Archive for the ‘Iran’ Category

Islam in Iran – Wikipedia

The Islamic conquest of Persia (637651) led to the end of the Sasanian Empire and the eventual decline of the Zoroastrian religion in Persia. However, the achievements of the previous Persian civilizations were not lost, but were to a great extent absorbed by the new Islamic polity. Islam has been the official religion of Iran since then, except for a short duration after the Mongol raids and establishment of Ilkhanate. Iran became an Islamic republic after the Islamic Revolution of 1979.

Before the Islamic conquest, the Persians had been mainly Zoroastrian, however, there were also large and thriving Christian and Jewish communities, especially in the territories of at that time northwestern, western, and southern Iran, mainly Caucasian Albania, Asristn, Persian Armenia, and Caucasian Iberia. Eastern Sassanian Iran, what is now solely composed of Afghanistan and Central Asia, was predominantly Buddhist. There was a slow but steady movement of the population toward Islam. When Islam was introduced to Iranians, the nobility and city-dwellers were the first to convert, Islam spread more slowly among the peasantry and the dehqans, or landed gentry. By the late 11th century, the majority of Persians had become Muslim, at least nominally.

Islam is the religion of 99.4% of Iranians. 90-95% of Iranians are Shi'a and 5-10% are Sunni. Most Sunnis in Iran are Kurds, Larestani people (from Larestan), Turkomen, and Baluchs, living in the northwest, northeast, south, and southeast.[1] Almost all of Iranian Shi'as are Twelvers.

Though Iran is known today as a stronghold of the Shi'a Muslim faith, it did not become so until much later, around the 15th century. The Safavid dynasty made Shi'a Islam the official state religion in the early sixteenth century and aggressively proselytized on its behalf. It is also believed that by the mid-seventeenth century most people in Iran and the territory of the contemporary neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan had become Shi'as,[2] an affiliation that has continued. Over the following centuries, with the state-fostered rise of a Persian-based Shi'ite clergy, a synthesis was formed between Persian culture and Shi'ite Islam that marked each indelibly with the tincture of the other.

Expansion under the Prophet Mohammad, 622-632

Expansion during the Patriarchal Caliphate, 632-661

Expansion during the Umayyad Caliphate, 661-750

Muslims invaded Iran in the time of Umar (637) and conquered it after several great battles. Yazdegerd III fled from one district to another Merv in 651.[3] By 674, Muslims had conquered Greater Khorasan (which included modern Iranian Khorasan province and modern Afghanistan, Transoxania).

As Bernard Lewis has quoted[4]

"These events have been variously seen in Iran: by some as a blessing, the advent of the true faith, the end of the age of ignorance and heathenism; by others as a humiliating national defeat, the conquest and subjugation of the country by foreign invaders. Both perceptions are of course valid, depending on one's angle of vision."

Under Umar and his immediate successors, the Arab conquerors attempted to maintain their political and cultural cohesion despite the attractions of the civilizations they had conquered. The Arabs were to settle in the garrison towns rather than on scattered estates. The new non-Muslim subjects, or dhimmi, were to pay a special tax, the jizya or poll tax, which was calculated per individual at varying rates for able bodied men of military age.[5]

Iranians were among the very earliest converts to Islam, and their conversion in significant numbers began as soon as the Arab armies reached and overran the Persian plateau. Despite some resistance from elements of the Zoroastrian clergy and other ancient religions, the anti-Islamic policies of later conquerors like the Il-khanids, the impact of the Christian and secular West in modern times, and the attraction of new religious movements like Babism and the Bahai faith (qq.v.), the vast majority of Iranians became and have remained Muslims. Today perhaps 98 percent of ethnic Iranians, including the population of Persia, are at least nominal Muslims. For such a fundamental, pervasive, and enduring cultural transformation, the phenomenon of Iranian conversions to Islam has received remarkably little scholarly attention (for an early and still worthwhile survey of the subject, see Arnold, pp.20920; for significant recent advances, see Bulliet, 1979a; idem, 1979b).

