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February 22, 2024

By Kelly Shannon

Ever since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Irans leaders have believed that the United States seeks regime change to roll back the Islamic revolution and restore US hegemony in Iran. Yet the United States has not pursued this as a policy goal, nor has US policy appeared to include direct interference in Irans domestic affairs. Instead, in recent years, US policymakers seem to have assigned Iranand the Middle East more broadlya lower priority than other areas like Ukraine, and have pursued a policy of containment toward Iran so that US attention could be focused elsewhere.

This policy has clearly failed. The Islamic Republic has become increasingly confident in its international behavior and domestic repression, bolstered by the belief that the Westespecially the United Statesis too weak to stop it. The result is that Iran today is a significant threat to stability, peace, and human rights in the Middle East. The October 7, 2023, attack by Irans client Hamas on Israel and subsequent attacks on shipping by the Iran-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen underscore two important realities: first, the crucial importance of Middle Eastern stability to global affairs; second, a dire need for the United States to overhaul its Iran policy. If the United States does not change its approach to Iran, the Islamic Republics behavior and regional stability will only worsen.

The time is ripe for policy change. Despite harsh international sanctions, the clerical establishment has not moderated its behavior and flouts those sanctions, such as when it sells oil to China. Limited US engagement with Iran has also failed to rein in Tehrans worst impulses. Despite the successful signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, the unilateral US withdrawal from that agreement during the Donald Trump administration incentivized Iran to continue enriching uranium. The lack of consistency between US administrations makes a successful return to the negotiating table on nuclear issues unlikely. Meanwhile, Iran continues to engage in hostage diplomacy and flagrantly violates the human rights of its people. Its missile strikes against Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan on January 15 and January 16 also indicate the regimes increasing willingness to use military force against its neighbors and project power outside its borders, which risks further destabilizing an already unstable region.

The world has changed since US policy on Iran was last set. An influential bloc of countriesled by Russia and Chinahas arisen to challenge the US-led international order. Iran has gained important allies by joining this bloc. Tehrans growing partnerships with Moscow and Beijing provide it with diplomatic support, an economic lifeline, and increasing military prestige through its aid to Russia in the Ukraine war. Quite simply, the world today is far less united in its condemnation of Irans behaviorand its support for democracy, human rights, and the rule of lawthan in previous decades. US policy must adapt to account for this geopolitical shift.

Yet Irans domestic situation has also changed dramatically in a way that could benefit US policy objectives. While Iran faced multiple waves of popular protest over the past two decades, the Woman, Life, Freedom uprising that began in September 2022 distinctly differs from earlier protests. While previous protests called for reform, many Iranians now declared that reforming the Islamic Republic is impossible. The current movement calls for nothing less than the end of the clerical establishment and the creation of a secular democracy. US policymakers should take note of this critical shift. Should a democratic Iran develop, it would solve most of the problems with Irans current behavior. A stable, democratic Iran would be greatly in the US national interest.

While the mass protests of 20222023 have died down, Iranian citizens, especially women, continue to defy the regime. The Iranian people are not likely to change their views on the theocracy, and the regime cannot survive in the long term in the face of such widespread domestic opposition. After four decades of an oppressive, corrupt, ineffective government, there is not much more for the Iranian people to lose but much to be gained by seeking radical change. However, the regimes brutally violent crackdown on protesters and anyone who expresses the slightest hint of anti-regime sentiment indicates that mass protests alone will be insufficient to topple the governmentthe tactics of 1979 are not enough in the 2020s. Additional strategies are necessary, and international support will be critical to ensuring the success of any mass democratic movement in Iran.

The United States should, therefore, develop a new policy aimed at supporting the Iranian people in changing their government system. This must not be a policy of regime change in the traditional sense. While the United States has historically had success in overtly or covertly overthrowing foreign governmentsincluding ousting Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh in 1953it has been bad at managing the long-term consequences of such actions. The outcomes of the post-9/11 US wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are but the most recent examples.

