which are being overtly employed to not only devastate the Jewish state but are hyped as a means to escalate and broaden the resistance.

However, winning the conflict, as opposed to winning the war against Iran, cannot be accomplished unless Israel effectively confronts the religious-ideological dimension of the struggle as well. Victory will certainly not be achieved as long as the IDF continues to act contrarily and enshroud its operational successes, especially in the north, out of concern that advertising its accomplishments would force Hezbollahs hand.

Although it is perhaps the most challenging task, the draw of countering systematically the soft power component of Irans sinister grand design is its potential to destabilize the mullah regime itself. Moreover, pursuing such a perception-management campaign across the region would not be affected by the vagaries often associated with the U.S. elections schedule.

Yet time is of the essence. In the absence of a comprehensive Israeli strategy to defeat the Iranian grand scheme, Khamenei's June 3 boast that the Zionist regime is gradually melting before the eyes of the people of the world, could become sufficiently convincing for the mullahs to try and deliver a coup de grace to the Jewish state.

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Unmasking Iran's strategy to take over the Middle East - Ynetnews

Shia Afghans are being brought to Iran to make up for the lack of religious Iranians – Atlantic Council

IranSource June 3, 2024 Print this page Shia Afghans are being brought to Iran to make up for the lack of religious Iranians

By Saeid Golkar and Kasra Aarabi

According to state-backed media in Iran, more than one hundred thousand Shia Afghan migrants in the Iranian city of Mashhad participated in state-backed mourning processions to commemorate the death of hardline Islamist President Ebrahim Raisi in late-May.

But this is far from a one-off.

In March, the presence of at least twenty thousand Afghan migrants at a state-run event in Tehran to commemorate the birth of the third Shia saint, Imam Hassanand support the Resistance Axiscaused a significant stir among Iranians.

Some Iranians have also ridiculed the Islamic Republics reliance on Afghan migrants to pack Tehrans eighty-thousand-seat Azadi stadium at a state-run ideological parade, mocking the move as further evidence of the regimes shrinking support base.

The topic of mass Afghan migration is virtually unavoidable on Iranian streets. The past year has seen a significant influx of Shia Afghans to Iransomething that is visible across every city and even in the most obscure rural areas, such as Khomein, the hometown of Islamic Republic founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

On the surface, there appear to be two explanations for this sudden surge in migration from Irans eastern border: the Taliban takeover in 2021, which caused mass displacement, and the fact that Iran has lost control over its borderswith an Afghan refugee increase of 338 percent since 2021, equivalent to 3.41 million people in just three years.

But the unusual pace with which Afghan refugees have been legally incorporated into Iranian society, despite severe backlash, suggests something greater and more coordinated is at play.

Historically, Afghans have faced state and societal discrimination in Iran. This discrimination prevented Afghans from owning homes, opening bank accounts, or buying cell phones, and Afghans also faced marriage restrictions. However, multiple reports have recently revealed that Afghan refugees en masse have been granted Iranian passports, national identity cards, and full citizenship rightsincluding the rights to work, vote, and own homes.

While many Afghans have used this avenue, others have taken advantage of recent changes to Irans migration laws, which grant immediate special permanent residence to foreign nationals interested in the Islamic Revolution or who support the ideals and securing the interests of the Islamic Republic.

In recent months, the mass participation of Shia Afghans at regime-organized eventsincluding speeches made by the president and supreme leader, state-run Shia Islamist processions, and even rubber-stamp electionssheds light on how the Islamic Republic is proactively using Afghan migrants to foster a loyal constituency and fill the widening gap between the state and Iranian society. As one Shia Afghan migrant declared on state television during the highly engineered March parliamentary elections, which were boycotted overwhelmingly by the Iranian population, Its my great honor to come to the ballot box and vote for the Islamic Republic.

This resembles the clerical establishments demographic engineering abroadrepopulating Sunni and Christian neighborhoods in places like Syria and Iraqwhere Shia migration, mainly from Afghanistan, has been used to facilitate Tehrans ideological and security needs. This model not only consolidates the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) suppressive security apparatus but serves to Islamize societies and change their identities according to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khameneis grand ideological project.

Against this backdrop, the pace at which Afghan Shia migrants have been incorporated into the Islamic Republics ideological and propaganda pillars raises serious questions. Is the regime deliberately manufacturing demographic changes in Iran through migration to engineer the supreme leaders long-held objective of achieving a so-called Islamic society?

As Khamenei has repeatedly argued, creating an Islamic society can only be achieved after creating a true Islamic government. The de facto appointment of hardline Islamist cleric and Khamenei protg Ebrahim Raisi in the 2021 presidential elections was designed to complete that first step so the regime could move toward an Islamic society, as noted by the supreme leaders representative to the IRGC.

From the start of the revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic has taken two approaches to Islamizing Iranian society: from above, through top-down imposition, and from below, focusing on grassroots projects such as establishing Basij militias and mosques in every neighborhood.