Recent research has established a general chronological framework for the process of conversion of Iranians to Islam. From a study of the probable dates of individual conversions based on genealogies in biographical dictionaries, Richard Bulliet has suggested that there was gradual and limited conversion of Persians down to the end of the Umayyad period (132/750), followed by a rapid increase in the number of conversions after the Abbasid revolution, so that by the time when regional dynasties had been established in the east (ca. 338/950) 80 percent or more of Iranians had become Muslims. The data on which Bulliets study was based limited the validity of this paradigm to generalizations about full, formal conversions in an urban environment. The situation in rural areas and individual regions may have been quite different, but the overall pattern is consistent with what can be deduced from traditional historical sources. Although in some areas, for example, Shiraz at the time of Moqaddasis visit in about 375/985 (p.429), there may still have been strong non-Muslim elements, it is reasonable to suppose that the Persian milieu as a whole became predominantly Islamic within the period of time suggested by Bulliets research.[6]

Following the Abbasid revolution of 749-51, in which Iranian converts played a major role, the Caliphate's center of gravity moved to Mesopotamia and underwent significant Iranian influences.[7] Accordingly, the Muslim population of Iran rose from approx. 40% in the mid 9th century to close to 100% by the end of 11th century.[8] Islam was readily accepted by Zoroastrians who were employed in industrial and artisan positions because, according to Zoroastrian dogma, such occupations that involved defiling fire made them impure.[9] Moreover, Muslim missionaries did not encounter difficulty in explaining Islamic tenants to Zoroastrians, as there were many similarities between the faiths. According to Thomas Walker Arnold, for the Persian, he would meet Ahura Mazda and Ahriman under the names of Allah and Iblis.[9]Muslim leaders in their effort to win converts encouraged attendance at Muslim prayer, and allowed the Quran to be recited in Persian instead of Arabic so that it would be intelligible to all.[9] The first complete translation of the Qur'an into Persian occurred during the reign of Samanids in the 9th century. Seyyed Hossein Nasr suggests that the rapid increase in conversion was aided by the Persian nationality of the rulers.[8][10]

According to Bernard Lewis:

"Iran was indeed Islamized, but it was not Arabized. Persians remained Persians. And after an interval of silence, Iran reemerged as a separate, different and distinctive element within Islam, eventually adding a new element even to Islam itself. Culturally, politically, and most remarkable of all even religiously, the Iranian contribution to this new Islamic civilization is of immense importance. The work of Iranians can be seen in every field of cultural endeavor, including Arabic poetry, to which poets of Iranian origin composing their poems in Arabic made a very significant contribution. In a sense, Iranian Islam is a second advent of Islam itself, a new Islam sometimes referred to as Islam-i Ajam. It was this Persian Islam, rather than the original Arab Islam, that was brought to new areas and new peoples: to the Turks, first in Central Asia and then in the Middle East in the country which came to be called Turkey, and India. The Ottoman Turks brought a form of Iranian civilization to the walls of Vienna..."[11]

The Islamization of Iran was to yield deep transformations within the cultural, scientific, and political structure of Iran's society: The blossoming of Persian literature, philosophy, medicine and art became major elements of the newly forming Muslim civilization. Inheriting a heritage of thousands of years of civilization, and being at the "crossroads of the major cultural highways",[12] contributed to Persia emerging as what culminated into the "Islamic Golden Age". During this period, hundreds of scholars and scientists vastly contributed to technology, science and medicine, later influencing the rise of European science during the Renaissance.[13]

The most important scholars of almost all of the Islamic sects and schools of thought were Persian or live in Iran including most notable and reliable Hadith collectors of Shia and Sunni like Shaikh Saduq, Shaikh Kulainy, Imam Bukhari, Imam Muslim and Hakim al-Nishaburi, the greatest theologians of Shia and Sunni like Shaykh Tusi, Imam Ghazali, Imam Fakhr al-Razi and Al-Zamakhshari, the greatest physicians, astronomers, logicians, mathematicians, metaphysicians, philosophers and scientists like Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Nasr al-Dn al-Ts, the greatest Shaykh of Sufism like Rumi, Abdul-Qadir Gilani.

Ibn Khaldun narrates in his Muqaddimah:[14]

It is a remarkable fact that, with few exceptions, most Muslim scholars in the intellectual sciences have been non-Arabs, thus the founders of grammar were Sibawaih and after him, al-Farsi and Az-Zajjaj. All of them were of Persian descent... they invented rules of (Arabic) grammar. Great jurists were Persians. Only the Persians engaged in the task of preserving knowledge and writing systematic scholarly works. Thus the truth of the statement of the prophet (Muhammad) becomes apparent, "If learning were suspended in the highest parts of heaven the Persians would attain it" The intellectual sciences were also the preserve of the Persians, left alone by the Arabs, who did not cultivate them as was the case with all crafts This situation continued in the cities as long as the Persians and Persian countries, Iraq, Khorasan and Transoxiana (modern Central Asia), retained their sedentary culture.