Iranian history also proves that regime change cannot come from the outside. Any government imposed by a foreign poweror that even appears to bewill lack domestic legitimacy. Ever since Irans constitutional revolution in 19051911, ending foreign influence over Irans leaders has been a major reason why Iranians opposedand toppledprevious governments, including the Pahlavi monarchy in 1979. Thus, any government that replaces the Islamic Republic must be understood by the Iranian people as entirely indigenous in origin. It can have foreign alliances, but cannot be installed by foreign intervention. The traditional US approach of using military intervention or a coup to accomplish regime change would irredeemably taint whichever government replaces the current theocracy.

Instead of traditional regime change, the United States should adopt a two-pronged approach to assist the Iranian people in their pursuit of democratic change. In the short term, US policymakers should continue to engage in difficult diplomacy and deterrence with the Islamic Republic to try to reduce Irans bad behavior as much as possible, while keeping in mind that genuine dtente with the regime is not possible given its ideology, in which anti-Americanism is a core element.

In the long term, the United States should implement a policy of overtly and covertly helping the Iranian people create the conditions to build and sustain a successful mass movement to democratize Iran and align its behavior with global norms and the rule of law, especially regarding human rights. To achieve this long-term goal, US policymakers must resist the urge to take the lead; they must instead listen to anti-regime Iranians in the country, especially experienced womens rights activists, and dissidents in exile, and help the Iranian people empower themselves to lead the change in their country.

Such a policy approach is rare in US history. Yet there are precedents when Americans supported positive change abroad by adopting a supportive role and genuine commitment to democracy and human rights that successfully secured US objectives and international security. Rather than direct intervention, subtle forms of US support for anti-communist movements in Eastern Europe during the late Cold War, especially the Solidarity Movement in Poland, helped those movements ultimately overthrow their communist governments on their own, build nascent democratic systems, and end the Cold War in 19891991. While the US government hesitated for decades to condemn the South African apartheid regime, the US publics vocal support for the anti-apartheid movement and active participation in divestment helped the South African people end racial apartheid and build an inclusive democratic government led by Nelson Mandela in 1994. Updating these approaches for the twenty-first century could go a long way toward helping Iranians build an Iran that is no longer a threat to its own people or regional stability.

US policymakers could deploy various tools on multiple fronts to accomplish this objective, and the United States would need to do this in partnership with its democratic allies. Countries with no problematic history of dominating Iransuch as Ireland, South Africa, Mauritius, New Zealand, or Japanwould be best suited to this work. In essence, dissident Iranians need space, resources, meaningful international support, and a measure of protection to organize a powerful opposition movement. US policy would serve to support these suppressed voices in Iran.

To implement this policy, the United States would work covertly with Iranians and overtly to marshal international support for the Iranian people. In Iran, US policymakers should identify as many key in-country individuals with whom to work as possible. Ideally, these should be people with local or national influence who can get things done, show leadership potential, bring diverse perspectives to the table, and have clear ideas for what a post-Islamic Republic Iran should look like. Irans prisons are full of such leaders; many more are emerging across the country. The United States would work with this cohort to help create and run workshops for Iranians on democratic capacity building, strategic planning, governance best practices, and help with ideas for economic support for movement participants, as well as connect these Iranians with activists abroad with relevant experience. The United States should also find a way to provide reliable, safe internet access that is not easy for the regime to hack or trace, which will be essential for movement organizing and education efforts.

Along the way, US policymakers must resist the urge to anoint a particular opposition leader, avoiding another Ahmed Chalabi situation. The Iranian people will choose their leaders in a post-Islamic Republic future, which is as it should be.

The United States could, however, attempt to unify the Iranian diaspora. The unprecedented coming together of the diaspora in support of the Woman, Life, Freedom movement provided protesters on the ground with much-needed moral support and international amplification of their voices. When the coalition of diasporic leaders collapsed by late spring 2023, it was a major blow to the movement on the ground in Iran. Building solidarity and unity within the long-factionalized diaspora will be difficult. Still, a unified diasporic voiceand fundingsupporting the opposition movement in Iran will be a key component in such a movements ultimate success.

At the international level, the United States and its allies must keep the worlds attention on Iran. There is already significant support for Iranians among the global public, as evidenced by the many worldwide solidarity protests during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement. Governments must align with this global public opinion. Just as the United States and its allies did with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the international community must consistently and loudly condemn all human rights violations and political repression by the Islamic Republic. International condemnation of Irans behavior through unified statements by a coalition of anti-regimepreferably, democraticgovernments, as well as unified rejection of Iran holding influential human rights-related positions in the United Nations or its representation at legitimizing international forums like the World Economic Forum in Davos, would help maintain international pressure on the Islamic Republic.

