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Foreign Minister Yair Lapid will light the second Hanukkah candle together with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson at 10 Downing Street. They are old acquaintances, back from the time when Johnson was a member of Parliament and Lapid a media personality. On that same day, the nuclear talks between the world powers and Iran will resume in Vienna. Presumably, the meeting between Lapid and Johnson will range further than talk about Hanukkah customs.

The Israeli minister might not admit this but the aim of his visit is to persuade Johnson and on the following day, with another candle, French President Emmanuel Macron to pressure the Americans to maintain the sanctions that were toughened during Donald Trumps presidency, no matter what Iran promises them. In any case, Lapid and Prime Minister Naftali Bennett are convinced, Tehran will continue to deceive the world.

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Dont get pulled along. Lead, Lapid will urge them. Say that you wont offer any relief from the sanctions as long as a genuine, airtight agreement hasnt been signed, with no loopholes.

The talks in Vienna were supposed to lead, more or less, to a return to the original agreement that was drawn up with President Barack Obamas administration and the world powers in 2015. But that agreement is out. Pass. The Iranians arent prepared to hear of it. Instead, U.S. President Joe Biden is taking a different tack: Less for less. The Iranians will get some easing of the sanctions and in return will delay their nuclear program. Thats not going to happen, say Bennett and Lapid, as well as Defense Minister Benny Gantz, who will be heading to Washington in about two weeks. The Iranians will pocket the concessions and continue to gallop ahead.

The nuclear talks pose a complicated challenge to Israels diplomatic and security leadership. Israels traditional position rules out any negotiations if there is no comprehensive package of prohibitions on the table, beyond just a delay in the ayatollahs nuclear program.

On the security side, the situation is even more complicated. Most of the top brass over the years supported the original agreement. They saw it as the least bad alternative. In advance of the renewal of the talks, military Chief of Staff Aviv Kochavi to whom some ascribe political ambitions hastened to make public his position that is, the Israel Defense Forces opposition to any kind of new agreement. Between Gantzs positions and Bennetts (it is not yet clear where Lapid stands), it is certainly possible to discern daylight, as the Americans say. They are not in disagreement regarding the overarching aim: preventing a bad agreement thats full of holes and building a military option. However, they do not agree on the boundaries of the discourse, the cooperation and the manner of dialogue with the Americans.

At the Haaretz Conference, Gantz said he would support an agreement that is better and stronger, which will set Iran back and deny it nuclear capabilities while restoring effective inspection and supervision of the nuclear sites. At the moment, he noted, we arent there. Bennetts remarks werent as vivid. Finance Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who, like Bennett, served in the past as defense minister, threw out an interesting comment this week: Within five years, and this is still a conservative estimate, he said, Iran will be a nuclear power with proven capability.

It could be that Lieberman is letting himself say aloud what Bennett knows but wont dare make public.

There is no doubt: Bennett is constrained. Between his ideology and his shrinking electoral base, along with the public consensus against the agreement, he really doesnt have freedom to act. He cant keep silent his rivals from the right will swoop down on him. But he promised Joe Biden, in their private conversation in the residential wing of the White House towards the end of August, that he, unlike you-know-who, will not conduct a public campaign against the administration. He will not act behind the presidents back in Congress. He will express Israels position, and the practical work will be conducted through the diplomatic channels. Biden appreciated this. Feel free to call us any time you want to talk, he told Bennett.

Bennett cant support the agreement but he can regulate the height of the flames in the most important bilateral relationship Israel has. Still: Not construction in the territories, not a military operation in the Gaza Strip, not an American consulate in East Jerusalem its the nuclear talks that hold the potential for the first real clash between Jerusalem and Washington.

In the triangle between Vienna, Washington and Jerusalem, a double game will be played. Out of one side of the mouth, tough words will be spoken against any agreement at all. At the same time, there will be feverish activity to influence the content of the agreement. In this, Biden will give a measure of forbearance to the current Israeli government, which had been withdrawn from the Netanyahu government because of its political action against the Obama administration, action that aimed more for gains at home than at influencing the Americans. The two sides now will quarrel in broad daylight and reconcile in the shadows.

Legacy

A highly placed government source told me this week that public discussion will begin over Benjamin Netanyahus real heritage on the subject of the Iranian nuclear program. And what is it, I asked.

One big bluff, he replied.