In the 9th and 10th centuries, non-Arab subjects of the Ummah, especially Persians created a movement called Shu'ubiyyah in response to the privileged status of Arabs. This movement led to resurgence of Persian national identity.[15] Although Persians adopted Islam, over the centuries they worked to protect and revive their distinctive language and culture, a process known as Persianization. Arabs and Turks also participated in this attempt.[16][17][18]

As the power of the Abbasid caliphs diminished, a series of dynasties rose in various parts of Iran, some with considerable influence and power. Among the most important of these overlapping dynasties were the Tahirids in Khorasan (820-72); the Saffarids in Sistan (867-903); and the Samanids (875-1005), originally at Bokhara. The Samanids eventually ruled an area from central Iran to Pakistan.[19] By the early 10th century, the Abbasids almost lost control to the growing Persian faction known as the Buwayhid dynasty (934-1055). Since much of the Abbasid administration had been Persian anyway, the Buwayhid, who were Zaidi Shia, were quietly able to assume real power in Baghdad.

The Samanid dynasty was the first fully native dynasty to rule Iran since the Muslim conquest, and led the revival of Persian culture. The first important Persian poet after the arrival of Islam, Rudaki, was born during this era and was praised by Samanid kings. The Samanids also revived many ancient Persian festivals. Their successor, the Ghaznawids, who were of non-Iranian Turkic origin, also became instrumental in the revival of Persian.[20]

In 962 a Turkish governor of the Samanids, Alptigin, conquered Ghazna (in present-day Afghanistan) and established a dynasty, the Ghaznavids, that lasted to 1186.[19] Later, the Seljuks, who like the Ghaznavids were Turks, slowly conquered Iran over the course of the 11th century. Their leader, Tughril Beg, turned his warriors against the Ghaznavids in Khorasan. He moved south and then west, conquering but not wasting the cities in his path. In 1055 the caliph in Baghdad gave Tughril Beg robes, gifts, and the title King of the East. Under Tughril Beg's successor, Malik Shah (10721092), Iran enjoyed a cultural and scientific renaissance, largely attributed to his brilliant Iranian vizier, Nizam al Mulk. These leaders established the observatory where Omar Khayym did much of his experimentation for a new calendar, and they built religious schools in all the major towns. They brought Abu Hamid Ghazali, one of the greatest Islamic theologians, and other eminent scholars to the Seljuk capital at Baghdad and encouraged and supported their work.[19]

A serious internal threat to the Seljuks during their reign came from the Hashshashin- Ismailis of the Nizari sect, with headquarters at Alamut between Rasht and Tehran. They controlled the immediate area for more than 150 years and sporadically sent out adherents to strengthen their rule by murdering important officials. Several of the various theories on the etymology of the word assassin derive from these killers.[19]

Although Shi'as have lived in Iran since the earliest days of Islam, the writers of the Four Books of Shi'a ahadith were Iranians of the pre-Safavid era and there was one Shi'a dynasty in part of Iran during the tenth and eleventh centuries, according to Mortaza Motahhari the majority of Iranian scholars and masses remained Sunni till the time of the Safavids.[21]

The domination of the Sunni creed during the first nine Islamic centuries characterizes the religious history of Iran during this period. There were however some exceptions to this general domination which emerged in the form of the Zayds of Tabaristan, the Buwayhid, the rule of Sultan Muhammad Khudabandah (r. Shawwal 703-Shawwal 716/1304-1316) and the Sarbedaran. Nevertheless, apart from this domination there existed, firstly, throughout these nine centuries, Shia inclinations among many Sunnis of this land and, secondly, original Imami Shiism as well as Zayd Shiism had prevalence in some parts of Iran. During this period, Shia in Iran were nourished from Kufah, Baghdad and later from Najaf and Hillah.[22]

However, during the first nine centuries there are four high points in the history of this linkage:

Due to their history being almost fully intertwined, Iran as well as Azerbaijan are both discussed here. Iran and Azerbaijan were predominantly Sunni until the Sixteenth Century. Changes in the religious make-up of nowadays both nations changed drastically from that time and on. In 1500 the Safavid Shah Ismail I undertook the conquering of Iran and Azerbaijan and commenced a policy of forced conversion of Sunni Muslims to Shia Islam. Many Sunnis were murdered. When Shah Ismail I conquered Iraq, Dagestan, Eastern Anatolia, and Armenia he similarly forcefully converted or murdered Sunni Muslims. The oppression and forced conversion of Sunnis would continue, mostly unabated, for the greater part of next two centuries until Iran as well as what is now Azerbaijan became predominantly Shiite countries.[2]

As in the case of the early caliphate, Safavid rule had been based originally on both political and religious legitimacy, with the shah being both king and divine representative. With the later erosion of Safavid central political authority in the mid-17th century, the power of the Shia scholars in civil affairs such as judges, administrators, and court functionaries, began to grow, in a way unprecedented in Shi'ite history. Likewise, the ulama began to take a more active role in agitating against Sufism and other forms of popular religion, which remained strong in Iran, and in enforcing a more scholarly type of Shi'a Islam among the masses. The development of the ta'ziaha passion play commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husayn and his family and Ziarat of the shrines and tombs of local Shi'ite leaders began during this period, largely at the prompting of the Shi'ite clergy.[23] According to Mortaza Motahhari, the majority of Iranians turned to Shi'a Islam from the Safavid period onwards. Of course, it cannot be denied that Iran's environment was more favorable to the flourishing of the Shi'a Islam as compared to all other parts of the Muslim world. Shi'a Islam did not penetrate any land to the extent that it gradually could in Iran. With the passage of time, Iranians' readiness to practise Shi'a Islam grew day by day. It was the Safavids who made Iran the spiritual bastion of Shiism against the onslaughts of shi'as' by orthodox Sunni Islam, and the repository of Persian cultural traditions and self-awareness of Iranianhood,[24] acting as a bridge to modern Iran. According to Professor Roger Savory:[25]

During the 20th century Iran underwent significant changes such as the 1906 Constitutional Revolution and the secularism of the Pahlavi dynasty.

According to scholar Roy Mottahedeh, one significant change to Islam in Iran during the first half of the 20th century was that the class of ulema lost its informality that allowed it to include everyone from the highly trained jurist to the "shopkeeper who spent one afternoon a week memorizing and transmitting a few traditions." Laws by Reza Shah that requiring military service and dress in European-style clothes for Iranians, gave talebeh and mullahs exemptions, but only if they passed specific examinations proving their learnedness, thus excluding less educated clerics.

In addition Islamic Madrasah schools became more like 'professional' schools, leaving broader education to secular government schools and sticking to Islamic learning. "Ptolemaic astronomy, Aveicennian medicines, and the algebra of Omar Kahayyam" was dispensed with.[26]

The Iranian Revolution (also known as the Islamic Revolution,[27][28][29][30][31][32]Persian: , Enghelbe Eslmi) was the revolution that transformed Iran from a secular, modernizing monarchy under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to an Islamic republic based on the doctrine of Velayat-e faqih (rule by an Islamic jurist), under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic.[33] It has been called "the third great revolution in history", following the French and Bolshevik revolutions,[34] and an event that "made Islamic fundamentalism a political force ... from Morocco to Malaysia."[35]

Sunni Muslims constitute approximately 5-10% of the Iranian population. A majority of Lari people (Persians), Kurds, virtually all Baluchis and Turkomans, and a minority of Arabs and Azeris are Sunnis, as are small communities of Persians in southern Iran and Khorasan.

The mountainous region of Larestan is mostly inhabited by indigenous Sunni Persians who did not convert to Shia Islam during the Safavids because the mountainous region of Larestan was too isolated. The majority of Lari people are Sunni Muslims,[36][37][38] 35% of Lari people are Shia Muslims. The people of Larestan speak the Lari language, which is a southwestern Iranian language closely related to Old Persian (pre-Islamic Persian) and Luri.[39]

Shia clergy tend to view missionary work among Sunnis to convert them to Shi'a Islam as a worthwhile religious endeavor.[40] In those towns with mixed populations in the Persian Gulf region, and Sistan and Baluchistan, tensions between Shi'as and Sunnis existed both before and after the Revolution. Religious tensions have been highest during major Shi'a observances, especially Moharram.[40]

Iran's government is unique in following the principle of velayat-e faqih or guardianship of the jurist, according to which government must be run in accordance with traditional Islamic sharia, and for this to happen a leading Islamic jurist (faqih) must provide political "guardianship" (wilayat or velayat) over the people. Following the Iranian Revolution, the 1979 Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran made the "guardian" the Supreme Leader of Iran[41] The author of Velayat-e faqih doctrine, Ayatollah Khomeini, as the first Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.