The regime is not immune to global pressure to moderate its behavior. US policymakers could also do much to encourage enhanced US public support for the people of Iran. International media, US policymakers, and democratic allies can use knowledge and truth as weapons; the Islamic Republic relies on lies and deception. Shining a harsh light on those lies and countering them with truth will be a valuable approach to combatting autocracy and oppression. Propaganda efforts to drive a wedge between Russia and Iran, as well as undermine its support by the rank-and-file within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and military, would also help weaken the regime.

If, as President Joe Biden has insisted, the greatest global challenge today is the war between autocracy and democracy, then Iran is a major front in that war. The Woman, Life, Freedom uprising is the most consequential mass democratic movement in the world today. Supporting the growth, maturation, and ultimate success of this movement is not only morally right, but a strategically logical position for the United States to take. This policy will require years of commitment and a redefinition of what regime change policy looks like, but helping the Iranian people end the Islamic Republics bad behavior would be a major victory for democracy, human rights, and, ultimately, global stability. Iranians have the will and capacity to create a brighter future. Will US policymakers choose to help?

Dr. Kelly J. Shannonis a 20232024 W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell national fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and associate professor of history at Florida Atlantic University.

Image: Protestors release smoke in Iran's colors during a protest against the Islamic regime in Iran marking the 45th anniversary of the revolution, Washington, DC, February 10, 2024. The event comes amid rising tensions between Iran and the United States following the October 7, 2024, Hamas attacks in Israel, and amid the continuing Woman, Life, Freedom Movement that began with the death of Zhina Mahsa Amino in September, 2022. (Photo by Allison Bailey/NurPhoto)

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The United States needs a new Iran policyand it involves regime change, but not the traditional kind - Atlantic Council

The UN nuclear watchdog has voiced growing concern over Irans ability to build nuclear weapons, fuelled by public statements in the country, a confidential report seen by AFP said.

Tensions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have repeatedly flared up since a 2015 deal curbing Tehrans nuclear program in exchange for sanction relief fell apart.

In the report, IAEA head Rafael Grossi says that public statements made in Iran regarding its technical capabilities to produce nuclear weapons only increase the director generals concerns about the correctness and completeness of Irans safeguards declarations.

In recent years, Iran has gradually decreased its cooperation with the IAEA by deactivating surveillance devices needed to monitor the nuclear program and barring inspectors among other measures.

Grossi reiterates his call on Tehran to cooperate fully and unambiguously with the agency, as relations between the two parties have been steadily deteriorating.

Only through constructive and meaningful engagement can these concerns be addressed, Grossi said in a confidential quarterly report.

Iran has significantly ramped up its nuclear program and now has enough material to build several atomic bombs.

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IAEA increasingly concerned over Iran's nuclear weapon capability - The Times of Israel

Iran fires a Shahab-3 medium-range ballistic missile during an undated test. The Shahab-3 has a range of 2,000 km, enough to reach Israel. Missile forces are a key part of Iran's security concept. (Credit: Fars News Agency, via Wikimedia Commons)

Last November, a report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) provided insights into the sustained and unprecedented progress of Irans nuclear program, including the alarming update about a speed-up in its uranium enrichment. While the ongoing conflict in the Middle East continues to capture both regional and global attention, the IAEA report serves as a striking reminder that the Iranian nuclear challenge persists, and with it a substantial risk of regional escalation.

Two opposing dynamics are at play in the region: a growing Iranian confidence in its long-term strategy, and the erosion of Israeli confidence in maintaining its national security. These create fertile and perilous ground for a potential direct confrontation, in which the nuclear issue would be central.

It is time to change course, find alternatives to the ineffective current policies, and avoid a strategic mistake that will enable Iran to get closer to a nuclear weapon.

The United States and its allies should present Iran with a final proposal to return to an agreement framework for Tehrans nuclear program; if declined, talks must be halted. This approach must be accompanied by alternative measures to diminish Irans confidence in the efficacy of its current aggressive strategy. Such measures should include clearly communicating a red line to Iran regarding progression toward weaponization of its nuclear programand also communicating, through private back channels, that the United States has developed contingency plans to attack Irans nuclear facilities and other targets important to the Iranian regime should the red line be crossed. It is equally crucial, however, to avoid cornering Iran in a manner that further incentivizes nuclear advancement, recognizing its need to maintain counter-leverage.

