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History is littered, the British writer and politician Enoch Powell said, with the wars which everybody knew would never happen.

A full-blown conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Israel once seemed implausible. But last month, the long-running shadow war between the two nations burst into the open in a series of unprecedented drone and missile strikes, raising the specter of a fight that would contain enough advanced technology, paramilitary forces and mutual acrimony to incinerate large parts of the Middle East, collapse the global economy and entangle the United States and other major powers.

Now the two sides appear to have hit pause, but for how long? As long as Iran is ruled by an Islamist government that puts its revolutionary ideology before the national interest, the two countries will never know peace, and the Middle East will never know meaningful stability.

Iran and Israel are not natural adversaries. In contrast to other modern conflicts between Israel and Palestine, Russia and Ukraine, China and Taiwan Iran and Israel have no bilateral land or resource disputes. Their national strengths Iran is an energy titan and Israel is a tech innovator are more complementary than competitive. The nations also have a historical affinity dating back over 2,500 years, when the Persian King Cyrus the Great freed the Jews from the Babylonian Captivity. Iran was the second Muslim nation, after Turkey, to recognize Israel after its founding in 1948.

Their modern animosity is best understood through the lens of ideology, not geopolitics. It began with the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the dogmatic Shiite cleric who led the 1979 revolution that transformed Iran from a U.S.-allied monarchy into an anti-American theocracy. Khomeinis 1970 treatise Islamic Government, which became the basis of the constitution that governs the Islamic Republic, is laced with tirades and threats against wretched and satanic Jews. Then, as now, antisemitism often lurked below the surface of anti-imperialism.

We must protest and make the people aware that the Jews and their foreign backers are opposed to the very foundations of Islam and wish to establish Jewish domination throughout the world, Khomeini wrote. Since they are a cunning and resourceful group of people, I fear that God forbid they may one day achieve their goal and that the apathy shown by some of us may allow a Jew to rule over us one day.

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Opinion | Iran and Israel Werent Always Enemies - The New York Times

In the shadow of the Gaza conflict, armed groups aligned with Iran have stepped up a campaign aimed at pushing the U.S. to end its military deployments in Iraq and Syria. After mounting a series of direct attacks on U.S. bases in south-eastern Syria, which prompted a wave of retaliatory strikes, Iran shifted its focus to loosening the already shaky hold of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which are allied with Washington, on lands east of the Euphrates River. Portraying the SDF as an occupying army aligned with a foreign power in a region predominantly inhabited by Arab tribes, Iran has been able to rally local groups to perpetrate attacks on this U.S.-backed force. While both Iran and the U.S. seem keen to avoid a wider escalation of regional conflict, the situation in eastern Syria is likely to remain volatile, at least until Israel and Hamas reach a ceasefire in Gaza. Pressing for an end to that conflict and, in the meantime, pushing the SDF to build bridges with alienated Syrian communities are ways for Washington to help defuse tensions in the region.

On 18 October 2023, a day after hundreds of people were killed at the al-Ahli Arab hospital in Gaza in an explosion that Arab media overwhelmingly blamed on Israel but for which Israel denied responsibility, drones and missiles were launched at U.S. military bases at al-Tanf and the Conoco gas field, both in eastern Syria. The Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an alliance of Iran-aligned formations that includes Kataib Hizbollah, Harakat al-Nujaba and Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, claimed responsibility for the attacks, which they labelled revenge for Gaza.

Part of the Hashd al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilisation), an amalgam of Iraqi militias that assembled in 2014 to fight the Islamic State, or ISIS, and were integrated into the Iraqi security apparatus in 2016, these armed groups now also operate in Syria. Working outside the Iraqi state structure with the support of Irans Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, they are stationed in government-controlled areas west of the Euphrates alongside other Iran-aligned groups. For nearly a year until the 18 October barrage these groups had not struck U.S. troops, instead observing a unilateral ceasefire they had declared in support of the newly formed Iraqi government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shiaa Sudani. The October strikes were also the first shots of some 150 they would take at U.S. assets in Syria and Iraq by the end of January 2024.

The U.S. bases air defence systems fended off nearly all the attacks, which caused injuries but no fatalities among U.S. forces. Retaliation was slow in coming, but in November and December the U.S. started hitting the armed groups in question in Iraqi cities and near government facilities. Strikes on Iranian-backed groups in eastern Syria and the killing of a senior Revolutionary Guards commander in Damascus in late December, both unclaimed but attributed to Israel, turned up the heat.