The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran mandates that the official religion of Iran is Shia Islam and the Twelver Ja'fari school, though it also mandates that other Islamic schools are to be accorded full respect, and their followers are free to act in accordance with their own jurisprudence in performing their religious rites and recognizes Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian Iranians as religious minorities. As part of this mandate of allowing other practices, however, the Islamic Republic does not allow Sunni mosques in areas where Sunnis are not the demographic majority.[42]

Citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran are officially divided into four categories: Muslims, Zoroastrians, Jews and Christians. This official division ignores other religious minorities in Iran, notably those of the Bah' faith. Bahs are a "non-recognized" religious minority without any legal existence. They are classified as "unprotected infidels" by the authorities, and are subject to systematic discrimination on the basis of their beliefs. Similarly, atheism is officially disallowed; one must declare oneself as a member of one of the four recognized faiths in order to avail oneself of many of the rights of citizenship.[43]

Historically, the most important religious institution in Iran has been the mosque. In towns and cities, congregational prayers, as well as prayers and rites associated with religious observances and important phases in Muslim life, took place in mosques. Primarily an urban phenomenon, mosques did not exist in most Iranian villages. In the years preceding the Revolution, Iranian Shias generally attached diminishing signicance to institutional religion, and by the 1970s there was little emphasis on mosque attendance, even for the Friday congregational prayers. During the Revolution, however, mosques in large cities played a prominent social role in organizing people for large demonstrations. Since that time, the mosques have continued to play important political and social roles, in addition to their traditional religious functions.[44] At the same time, weekly mosque attendance rate in Iran has been very low compared to other Muslim countries.[45] In particular, politicization of Friday prayers under the Islamic Republic has had the paradoxical consequence of discouraging religious people from attending Friday prayers. People who attend prayers tend to have more positive evaluation of the political system than people who do not attend.[45]:2289

Another religious institution of major signicance has been the hoseiniyeh, or Islamic center. Wealthy patrons nanced construction of hoseiniyehs in urban areas to serve as sites for recitals and performances commemorating the martyrdom of Hussein, especially during the month of Moharram. In the 1970s, hoseiniyehs such as the Hoseiniyeh Irshad in Tehran became politicized as prominent clerical and lay preachers helped to lay the groundwork for the Revolution by referring to the symbolic deaths as martyrs of Hussein and the other imams in veiled but obvious criticism of Mohammad Reza Shahs regime. Institutions providing religious education include madrassas, or seminaries, and maktabs, or primary schools run by the clergy. The madrassas historically were important settings for advanced training in Shia theology and jurisprudence. Each madrassa generally was associated with a noted Shia scholar who had attained the rank of ayatollah. Some older madrassas functioned like religious universities at which several scholars taught diverse religious and secular subjects. Students, or talabehs, lived on the grounds of the madrassas and received stipends for the duration of their studies, usually a minimum of seven years, during which they prepared for the examinations that qualify a seminary student to be a low-level preacher, or mullah. At the time of the Revolution, there were slightly more than 11,000 talabehs in Iran, approximately 60 percent of them at the madrassas in Qom. From 1979 to 1982, the number of talabehs in Qom more than tripled from 6,500. There were just under 25,000 talabehs at all levels of study in Qom seminaries in the early 2000s, as well as about 12,000 talabehs at seminaries in other Iranian cities.[44]

Maktabs started to decline in number and importance in the rst decades of the twentieth century, once the government began developing a national public school system. Nevertheless, maktabs continued to exist as private religious schools until the Revolution. Because the overall emphasis of public schools has remained secular subjects, since 1979 maktabs have continued to serve children whose parents want them to have a more religious education.[44]

