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The order for Iraqi armed factions to halt their attacks on US interests last week came directly from Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Middle East Eye can reveal.

According to commanders of Shia armed factions and politicians, Khameneis orders were explicit and demanded the paramilitaries immediately cease their attacks.

Khamenei's orders were straightforward and clear. All attacks targeting US interests in Iraq must stop, a senior commander of an Iranian-backed armed faction involved in the attacks told Middle East Eye.

'Khamenei's orders were straightforward and clear. All attacks targeting US interests in Iraq must stop'

- Iraqi paramilitary commander

The US embassy in Baghdad, military bases hosting the US-led coalition forces and logistical support convoys have been subjected to almost daily attacks by Katyusha rockets, explosives and sometimes direct fire over the past three months.

Although these attacks have not caused significant losses, their frequency has bothered the Iraqi and US governments and raised the concern of diplomatic missions, especially after the targeting of UN and British convoys.

In response, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has threatened to close Washingtons embassy in Baghdad unless the attackers were brought to heel.

Iraqi officials told MEEthatPompeo also promised to strike dozens of targets, including secret headquarters and sites belonging to armed factions and Iranian-backed politicians.

Besides those threats, Tehran has seen the need to give Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimis government some respite. Already it is grappling with a financial crisis sparked by low oil prices, as well as the coronavirus pandemic, and the uncertainty surrounding the governments collapse would cause Iran a fresh headache.

Kataeb Hezbollah, the faction most hostile to the US and accused of carrying out the majority of attacks, was first to respond to Khameneis order. It was quickly followed by Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba and other small factions.

"The Americans seek to inflame people against us in various ways, so we decided that thwarting the Americans efforts in this regard is more important than targeting the American embassy, a prominent commander of one of the armed factions involved in these attacks told MEE.

"Calming the Iraqi street, preserving the Iraqi government and the political process is the priority now. Therefore, it was decided to suspend all attacks targeting US interests in Iraq until the danger passes.

The significant shifting in the attitude of the Iranian-backed armed factions and the timing of the announcement of this unilateral truce has raised manyquestions about the real goal of this decision, its conditions, its time limits, the identity of the guarantor party, and, most importantly, who is making it.

Iraq has been one of the biggest arenas of conflict between the United States and Iran since 2003. Both nations control dozens of armed groups, as well as political and military leaders who are working to implement their agendas.

Iraqi officials said the US administration is afraid that armed groups linked to Iran will attack the Baghdad embassy to embarrass US President Donald Trump, who is seeking to win a second term in the 3 November election.

'War is imminent': Iraq's Kadhimi moves to fend off US threat to target pro-Iran groups

It is a scenario that reflects the strategy employed by Tehran over recent months, and Washingtons fears are well-founded.

Armed factions had been encouraged to attack US targets to "pressure Trump and his allies in Iraq" and push him into taking reckless action that could cause him to lose the elections, Iraqi officials and armed factions commanders told MEE.

However, it seems that calculations changed after "the Iranians made sure of the seriousness of the threats that Pompeo conveyed through Iraqi President Barham Salih to strike Iranian interests and their allies inside Iraq", according to a senior Shia leader close to Tehran.

"The Iranians have received very important advice from a common ally that had a clear effect in changing their position," the politician, who was involved in talks with Iran, told MEE.

"The advice is to avoid provoking Trump at this stage as he is serious about his threats and because he is desperate and will not hesitate to do a reckless act that will cost everyone dearly, the politician added.

'All signs indicate that the British were the ones who played an influential role this time'

- Shia politician

"Any military action inside Iraq now means the downfall of the Iraqi government. Iran itself will not be able to deal with the consequences of the fall of the government, especially the consequences of a political, financial and economic nature.

That so-called common ally is Britain, a country believed by Shia leaders to be the real player in the Iraqi arena at present, and credited with persuading the Iranians to avoid provoking the Americans and follow the option of appeasement.

"No clear information is available, but all signs indicate that the British were the ones who played an influential role this time, although they did not appear in the picture as usual, the politician said.

"They have communication channels with all parties, including the armed factions, and they have been negotiating for a long time with the factions, specifically Kataeb Hezbollah, with the aim of stopping the attacks.