Worse was to come for U.S. forces in the area. A drone attack on 28 January 2024 on Tower 22, a U.S. base in Jordan near Rukban that provides support for U.S. military operations across the border in Syria, killed three U.S. soldiers and injured 40. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. U.S. officials stated that the bases air defence system mistook the incoming drone for a U.S. device returning from a mission and therefore failed to intercept it. Since it was the first attack ever by Iran-backed groups on U.S. forces in Jordan, which has long been free of the violence characterising the Syrian and Iraqi theatres of conflict, the strike in itself marked a clear provocation. Sources in the group claim that it did not anticipate killing U.S. soldiers at Tower 22, expecting that the bases air defences would take down the drone, as had happened many times before. But by claiming U.S. lives, even if that was not the expected outcome, the attack crossed a threshold that made a forceful U.S. response all but a foregone conclusion.

The Iran-affiliated armed groups were clearly aware they had overstepped their bounds. They promptly evacuated bases in eastern Syria and western Iraq. Esmail Qaani, commander of the Revolutionary Guards elite Qods force, reportedly arrived in Baghdad within hours to tell the Iraqi groups to de-escalate, apparently concerned that the U.S. might retaliate against Iran directly. On 30 January, Kataib Hizbollah issued a statement announcing it would suspend attacks on U.S. troops. Other groups, such as Harakat al-Nujaba, vowed to continue their campaign but nevertheless scaled down their attacks significantly.

In an initial response on 3 February, the U.S. attacked 85 locations in Syria and Iraq. Revolutionary Guards commanders and affiliated militia members had had nearly a week to evacuate, so many of the ammunition and weapons warehouses the U.S. hit were reportedly empty, but the combined death toll still reached 51. The 34 fatalities in Syria included members of Syrian, Lebanese, Iraqi, Afghan and Pakistani groups linked to Iran. The strikes in Iraq killed sixteen Hashd members unaffiliated with the Iran-backed groups, as well as a civilian. In a second response on 7 February, a U.S. drone strike in Baghdad killed senior Kataib Hizbollah commander Abu Baqir al-Saadi. In the aftermath of these retaliatory strikes, the Iraqi armed groups continued to harass U.S. positions in Syria, albeit with lesser frequency and training their sights more on bases near the gas and oil fields in the east. On 25 February, Harakat al-Nujaba announced a temporary suspension of hostilities against U.S. forces, vowing to continue attacks on the U.S. until the end of the Gaza war. After a 30-day halt, Iraqi groups resumed only sporadic attacks on U.S. bases in eastern Syria.

The Tower 22 attack marked an inflection point, with Iran and its Iraqi allies seemingly opting to dial back the intensity and scope of direct attacks on U.S. troops in its aftermath to avoid a wider escalation that could jeopardise their long-term interests. That said, the influx of weapons and fighters into eastern Syria has continued. Since the end of January, the Iran-backed groups have shifted their focus: rather than solely attacking the U.S. military, they have rallied Arab tribal militias against the SDF as a way to weaken the latters hold on local power while bolstering their own position in eastern Syria. This strategy has involved a growing division of labour. Those Iran-backed groups composed of fighters from outside Syria have targeted U.S. bases, while Arab tribal militias based in government-held areas and backed by the Revolutionary Guards and the Syrian government have stepped up attacks on the SDF. During February and March, these tribal militias fired rocket-propelled grenades at SDF positions along the Euphrates and attempted incursions into territory held by the group on a near-daily basis.

Targeting the SDF has a clear strategic logic: keeping the conflict local, thus posing limited risk of U.S. retaliation. (After a drone attack by Iraqi groups near the U.S. base at the Omar oil field on 5 February killed seven SDF members, the U.S. refrained from escalating.) The Arab militias oppose the Kurdish-dominated SDFs rule over large parts of eastern Syria and have branches extending deep into SDF-controlled territory, where their kin say they are suffering under Kurdish rule. Mistrust of SDF governance is prevalent among Arab communities in these areas, which believe that the group gives Kurds preferential political and economic treatment. Arabs also resent the SDFs compulsory recruitment practices, adding to the sources of discontent that have allowed the Syrian government and Iran to make inroads in these communities.

Targeting the SDF has a clear strategic logic: keeping the conflict local, thus posing limited risk of U.S. retaliation.

Iran-backed groups and the Syrian government brand the SDF an occupying army aligned with a foreign power in a bid to boost recruitment of fighters from among the tribal groups. U.S. support for Israel in the Gaza war has provided additional fodder for their enlistment campaign. Many Arabs in eastern Syria are wary of non-Arab Iran, which they suspect of having an intent to convert the locals, who are mostly Sunni Muslims, to Shiism. But for the time being, a shared sense of outrage over Gaza and Muslim solidarity has superseded these doubts.