At the same time, any plan regarding the Iranian nuclear program must address Israeli concerns to help mitigate the risk of unilateral actions originating from Jerusalem. A provisional solution that sustains rivalry but establishes well-defined rules could prove advantageous for all parties involved and may pave the way for future substantial de-escalation.

Irans growing confidence. Since the Hamas attack on October 7, Iran has affirmed the effectiveness of its national security strategy, including patient and consistent encirclement of its adversaries including Israel, Saudi Arabia, and US forces. The current Middle East war reveals that Irans armed allies in Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, and Gaza (known as the axis of resistance) showcase an offensive regional capability with growing willingness to challenge opposing countries.

Irans regime has also strengthened its public perception, positioning itself as a regional patron equivalent to the United States. In some Iranian military circles, the conflict is perceived as proof that weakening Israel is an attainable objective within its strategic reach.

In addition, Iran has gleaned that the United States is willing to increase power projection in the Middle East during a crisis and is maintaining strong support for Israel. Nevertheless, some argue that Tehran also perceives the United States as notably cautious, reluctant to engage in unilateral action, and willing to act against Irans proxies within coalitions, to avoid a direct confrontation.

From an operational point of view, Iran has obtained evidence from the Hamas attack that concealing and deceiving Israel on security matters is indeed feasible, even within Jerusalems immediate sphere of influence.

Israel on the other hand has undergone a national trauma due to the unprecedented scale, level of violence, and surprise of the Hamas attack. For many Israelis, the attack intensified the fundamental fear that external risks may evolve into an existential challenge that the countrys current national security strategy is insufficient to deter. Israelis increasingly recognize that the Iranian strategy to encircle Israel with threats is gaining momentum. Some argue that Irans actions serve as evidence of its profound hostile intentions and threat to Israels future.

The United States has now come to realize that the challenges in the Middle East will persist, contrary to what officials hoped until the Hamas attack. The region is highly volatile and will remain so for the foreseeable future, therefore necessitating continuous diplomatic and security attention.

Although neither Israel nor Iran seems to seek a direct confrontation, the recent fighting, the consistent trends toward escalation in recent years, and the evolving geopolitical landscape are all pushing toward a more precarious outcome.

Iran gears up. Irans security concept is shaped by the synergy of its regional proxy strategy, latent nuclear deterrent, and military focus on missiles and droneselements that interconnect.

The recent success of the axis of resistance strategy may amplify Iranian confidence in its efficacy. It could reinforce the belief that Tehran can navigate and mitigate the risks associated with an increasingly aggressive approach in the region. The absence of direct consequences for supporting belligerent allies may further solidify the perception of the righteousness of its strategic trajectory. This, in turn, might indirectly embolden assertiveness within other facets of the Iranian security concept, including the nuclear program, albeit not in the short term.

While Iran currently faces no immediate need to enhance its deterrence capacity, there is a looming concern that over time, the regime may succumb to a growing temptation to advance further in the nuclear field. Considering the limited response to its nuclear progress in recent years, Iran might seize the opportunity to gain experience and gradually normalize advanced capabilities, such as uranium metal production and uranium enrichment that produces bomb-grade fissile material.

The international communitys focus on other issues, coupled with Israels intelligence failure to foresee the October 7 attack, may inadvertently increase voices in Tehran advocating further advancement in Irans nuclear creep. This incentive might increase if both the United States and Israel keep their focus on severe challenges of domestic politics, and after regional tension relief that allows international attention to return to other arenas. The future expiration of limitations on Irans nuclear program, as agreed upon in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), also known as the Iran nuclear deal, may further enhance this trend.

In addition, a perceived failure in another component of its security apparatus could also motivate Iran to pursue advancements in its nuclear capabilities. This could be triggered, for instance, by an Israeli offensive action that significantly undermines the success of the axis of resistance. In such a scenario, hawkish elements within the Iranian regime might determine that nuclear capabilitiesas opposed to the proxy strategyoffer a more sustainable and effective deterrent against adversaries.