MEE has asked the UKs Foreign Office for comment, but received none by the time of publication.

Irans volte-face coincided with a series of meetings, both open and surreptitious, held by UN Special Representative to Iraq Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert with commanders of Iran-backed armed factions.

The last of which, with Kataeb Hezbollah leader and Popular Mobilisation Authority (PMA) chief of staff Abdulaziz al-Muhammadawi "Abu Fadak" earlier this month, prompted observers to link these meetings with the truce declared last week.

However, the truth is that Hennis-Plasschaert failed to reach any result in these meetings, commanders told MEE.

How Iraq's Kadhimi used Iran visit to stake a claim for sovereignty

Abu Fadak refused to meet with Hennis-Plasschaert three times, only eventually relenting at the request of Kadhimi, two of the commanders close to the Kataeb Hezbollah leader told MEE.

"Hennis-Plasschaert had nothing to do with the announced truce, despite her meeting with Abu Fadak focusing on the attacks against US interests in Iraq, a prominent PMA commander close to Abu Fadak and familiar with the talks told MEE.

She asked Abu Fadak to intervene, but he refused. He said that he cannot be a mediator between the factions and the Americans.

The commander said the US made a great mistake when it killed Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and Kataeb Hezbollah co-founder Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in a drone strike on Baghdad airport in January. The pair were the two most important people responsible for preserving the balance in Iraq, and could have stopped these attacks with a word, he said.

"The Americans are the ones who started this mess, and they have the power to end it by leaving Iraq. The solution is for the Americans to leave within a reasonable time limit, not three years as they are requested, the commander added.

"Abu Fadak offered the Americans a withdrawal time limit of two to three months, guaranteeing them full protection and assistance in transporting their equipment, machinery and personnel to Kuwait if they agree.

Hennis-Plasschaert was subjected to widespread criticism in Iraq for meeting Abu Fadek, accused of implicitly recognising his power and influence. But her mission was not, in fact, a complete failure.

The UN envoys dialogues are credited by some for providing a way out for the rest of the factions to agree to the ceasefire without seeming beholden to Iran.

"[Hennis-]Plasschaert was the joker of the negotiations that led to the armistice between the factions and the American embassy, a commander of one of the factions involved in the attacks told MEE."She played the role of mediator and was the indirect channel of communication between the two parties

"She worked to find a middle area in which the two parties could meet. Therefore, it was decided to stop the attacks and calm the situation until negotiations mature, and then the time limit for withdrawal and truce will be determined."

The commander stressed that the UN and Hennis-Plasschaert provided the armed groups no guarantees, but the envoys mentality as a former Dutch defence minister has created a kind of understanding between us and her.

"At this stage we are confident that she will succeed in managing this file," he said.

The United Nations mission in Baghdad told MEE it had no comment at this stage regarding the allegations over Hennis-Plasschaerts negotiations.

Unusually, Khameneis order was not transmitted to the armed factions through regular channels or Iranian officials working on Iraq.

Instead, due to its importance, the commanders of the most prominent factions, including the Badr Organization, the oldest Iranian-backed Shia group in Iraq;Kataeb Hezbollah; and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the most powerful faction, were summoned to Qom to meet Khamenei, at least three of the factions leaders told MEE.

There was more than one meeting with Khamenei.

'Khamenei says that Kadhimi is Shia, regardless of whether he is bad or good from our point of view'

- Senior paramilitary commander

One was with Badr Organisation leader Hadi al-Amiri, and another with representatives of Kataeb Hezbollah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq, al-Nujaba and Iranian advisors, in addition to the person in charge of the Iraq file.

"The essence of the orders that were issued were to preserve power in the hands of the Shia. That is, to preserve the position of the prime minister and the current government, a senior commander of an Iranian-backed armed faction told MEE.

"Mr Khamenei says that Kadhimi is Shia, regardless of whether he is bad or good from our point of view, and he will eventually leave this position sooner or later. But the position must remain in the hands of the Shia.

The commander said Khamenei warned any attacks now could threaten Kadhimis rule, and therefore everyones political strategies.

Therefore, any activities that might threaten the Iraqi government or place it at the mercy of the Americans must be stopped immediately, he said.

This article is available in French on Middle East Eye French edition.