Iran has focused its recruitment efforts on the vicinity of Khasham, a town east of Deir al-Zor, the only government-controlled area on the eastern bank of the Euphrates. By raising a loyal militia, Tehran seems to hope to secure a river crossing to facilitate lucrative smuggling and infiltration into SDF-held areas near the Conoco gas field and the U.S. base there. In November, Iran-backed groups opened recruitment offices in this area, offering monthly salaries of 1.5 million Syrian pounds ($107 at the black-market rate), twice the amount paid to Iran-backed militia fighters elsewhere in Syria, and closer to the two million pounds ($143) the SDF gives its recruits. Tribal fighters receive training at Revolutionary Guards bases in al-Bukamal and al-Mayadeen, and are equipped with light and medium weapons, including rocket-propelled grenade launchers and DShK machine guns.

Adding to the SDFs predicament is the fact that a third regional power Trkiye is bent on destroying it, viewing the group as an arm of the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, which Trkiye, the U.S., the EU and some other states consider a terrorist organisation. Trkiye has targeted critical infrastructure in SDF-held areas in northern and north-eastern Syria in three distinct waves of intense shelling in October, December and January in response to PKK attacks on the Turkish army in northern Iraq. Its heavy bombardment has disrupted water and electricity provision, and reduced oil and gas production, which is the main source of income for the SDF-dominated Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria. An all-out Turkish invasion aimed at defeating the SDF would likely trigger mass civilian displacement, especially of Syrian Kurds.

While the wave of Iran-backed militia attacks on U.S. bases since October is a response to Israels war in Gaza, they appear aimed at achieving three complementary strategic objectives for Tehran. First, they raise the political and strategic cost that Washington incurs by keeping U.S. troops deployed in Iraq and Syria, which it officially justifies as part of the continuing campaign against ISIS; they thereby serve Irans long-term goal of rolling back the U.S. presence in both countries. Iran seeks to achieve this objective by wearing down U.S. forces, with a view both to inciting U.S. politicians to call for troop withdrawal and to shaping the Iraqi domestic debate.

Iran seeks to achieve this objective by wearing down U.S. forces, with a view both to inciting U.S. politicians to call for troop withdrawal and to shaping the Iraqi domestic debate.

Admittedly, in their immediate aftermath, the attacks seem to have had the opposite effect: in mid-January, the U.S. sent 1,500 additional troops to both countries, reinforcing the 2,500 it already had in Iraq and the 900 stationed in Syria. But over time the tit-for-tat cycle in the Iraqi and Syrian theatres could erode U.S. support for future deployments, even as Iran holds the campaign at a level that does not expose it or its Iraqi allies to serious retaliation. Political debate in Washington could play a key role in this respect. Even limited additional harm to U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria could bring Congressional scrutiny of the domestic legal authority and rationale for their continued deployment, a scenario that the White House clearly wants to avoid, particularly in an election year. During his term in office, Donald Trump, the Republican challenger to President Joe Biden, ordered and then partly walked back a U.S. withdrawal from Syria. He may well seek to exploit casualties in Syria to lambast the Biden administrations Middle East policies, despite the likelihood that he would face resistance to this position from within his own party.

Tehrans primary means of compelling a U.S. withdrawal, however, is through shaping the political debate in Iraq. The U.S. counterstrikes on Iran-aligned Hashd groups have embarrassed the Sudani government, under whose command they nominally fall since they form part of the Iraqi security structure. They threaten to disrupt the delicate balancing act of a prime minister who has tried to placate the armed groups pushing for an expedited U.S. departure at the same time as working to mollify other constituencies, like the Kurds, Sunni Arabs and some Shiites, who fear an even greater Iranian presence in the event that the U.S. leaves abruptly.

Pressured by Iran-aligned parties, on whose support it depends, the Sudani government has moved forward with attempts to terminate the mandate of the U.S.-led anti-ISIS coalition in Iraq. These efforts intensified after U.S. retaliatory attacks extended beyond strikes on pro-Iranian armed groups to targets closer to the government. U.S. drones hit Hilla city on 26 December and Baghdad on 4 January, causing casualties not only among these groups, but also in the Hashd and federal police forces. The government, which until then had defended the partnership with the U.S., condemned it for violating Iraqi sovereignty and launched talks with the Biden administration to phase out the international coalition. If its slow-moving efforts, which neither side appears keen to accelerate, succeed, they could also undermine the international legal basis for the presence of U.S. troops in Syria, since the principal U.S. justification for military operations there is the defence of Iraq from ISIS.