For many long years Netanyahu was Mr. Iran. The sophisticated PR machine he had at his disposal, and most notably his own proven abilities in that area, built up an image that other politicians found difficult to puncture. Ehud Barak did his very best, and so did Ehud Olmert and of course also the heads of the espionage and intelligence agencies who have since retired. But there was always one prime minister, and oppositionists with rapidly approaching expiration dates.

Bennetts entry into the Prime Ministers Office last June introduced him to the material. For about five weeks he conducted a policy review, a re-examination of Israels policy on Iran: hours, almost daily, of discussions, PowerPoint presentations and summations.

Bennett articulated his conclusions in a statement he declaims frequently, this week too: I was astonished by the gap between the rhetoric and the deeds. I found a disturbing distance between statements that we will never allow Iran to go nuclear and the legacy we have received. The mistake we made after 2015 will not repeat itself.

I asked the source what he meant by one big bluff. He gave an example: In Netanyahus last half year in power, between January and June of this year, Trump left and a Democratic administration came in. The Iranians were no longer afraid of an attack. They stepped on the gas and went full speed ahead towards a bomb. Then it became clear to us that Trumps sanctions hadnt borne the anticipated fruit, and Americas withdrawal from the agreement not only didnt improve the objective situation but even made it worse. During that critical period, Bibi did not recalibrate the Israeli strategy to the new situation. He simply rolled on.

The issue of the Iranian atomic program is an important element in the legacies of all prime ministers since Yitzhak Rabin (in his second term). Bennetts industrial peace in the international arena is not promising success in this area. Domestically, the prime minister and the foreign minister are working well together on the matter. There is even coordination with Gantz on the nuclear issue. But within their respective offices and between them, there is some dissonance.

Thus, on the eve of the renewal of the talks, some of the players in that sensitive area believe that the task is too big for Shimrit Meir, Naftali Bennetts political adviser. Meir is officially defined as his bureaus liaison with Washington. Someone whom we shall call a high-ranking diplomatic source, and who wants Bennett to succeed, met the prime minister recently and suggested that he strengthen Meirs position. He told him that he needs an uber-adviser, a heavy hitter, an experienced hand who has held important diplomatic positions in Israel and abroad. An Arabist, even if she is talented, isnt enough. The man proposed a number of names, headed by Ron Prosor, formerly the director-general of the Foreign Ministry and ambassador to a number of countries. Bennett, as of now, hasnt taken the advice.

They dont give, they wont get

The passage of the national budget about three weeks ago hasnt benefited the opposition. A kind of slackness has spread through its ranks. The margins in the Knesset votes are a lot larger than two MKs worth, which is the difference between it and the coalition. The oppositionist strategy that its leaders adopted, and into which the remnants of its bloc were dragged at the time the coalition was being formed, has led them into a dead end. They are having a hard time surviving the long, sad nights in the Knesset plenum. The childish absence of top Likud members from the committees is hurting only them. They are even refusing to establish the Knesset State Control Committee, which by law must be headed by a representative of the opposition, and which has the power to rattle the government ministries. Theyve turned the tantrum into a method of operation.

Netanyahu is winding up a less than spectacular week. The critical headlines chased him: Attorney General Avichai Mendelblit wrote to the High Court of Justice that Netanyahu had to pay back the money he received from his cousin Nathan Milikowsky, who died a few months ago, and his friend Spencer Partrich $300,000 to the former, actually to his estate, and 2 million shekels ($630,000) to the latter.

The items of jewelry worth hundreds of thousands of shekels that were given to his wife by their personal pair of billionaires, Arnon Milchan and James Packer, could reopen and broaden Case 1000, which in any case is bursting with corrupt merchandise. Nir Hefetzs testimony this week drew a disturbing picture of an obsessed, crazed family with criminal behavior patterns and an uncontrollable fixation on the media. The head of the family came across as enslaved by his wife and son. (They wipe the floor with him, Likud MK David Amsalem would say, and we will get to him soon.)

The defeat experienced by Netanyahu and his partners in the vote on a term limit was definitive, 66 to 48. What didnt they say about the bill? Syrian! Iranian! North Korean!" (or "North Iranian! in the words of Likud geopolitical expert MK May Golan). The difference between the cries of distress and the margin of the vote was embarrassing. It turns out they hadnt even convinced themselves.

Netanyahus personal war against limiting a prime ministers term to eight years was not rational in any respect. Most of the public supports the idea. The law isnt retroactive, so there isnt the slightest bit of anything personal in it. He can be re-elected again, say three years from now, to serve until the age of 83 and then cancel the decree and forge ahead. The leader of the opposition didnt even bother to make a speech during the debate. He hid out in the bowels of the Knesset while the initiator of the bill, Justice Minister Gideon Saar, abused him with great pleasure from the podium. When Netanyahus turn came, he entered the hall, voted no and disappeared.