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EXCLUSIVE: Iran's Khamenei ordered end to Iraqi attacks on US interests - Middle East Eye

Migrant Channel crossing incidents

Persecuted for his beliefs, talented Iranian poet Zartosht found his life at risk and was forced to flee his country.

He and his son endured terror and violence as they travelled through Europe, just wanting to survive.

Living in the Calais Jungle, Zartosht dreamed of taking his son to Britain. But high prices charged by people smugglers meant they had to split up.

Every second of the 13-hour journey across the English Channel, Zartosht was terrified he and the 14 other people in the dinghy would fall out and drown.

Humanitarian charity Freedom from Torture said refugees like Zartosht and likely those who died on Tuesday make dangerous journeys with their children because they have no other choice.

He is now reunited with his son in the UK and is receiving psychotherapy from Freedom from Torture after being tortured in an Iranian prison.

As large numbers of migrants continue to attempt the crossing sometimes with fatal consequences he volunteered to speak to the PA news agency about his experiences.

He spoke through an interpreter and chose the name Zartosht after a 13th-century Persian poet to be used in place of his real name to protect his identity.

Growing up in Iran, Zartosht came from a big family.

After his brother was killed in the Iran-Iraq war, Zartosht, aged just 14, and some of his friends went to fight on the front line.

We were firing artillery and one of the shells was stuck in the barrel and we tried to release it and it exploded. Quite of few of us got killed, he said.

As he recovered from his injuries Zartosht started writing poetry.

He wrote about falling in love, but some of his work became political about the regime.

Zartosht recalled one day sitting in a park with his girlfriend when police pulled up and arrested them.

He was sentenced to 50 lashes, which he says was the punishment for being caught outside with somebody.

He continued with his creative work, writing about the origins of Islam in Iran.

Somebody just got a whiff of my poetry and they reported me before I knew it I was arrested, he said.

They just put a bag over my head shoved me into the back of a car and took me somewhere, nobody knew anything about it.

Zartosht was disappeared and held in a prison for four years before he was eventually released thrown out on the street outside the city.

For a few months he moved back in with his wife and son. But soon police came for him again.

They raided my house trying to arrest me again.

My son was at home, he rang me up and said: Dad, dont come here, run away.

Zartosht felt he had no choice but to flee. He was smuggled into Turkey where he was eventually joined by his 10-year-old son and the pair worked in a clothes factory trying to make enough money to survive and get them to Europe.

One night he heard a 17-year-old girl screaming for help and stepped in to rescue her from two men who were attacking her.

She told them she also wanted to get to Greece and her fiance paid for Zartosht and his sons travel in return for escorting her there safely.

When Zartosht and his son arrived in Greece, they spent 15 days in a detention centre before being sent to a migrant camp in Athens.

Zartosht said the camp was violent and there was little support. He was regularly beaten up and said he was stabbed at least once.

Eventually he and his son were given Greek documents which permitted them to travel through Europe.

They decided to travel to France and went to live in the Calais Jungle where things were better though he still had little money.

He was told that smugglers could get his son to Britain in a lorry for about 500 euros and he agreed, intending to follow as soon as he could afford it.

But one day Zartosht got back from the food queue to find his son gone and discovered that he had been put on a boat with 15 others and told to cross the Channel.

I was worried sick. For 10 days I just couldnt stop crying, he said.

I was alone and tearful.

He worked until he got enough money together to make the crossing himself and paid the fee.

Zartosht described how he was forced aboard a dinghy boat with 14 others by a smuggler.

They pulled a gun on me and said: You either get in the boat or you lose your money and your life.

Among those on the boat with him were three women, a child and an old man.

During the terrifying 13-hour crossing, they were buffeted by waves and left floating at sea, not knowing where they were.

Eventually a French patrol boat made contact and told them they would have to return to France. But after pleading with them, eventually a UK Border Force boat approached.

As they were taken aboard, the weather got even worse. Zartosht said that if they had not been picked up they would have all drowned in the storm.

Everybody was crying with joy that they were safe and that somebody had picked them up, he said.

He was taken ashore in Dover and then on to a detention centre the next day.

About eight days later, he was reunited with his son. The pair have been housed in Birmingham while they wait for their asylum application to be processed.

He said he absolutely adores their new home because the UK is such a green country.