Irans second strategic objective is to expand its own footprint in eastern Syria, which it uses as a gateway to the Levant, funnelling arms to Hizbollah in Lebanon as a means of deterring Israel. Its main goal in this regard would be U.S. withdrawal from al-Tanf, which sits on a major highway between Iraq and Syria and represents a significant obstacle to Iranian power projection. While the al-Tanf base does not block Iranian movement of troops and materiel across Syria as such, the base and its surrounding 55km deconfliction zone prohibits the entry of U.S. opponents and counters Irans ability to establish a permanent presence that connects its strategic hubs in eastern Syria with those in the south of the country.

Irans third strategic objective is to rehabilitate the Syrian government. To this end, it seeks to destabilise SDF rule in northern and eastern Syria. Co-opting Arab tribes, particularly in areas with major oil and gas deposits, may allow Iran to build up a support base that could enable Syrian government forces, in the event of a U.S. withdrawal, to retake the most valuable part of eastern Syria without a fight.

At the same time, the latest round of violence in eastern Syria has exposed the limits to what Iran can do there. It has highlighted the absence of a capable local proxy force comparable to its allies in Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen. To compensate for this limitation, it has relied on a division of labour between foreign and local groups to do its bidding, but this approach has seen only partial success. Tehran has been able to stir up Syrian Arab militias against the SDF, and these groups have served to undermine the already tenuous control and legitimacy of the Kurdish-led administration in a resource-rich and predominantly Arab tribal region, while wearing down the SDFs forces with skirmishes across the Euphrates. But these militias still lack infrastructure, organisation and materiel, and the lack of ideological alignment between the militias and Iran also makes them unlikely candidates for a full-blown partnership like that of Iranian clients elsewhere.

To put pressure on the U.S., Iran still relies heavily on groups from outside Syria, particularly those belonging to the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. But this gambit is risky. Any serious escalation in eastern Syria involving these Iraqi groups risks U.S. retaliation on Iraqi soil, whereas relying on a Syrian proxy force to conduct attacks on U.S. bases would contain the conflict within Syrias borders. Worsening conflict could have serious knock-on effects on Irans partners and interests in Iraq, as well as jeopardise that countrys hard-won but fragile stability a scenario that interestingly is as unpalatable for Tehran as it is for Washington.

For the U.S., Irans pursuit of its strategic objectives could compromise its position in eastern Syria. Retaliation for the Tower 22 attack appears to have been partially successful in deterring attacks, as shown by the Iran-aligned armed groups decision to tone down attacks. The new status quo nevertheless remains precarious. The relative calm in the attacks aftermath yielded to alarm at the threat of a wider regional conflagration following Israels 1 April strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus, which prompted Irans first-ever direct attack on Israel on 13-14 April. Washington moved to de-escalate, helping reduce tensions once more. But events in Gaza, or intensified Israeli attacks on Iranian assets in Syria, could trigger a new round of escalation in eastern Syria. Iran-aligned groups are primed to continue harassing U.S. troops in Syria in either eventuality, although possibly in ways that do not expose these groups and Iranian interests to violent retribution.

Iran-aligned groups are primed to continue harassing U.S. troops in Syria in either eventuality, although possibly in ways that do not expose these groups and Iranian interests to violent retribution.

Likewise, the tribal groups campaign against the SDF, which in contrast to attacks on U.S. troops carries little risk of retaliation for Iran, will almost certainly continue and may even accelerate. A progressively weaker SDF will leave U.S. bases in the most resource-rich areas of eastern Syria the oil and gas fields east of al-Mayadeen and Deir al-Zor in an increasingly hostile environment in which they would find their presence difficult to sustain.

There are things that could help lower the temperature in the area. Reaching a durable ceasefire in Gaza would almost certainly help slow the anti-U.S. momentum across the region that Iran and its allies are exploiting, as evidenced by Iran-backed groups cessation of hostilities during the temporary halt in hostilities in November. A truce would also improve the climate for negotiations over the U.S. presence in Iraq. But Washington would also be well advised to pay attention to the condition of the SDF, particularly in the triangle south of the M7 highway, which connects Deir al-Zor to Syrias northeast, with its significant hydrocarbon deposits. The U.S. should apply pressure on its partner to address the grievances of the local Arab population that have made some of its members vulnerable to co-optation by Iran. It may need to mediate between the Arabs and the SDF, as it did in September 2023, when it brokered an end to intense clashes triggered by the SDFs arrest of a tribal leader. Both the U.S. and the SDF should also give serious consideration to the areas future, and do some contingency planning. Despite the Biden administrations clear intent to maintain the U.S. military presence in Syria, U.S. politics remain unpredictable. A precipitous U.S. withdrawal would leave the SDF dangerously exposed to assault by Trkiye and/or the Syrian government, potentially initiating a new round of violence in Syrias volatile east.