Another major religious institution in Iran is the shrine. Pilgrimage to the shrines of imams is a specic Shia custom, undertaken because Shia pilgrims believe that the imams and their relatives have the power to intercede with God on behalf of petitioners. Of the more than 1,100 shrines in Iran, the most important are those for the Eighth Imam, Reza, in Mashhad, for Rezas sister Fatima in Qom, and for Khomeini in Tehran. Each of these is a huge complex that includes the mausoleum of the venerated one, tombs of various notables, mosques, madrassas, and libraries. Imam Reza's shrine is considered the holiest. In addition to the usual shrine accoutrements, it comprises hospitals, dispensaries, a museum, and several mosques located in a series of courtyards surrounding the imams tomb. The shrine's endowments and gifts are the largest of all religious institutions in the country. Although there are no special times for visiting this or other shrines, it is customary for pilgrimage trafc to be heaviest during Shia holy periods. Visitors represent all socioeconomic levels. Whereas piety is a motivation for many, others come to seek the spiritual grace or general good fortune that a visit to the shrine is believed to ensure. Since the nineteenth century, it has been customary among the bazaar class and members of the lower classes to recognize those who have made a pilgrimage to Mashhad by prexing their names with the title mashti. Shrine authorities have estimated that at least 4 million pilgrims visit the shrine annually in the early 2000s. There are also important secondary shrines for other relatives of the Eighth Imam in Tehran and Shiraz. In virtually all towns and in many villages, there are numerous lesser shrines, known as imamzadehs, that commemorate descendants of the imams who are reputed to have led saintly lives. In Iraq the shrines at Karbala and An Najaf also are revered by Iranian Shias. Pilgrimages to these shrines and the hundreds of local mamzadehs are undertaken to petition the saints to grant special favors or to help one through a period of troubles. The constant movement of pilgrims from all over Iran has helped bind together a linguistically heterogeneous population. Pilgrims serve as major sources of information about conditions in different parts of the country and thus help to mitigate the parochialism of the regions.[44]

The vaqf is a traditional source of nancial support for all religious institutions. It is a religious endowment by which land and other income-producing property is given in perpetuity for the maintenance of a shrine, mosque, madrassa, or charitable institution such as a hospital, library, or orphanage. A mutavalli administers a vaqf in accordance with the stipulations in the donor's bequest. In many vaqfs, the position of mutavalli is hereditary. Under the Pahlavis, the government attempted to exercise control over administration of the vaqfs, especially those of the larger shrines. This practice caused conict with the clergy, who perceived the government's efforts as inimical to their inuence and authority in traditional religious matters. The governments interference with the administration of vaqfs during the Pahlavi era led to a sharp decline in the number of vaqf bequests. Instead, wealthy and pious Shias chose to give nancial contributions directly to the leading ayatollahs in the form of zakat, or obligatory alms. The clergy, in turn, used the funds to administer their madrassas and to institute various educational and charitable programs, which indirectly provided them with more inuence in society. The access of the clergy to a steady and independent source of funding was an important factor in their ability to resist state controls, and ultimately helped them direct the opposition to the shah.[44]

Statistics of religious buildings according to which has been gathered in 2003.

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Islam in Iran - Wikipedia

The Fantasies of Iran Hawks – The American Conservative

U.S. Department of State/Flickr

Charles Krauthammers analysis of Trumps Saudi visit and his foreign policy is as wrong as you would expect it to be:

That progress began with Trumps trip to Saudi Arabia, the first of his presidency an unmistakable declaration of a radical reorientation of U.S. policy in the region. Message: The appeasement of Iran is over [bold mine-DL].

Barack Obamas tilt toward Iran in the great Muslim civil war between Shiite Iran and Sunni Arabs led by Saudi Arabia was his reach for Nixon-to-China glory.

Iran hawks have tried to spin Obamas regional policies as appeasement of Iran for years, but this was never true. Mind you, these people think any form of diplomatic engagement is appeasement, since they are satisfied with noting less than total capitulation of the other side. As they see it, if Obama negotiated with Iran he must have also appeased them, but thats a ridiculous way to think about these things. That doesnt tell us anything about what actually happened during the Obama years, but it does remind us of the hawks knee-jerk rejection of diplomacy.

In order to appease, one party must make a costly concession to another in order to avoid an attack. If anyone was being appeased during the nuclear negotiations, it was the U.S. and the rest of the P5+1. To believe that Iran was the one being appeased requires forgetting that it was the one that had to make the most significant and lasting concessions to gain relief from punishing sanctions. All that the U.S. conceded was that Washington would stop some of the sanctions our government imposed on them. No honest observer could call that appeasement of Iran, but then Iran hawks havent been honest about most things during the debate over the nuclear deal.