Saar enlisted the support of the six members of the Arab-majority Joint List. In his first term in office, Netanyahu coined the expression in reference to the Palestinians: If they give, theyll get; if they dont give they wont get. The members of the Joint List are only getting. If they were to show Likud the same oppositionist loyalty that the Likudniks display towards them, in votes that are important to them, the Basic Law that requires a special majority would not have passed. Yamina MK Yomtob Kalfon was absent from the Knesset plenum during the vote, violating coalition discipline. He is the coalitions 61st MK. He too, it turns out, is a weak link.

Every week has its contretemps in the prime ministers party. This week there were two: Kalfons absence and the opening of a criminal investigation against Abir Kara, deputy minister in the Prime Ministers Office, on suspicion of double voting. The precedent Bennett has chalked up as a prime minister from a tiny party isnt the only one. He is also the first prime minister who has relied more on his coalition partners at moments of truth than on the members of his own party. Historically, lawmakers from the ruling party are the responsible adults, the kindergarten teachers in the Knesset, the soothers and conciliators of their partners. In the current coalition, it is Lapid and his colleagues in Yesh Atid who are playing that role.

Kalfon was marked out as a potential rebel on the eve of the crucial vote on the 2021-2022 budget. He withstood the pressure. In Bennetts circle they are watching him closely. He is religious, an immigrant from France. The French community in Israel is considered supportive of Likud and Netanyahu. If the ill omens prevail, Religious Affairs Minister Matan Kahana will deign to return to the Knesset, which he left under the so-called Norwegian arrangement whereby cabinet ministers can leave the Knesset to devote themselves more fully to their ministries, and have the next person on their partys slate enter the Knesset in their stead until the minister, for whatever reason, returns to the Knesset. Kalfon, one of the many Norwegian lawmakers now, will return to his private law practice.

Fear and calculation

Likud MK Yuli Edelstein came to Reichman University this week for the annual Herzliya Conference. Interviewer Sefi Ovadia quoted to Edelstein a few paragraphs from Likud colleague Amsalem:

Attorney generals are like ravaging wolves, they have to be put in a cage .... [Menachem] Begins story that there are judges in Jerusalem that judicial rulings must be adhered to is over. Amsalem finished with: There's no justice anymore. Ovadia asked: Is this view popular with you guys?

Likud is a large party, a movement, it has absolutely everything, Edelstein, a former Knesset speaker, replied. Including a black sheep, and maybe more than one. Let me remind you who came in first in the most recent primary. (He did, but that was a long time ago.) It was somebody who doesnt curse a lot.

A few hours later, Edelstein phoned Amsalem to tell him he wasnt referring to him as a black sheep or a guy who curses a lot.

I watched the Edelstein interview a few times. I was disappointed and felt sorry for him. When he was young he wasnt afraid to go head to head with the Soviets he was sentenced on false charges and did hard labor in the Gulag. What does Amsalem have that scared him more than this?

Alas, no one from Likud has dared say a word about the filth and curses Edelstein spewed on members of his caucus in that interview that was shown online. Are they afraid of him, and of party members whose support hell solicit in the future?

Netanyahu believes that the extremist language above which hes supposedly floating is beneficial to him and Likud. Not likely. The Amsalem phenomenon and that of Likudniks Shlomo Karhi, Galit Distal Atbaryan, May Golan and their spiritual mother Miri Regev is exactly what prevented Netanyahu from obtaining the majority needed to form a government after the last election.

Veteran Likudniks who got disgusted with their party left, completing the exile to the renegade New Hope party and knocked Netanyahu out of the premiership. The Likud bunch mentioned above didnt bring in any Knesset seats for the party but merely provided a loud and rude retinue for the famiglia boss under criminal indictment.

Selective memory

On Wednesday the Knesset discussed Likud MK Yariv Levins bill to add Menachem Begin to the very short list (David Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Rabin) of prime ministers whose death date is a national memorial day. Well, Begin and Levin belonged to the same party, and Begin was Levins godfather at his circumcision ceremony, but its still worth wondering what connection the lawmaker has to the legendary leader.