Read more:
How Iran Seeks to Exploit the Gaza War in Syrias Volatile East - Crisis Group

Many Western leaders press allies and partners not to hit back hard when their enemies attack. After the foiled Iranian attack on Israel last month, for example, U.S. President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to take the win instead of retaliating. Ukraine has been similarly pressured by its Western supporters not to strike targets in Russiasuch as oil refinerieseven if their unobstructed functioning directly aids Russia on the battlefield. Restraint has become the Wests guiding strategic principle, seemingly preserving a modicum of international stability by keeping wars from escalating out of control.

Many Western leaders press allies and partners not to hit back hard when their enemies attack. After the foiled Iranian attack on Israel last month, for example, U.S. President Joe Biden told Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to take the win instead of retaliating. Ukraine has been similarly pressured by its Western supporters not to strike targets in Russiasuch as oil refinerieseven if their unobstructed functioning directly aids Russia on the battlefield. Restraint has become the Wests guiding strategic principle, seemingly preserving a modicum of international stability by keeping wars from escalating out of control.

Even if Israel and Ukraine dont heed them, such requests to practice restraint are dangerous. They incentivize the attacker to be more aggressive, not less. By conveying to Russia or Iranand by extension, Chinathat Western partners will be pressed to absorb the attack and fight a strictly defensive war on their own territory, Western policymakers achieve the opposite of what their risk aversion intends: They elevate the risk of a widening war. They are making aggression relatively cost-free for imperial powers, to be fought only on the attacked countrys land or thwarted by expensive defensive means. Paradoxically, restraining allies that have been attacked is destabilizing; the Western attempt to control escalation ultimately makes it more likely.

Take, for example, the recent case of Irans onslaught on Israel. Deterrence clearly failed as Iran directly attacked Israel for the first time using a substantial and layered package of missiles and drones. Iran chose to attack despite a standing Israeli policy to punish every attack on its territory and citizensand despite the effective denial technologies fielded by Israel. It was the largest drone and missile attack in recent history, more substantial than anything Russia has launched against Ukraine in a single night.

But whereas deterrence failed, Irans missiles and drones were almost completely intercepted by Israel with the aid of the United States, Britain, France, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Only a few missiles fell on two Israeli air bases, causing minimal damage; one civilian was wounded by shrapnel in the Negev desert. Such a failure should cause relief and be a source of celebration. After all, what could have been horrific devastation in Israel turned into an embarrassing turkey shoot for Iran. Punishment for such a failed attack, the argument goes, was not warranted: Defense was a success, the strategic interaction was over. Restraint ought to prevail.

Undoubtedly, the restraint advocated by many in the West is appealing. It may bestow a veneer of moral superiority to a country willing to suffer attacks without responding in kind. Tit-for-tat, after all, seems childish, and revenge even worse. In the case of a successful defense such as Israels interception of Irans missiles, retaliation may even look unnecessary.

But erecting the air defense necessary to deny such attacks comes at great cost, and the shield is not perfect. The resources necessary to develop, deploy, and operate a complex, multilayered defensive system capable of intercepting ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones are substantial. Irans attack probably cost it around $100 million, whereas the bill for Israels defense during that single night probably reached something in the $1 billion range. Israel is estimated to have incurred more than half of these costs, with most of the rest borne by the United States. The fiscal equation clearly favors the attacker.

Beyond the sheer expense, there is the unquantifiable cost in potentially greater insecurity. The more successfully a defensive system protects a countryeven as it fails to deter the attacker in the first placethe less credible the threat of punishing retaliation will be. This invites the attacker to strike again, while the defender is pressured to absorb the attacks without responding in kind. Given how cheap drones and even ballistic missiles have become, Iran can seek to saturate Israeli defenses and increase the likelihood that missiles get through. Alternatively, too many attacks could bankrupt the target. And yet, Biden seems to think that one failed Iranian attack will deter further assaults. Israel demonstrated a remarkable capacity to defend against and defeat even unprecedented attacks, he said in a statement, sending a clear message to its foes that they cannot effectively threaten the security of Israel.

