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Key Point:Iran is trying to fool people by presenting an old plane as new.

In February 2017 I published an article on the Iranian Saeqeh (Thunderbolt) fighter. Billed as Irans first domestically-built jet fighter to enter operational service, the Saeqeh.

Fast forward a year and a half later and we are again greeted with headlines for yet another 100% indigenously made fighter jet, this time a state of the art two-seater called the Kowsar. And yet it appears identical to an F-5F Tiger II two-seater jet.

If anything, it is far less original than the Saeqeh, which has airframe modifications including enlarged strakes and twin vertical tail stabilizers. The Kowsar doesnt appear to have any external changes from the F-5F. How was this jet even worthy of the photo-op with Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in the instructors seat for Iranian Defense Industry Day?

It happens there really is a program to build a combat-capable Kowsar advanced jet trainer. It simply wasnt the aircraft on display this summer.

According to Iranian aviation expert Babak Taghvaee, the Kowsar may merely be an avionics testbeda regular F-5F fitted with new avionics (rumored to be of Chinese origin) eventually intended for use in the Saeqeh fighter, spruced up with a fresh coat of gleaming paint for the photo-op. The test-bed used may date all the way back to Iran's first attempt to reverse-engineer the F-5 in the 1990s, the Azaraksh. This was because the real Kowsar-88 wasn't ready yet.

Iran had announced back in 2013 it was developing a Kowsar-88 trainer which could also serve in the light attack role. In 2017, footage of a prototype undergoing taxi trials was unveiled which you can see here.

Though influenced by the F-5, the prototype is a different airplane and is much shorter. Interestingly, it bears a striking resemblance to the Taiwanese AIDC AT-3 jet trainer. Details are scarce, but the actual Kowsar-88 apparently would have a digital glass cockpit using three multi-function displays and uses two J85-13 turbojet engines reverse-engineered from the F-5.

The public has had short memories as President Rouhani also attended a ceremony showing off the Kowsar-88s in July 2017. Even the most uninformed observer can compare this Kowsar to the one displayed August 2018 and see they are not the same airplanes.

According to the European Defense Review, sixteen domestically-built Kowsar-88s are planned to take over training duties currently undertaken by the more capable Saeqeh jets in the next decade. Iran will attempt to acquire additional J85 engines on the black market, but if that fails, will cannibalize the parts from twelve older F-5A and B model aircraft.

Meanwhile, Tehran reportedly plans to deploy fifty single-seat Saeqeh-1 fighters and fourteen two-seat Saeqeh-2 fighters by rebuilding additional rusty old F-5E and F-5F airframes. Depending on the status of international sanctions, Iran may also seek to procure Russian Yak-130 or Chinese JL-10 (aka L-15 Falcon) supersonic trainers.

Versatile trainer/light attack jets continue to be popular with militaries across the globe from Chinas L-15, to the Nigerian Alpha Jets fighting Boko Haram, to South Koreas FA-50 Golden Eagle, which has seen a lot of combat in The Philippines. In addition to being forgiving stepping stones for training fighter pilots to fly more demanding aircraft, advanced jet trainers can perform counter-insurgency and strike missions far more cost-efficiently than a high-performance jet fighter. Supersonic trainers with radar can also perform light air defense duties.

Of course, these are not the sort of aircraft one uses to fight off F-15 Eagles or F-22 stealth fighters, which is precisely the major threat Iranian defense have to worry about coming from the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Instead, programs like the Kowsar reflect Tehrans plans to shore up fighter pilot training and sustain the number of operational airframes capitalizing on the raw material furnished by America prior to the Iranian Revolution if international sanctions curtail foreign procurementas seems more likely since U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal.

The latest episode with the not-Kowsar fighter illustrates yet again the casual dishonesty of Tehrans propagandists. Iranian industry wanted to display the Kowsar-88 for an expowhich does appear to be a real airplane! However, the actual Kowsar-88 wasnt ready for display this August, so Tehran simply took an old, very well-known jet fighter and claimed it was a new one, in full view of domestic and international audiences that would know better.

The irony is that Tehran doesnt need to be ashamed of its resourceful use of old jet fighters. In the nine-year-long Iran-Iraq war during the 1980s, Iranian fighter pilots fought one of the most intense air wars in recent history defending their home soil. Though higher-performance F-4 Phantoms and F-14 Tomcats shot down dozens of Iraqi fighters (and suffered losses in return), even the F-5s chalked up a number of kills against MiG-21 fighters and Su-20 attack jets.

Sbastien Roblin holds a Masters Degree in Conflict Resolution from Georgetown University and served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education, editing, and refugee resettlement in France and the United States. He currently writes on security and military history for War Is Boring. This piece was first featured in 2018 and is being republished due to reader's interest.