Begins legacy is more diverse than those of other prime ministers, Levin argued. He listed this legacy's main features: security, settlements, diplomatic and security independence, social affairs. (In this, historians will attest, Begin is no different from Ben-Gurion, Levi Eshkol, Rabin and Ariel Sharon.) I think that of all the things Begin left behind, the most important is that there wasn't a civil war, Levin said.

He referred, rightly, to Begin's order to the right-wing Irgun paramilitary in June 1948 not to fire on the Israeli soldiers who sank the Altalena arms ship and killed 16 members of the organization.

For some reason Levin, who's also former Knesset speaker, didnt mention Begins commitment to the rule of law and the primacy of the courts. He didn't mention the dignity with which Begin treated the opposition, his respect for the rules of the parliamentary game during his 29 years as opposition leader. (For example, he would never have dreamed of boycotting the Knesset committees.)

Levin also didnt mention the great respect Begin had for attorney generals, the law enforcement agencies, the public servants. Begin didnt call them bureaucrats, didn't incite against them, didn't sic his supporters on them and didn't disparage them the way the politician for whom Levin is the consigliere has been doing for many years.

And Levin is the guy who calls the Supreme Court justices a dictatorship, a bunch of radical leftists and tainted by personal interests, part of the wacko agenda hes leading against the court.

It was Levin who advised Edelstein to defy a Supreme Court ruling. As Levin put it, if the court's president, Esther Hayut, wants to put herself above the Knesset, she is welcome to come to the building with the courts guards and open the plenary session herself .... That way it will be clear that its a coup by a handful of judges.

New Hope's Zeev Elkin, a former Likudnik, replied on behalf of the government. He reminded Levin of Begin's comment that a leader's long term in office is a danger to the freedom and morality of the nation, and it breeds corruption. (Elkin was talking about the term-limit bill that had been passed two days earlier.)

Its a good thing Levin wont be in charge of the memorial day for Begin. He would ban mention of all that rule-of-law mumbo jumbo and the There are judges in Jerusalem comment. Basically, Levin is Amsalem in a suit. Begin would have been ashamed of him.

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Tension at the core: Bennett goes head-to-head with U.S. over Iran - Haaretz

Chair,

France, Germany, and the United Kingdom would like to thank Director General Grossifor his report on the implementation of safeguards in Iran, contained in GOV/2021/52, andDeputy Director General Aparo for the Technical Briefing on 18 November.

First, we would like to underscore our grave concern by the information in the DirectorGenerals report that IAEA inspectors operating in Iran have, for several months, beensubjected to intimidation through excessively invasive physical searches. This is unacceptableand unprecedented. We express our full support for IAEA inspectors who carry out their roleswith impartiality, professionalism, and dedication and must be able to undertake their dutieswithout fear of intimidation. As the Director General noted, Irans new security proceduresare inconsistent with both internationally accepted security practices and the Agreement onthe Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA, and prevent IAEA inspectors from being able toeffectively discharge their functions under the NPT Safeguards Agreement. Like all NPT stateparties, Iran is legally obliged to take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors caneffectively discharge their functions. We call on Iran to take immediate steps to prevent anyfurther incidents from occurring, and encourage the Director General to promptly report anynew incidents to this Board. We fully associate ourselves with the statement by Canada, to bedelivered later, on behalf of a group of states.

Chair,

We would like to commend the efforts of the Director General and the Secretariat inverifying Irans compliance with its safeguards obligations and commitments. We firmlysupport their professional and impartial efforts to fully clarify information concerning thecorrectness and completeness of Irans declarations under its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Wereiterate the importance of the IAEA continuing to evaluate all safeguards-relevantinformation available to it in line with standard practice.

We fully support the Director Generals tireless efforts to engage in substantialdiscussions with Iran in order to resolve issues related to four undeclared locations in Iran. Ithas now been over two years since these efforts commenced, and seventeen months sincethe Board adopted a resolution calling on Iran to fully co-operate with the Agency and satisfy its requests without any further delay. Yet Iran has still failed to provide the necessaryexplanation for the presence of anthropogenic nuclear material particles related to threelocations, as well as the current location of natural uranium in the form of a metal disc.

In the absence of a credible explanation from Iran, we share the deep concerns of theDirector General that undeclared nuclear material and/or equipment has been present atundeclared locations in Iran and its current location is not known to the Agency. As we haverepeatedly stated, this is not just a question of Irans past activities but a live issue concerningthe completeness and correctness of Irans safeguards declarations today.