The Biden administrations approach to Russias attack on Ukraine is analogous. U.S. defense official Celeste Wallander recently said that Ukraine holds itself to the highest standards of observing the laws of armed conflict. Although the laws of war say no such thing, the administration considers Russian oil refineries out of bounds for Ukraine to strike, with the Ukrainians supposed to limit themselves to the exchange of fire on the front line. Behind the moralizing, the administration seeks to control any escalatory dynamics by holding the Ukrainians backalbeit not entirely successfully. The logic or hope behind this reasoning is that a restrained Ukraine will limit Russian escalation and contain the war. A more aggressive Ukraine that strikes deep inside Russia, or so this argument goes, will only result in greater Russian escalation against Ukraine and perhaps even against countries supporting Ukraine. The unmistakable message to Moscow is that Washington and other Western capitals would rather see Ukraine under military duress than Russia under attack. The same thing holds for the red lines the West imposes not on Ukraine but on itselfGerman Chancellor Olaf Scholz refusing to provide Ukraine with Taurus long-range cruise missiles, for exampleall of which emboldens Russia even further.

The Biden administrations obsession with restraining front-line allies and partners is misplaced. Taking offensive actions off the tableby not providing the appropriate weapons, by sending them under the strict condition that they only be used on Ukraines territory, or by telling Israel to take the winis highly likely to produce the opposite of the intended effect. By limiting Russias and Irans risks and costs, it lowers the bar for further aggression.

The repercussions of this faulty Western understanding of escalation go far beyond Europe and the Middle East. With its pressure on Israel and Ukraine, Washington is sending a signal to China that a potential attack on Taiwan will be met only by defensive measures such as intercepting incoming missiles and that force will only be wielded along a thin line of contact. Maybe Taiwan will be told to take the win if not much damage is done in an initial Chinese strike or that the highest standards require it to refrain from striking Chinese ports or logistical nodes.

It is dangerous to believe that a regional equilibrium will be maintained simply by pouring a lot of money into defensive systems and denial technologies. Front-line states must have the abilityand support of their alliesto strike the enemy behind the apparent safety of its borders and not just absorb its attacks. For deterrence to be restored or strengthened, these states have to be able to retaliate with offensive actions.

Stability does not arise exclusively out of the ability to parry the enemys blows, but out of the credible promise of hurting him back.

Read the original:
Biden's Escalation Fears on Russia and Iran Have Dangerous Consequences - Foreign Policy

April 17 marked Ayatollah Ali Khameneis 85th birthday and coincided with a critical juncture for Iran as tensions with Israel escalated at historic proportions. While details regarding Khameneis physical state remain confidential, unprecedented remarks from the head of the Supreme Leaders medical team stirred speculation about Khameneis true condition.

In an interview, Alireza Marandi stated, God has shown great favor to the Islamic Republic and all of us by keeping him [Khamenei] in good health He is remarkably fit, defying his age.

Broadcasting these comments, rather than reassuring the public, did the opposite, renewing questions about potential successors.

The Iranian ruling system claims to be both Islamic and a republic, with many nominally elected offices. However, the March 1 elections had the lowest participation rate in the history of the Islamic Republic, with only 41 percent of eligible voters taking part. The wholesale disqualification of reformist and moderate candidates by the ultra-conservative Guardian Council, tasked with vetting candidates, contributed to an unparalleled surge for the most extreme faction within the Iranian system.

For the first time, the top three elected members of parliament in Tehran were from an ultra-conservative group known as Paydari or the Steadfastness Front. The groups spiritual leader, Ayatollah Taqi Mesbah Yazdi, who died in 2021, argued that elections in Iran only occur because the countrys ruler permits them and that the leader can endorse or reject the peoples choices.

Mesbah followers are staunch advocates for the enforcement of religious norms, particularly concerning women, support restricting internet access, and harbor strong anti-American tendencies. Their opposition to any U.S. foothold in Iran or advancement of modernity stems from a belief that such developments would render their ideology obsolete. In this aspect, they align closely with the views of Khamenei.

Historically, representatives from Tehran are the most influential in parliament. It remains to be seen whether the ultra-conservative faction will secure control of the Presidium, or whether an opposing faction of conservatives, led by the current parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, will prevail. The composition of the Presidium, which consists of a chairman, two vice-chairmen, six secretaries, and three observers, will be determined in June through elections within the parliament. The Presidium has a long list of duties related to the management of the parliament. However, in practical terms, the chairman plays a pivotal role in providing direction to the body and wields significant power to advance his agenda.