Most importantly, Zartosht said, his son has a place at college and is settled in.

He himself has filled a 200-page notepad with stories.

He now awaits a decision on their asylum applications, a process which he said is unbearably stressful and which he thinks should be made simpler.

Sonya Sceats, CEO of Freedom from Torture, said: We have repeatedly called for safe and legal routes for people to access asylum in the UK and prevent these senseless tragedies.

Instead, Home Secretary Priti Patel has spent the summer whipping up hysteria about the Channel and painting these vulnerable people as invading foreigners, for political ends.

These tragedies will happen again and again unless we listen to the desperate stories of people like Zartosht and uphold our moral and legal duties.

Read more:
'They pulled a gun on me': Iranian poet recalls harrowing journey to the UK - shropshirestar.com

Forty years ago, a major war between Iran and Iraq set the stage for far-reaching and lasting regional dynamics. The conflict which began in September 1980 when Saddam Hussein invaded Iran, and ended in a stalemate in 1988 was the nascent Islamic Republics first major military test. It was an existential battle for the Iranian leadership, coming just one year after the 1979 revolution in Iran. The war claimed at least one million lives.

The legacies of the war are numerous. In the decades since, Iran has developed a marked capacity to mobilize Shiite communities across the region, penetrating previously impervious political and ideological spaces, particularly in Iraq but also in Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Moreover, it was in Iraq, during the formative stages of the war, that the Islamic Republic first started to implement a proxy network, one that has expanded region-wide (particularly in Syria and Yemen) in recent years. Finally, in shaping the political and foreign policy outlook of todays leadership in Iran and in Gulf Arab states, the war additionally sowed the seeds for current geopolitical rivalries that have hampered efforts to secure durable regional peace.

A key dynamic during the war and one that would continue in the decades afterward was Irans mobilization of Iraqi Shiite opposition groups. Tehran extended its support to other opposition groups, like the Kurds, but it was particularly focused on spurring a Shiite insurgency campaign within Iraq, encouraging mass defections from the Iraqi military, and trying to trigger an uprising among the majority-Shiite population. That was to no avail. Revolutionary fervor in Iran was instrumental to Tehrans ability to push back against an enemy that had superior technological capabilities and a plethora of backers, including the U.S., its allies in the West, and the Gulf Arab states but it could not inspire a similar response in Iraq.

The opposition groups and fighters Iran backed were immensely divided and lacked battlefield experience or discipline. The international community labeled them fundamentalist Shiite Islamist terrorists, and the Baath regime had an impressive capacity to repress and co-opt, as well as insulate its armed forces from mass defections.

The vast majority of Shiite personnel within the Iraqi army along with Sunnis fought loyally during the war. This was not out of loyalty to the regime, necessarily, but to prevent Iraq from becoming colonized by Iran or from following in its theocratic footsteps. Iran-aligned Shiite opposition groups, for their part, emphasized in their publications that colonization would not happen, and they framed the war not as a religious campaign but a campaign to overthrow the Tikriti gang (a reference to Saddam Husseins hometown and that of many of his closest confidantes and subordinates).

As I have detailed elsewhere, Iraqs Shiites failed to emulate their revolutionary counterparts in Iran and rise up against the Baath regime. In his book The Shiite Movement in Iraq, the late Iraqi sociologist Faleh Abdul-Jabar argued that such opposition movements failed because they did not sufficiently nationalize their cause. Iraqs Shiite Islamist movements were forced into exile and integrated into the Iranian war effort, appearing internationalist with a national sidetrack to audiences back home; for Irans Islamic leaders, the focus was the reverse. As Abdul-Jabar contended, this isolated Iraqs Shiite opposition groups from the mainstream of Iraqi patriotism, which emerged during the Iraq-Iran war and was embraced by the majority of the Shiis who fought Iran.

Despite the best efforts of Iran and its Iraqi partners who even recruited and mobilized Iraqi military defectors and prisoners of war to establish the Badr Brigade militia they did not come remotely close to overthrowing the Baath regime. They were outmatched by Saddams multi-faceted strategy of appeasing and punishing the Shiite community. A charm offensive by the regime included refurbishing and allocating large sums to the holy shrine cities. Saddam stressed the Arab identity of Shiism. He deployed Shiite symbolism throughout the war effort, claiming to be a descendant of Imam Ali and the Prophet Muhammad. Saddam even made Imam Alis birthday an Iraqi national holiday. Indeed, Saddam cunningly became more Shiite as war with Iran continued.

