SEOUL If international sanctions on Iran are lifted pronto a condition Iran is demanding as part of any nuclear deal how hard might it be to reimpose them, in the likely event that Iran cheats? For a glimpse of just how tough it could be, take the case of Irans Bank Mellat, headquartered in Tehran, but with a branch in Seoul where, during a recent trip to South Korea, I dropped by for a look.
Occupying spacious quarters on the 13th and 14th floors of a high-rise office building in Seouls busy Gangnam district, this branch of Bank Mellat appeared to have no customers on the premises. That was no surprise, because for several years now, Bank Mellat in Seoul has been under sanctions by the U.S., United Nations and the South Korean government.
But Bank Mellats branch in Seoul is not actually closed. When I pressed the button on the front door intercom, someone buzzed me in. The lights were on. The marble floor was polished. On a long curved front counter, a sign advertised advice on letters of credit. Seated behind the desk, under portraits of Irans Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and his predecessor, the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, were two South Korean women. They greeted me in English, listened to my request for an interview, first told me no, then told me maybe, then ushered me into a conference room while they disappeared down the hall to summon a senior bank official.
The conference room was decorated with gold-framed certificates, written in English, naming Bank Mellat the Bank of the Year for Iran, for the years 2000 and 2002. In a brown wood frame there was also a statement of Bank Mellats Quality Policy, dated Sept. 15, 2003, and promising among other things To develop through ongoing efficiency the success of our customers and of our Branch.
There was time to reflect on how that had since turned out, including the dogged effort it took for the U.S. to persuade South Korea to impose sanctions on this branch of Bank Mellat. The highlights described in this article are gleaned from U.S. State Department cables posted by Wikileaks, plus press coverage, United Nations documents and U.S. Treasury designations and press releases.
Basically, U.S. allegations, warnings and diplomatic demarches, coupled with U.S. and U.N. sanctions, piled up for more than three years before South Koreas government the authority with jurisdiction finally blacklisted Bank Mellats branch in Seoul. During that time, South Korea was benefiting from billions of dollars worth of business every year with Iran, buying oil and providing goods and services such as construction. Many of the related transactions flowed through Bank Mellat in Seoul. Many of these dealings were surely legitimate, but some, according to the U.S. government, were not.
In August, 2007, the State Department dispatched a cable to the U.S. embassy in Seoul, asking that the South Korean government be informed of serious U.S. concerns about possible Iranian financial activities in your country, especially insofar as Seouls branch of Bank Mellat is concerned.
South Korea responded by providing U.S. authorities with a 46-page report that gave Bank Mellat a clean bill of health. Treasurys then-under secretary for terrorism and financial intelligence, Stuart Levey, traveled to Seoul to stress U.S. concerns. South Korea agreed to continue investigating the Seoul branch of Bank Mellat.
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Lesson Of An Iran Sanctions Saga In Seoul