Despite all these efforts, Iranian society today is anything but Islamic. A leaked poll conducted by the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance from 2023 revealed that 73 percent of Iranians seek a secular state, contrary to regime propaganda. The Woman, Life, Freedom uprising in 2022 following the killing of Mahsa Jina Amini for improper hijab brought these data to life.

Videos of women and men burning the compulsory Islamic veil and the Quran, the torching of mosques and Shia eulogy centers, and the new trend of turban tossing to mock the Shia clergy revealed the extent of secularization in Iranian society.

In many ways, the uprising was the final nail in the coffin for Khamenei and his hardline followers attempts to achieve an Islamic society among Iranians.

Having tried and failed to Islamize society from above and below, the clerical establishment and the IRGC adopted a new approach to the creation of their ideal Islamic societyIslamization from outside.

Migrants from Afghanistan and other shia comminutes are, in many ways, the perfect candidates for Khamenei to exploit to implement his project of Islamization. The Shia Afghan community is undoubtedly more religiously conservative and observant than the increasingly secular Iranian populationand Tehran is awarding full privileges to committed Shias from Afghanistan.

The current migration figures from Afghanistan underscore that engineering demographic changes in Iran is not a pipe dream for the supreme leader, but a genuine possibility that is within reach.

These figures reveal that there are as many as 6 million Afghan migrants in Iran. However, according to Seyed Hadi Kasai-Zadeh, editor of the journal Meydan-e Azad, if the current trajectory of migration continues, this figure could increase to 20 million in the next three years. Today, as many as ten thousand Shia Afghans are crossing the border into Iran. These numbers, coupled with mass Iranian emigrationwith as many as 2.2 million Iranians leaving the country in 2023 aloneand the countrys historically low birthrate reveal its population will be very different in the coming years.

Irans birthratewhich has dropped from 6.4 percent in 1980 to 1.66 percent in 2022has been a significant cause of concern for the aging ayatollah. In 2013, the supreme leader demanded that Irans population increase to 150 millionwhich he deemed necessary for the establishment of a new Islamic civilization. To achieve this, the regime has employed both incentives for baby makingsuch as providing free housing or high-speed internet to married couplesand forced impositions, such as banning contraception for men and women. An anonymous IRGC official told us that all members of the IRGC must have at least two children or provide medical reasons why they cannot.

In the conspiratorial worldview of Khamenei and the clerical establishment, Irans low birthrate is part of a Western plot to decrease the global Shia population and incapacitate the workforce the regime needs to establish its new Islamic civilization. Many in Iran have interpreted the influx of Shia Afghan migrants as Khameneis attempt to remedy this. In 2023, the state-run Islamic Republic newspaper reported that, in the fall of 2022, out of 300 births in a hospital in Fars province, 294 were Afghan. These statistics simply cannot be ignored.

But how will Shia Afghan migrants contribute toward achieving Khameneis so-called ideal Islamic society? One way relates to Islamizing public life in Iran. The regime has long sought to increase attendance at mosques, Shia Islamist eulogy centers (heyats), and public ideological processionsattendance which has been significantly declining among Iranians. For example, during this years Nowruz holiday, while large numbers of Iranians opted to celebrate New Year festivities at pre-Islamic, secular historical sites, a reported thirty thousand foreign migrantsthe overwhelming majority of whom were Afghangathered in Mashhad at the holy shrine of eighth Shia saint, Imam Reza.

Islamic morality policing is another example. As more and more Iranian women and men resist Islamic dress codes, the regime is seeking to actively incorporate Shia Afghan migrants in its efforts to enforce its Islamist enjoining good, forbidding evil doctrine, which underpins its morality policing codes. The finaland perhaps most importantexample relates to bolstering the IRGCs security and paramilitary apparatus. Reports have revealed that the IRGC has been encouraging Shia Afghan migration in Iran to bolster its Shia Afghan proxy, the Fatemiyoun Brigade. This paramilitary forceknown as the IRGCs Afghan Hezbollahis actively participating in the Iranian regimes militancy and terrorism abroad, including against Israel and US forces. Regime affiliates have also alluded to using Afghan migrants to suppress future anti-regime protests in Iran.

In the short term, Khamenei might be able to use Islamization from outside to fill the increasing gap between the regime and its people, and to expand his shrinking social constituency. In the medium to long term, however, such demographic manufacturing will inevitably inflame domestic tensions in Iran, further increasing the gap between the Iranian people and the regime and resulting in societal conflict between Iranians and Afghan migrants.

If Khamenei and the IRGC can control this, then they will have a better chance of preserving the Islamic Republic, undercutting the widely held belief that the modernization and secularization of society will inevitably lead to the collapse of the regime. On the other hand, if the regimes project unravels, it could increase the frequency of mass protests and violent resistance against the regimes suppression. Either way, domestic instability in Iran is about to get a lot worse.

Saeid Golkaris a senior adviser at United Against Nuclear Iran and UC Foundation associate professor in the department of political science at the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga.

Kasra Aarabiis the director of IRGC research at United Against Nuclear Iran. Follow him on X:@KasraAarabi.