During the so-called appeasement of Iran, the U.S. imposed extensive sanctions on the Iranian economy and persuaded many of its major trading partners to do likewise. The U.S. also armed Irans regional rivals to the teeth, and Obama set a record for selling more weapons to the Saudis than any president before him. On top of that, Obama backed the forces opposing the Syrian government for most of his second term, and supported the Saudi-led coalition in their delusion that attacking Yemen had something to do with combating Iranian influence. Everything Trump has done to date has represented a continuation of Obama-era policies. That is not a reorientation, much less a radical one, and thats the problem.

Trumps regional policies are awful in large part because he is continuing what Obama was doing and compounding Obamas errors with more of his own. The main and perhaps only meaningful difference is that Obama occasionally offered mild criticisms of the Saudis, and Trump wont shut up about how great they are. The policies are quite similar and similarly horrible, but for a partisan and ideologue like Krauthammer that is unimaginable. So we are treated to the fantasy that Trump has engineered a reversal from Obama policies that he is adopting.

Krauthammer misleads again when he claims that supporters of the nuclear deal promised that Iranian international behavior would improve. Hardly anyone in favor of the nuclear deal thought it would alter Irans foreign policy, and virtually no one made that part of the central argument for the deal. The Obama administration often argued that they hoped the deal might do that, but didnt expect that it would. Indeed, most supporters of the deal made a point of distinguishing between what the deal was supposed to dorestrict Irans nuclear program and subject it to a verification processand what it couldnt possibly do (i.e., change other Iranian government behavior for the better). It was opponents that were desperate to link the negotiations over the nuclear issue with everything else in the region as a way of derailing the talks and sabotaging the deal. They failed then, and so now theyre concocting a false story to try to bring discredit on the agreement now. The Iran hawks problem is that the deal is working as advertised, Iran is complying with its obligations, and the nightmare scenarios they painted about how it would fuel Iranian power have not come to pass (nor as they likely to). Even the Trump administration has conceded that Iran is complying with the deal. Some radical reorientation.

Unfortunately, U.S. policies in the region could do with a genuinely radical reorientation, but Trump isnt going to provide it. He and his advisers bought into the nonsensical D.C. conventional wisdom that Obama had been too soft on Iran and too hard on our clients. Trump may think he is making a big break from Obama, but in reality he is just doing more of the same. The people of Yemen in particular are continuing to pay for our shameful indulgence of the Saudis and their allies. The sick thing about all this is that Trump is likely to be celebrated in Washington expanding on Obamas worst policies, and Krauthammers absurd column is probably just the first of many to do so.

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The Fantasies of Iran Hawks - The American Conservative

How Is Iran’s Hassan Rouhani A Moderate? – Forbes


Washington Post
How Is Iran's Hassan Rouhani A Moderate?
Forbes
Following the May 19th presidential election in Iran and the incumbent Hassan Rouhani reaching a second term, there was an outpouring of Western mainstream media describing him as a moderate again. As described by the National Review, Iran's sham ...
Iranian President Rouhani won reelection. Here's how reformists got him there.Washington Post
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How Is Iran's Hassan Rouhani A Moderate? - Forbes

In Iran’s elections, the hard-liners lost. What comes next? – Washington Post

By Payam Mohseni By Payam Mohseni May 26 at 8:00 AM

More than 40 million Iranians voted last Friday in a presidential election to choose their countrys future path: between one of engagement and diplomacy with the West and one based on a self-reliant economic populism. With a 73 percent turnout, Iranians overwhelmingly chose moderate incumbent Hassan Rouhani in what was a clear defeat for the main conservative challenger, Ebrahim Raisi, and a major setback for the conservative camp.

The uncertainty and high stakes involved in the election yet again confirms the importance of genuine electoral competition within the bounds of the Iranian political system and the serious role given to popular input and participation as opposed to other Muslim states in the Middle East.

Scorched-earth campaign

This years campaign was particularly harsh as Irans conservatives undertook a high-powered offensive against Rouhani far beyond their regular campaigning tactics. The degree of mobilization, campaigning, investment and consensus-building within the conservative camp was unprecedented in the last two decades as were the serious charges against Rouhani that dragged the president and his entire administration through the mud with embarrassing corruption allegations.

These attacks pushed Rouhani headfirst into the reformist camp as he aggressively attacked the state in a bid to attract voters and gain popularity through anti-establishment rhetoric. While Rouhani had relied on the reformists since his 2013 election, he adopted their rhetoric in the final stretch of the campaign in a degree above and beyond his prior bounds.