In other words, it has taken some time, failure, and painful lessons for Iran to command the proxy network that it does today. From Tehrans perspective, this has been essential to ensuring that Irans international isolation felt acutely during the war would not become an existential issue again. While Irans nuclear ambitions may yet be curtailed, its vast armed proxy network is perhaps its single most important defense and deterrence capability, and arguably the most transformational legacy of the war. This network, overseen by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has been central to the Islamic Republics ability to contain, deter, or eliminate its external rivals.

It was during the Iran-Iraq war that Iran established its single most important foreign legion: Lebanons Hezbollah. Since its creation in 1982, Hezbollah has achieved a supra-state status in Lebanon, superseding state institutions. It has also become indispensable to Irans expansionist ambitions and critical to Tehrans ability to mobilize, establish, and train militia groups across the region. Hezbollah has itself established affiliates across the region in the years since, with reverberations across conflict theaters. Hezbollah has outgrown its sponsor in this respect.

In Iraq, the Badr Brigade is currently Iraqs most powerful paramilitary force: It controls the Interior Ministry and has wide-ranging influence across Iraqs institutions. It dominates the 100,000-plus Popular Mobilization Force, and has extended its reach into Syria to help prop up Bashar Assads regime. The organization developed its abilities on the battlefield, its capacity to recruit willing fighters, and its ability to subvert state institutions during the war with Iraq. Hezbollah and the Badr Brigade would not be what they are today were it not for the painful experiences, lessons, and losses of the Iran-Iraq war.

The war shaped the outlook of many of Irans current decisionmakers. Its supreme leader today, Ayatollah Khamenei, was Irans president at the time. Its president today, Hassan Rouhani, was then the commander-in-chief of Irans Air Defense. The leadership of the current IRGC Irans most powerful military force, and an entity that Khamenei helped form made their names during the war. This includes the former head of its elite Quds force, Qassem Soleimani, who spearheaded Irans vast network of proxies over the past two decades, until his assassination by the U.S. in January. More broadly, the war helped solidify the foundational myth of the Islamic Republic. In the aftermath of a revolution that was driven by disparate political forces, the conflict enhanced the new regimes ability to consolidate its hold on power.

Today, Iranian leaders continue to stress how internationally isolated Iran was in the aftermath of its revolution, left on its own as a nascent government to confront Iraqs tanks and chemical weapons and U.S. and Western support for Saddam. Incidents like the mistaken 1988 U.S. downing of an Iran Air flight, which killed almost 300 innocent Iranians, reinforced the notion that the Islamic Republic had no allies and that the West was bent on Irans demise. From Tehrans perspective, this legacy of isolation necessitates its pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and, of course, its continued deployment of proxy groups outside of its borders.

The emergence of a Shiite theocracy in Iran and the subsequent eight-year war created regional peace and security contours that shape contestations in the region today. For instance, Tehran instructed its proxies to carry out what were the first major contemporary suicide terrorist attacks, including the 1981 bombing of the Iraqi embassy in Beirut and Hezbollahs attack on the American Marine barracks in Lebanon. In 1983, members of Iraqs Islamic Dawa Party which was Iraqs ruling party from 2006 to 2018 carried out suicide terrorist attacks in Kuwait, targeting the U.S. and French embassies, and was complicit in a series of other high-profile attacks in the region. Iranian proxies and Shiite Islamist groups were thus among the early adopters of suicide bombs, which since became a standard tool of warfare by jihadi movements.

Thus, Iran took the war to the Gulf Arab states, calling on their Shiite populations to rise up against their governments. Gulf monarchies, in turn, came to see Irans new leadership as an existential threat, which in turn prompted Saudi Arabia to unleash its own proselytizing brand of fundamental Sunni Islam and support for groups that could mount a pushback against Irans encroachment. The Gulf monarchies have since increasingly viewed their relationship with Tehran through the prism of their own restive Shiite communities, communities that have long-standing political, socio-cultural, and religious ties to Shiite centers of power and influence elsewhere in the region. These action-reaction dynamics are a key part of why the contemporary Middle East is divided and why achieving lasting stability in the region has so far proved insurmountable.