Media: Reuters

Continued here:
Fake Fighter News: The Failure of Iran's "New" Saeqeh Jet Fighter - The National Interest Online

Just who speaks for Iran? When engaging with the Islamic Republic, the international community has tended to treat the country as a monolith, a consolidated political and ideological entity presided over by an entrenched clerical elite. That, however, is hardly the case. In truth, Iran is a complex and cosmopolitan melting pot made up of multiple, competing ethnic identities kept in check by a strong central authoritybut just barely.

This state of affairs is a natural byproduct of Irans imperial history. At the height of its power in the late 1600s, the Safavid dynasty, the greatest of the Iranian empires that spanned more than half a millennia, covered a swathe of territory stretching from central Afghanistan to southeastern Turkey and encompassed millions of people and dozens of distinct ethnic groups. Over the years, as the contours of imperial Iran expanded and constricted, a multitude of cultures and ethnicities came under its sway. As the centuries wore on, migration and commerce merged these disparate communities into what we now know as modern-day Iran.

Exactly how ethnically diverse Iran actually is, however, is a matter of some debate. There are currently no agreed-upon academic or governmental sources on Irans ethnic make-up, says Brenda Shaffer of Georgetown University, one of the countrys leading experts on Irans ethnic minorities. And because there arent, U.S. government estimatesincluding the CIAs vaunted World Factbook, which policy institutes and academia routinely rely on for figureshave tended to reflect official Iranian data regarding the population of its provinces.

That, Shaffer insists, is a mistake, because the Iranian regime has a vested interest in overrepresenting the countrys Persian majorityand underplaying the size and salience of other ethnic groups. By her estimates, the most reliable estimates of what Iran actually looks like internally can be extrapolated from earlier, and less political, sociological surveys carried out in the 1970s. Based on those figures, Shaffer projects that Irans current population of more than eighty-five million is made up of some forty-two million Persians, an estimated twenty-seven million Azerbaijanis, and roughly eight million Kurds, five million Arabs, two million Turkmen, and one-and-a-half million Baluch.

In other words, while Persians are indeed a majority within the Islamic Republic, their numbers are considerably more modest than generally advertised. The rest of the country, meanwhile, is comprised of a number of large and influential ethnic groups.

These groups are mostly concentrated in Irans various provinces, from East Azerbaijan, West Azerbaijan and Ardabil in the countrys northwest (home to the bulk of Iranian Azerbaijanis) to Sistan-Baluchistan in the southeast, where the preponderance of Iranian Baluch reside. Yet their influence is felt far beyond those places. Shaffer notes that, virtually without exception, Irans major urban centers are multi-ethnic affairsthe product of decades of intermarriage between urban dwellers from different parts of the country (and, before that, the empire). The most prominent example of this trend is none other than Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei himself, whose ethnic Azerbaijani heritage is common knowledge within the country.

Nevertheless, it is in Irans provinces where ethnic identity remains the strongest and most politically active, which is why those regions represent a threat to the countrys clerical regime.

Throughout Iranian history, Shaffer notes, every time the center is weak, the periphery rises. The situation is the same today. With the start of the current round of unrest in Iran in December 2017, Irans ethnic enclaves emerged as the most vibrant centers of resistance to clerical rule. In turn, the Iranian regime reserved some of its harshest repressionincluding mass arrests and state-sanctioned violencefor cities located in provinces where ethnic minorities predominate.

The brutality of the official response reflects just how deeply Iranian authorities fear the political activism and destabilizing potential of the countrys ethnic communities. They have good reason to do so; in recent years, radical ethnic movements in various provinces throughout the country have emerged as a major domestic security challenge for the regime in Tehran.

In Sistan-Baluchistan, which borders Pakistan, a low-grade insurgency has been simmering since the middle of the last decade. There, attacks carried out by militant Sunni Baluch groups like Jundullah and Jaish ul-Adl against regime targets have exacted a heavy toll. For instance, In October 2018, Baluch extremists abducted more than a dozen members of Irans clerical army, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), in the province. A subsequent February 2019 attack on an IRGC convoy transiting the region left nearly thirty dead. Such violence, moreover, has persisted despite a 2014 understanding between Iran and Pakistan under which both countries committed to stepped-up counterterrorism cooperation along their common border.