A dramatic change in domestic or geopolitical conditions such as the risk-averse supreme leaders death or a normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia that allows Riyadh to possess a civilian nuclear program, might push Iran closer to such a shift.

Israels anxiousness. Israels heightened sense of threat compels it to reconsider the status quo, especially in Gaza and possibly in Lebanon. The demonstration of Israels weakness on October 7 may amplify calls in Jerusalem for more independent actions against what Israel sees as the octopus head in Tehran.

Current Israeli officials have been wary not to engage in unilateral moves that could endanger US interests. Although this cautious strategy may prevail, especially given the US support during the current Middle East fighting and considering the upcoming presidential elections in the United States, the trajectory may eventually change.

A shift in US policy vis a vis Iran, which includes a de facto abandonment of the fuel cycle limitations toward a focus on preventing weaponization, might raise concerns in Israel about a threat perception gap between the two nations.

A widening distrust between President Joe Biden and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus right-wing government could potentially further prompt Israel to rely more on its own capabilities and consider unilateral action against Iran.

If Irans nuclear progress continues and approaches a threatening red line, the Israeli government, influenced by a heightened public threat perception, may feel compelled to implement its well-known preventive strategy, akin to past actions against nuclear facilities in Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007. If Netanyahus right-wing government stays in power, and former President Donald Trump reenters office next year, the chances for such a move might increase.

Changing course. Adverting escalation dynamics between Israel and Iran in the nuclear realm will be one of the most central and complex challenges to the Middle East in the years to come.

The primary objective should remain the pursuit of an agreement that diminishes Irans current fuel cycle capabilities and addresses the military dimensions of its nuclear program. Nevertheless, at present, the prospect of Iran and the United States reestablishing a sustainable agreement on the nuclear realm appears dim.

In the diplomatic realm, the United States and its allies should present Iran with a definitive and time-bound sincere offer to re-engage within an agreement framework, even if on a partial basis. Should Iran not accept this proposal, negotiations must be postponed until circumstances change, for example, after the presidential elections. Prolonged, inconclusive talks without tangible outcomes create ambiguity, undermine the credibility of alternative options, and allow Iran to exploit the absence of clear rules and consequencesas it showed in recent years.

In the event of failure to reach a long-lasting agreement, the US and its allies must implement alternative measures to impede Irans progress, with the prevention of nuclearization as the main priority. Simultaneously, addressing Israeli concerns regarding the nuclear program can help mitigate the risk of unilateral moves originating from Jerusalem.

A viable preventive strategy could base itself on eroding Irans confidence in the effectiveness of its aggressive approach while bolstering deterrent measures without triggering escalation. Accordingly, there should be an updated US contingency plan to target nuclear infrastructure and official regime targets, and its extent should be clearly but privately conveyed to the Iranian leadership, to establish a potential clear and substantial cost for regime stability.

By seeking a more risk-prone approach, the United States can reduce Irans confidence in advancing its nuclear program. Until 2015, such a muscular approach, combined with diplomacy, was used to prompt Iran to compromise, recalibrate its course on nuclear progress, and re-engage within an agreement framework.

The current crisis and US power projection in the Middle East can be leveraged as an opportunity to bolster the credibility of a new approach toward Iran. Maintaining a threatening presence in the region, even if intermittent, challenges Irans assumption of its ability to manage and mitigate the risks of its long-term strategy, especially if portrayed as a consequence of the violence originated by the axis of resistance.

It is crucial to reduce the risk of unilateral actions by Jerusalem against Iran, especially if an interim arrangement leaves Iran in an advanced technological state and places Israel in a passive position. The upcoming year should therefore be used to bolster Israels confidence in the existence of a future substantial Plan B against Irans nuclear program.

Given the profound mistrust between Iran and the West, and the challenges in reaching a lasting agreement, a provisional solution that maintains the status of conflict while establishing well-defined rules to prevent weaponization could prove advantageous for all parties involved. This approach would allow Iran to uphold an image of assertiveness and external rivalry, which can be attributed to domestic challenges. Simultaneously, Israel can gain security assurances from the United States on a matter of existential importance while keeping some maneuvering room, whereas the United States can project power, focus attention on other rivals, and avoid intense criticism at home.