The Director Generals report also noted Irans sustained lack of substantiveengagement with the Agency since September, with no interactions at all on two of theoutstanding cases and no meaningful progress in resolving the remaining issues. We recallthat in Irans Joint Statement with the Agency of 12 September, Iran committed to enablingthe Director General to hold high-level consultations in Tehran on enhancing co-operation.Yet Iran delayed for over two months in scheduling this visit until the very eve of the Board,which has undermined the Director Generals ability to provide full and timely reporting to theBoard.

Chair,

The Director General updated the Board on 24 November that, despite his efforts, hehad been unable to reach an agreement with Iran to address the issues raised in this reportwhich Iran has now had over two years to resolve and also the issue relevant to the JCPOAcovered during his visit. The Director General asked for the Boards continued support in hisefforts to engage with Iran. Iran now needs to fully co-operate and actively engage with theAgency without further delay. Should rapid and tangible progress not be forthcoming, ameeting of a special board to take action will very soon become inevitable.

Finally, we echo the Director Generals call on Iran to fulfill all its legal obligations underthe Subsidiary Arrangements to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, including fully implementingModified Code 3.1. We reiterate that implementation of Modified Code 3.1 cannot bemodified or suspended unilaterally. In refusing to fully co-operate with the IAEA, Iranundermines the integrity of the global safeguards system.

We encourage the Director General to continue reporting to the Board of Governors,as appropriate, and would welcome making report GOV/2021/52 public.

Thank you.

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NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: E3 statement to the IAEA, November 2021 - GOV.UK

First, there was the Emirati Embassy in Damascus that reopened in 2018, then a few high-profile Arab delegations met with Syrian diplomats and politicians abroad, and soon normalization between the Arab world and Bashar Assad became the hottest thing in regional politics. Everyone, from Jordans King Abdullah II to Egyptian and Saudi generals, was busy crafting a new path on Syria in order to bring it back into the Arab fold.

Back in 2019, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the UAEs foreign minister, said his country intends to ensure that Syria returns to the Arab region, while Russia, Assads main backer, called on the Arab League to reinstate Syrias membership that was revoked back in 2011.

5

Flags of Syria, Russia, and Iran in Syria

(Photo: AP)

Off record, Arab officials explain that by normalizing relations with Assads Syria and helping it restore stability through economic development and postwar revival, they will also promote another important goal squeezing Iran out of Syria, or at least minimizing its role there.

The U.S. did not prevent a rapprochement between Jordan and Syria, yet it harshly criticized the recent meeting between Abdullah bin Zayed and Assad, whose regime is heavily sanctioned by both the U.S. and EU.

Israel, however, took a more nuanced position, quietly hoping that Arab influence would replace the Iranian one. One has to wonder: Is there a real chance to squeeze Iran out of Syria by normalizing Assad and pouring Arab investments into Syrias devastated land?

Dr. Raz Zimmt, an expert on Iran at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) at Tel Aviv University, expects no reduction in Iranian influence in Syria for the foreseeable future.

5

Iranian Cargo plane in Damascus, Syria

It is worth distinguishing between the Iranian influence on the military level, and the soft Iranian influence on the political, economic, religious, and cultural levels, said Zimmt. In terms of military influence, however, Iran has greatly reduced the presence of Revolutionary Guards in Syria in recent years due to the change in operational circumstances (as there is no need for a large presence of Revolutionary Guards) and is increasingly relying on local Syrian personnel recruited by pro-Iranian militias aided by Hezbollah and the militia.

The Syrian regime is currently unable to retain control of the territories liberated in recent years without Iranian military involvement, which is therefore not expected to shrink. At the same time, Iran is working to preserve and even strengthen its political, economic, cultural, and religious influence, he continued.

Although Syria (with Russian support) seems to prefer Russian or Turkish involvement in its economic rehabilitation, this does not stop Iranian efforts to integrate into reconstruction efforts in Syria and at the same time act to strengthen its religious-cultural influence, especially in Shiite-populated areas, Zimmt said.

5

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Syrian President Bashar al-Assad

(Photo: AP, Reuters, EPA)

Since 2013, Tehran has significantly tightened its grip on Syrias civilian and economic affairs, according to a report from the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, so that it would be impossible to sideline or push Iran out altogether. In 2019, Tehran announced that it would build a railway network from western Iran to Syrias Mediterranean port of Latakia, while Iranian companies have seized a share in Damascus property market and its businessmen have become influential figures in Syrian real estate.