Irans majority Kurdish regions of West Azerbaijan, Kordestan and Kermanshah are similarly restive. Over the years, Iranian soldiers have become regular targets of attacks in those places carried out by local radicals, often in cooperation with sympathetic elements across the border in Iraq. The most prominent actor in this regard is the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), a Kurdish separatist group linked to Turkeys outlawed Kurdistan Workers Party which waged a pitched military campaign against the Iranian regime elements in the region between 2004 and 2011. This group has sporadically clashed with regime forces since then.

Irans eastern province of Khuzestan, meanwhile, is the site of significant separatist activity on the part of the countrys Arab minority. The region has a long history of social activism dating back to the 1920s, but in recent years the situation has become more heated, in part as a result of the activities of an insurgent group known as the Arab Struggle Movement for the Liberation of Ahvaz (ASMLA).

Between 2005 and 2015, large-scale civil unrest broke out in the province, mirroring the ethnic turmoil then occurring elsewhere in the Islamic Republic. While that ferment has abated somewhat since then the potential for large scale violence remains. In April of 2018, mass demonstrations erupted throughout Khuzestan, with the resulting clashes with authorities claiming scores of lives. And that September, a group of terrorists attacked a military parade in Ahvaz, killing nearly thirty soldiers and civilians in the most significant incident of its kind within Iran in recent memory. Shaffer points out that the instability in Khuzestan is particularly worrisome to the regime since it is located at the center of the countrys oil production.

Its no wonder, then, that Irans leaders are distrustful of the countrys ethnic minorities, and all too eager to suppress them. Authorities have long applied more discriminatory policies and stricter security measures in heavily ethnic provinces than elsewhere in the country. In his most recent report, Javaid Rehman, the UNs Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran, laid out in damning detail precisely what form this persecution takes. The regime, Rehman outlined, is responsible for the arbitrary deprivation of life and extrajudicial executions; a disproportionate number of executions on national security-related charges; a disproportionate number of political prisoners; arbitrary arrests and detention in connection with a range of peaceful activities such as advocacy for linguistic freedom, organizing or taking part in peaceful protests and being affiliated with opposition parties; incitement to hatred and violence; the forced closure of businesses and discriminatory practices and denial of employment; and restrictions on access to education and other basic services.

Worries over ethnicity even permeate the regimes internal organization. In much the same way the Soviet Communist Party in its day managed the inherent risk posed by the diverse ethnicities that had been drawn into the USSR, Shaffer says, great pains are taken today at the official level in Tehran to ensure that soldiers in Irans military do not serve in the province of their core ethnicity. In this way, the Iranian regime seeks to mute any residual identity that might supersede loyalty to the state, should push come to shove.

If it does, however, then Iranian authorities will have some unlikely allies: ordinary Iranians themselves. For most, national unity is a paramount concern, and many would prefer a united countryeven one under clerical ruleto a fragmented post-theocratic nation. For this reason, ethnic politics represent something of a third rail in any discussion of Irans future. Even ardent opponents of the current regime make abundantly clear that they would back the existing status quo if the alternative was a breakup of the country along ethnic lines. Irans clerical regime, in turn, has exploited these fears, disseminating messages that emphasize that only it has the capability to prevent such a situation.

It is also the reason why Irans disparate opposition groups have spent so little time discussing the plight of the countrys ethnic minorities, beyond general promises of equal treatment in whatever order emerges after the Islamic Republics collapse. Underlying this laissez faire attitude is an uncomfortable reality: ensuring that Irans assorted ethnic groups are content, engaged and committed to keeping the country intact are among the most pressing tasks facing anyone who hopes to rule this nation of nations after the ayatollahs.

Ilan Berman is the senior vice president of the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. This piece is the seventh in a series of articles exploring the beliefs, ideas and values of different factions within the Iranian opposition, as well as the challenges confronting them.

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Iran's Imperial History Overshadows Its Future - The National Interest Online

WARSAW (AFP) - An Iranian driver who was stranded after his lorry broke down in Poland received a helping hand from locals who launched a crowd-funding initiative for a new truck to take him home.

By Friday morning, the appeal on the website zrzutka.pl had drawn more than 250,000 zlotys (S$88,000) in donations for Fardin Kazemi.

The self-employed driver was forced to sleep in his American International 9670 lorry after it broke down in early December near the southern city of Czestochowa after travelling 5,550km.

Locals provided him with food and a roof over his head a few days after the vehicle broke down.

"I am very thankful to the great Polish nation for (their) hospitality," Kazemi said.

He was delivering raisins to Poland and was supposed to continue on to the Czech Republic to pick up goods to import to Iran, according to local media.

After his story hit the Internet, Polish lorry-drivers joined forces to help him repair the vehicle, and when that proved impossible, they decided to crowd-fund him a new one.