Why would the conservatives mount such an extensive scorched-earth campaign against a strong incumbent president who lifted sanctions with the nuclear deal when there was such a high risk of loss and defeat? Was this a strategic mistake tarnishing both the conservatives and Raisis credibility? The answer lies beyond this particular election and in the larger war over the future of the supreme leadership after Ayatollah Khomeini.

Realignments within the conservative bloc

Win or lose, conservatives decided the battle lines be drawn between true believers and the increasing amount of conservatives peeling away to join Rouhanis moderate alliance that defines itself as anti-extremist. The conservatives strategy aimed to create unity among the faithful in the face of Rouhanis encroaching influence and instigate a factional realignment against the sitting president. It is the tenability and success of this conservative alliance that will significantly impact the future path that Iran takes not simply the current reelection of Rouhani to the presidency.

Indeed, Rouhanis 2013 election and the nuclear deal were largely possible with the backing of key segments of the conservative Iranian elite what I call the modern theocrats within Rouhanis larger power triangle. Rouhanis cross-factional alliance is a serious force in the battle of succession. If Rouhani successfully amalgamates reformists, moderates and conservatives into one cohesive whole, a broad elite consensus with a soft ideological vision and desire for global integration could dominate the state in stark opposition to the revolutionary anti-imperialist ideology of the supreme leader and hard-liners.

Rouhanis explicit thanking of Mohammad Khatami alongside Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri in his presidential acceptance speech could not be any more telling of the coalition he has built, all the more intriguing since Nateq-Nouri resigned from the supreme leaders inspections office before the election in a possible sign of internal disagreements. These two figures were once the respective reformist and conservative candidates in the 1997 presidential elections and it demonstrates the convergence of forces that has occurred between the once opposing factions in support of Rouhani. This broad alignment wants to strengthen its position to push through fundamental reforms and make a bid for the countrys third supreme leader.

For the conservatives, this would be a disaster. Their strategy was therefore to stymie any inroads of Rouhanis popularity within conservative forces and to fully bring everyone into the anti-Rouhani camp by waging a polarizing campaign against the administration. These lines, they calculated, would need to be drawn in the sand for the upcoming major political battles on the horizon irrespective of this particular electoral result.

The staunch attacks on Rouhani forced the president to adopt strong reformist discourse, allowing the conservatives to more easily rally the faithful against him. Directing conservative antipathy for Rouhani had been far from the case four years ago. While the likelihood of ascending to the supreme leadership for Raisi has diminished, conservatives as a whole still retain the power and have gained cohesiveness to push their own candidate for the position.

Looking to the future

Additionally, this election highlights a growing secularization and non-revolutionary, pro-Western trend in Iran in part a result of the very success of the Islamic Republic to modernize society. The greater empowerment of voices that are sympathetic to increased interactions with the West valuing secular academic education and emphasizing a liberal womens rights discourse all fly against the ideals of the Islamic revolution that pushed for an indigenous cultural movement and was the flag bearer for anti-imperialism.

This larger secularization will only increase in time as the conservatives have not developed alternate models of cultural production to bring about a popular change of direction perhaps most importantly because the very ruling elites across the political spectrum, including many of the conservatives, have themselves modernized and Westernized over time.

Accordingly, a well-defined identity with clear ideological boundaries will enable the conservatives to act as a coherent opposition group and more effectively take on a moderate-reformist coalition making significant inroads in politics and society and that threatened the conservative elite.

This election demonstrated that the conservatives will fight to preserve their base, provoke polarization and make sure they are not enveloped by shades of gray where moderates can act as revolutionaries and reformists at the same time.

Payam Mohseniis the director of the Iran Project and fellow for Iran Studies at the Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. He is also a lecturer in the department of government at Harvard University where he teaches Iranian and Middle East politics.

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In Iran's elections, the hard-liners lost. What comes next? - Washington Post

Senate Panel Approves Stiff Iran Sanctions and Says Russia Is Next – New York Times


New York Times
Senate Panel Approves Stiff Iran Sanctions and Says Russia Is Next
New York Times
Because Iran has complied with the nuclear accord, the Senate committee had to find other reasons to impose the sanctions, and linked the penalties to Iran's continued support for terrorism and its human rights violations, among other concerns. But the ...

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Senate Panel Approves Stiff Iran Sanctions and Says Russia Is Next - New York Times