In addition, during the last few years, important demographic changes have taken place in Syrian towns and villages that were abandoned by refugees who had to flee for their lives; newcomers all Shiites from Iran, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, replaced them.

How do Iranians feel about the news of Sunni Arab efforts to normalize relations with Syria that are meant to minimize Iranians influence and power in the country?

There are two perceptions in Iran on this issue, says Zimmt. One view holds that Arab efforts to get closer to Assad are intended to weaken Iranian influence in the country and promote Arab (and especially Gulf) influence at Irans expense.

Yet, there is also an assumption that the normalization between Syria and some Arab countries is a positive expression of the Arab worlds recognition that Iran has won the battle in Syria and that the Arabs must come to terms with the Syrian regime. It is worth noting that this process is taking place in parallel with the ongoing rapprochement between the United Arab Emirates and Iran in the past two years and the Iraqi-mediated talks between Iran and Saudi Arabia, he adds.

5

Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

(Photo: AFP)

According to his school of thought, at this stage, there is no particular concern on the part of Tehran regarding this process and it does not currently identify a real threat to Iranian interests in Syria.

As long as this is Irans assessment, it is not likely to try to sabotage efforts by the Arab world to approach the Syrian regime and it will continue to present them publicly as proof that the Arab world, which previously supported the Syrian opposition, has been forced to recognize the new reality shaped by Iranian influence and assistance, Zimmt says.

Russia has also expressed support for Arab normalization efforts vis-a-vis Damascus. According to Marianna Belenkaya an expert on Arab affairs and a journalist at the Kommersant newspaper and publishing house Moscow has encouraged the reinstatement of Arab ties with Syria and its readmission to the Arab League for quite a long time, as it believes this will best serve Russian interests in the country.

Along with the political aspect of normalization, there is also an economic angle. Russia needs the Gulf money for Syrias reconstruction, Belenkaya said.

5

Iranian soldiers

(Photo: gettyimages)

Will this move allow Iran to be pushed aside? she asks rhetorically. Iran is engrained in the Syrian soil both militarily and economically, and its hard to believe that it can be squeezed or pushed out, she says.

Theoretically Russia would be happy to diminish Irans power, and its common knowledge in Moscow that Iran stands in the way of quite a few issues in Syria, for example, political reconciliation, and provokes Damascus to act in a more aggressive way, for instance in the Daraa region. At the same time, Russia is very realistic. It believes that Iran cannot be pushed out militarily, but its power can be diminished if there will be an alternative, Belenkaya says.

The experts agree Arab rapprochement will be gradual, and that it will take time to achieve an Arab consensus. (For now, Qatar has voiced vocal opposition to the move.) Its also unclear what price Damascus would need to pay to regain Sunni Arabs favor and whether it will be willing to actually pay.

As for Israel, for now, its policy on preventing Iranian encroachment in Syria will remain unchanged.

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Can the Arab countries squeeze Iran out of Syria? - Ynetnews

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Morning news brief: US threatens Iran, Cummins named Test captain and more - WION

After months of uncertainty and growing concerns from the West, Iran announced in early November that negotiations over reviving the 2015 nuclear deal would resume, with a first meeting scheduled in Vienna on November 29. For the moment, the pressure has come down a notch, but the outlook for success is bleak. Irans demand that the United States remove all sanctions imposed since U.S. President Donald Trump withdrew from the agreement in 2018, and its insistence that the United States provide a guarantee that a future president wont leave the deal again go well beyond the terms of the original agreement. In addition, Irans nuclear advances mean that a return to the deal is now less attractive for the United States, because Iran has gained important knowledge that cannot be easily wiped away. Under these conditions, a deal will be hard to reach. But the Biden administration needs to try, because a nuclear-armed Iran would make the world a far more dangerous place.

That, at least, is what most observers believe. Ray Takeyh disagrees. In The Bomb Will Backfire on Iran (October 18, 2021), he presents a far more sanguine view. Going nuclear, he argues, would cost the Iranian regime a great deal and fail to yield any strategic benefit. This will eventually become apparent to the people of Iran, who will then rise up against the regime, Takeyh predicts. And so, in his view, the nuclear gambit will backfire: in the end, he writes, the most consequential victim of an Iranian bomb will be the theocracy itself.

But these claims dont hold up to scrutiny. They ignore important evidence, rest on a set of questionable assumptions, and fail to take into account the lessons offered by looking at the experiences of other nuclear-armed states. In reality, an Iranian bomb isnt inevitable, and the global pressure campaign Takeyh expects to emerge in the aftermath of an Iranian nuclear test wont materialize. A nuclear Iran would pose serious challenges to the United States, and Takeyhs suggestion that such a scenario would present an opportunity to bring about regime change is risky and unwise. The better option remains trying to prevent the emergence of an Iranian bomb in the first place.