This delicate equilibrium has the potential to establish a new status quo and, in the long term, may serve as a foundation for future de-escalation initiatives.

In conjunction with the proactive measures needed to counter the Iranian nuclear threat, it may be prudent for those addressing this challenge to incorporate, to some extent, the strategic patience observed by the Iranian regime itself.

The ongoing internal processes indicating public disaffection with the Iranian regime are anticipated to persist and potentially intensify in the coming years. Whether this takes three, five, or 15 years, the most significant potential for a sustainable alteration in the trajectory of Irans nuclear advancement lies in a natural change within the current hawkish regime.

After several years of attempts failed to yield the desired results and the risks of escalation intensify, current policies can no longer be relied upon uncritically. To avoid a strategic mistake in the Israel-Iran relations, it is time to consider alternatives.

Originally posted here:
How to avoid nuclear escalation as a confident Iran and insecure Israel square off - Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

A man charged with participating in a plot hatched in Iran to assassinate Masih Alinejad, an Iranian American human rights activist and a sharp critic of Irans repression of women, has been extradited to the United States, American authorities said on Wednesday.

The man, Polad Omarov, 39, was turned over to representatives of the U.S. government at Vaclav Havel Airport in Prague on Wednesday morning, Reuters reported, citing a statement from the Czech Justice Ministry. He was arrested in the Czech Republic in January 2023.

A federal indictment unsealed in New York last year said Mr. Omarov and three co-conspirators were part of an Eastern European criminal organization known by its members as Thieves-in-Law, which has ties to Iran and in 2022 was given the assignment to kill Ms. Alinejad, a journalist in Brooklyn.

Federal prosecutors in Manhattan have said that Mr. Omarov, a citizen of Georgia, held a leadership role in the organization and resided in Eastern Europe.

This matter is going to be over today, brother, Mr. Omarov said in a message to one of his co-conspirators in July 2022, shortly before another plotter, Khalid Mehdiyev, an Azerbaijani man living in Yonkers, N.Y., was found with a loaded AK-47-style assault rifle outside Ms. Alinejads house, the indictment charged. I told them to make a birthday present for me, Mr. Omarov wrote.

At the time, Mr. Mehdiyev, at the direction of Mr. Omarov and another man, Rafat Amirov, was preparing imminently to execute the attack on Ms. Alinejad, the indictment said.

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Man Extradited to U.S. in Suspected Iranian Plot to Kill Activist - The New York Times

Hungarian Foreign Minister Pter Szijjrt visited Tehran on 22 February and met with Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, despite the fact that Iran is actively supporting Russia in its war against Ukraine.

Source: European Pravda, citing Hungarian media outlet MTI

Details: Szijjrt, who was taking part in a Hungarian-Iranian business forum in Tehran, said the two countries are interested in developing economic cooperation in areas that are not affected by sanctions, such as pharmaceuticals, healthcare, the food industry, and water management.

He announced on Facebook that he had signed a bilateral agreement that would "open up even greater access to the Iranian market for high-quality Hungarian agricultural technology and food products".

At a joint press conference with his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Szijjrt said he had come to Tehran to prevent an escalation of the conflict in the Middle East, which would pose a "huge threat to global security".

Szijjrt made only a passing mention of the 7 October 2023 terrorist attack on Israel by Iran-backed Hamas militants and the attacks on civilian vessels by Yemeni Houthis, who are also sponsored by the Iranian regime.

He made no mention at all of the fact that Tehran is providing military assistance to Russia to wage its war in Ukraine, which contradicts Hungary's position that no one should provide weapons to either side in the "conflict".

Ironically, it was reported just before the Hungarian foreign minister's visit that Iran had sent several hundred ballistic missiles to Russia for strikes against Ukraine.

This is not the first time that Hungary has sought to build relations with countries from the modern-day "axis of evil". In 2022, Szijjrt welcomed the Iranian minister of economy, and in 2023, he travelled to Belarus and shook hands with its self-styled president, Alexander Lukashenko. Senior Hungarian officials are also the only ones in the EU who have continued to travel to Russia since the outbreak of the full-scale war in Ukraine.

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Hungarian foreign minister visiting Iran for trade negotiations "forgot" that Tehran supplies Russia with weapons - Yahoo News