Today, the strategic calculus in many regional capitals is rooted in these historical episodes of conflict and tumult, which has diminished the prospects of a durable peace. After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, it was precisely the legacies, lessons, and a sense of unfinished business that contributed to the multitude of sectarian conflicts. The ongoing battle for Iraqs political order has pitted those Shiite Islamist political actors who were backed or established by Iran during the war against Arab Sunni actors with long-standing relations with the Arab Gulf.

Saddam Hussein and others in Baghdad saw an invasion of Iran as a historic opportunity to transform Iraqs regional standing, making it the true pan-Arab power it had longed to become, as Baath regime records captured by the U.S. after the 2003 invasion indicate. Yet, for Iraq and its Baath regime, the war and its second-order effects had a cumulative, harmful impact. In the decades since, Iraq and its people have experienced bankruptcy, destitution, and more conflict.

As the unfinished business of the war continues to play out, the proxy problem is a key area to watch. Iran started this approach during the war, learned lessons from its failure then, and quickly proved able to successfully promote proxies elsewhere. The reverberations of that approach and of its devastating consequences are central to the challenges facing the Middle East now.

Read more here:
How the Iran-Iraq war will shape the region for decades to come - Brookings Institution

"You don't see the terror the way you used to see the terror," Trump said.

The Trump administration has tried to reimpose more sanctions on the Islamic Republic since its withdrawal from the nuclear deal. Trump told Limbaugh he would be able to renegotiate a deal blocking the country's nuclear program within a year if he gets reelected.

Trump claimed during the show that Iran is "dying to have me lose." A number of reports have revealed Iran, China and Russia are vying to influence the presidential election. Bill Evanina, director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, announced in August that China and Iran were working to undermine Trump's reelection efforts, while Russia was continuing to bolster the president's support.

Microsoft also disclosed last month that Russian and Iranian hackers were targeting hundreds of organizations and actors involved in the presidential race, including both Trump and Democrat Joe Biden's campaigns. And the State Department warned in April that China, Russia and Iran were targeting the U.S. with disinformation related to the coronavirus pandemic.

Russian interference has become a persistent pain point for Trump since his first election efforts in 2016. He has balked at the notion that Russia favored his election, and Trump and his allies have repeatedly tried to shift attention toward other malign actors, such as China and Iran.

Trump's lengthy interview with Limbaugh comes as he reemerges in public appearances since being hospitalized for the coronavirus last weekend. Trump also had lively phone interviews with Fox Business Maria Bartiromo and Fox News' Sean Hannity on Thursday. He's slated to have an on-air interview on Fox News Friday night.

Continued here:
Trump drops the F-bomb on Iran - POLITICO

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Over the past few months, Iran has been working with China on a sweeping long-term political, economic, and security agreement that would facilitate hundreds of billions of dollars of investments in the Iranian economy. It is also pursuing a long-term partnership with Russia. Politicians in Tehran see the agreements as a necessary means of combating U.S. hegemony and hostility.

Irans new policy of a Pivot to the East involves cultivating strong economic, political, military, and security ties with the giants of the Asian continent, namely, China and Russia. This policy has gained all the more credibility among Iranian officials after the United States ill-advised move to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA, colloquially known as the Iran nuclear deal) and pursue a maximum pressure strategy.

The JCPOA was an international agreement between Iran and world powers endorsed by the U.N. Security Council in Resolution 2231. But while the Iranians fully implemented the deal, the United States withdrew from it under the Trump administration and the European Union subsequently failed to fulfill its responsibilities under the agreement. The upshot of the U.S. withdrawal and European complacency was a revival of sanctions at a pace and intensity unprecedented over the past 40 years. This has emboldened Irans long-debated strategy of adopting a Look East foreign policy, as the JCPOA experience convinced the Iranians that no matter how much goodwill is demonstrated, the West is both unreliable and untrustworthy.