A replacement lorry was found on Thursday but its seller DAF Trucks - a Dutch manufacturing company which is a division of US firm Paccar - pulled out at the last minute for fear of being affected by US sanctions against Iran.

The organisers of the online appeal now hope to quickly find another vehicle for Kazemi, according to a video posted to Facebook.

Here is the original post:
Poles launch crowd-funding appeal to help stranded Iranian lorry driver - The Straits Times

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps naval commander Admiral Alireza Tangsiri said the Persian Gulf belongs to Iran, saying that Iran has the right to question any vessels entering the Straits of Hormuz and Iranian territorial waters. The statement is the latest in a series of Iranian threats to neighboring countries of the Persian Gulf after six months of tensions in which Iran downed a US drone, attacked six ships and seized one UK-flagged ship in the sensitive waterway.Tangsiris statement is part of the IRGCs increasing attempts to harass or provoke the US and allies. The IRGC navy controls and monitors the foreign vessels which enter the Persian Gulf and questions them about their nationality, type of vessel and their destination, said the Iranian commander. He claimed the US has always responded to these requests. Iran hosted Omans foreign minister recently and sought to reduce tensions with the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Iran wants to push its own initiative called Hormuz Peace Endeavor (HOPE) in the Gulf. It also says that it wants a joint naval drill with Russia and China.Irans mixed statements about peace and also control are a way to send a message to the US and Western navies. For instance the US has sought to lead a maritime security initiative in the Gulf and France has pushed its own European role. Denmark and Holland appear ready to work with France, which has a naval base in the UAE. The US has a naval base in Bahrain. Since August the UK and US have also worked increasingly closely in the Gulf. In July, the UK seized an Iranian tanker and Iran seized a British tanker. Iran wants to claim that its navy can do what it wants, even escort US ships, in the Gulf.Irans IRGC naval commander says the Gulf covers 250,000 square kilometers and that it opposes nuclear-powered vessels entering the Gulf, including submarines. He says foreign states are also adding to insecurity in the Gulf. Iran says that the seven countries, called 7+1 in Irania parlance around the Gulf should be the ones to establish sustainable security in the region. That would apparently mean Kuwait, Iraq, Iran, Bahrain, the UAE, Qatar, Iran and Oman. Tasnim and Fars News both reported the admirals comments.Iran says that it will hold a large-scale naval exercise in the Gulf that will include a massive naval war game. Iran will show off its latest gadgets, although the Iranian navy is not very large and is no match for major Western navies. However, its use of IRGC fast-boats has been successful at harassing large ships of other powers. In March 2018 Iranian IRGC boats harassed the USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier and in October 2018, boats harassed the USS Essex, part of the US Amphibious Ready Group. In the summer of 2019 the US increased its naval presence in the Gulf, sending the US destroyer Mason to join the USS Bainbridge. The USS Abraham Lincoln remains near the Gulf with the USS Leyte Gulf. US Central Command said the USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Leyte Gulf were in the Arabian Sea on December 10.

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Irans IRGC: The Persian Gulf belongs to us - The Jerusalem Post

An Iranian man whose lorry broke down in Poland will be given a new truck after a fundraising drive

An Iranian driver who was stranded after his lorry broke down in Poland received a helping hand from locals who launched a crowd-funding initiative for a new truck to take him home.

Self-employed lorry driver Fardin Kazemi was delivering raisins to Poland and planned to continue on to the Czech Republic to pick up goods to import to Iran when his American International 9670 lorry broke down.

Mr Kazemi was forced to sleep in his truck after the breakdown 5,550 kilometres from home in the southern city of Czestochowa in early December. Locals provided him with food and a roof over his head a few days after the vehicle broke down, but quickly decided they wanted to do more to help.

Polish lorry-drivers joined forces to help him repair the vehicle, and when that proved impossible, they decided to crowd-fund him a new one.

I have travelled all over Europe for 27 years so far I have not had the chance to get to know Poles better, although they have always been nice. Now it turns out that they are wonderful people, and it is difficult for me to believe in all the help I received, Mr Kazemi told local newspaper Dziennik Zachodni.

By Friday morning, the appeal on the website zrzutka.pl had drawn more than 250,000 zlotys (Dh240,000) in donations for Mr Kazemi.

A replacement lorry was found on Thursday but its seller DAF Trucks - a Dutch manufacturing company which is a division of US firm Paccar - pulled out at the last minute for fear of being affected by US sanctions against Iran.

The organisers of the online appeal now hope to quickly find another vehicle for Mr Kazemi, according to a video posted to Facebook.

Updated: December 21, 2019 11:50 AM

See the original post:
Polish public to buy new lorry for stranded Iranian - The National