Takeyh argues that Iran has already decided to produce nuclear weapons and that it will inevitably do so. According to him, neither diplomacy nor covert action nor the threat of military force has done much to slow Irans march toward the bomb, much less stop it. Irans suspicions of the United States and its ambitions for regional dominance mean that it cannot simply stop at the threshold of acquiring the bomb. It has to go all the way.

It is impossible to rule out that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Irans supreme leader, already has his heart set on building the bomb. But instead of trying to perform the impossible task of peering into the minds of Irans leaders, it is better to examine the available evidence. And here, information suggests that Iran has not resolved to produce nuclear weapons. Instead, Tehran wants the ability to build weapons in the future in case it decides it needs themwhat is known in nuclear parlance as a hedging strategy.

Since 2007, U.S. intelligence has repeatedly indicated that Iran wants a bomb optionnot the bomb itself. As then Director of National Intelligence James Clapper testified to Congress in 2012, Iran is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons, in part by developing various nuclear capabilities that better position it to produce such weapons, should it choose to do so. Moreover, the U.S. intelligence community has said that any future Iranian decision about whether to build nuclear weapons will be based on a cost-benefit approach. In other words, contrary to Takeyhs assertion, Irans decision to weaponize is not a foregone conclusion. Indeed, Irans willingness to implement the 2015 deal it reached with the United States and other world powerswhich drastically reduced Tehrans nuclear program and its ability to quickly develop a bombis good evidence that Iran is not as committed to acquiring nuclear weapons as Takeyh suggests.

Irans leaders would need to be quite desperate to risk it all for a single nuclear weapon.

Despite its withdrawal from the nuclear agreement, even the Trump administration had to concede that Iran wasnt actively working to build weapons but was instead holding on to key documents and personnel to preserve technical expertise relevant to a nuclear weapons capability, and potentially to aid in any future effort to pursue nuclear weapons again, if a decision were made to do so. Israelwhich is laser focused on the Iranian nuclear threatapparently agrees. To the best of our knowledge, the directive [on whether to produce nuclear weapons] has not changed, a senior Israeli intelligence official said last month. They are not heading toward a bomb right now.

Intentions can change, of course. But how easy would it be for Iran to build a bomb if it decided to do so? Takeyh argues that Iran could quickly produce enough material for a device. He is certainly right about that. But he ignores the reality that unless Iran has built covert facilitiesand theres no evidence that it hasIran would be trying to break out at a site that is monitored by international inspectors, posing a high risk of detection and intervention. Kicking out international inspectors would prevent them from reporting on Irans activities but would itself be a major red flag and would signal that Iran was making a dash to the bomb. The international community might not have much time to act. But Irans margin of error would similarly be slim. Irans leaders would need to be quite desperate to risk it all for a single nuclear weapon.

Even if Iran succeeded in producing enough nuclear material, it would still have to package that material with other components into a nuclear device and potentially load it on to a missile. Takeyh ignores these steps of the process, on which Iran apparently hasnt made any progress for over a decade and which are vulnerable to detection. As the head of Israeli military intelligence said in October, there has been no progress . . . in the weapons project and that even from the moment you have a breakout, there is still a long way to go before a bomb, perhaps as much as two years. The fact that Iran hasnt made these preparations suggests that a move to nuclear weapons isnt in the offing.

But the international communitys ability to disrupt an Iranian sprint for the bomb doesnt matter if, as Takeyh argues, neither the United States nor Israel has the will to stop it. As much as these two countries focus on the Iranian nuclear program, strategic surprise is still possible. Still, it is incredibly difficult to imagine a scenario in which either the United States or Israel knowingly allows Iran to cross the nuclear threshold. Israel has ramped up training for a military strike on Irans nuclear sites. For decades, every U.S. president has pledged not to allow Iran to acquire nuclear weapons, and President Joe Biden recently stated that if diplomacy fails, the United States will turn to other options. A military strike to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons may be one of the few remaining foreign policy decisions that would have the support of a majority of Democrats and Republicans in Congress. Launching one would be a far easier decision than allowing Iran to cross the nuclear Rubicon.