Meanwhile, Iran has found willing partners to its east. Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing are opposed to U.S. military and interventionist policies in the Middle East and seek to eliminate the supremacy of the U.S. dollar looming over the world economy. Although it is not clear whether the three capitals have reached a consensus on a trilateral comprehensive alliance, they are examining serious steps in this direction. Three capitals participated in a four-day joint military exercise in the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Oman in 2019. In July, Irans Foreign Minister Javad Zarif visited Moscow to extend a 20-year cooperation agreement with Russia. In 2016, China agreed to raise the level of ChinaIran bilateral trade to $600 billion in 10 years, although that goal will be almost impossible to meet now. A comprehensive strategic deal is currently under negotiations.

Get briefed on the story of the week, and developing stories to watch across the Asia-Pacific.

Iran and China have similar interests in the domain of energy diplomacy. Securing sustainable sources of energy such as oil and gas is vital to Chinas economic growth and Iran can be a steady supplier. While major Arab oil-producing countries are aligned with the United States, Iran is not under U.S. influence. On the other hand, Washingtons maximum pressure approach has brought Irans oil exports close to zero barrels a day. Exporting oil to China will thus serve Irans interests. For its part, Russia has long been the dominant supplier of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to Europe, but its position in terms of exports has been challenged by the United States. Therefore, the mutual reliance of the three capitals on energy where they all face challenges from Washington is a fact that cannot be denied.

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Iran is a regional power in the Middle East and has founded its foreign policy on the basis of resisting U.S. hegemony. But in the process of resisting numerous forces of U.S. pressure, its economy has suffered from a lack of opportunities that would have otherwise been made available to it opportunities worth hundreds of billions of dollars. Iran has paid the price for its resistance strategy. Now Tehran presents itself as a unique opportunity for countries like China and Russia to build long-term alliances. Irans defeat will be counted as the victory of the United States and its regional allies, and in return, Irans success could be a determining factor in a U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East once and for all. Already, following the U.S. failure in wars on Afghanistan and Iraq and partnership with Saudi Arabia in attacking Yemen, it has become clear that the United States is no longer the dominant superpower in the Middle East. The traditional allies of the U.S. are in profound crises and their positions are particularly weakened. There is a vacuum of power in the Middle East that needs to be redressed.

Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing too have common strategic and long-term interests to contain the U.S. unilateralism, and this is one of the important factors in determining the future of the Middle East. There is a ripe opportunity here, as the Trump administrations unilateralist policy and its withdrawal from international treaties (including but not limited to the JCPOA) have all seriously called into question the legitimacy and the credibility of the United States as a world power. Many countries around the world are now considering China as the future successor to the United States in world leadership. For example, even amid souring China-Europe ties, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said the European Union has a great strategic interest in maintaining cooperation withChina. We Europeans will need to recognize the decisiveness with which China will claima leadingposition in the existing structures of the international architecture, Merkel said.

Amid all these considerations, steps continue toward Tehran-Beijing-Moscow alignment. Russia and China rejected the U.S. attempt to extend a U.N. arms embargo on Iran that is set to expire later in October 2020 according to the terms of the 2015 nuclear deal. While its unclear to what extent Russia and China will work to boost the Iranian military, Tehran remains the only option for Moscow and Beijing to balance their arms sales in the region with the Wests. The United States is the top arms supplier to 13 of the 19 countries of the Middle East, supplying nearly half of the regions arms; Europe follows with over 20 percent while Russia and Chinas share combined is about 20 percent.

In short, the United States coercive policies on Iran, Russia, and China will remain the main obstacle for the trilateral strategic alliance. However, the destiny of such a strategic agreement will be an important consideration in future international relations. Iran possesses the worlds second largest natural gas reserves and the fourth largest oil reserves, which position it as a significant weight in the strategic calculations that the Eurasian powers make in their foreign policy toward the Middle East. By strategic engagement with Iran, Beijing and Moscow would have a unique opportunity to reorient both Iran and its regional rivals toward the China-Russia Eurasian architecture.

Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian is Middle East Security and Nuclear Policy Specialist at Princeton University, Associate Professor at the University of Kashan, and a former spokesman for Irans nuclear negotiators. His bookIran and the United States: An Insiders View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace was released in May 2014. His latest book, A Middle East Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction: A New Approach to Nonproliferation, was published by Routledge in April 2020.

Continued here:
Iran's New Doctrine: Pivot to the East - The Diplomat