Image: Afghan women hold portraits of their sons and relatives who were members of the Fatemiyoun Brigade, which is a branch of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) Quds force, and killed during the war against ISIS in Syria, during a ceremony for commemorating death anniversary of a Quds force commander in Tehran, December 20, 2022. (Photo by Morteza Nikoubazl/NurPhoto)

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Shia Afghans are being brought to Iran to make up for the lack of religious Iranians - Atlantic Council

Iran: meet the men and women lining up to contest the early presidential election – The Conversation Indonesia

The death in a helicopter crash of the Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi, on May 19 has triggered a presidential election one year earlier than expected. Its a consequential moment in Iranian politics as many believed that Raisi was being groomed to take over as supreme leader on the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is 85.

The constitution states that an election must be held within 50 days of a presidents death in office. So the election, which was originally scheduled for June 2025, will take place on June 28 this year. When registrations closed on June 3, 80 candidates had come forward including, for the first time, a small number of women.

This long list tells us that, at this point, the supreme leaders office and its allies are keeping their options open on how to manage this election. The regime is in a difficult position. It wants to ensure that, as with the late president Ebrahim Raisi, it has a successor who will dutifully follow Ayatollah Ali Khameneis directions.

However, the regime needs a shroud of legitimacy. Having suppressed public expression since the mass protests after the disputed presidential election of 2009, it is enduring the lowest turnouts in the history of the Islamic Republic. Only 48.5% of eligible voters turned out for the 2021 presidential election and even fewer 41% in the parliamentary elections this year.

Among the candidates is Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker and former head of the Revolutionary Guards. He has registered, despite failing in three previous campaigns and in the face of opposition from hardline figures in the regime.

Other prominent candidates include Ali Larijani a former parliamentary speaker who was disqualified by the Guardian Council 2021 to ensure a clear path for eventual winner Ebrahim Raisi.

From the more moderate wing of the political spectrum, Eshaq Jahangiri, who was the first vice-president in the government of reformist president Hassan Rouhani from 2013 to 2021, and centrist Abbas Akhoundi, another minister in Rouhanis government, have also applied to be candidates.

From the hardline conservative end of the spectrum, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who was president from 2005 to 2013 has also registered. But it is likely that the regime, which disqualified him in 2021, will do so again, given the tension between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad during his second four-year term.

Read more: Iran: president's death has set hardliners jostling for position to replace ageing supreme leader

Saeed Jalili is likely to be a favourite of many hardliners. A former lead Iranian nuclear negotiator, he is now a fervent opponent of any interaction with the US. Hell talk tough about Irans international position and about the crackdown on womens rights and the enforcement of compulsory hijab at home.

But most of the 80 candidates whose applications have advanced are across a range beyond the hardline. Ghalibaf, a former mayor of Tehran, is more of a traditional conservative or principlist. Larijani, also a principlist rather than a hardliner, may attract centrist support. And Jahangiri is there as a representative for the reformists.

What matters is whom the Guardian Council decides is an appropriate candidate. The 12 members six clerics named by the supreme leader, and six jurists named by the parliament have consummate veto power. Their decisions on disqualification cannot be appealed.

In 2013 the supreme leaders office and thus the Guardian Council miscalculated. The council disqualified two-term former president Hashemi Rafsanjani, seeing him as a threat to the regimes crackdown on dissent. As a consolation, it allowed Rafsanjanis protg Rouhani to run, thinking he had no hope. But when the three conservative candidates approved by the council split the vote of the bloc, Rouhani won a first-round majority.

In 2021, the Council avoided that error by not only disqualifying prominent centrists and reformists, but also by removing conservatives such as Larijani and Ahmadinejad who might take votes from Raisi.

They could pursue the same tactic this time. But the risk is that, by denying any apparent choice to voters, they depress the turnout.

The advance of applications by four women notably hardline former MP, Zohreh Elahian poses a historic question for the Guardian Council. Until now, the Council has disqualified all female applicants on the grounds that candidates must be from among political or religious rijal which has tradiitonally been interpreted narrowly to mean men in politics.

But some constitutional experts and politicians have interpreted rijal to mean figures or persons irrespective of gender. And Elahian is a fierce supporter of the compulsory hijab so fierce that she has been sanctioned by Canada for endorsing the death penalty for participants in the recent woman, life, freedom protests.

Under pressure from those protests, spurred by the death in police custody of Mahsa Amini detained and beaten for inappropriate attire the regime may decide to allow the right type of woman to run.

How the early election will affect the political dynamic in Iran remains unclear. The supreme leader, who is 85 and without a clear successor, called Raisi a devoted servant and he would like the same in a successor.

Jalili will undoubtedly be running, probably as a favoured hardliner. But will both Ghalibaf and Larijani be blocked, or will one even both be permitted to stand to ensure the semblance of a contest? Will that facade also include a prominent reformist such as Jahangiri?

And an even bigger question is whether the regimes chosen tactic work with an Iranian population, most of whom have been ground down by 15 years of political turbulence and repression. The regime must tread a careful line between controlling the election and risking its legitimacy in an election where few people bother to turn out.

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Iran: meet the men and women lining up to contest the early presidential election - The Conversation Indonesia