In Takeyhs hypothetical scenario, a nuclear Iran would prompt a U.S.-led global backlash that would cut the Iranian regime off from the global economy and deny it the benefits of nuclear weapons. Realizing this, the Iranian public would become disillusioned and ultimately overthrow the regime; a new, pro-U.S. leadership would emerge in its place and dismantle Irans nuclear weapons.

In reality, things would probably play out much differently. First, a global pressure campaign against Iran would be unlikely to emerge. There would especially be little support for sanctions whose true goal was regime changea policy even most U.S. allies would reject. Although an Iranian nuclear test would be condemned across the globe and lead to a temporary spike in support for new penalties against Tehran, enthusiasm would wane in the subsequent months and years. China and Russiawhich seek to check U.S. ambitions, sell Iran military equipment, and (in Chinas case) buy Iranian oilwould likely defy any push to isolate Iran. Despite the best efforts of the United States, the result would be a leaky sanctions regime that would get leakier over time.

Takeyh is right that North Koreawhich challenges his argument because it has managed to hold on to power and its nuclear weapons despite massive pressureisnt the right comparison, because its isolation is in part by design. North Korea is also the clear historical outlier: international pressure against proliferators tends to gradually lessen once they cross the nuclear threshold. A better comparison therefore would be to the international response to Indias and Pakistans nuclear weapons tests in 1998, which triggered a public outcry and U.S. congressional sanctions. Those sanctions were gradually eased, and the international community had little appetite for imposing high economic costs given the low likelihood that New Delhi and Islamabad would disarm. Irans connection to the global economy creates vulnerabilities, but it also means that trying to squeeze the country to the point of collapse would not work.

The theory that a nuclear-armed Iran would stand idle as the United States tries to suffocate it is not one worth testing.

Although Takeyh acknowledges that a nuclear-armed Iran would pose significant challenges to the United States, he tends to assume that addressing these issues would be relatively easy and straightforward because, as he puts it, they would prompt a much-needed reset of U.S. policy that refocuses its attention on Iran and the region. In reality, the United States would face tough choices about its commitments to allies and how to balance those requirements against other significantand probably more importantsecurity threats from China and Russia. Takeyhs recommendation that Washington deploy nuclear weapons to the Gulf states is a case in point. It is questionable whether Congress or the American people would support such a move. It also probably isnt necessary given that the United States can already target Iran with nuclear weapons from halfway across the globe. And placing U.S. nuclear weapons on Irans borders could actually increase the risks that Tehran would use a nuclear weapon in a crisis because the regime might feel pressured to use them or lose them.

This leads to perhaps the most dangerous flaw in Takeyhs argument: trying to destabilize and induce the overthrow of an unsavory regime armed with nuclear weapons is flirting with disaster. The United States worries about and usually seeks to avoid political instability in nuclear states precisely because of the risk of theft, loss, or the unintended use of nuclear weapons. The theory that a nuclear-armed Iran would stand idle as the United States tries to suffocate it is not one worth testing.

Moreover, it is also unclear why the Iranian public would revolt against the attainment of a nuclear weapons capability. Even though polls show that most Iranians are opposed to weaponization today, support would probably shift following a test that many would view as a major achievement and a source of national pride. Those same polls consistently show that Iranians support their countrys nuclear program, even though it has come at a significant cost. And even if the regime were to collapse, Takeyh is too confident that it would be replaced by a pro-American leadership willing to dismantle Irans nuclear arsenal. A more hard-line faction could take controlor a set of leaders friendlier to the United States and its allies may still see value in holding on to nuclear weapons to burnish their credentials at home or to use as a bargaining chip. Trying to base an entire policy around predicting the outcome of a revolution seems misguided.

Rather than resigning itself to the inevitability of an Iranian bomb, the United States should instead focus on preventing Iran from crossing the nuclear threshold. The best way of doing that remains reaching a deal with Iran that rolls back its nuclear program under close international monitoring in exchange for sanctions relief. That is harder today given the Trump administrations withdrawal from the 2015 deal and Irans subsequent nuclear progress. But history suggests two reasons for optimism: Iran is not committed to the bomb, and its decisions on its nuclear program can be influenced. The task for Washington is to convince Iran that its interests are better served by reaching a deal than by escalating its nuclear program. To do that, the United States should keep the military option in its back pocket, stay open to a diplomatic solution, and remain flexible on alternatives to the imperiled nuclear agreement.

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A Nuclear Iran Is Not Inevitable: Why the World Cannot Give Up on Diplomacy - Foreign Affairs Magazine