The March 1 elections, in addition to choosing a new parliament, selected 88 clerics who comprise the Assembly of Experts, which is responsible for choosing a new supreme leader should Khamenei leave the role. Considering Khameneis age and that the assembly serves for eight years, it is quite possible that it will get to exercise that responsibility.

As with candidates for the Assembly, the Guardian Council made a systematic effort to purge moderates. Election of a supreme leader requires a two-thirds majority, thus an influential moderate could potentially assemble a faction to block the conservatives preferred candidate. This rationale led to the disqualification of Irans former moderate president, an old guard of the revolution, Hassan Rouhani.

According to a March 2 BBC Persian survey of 30 Iranian experts, there is an overwhelming belief that Khameneis second son, Mojtaba, will be his successor. However, I would challenge this prevailing viewpoint.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the leader of the 1979 revolution that overturned the Shah, repeatedly denounced hereditary rule as equivalent to an illegitimate monarchy. This view was expressed in a 21-volume collection of speeches, messages, interviews, decrees, religious permissions, and letters, known as Sahifeyeh Imam Khomeini.

Khamenei, who succeeded Khomeini in 1989, has also characterized hereditary governance as contrary to Islamic principles. On several occasions, including in a speech in July 2023, he stated that dictatorship and hereditary government are not Islamic (though, given Irans situation, labeling dictatorship as non-Islamic raised eyebrows).

On March 1, 2024, Ayatollah Mahmoud Mohammadi Araghi, a member of the Assembly of Experts, revealed, The news reached the leader that the experts are investigating the case of Mojtabas leadership. The leader said, What you are doing raises suspicions about the leaderships hereditary issue. So the investigation was not allowed. On another occasion, when they sought permission from the leader to investigate a person related to him, he responded, No, draw a line under this issue.

Supporters of Mojtaba Khameneis succession argue that Shiite Muslim tradition allows hereditary leadership in the concept of imamate. But religious experts counter that imams are chosen by God, while the supreme leader is elected by representatives of the people, and thus cannot be hereditary.

Those who do not believe Mojtaba will succeed his father also highlight another crucial issue: The system could face accusations of nepotism. Even if untrue, skepticism would likely persist, raising concerns that the Islamic system dismantled a hereditary monarchy and now wants to replace it with its own hereditary system under an Islamic guise.

In the view of this analyst, two other individuals are more likely successors to Khamenei.

Incumbent President Ebrahim Raisi has been tested over the years and has proven his unwavering loyalty to the system. From 1988, when at age 28 he was involved in mass executions of government opponents, until 2019, when Khamenei chose him as head of the judiciary, Raisi has consistently been obedient to the deep state.

Despite a setback in the 2017 presidential election, when he lost to Rouhani, Raisi garnered significant attention from Khamenei and the military-security apparatus. This led to his return to the political stage in 2021, with the system orchestrating his election by disqualifying every plausible candidate from the moderate/reformist camp.

The plan likely aimed to create a social base for him, showcasing his widespread acceptance in society. Some might argue that his presidency has instead revealed his incompetence, rendering him unsuitable for the countrys highest role. But many commentators have said that no one currently possesses the necessary personality and charisma for that position. Iran expert Hossein Bastani maintains that apart from the fact that public acceptance of the next leader is crucial for the Iranian government, it cannot be denied that the position of each potential leadership candidate is highly unstable within government circles. In other words, even the most prominent clerics whose names have been circulated in the succession competition lack credibility among insiders.

In fact, a figure like Raisi might be ideal for the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), which would most likely shape Irans domestic and foreign policies behind the scenes in the absence of Khamenei.

It is worth recalling what Khamenei conveyed to the Assembly of Experts seeking to elect him after Khomeinis death in 1989.

Apart from the fact that I myself am not really worthy of this position and I know this, maybe you gentlemen also know my leadership will be superficial, not real leadership, he said. For many gentlemen, my words do not have the validity of the leaders words. So, what kind of leadership will this be?

The IRGC and the security-intelligence apparatus are the pillars that supported and emboldened Khamenei. The next leader will likely be unable to wield power without their full support.

The new Presidium of the Assembly of Experts which includes the chairman, two vice-chairmen, and two secretaries, could also be pivotal in determining Irans third leader. It appears that Alireza Arafi, 67, a member of the new Assembly, stands a strong chance of becoming the chairman of the body.

Arafis ascent in Irans power structure began in 2001 following his appointment by Khamenei as the head of the World Center for Islamic Sciences (currently called Al-Mustafa International University).Its aim is to spread Shiite teachings and ideology globally through branches abroad. In 2016, Arafi was elected as one of seven members of the Supreme Council of Qom Seminary, an organization of Islamic scholars and experts, which is responsible for policy-making and macro-planning of seminaries across Iran. That same year, Arafi, who also served as the Friday prayer leader of Qom, a position appointed by Khamenei, was elected by the Supreme Council of Qom Seminary as the director of all seminaries across the countryone of the highest positions in Irans religious hierarchy.

Khamenei, who had previously hailed Arafi as an original, intellectual and resourceful jurist, remarked, (the right sat in its place).

This election, coupled with Khameneis commendation of Arafi, further bolstered his standing in Irans power structure. In 2018, in another significant stride, Khamenei appointed Arafi as a member of the Guardian Council.

Building on his successes within the system, Arafi secured the top position among the members from Tehran province in the recent elections for the Assembly of Experts, positioning him as likely to lead the presidium. Arafis name has been circulating as one of the potential successors of Khamenei since at least 2016.

The only flaw in his resume lies in the color of his turban, which unlike Khomeinis and Khameneis, is not black. Black turbans are traditionally worn by Sayyids, who claim to be descendants of the Prophet Mohammad and Imam Ali, the first Shiite Imam. However, its worth noting that Hossein Ali Montazeri, a cleric initially appointed Khomeinis successor, was also a white turban cleric.

Shahir Shahidsaless is an Iranian Canadian political analyst and freelance journalist writing about Iranian domestic and foreign affairs, the Middle East, and the U.S. foreign policy in the region. He is the co-author of Iran and the United States: An Insiders View on the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. He is a contributor to several websites with a focus on the Middle East. He tweets @SShahidsaless.

Original post:
Who Will Be Iran's Next Leader? Not Khamenei's Son Stimson Center - Stimson Center

Just days before hed premiere his new film The Seed of the Sacred Fig in Competition at the Cannes Film Festival, director Mohammad Rasoulof has been sentenced to eight years in prison and flogging in Iran. Hell also be subjected to a fine and the confiscation of property. The filmmaker has run afoul of the theocratic government there for years, and theres some indication the timing of this extremely harsh sentence is coercion to remove the film from the festival altogether.

Its easy to see why the authoritarian regime might be scared of Rasoulofs latest work. The Seed of the Sacred Fig Tree is literally about a judge for the Revolutionary Court in Tehran dealing with the fallout from the nationwide protests that have swept the country in recent years, and he particularly succumbs to paranoia when his gun disappears.

The 51-year-old director has been hit with a severe sentence, before, however. Making features since 2002, Rasoulof was first arrested in 2010 for supposedly filming without a permit an offense for which he received a six-year prison sentence, later knocked down to one year. After he returned from a trip abroad in 2017, the authorities in Iran confiscated his passport, forbidding him from leaving the country.

Hes received other sentences since, which were deferred due to the Covid pandemic, when Iran actually released over 50,000 prisoners to prevent the viruss spread. When he received another charge, for allegedly undermining Irans national security because of making his 2017 film A Man of Integrity, which won the top prize in Un Certain Regard, he received an outpouring of support from other filmmakers, such as Asghar Farhadi and Jafar Panahi. Not allowed to leave Iran for years, a coalition of filmmakers petitioned the government to allow him to attend Cannes in 2023, where he had been invited to participate in the Un Certain Regard jury.

His next film, There Is No Evil, about capital punishment in Iran, won the Golden Bear at Berlin. He filmed the entire movie in secret.

According to Iranian journalist Mansour Jahani, this particularly harsh sentence against Rasoulof is expected to be executed soon. However, he is not yet in prison as of publication time.

On X, Rasoulofs lawyer Babak Paknia wrote, as translated by Jahani, According to the verdict issued by the 29th branch of the Islamic Revolution Court of Iran, Mohammad Rasoulof was sentenced to 8 years of imprisonment (5 years applicable), flogging, fine, and confiscation of property. This ruling was confirmed in the 36th branch of the Court of Appeals and now the case has been sent to enforcement.

In a follow-up tweet, Paknia added, The main reason for issuing this sentence is signing statements and making films and documentaries, which in the courts opinion, these actions are examples of collusion with the intention of committing a crime against the countrys security.

IndieWire has reached out to the Cannes Film Festival for comment.

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Iran Sentences Director Mohammad Rasoulof to 8 Years in Prison and Flogging Days Before His New Film Premieres ... - IndieWire