Iran criticizes UNSC inaction regarding Israel #39;s airstrike in Syria
Iran #39;s ambassador to UN also said the fact that Israel #39;s impunity does not serve peace and security in the world and will lead to the deaths of more innocent...
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Iran sees the #39;opportunity #39; for a deal with Washington on the nuclear issue
At a meeting at the Munich Security Conference Iran #39;s Foreign Minister Javad Zarif said there is an "opportunity for a deal" with world powers over Iran #39;s disputed nuclear programme. The US...
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Iran sees the 'opportunity' for a deal with Washington on the nuclear issue - Video
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The nuclear program of Iran was launched in the 1950s with the help of the United States as part of the Atoms for Peace program.[1] The participation of the United States and Western European governments in Iran's nuclear program continued until the 1979 Iranian Revolution that toppled the Shah of Iran.[2]
After the 1979 revolution, a clandestine nuclear weapons research program was disbanded by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (19021989), who considered such weapons as haram (sinful) and forbidden as unethical and immoral in Muslim jurisprudence.[3] Iran has signed treaties repudiating the possession of weapons of mass destruction including the Biological Weapons Convention,[4] the Chemical Weapons Convention,[5] and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).[6]
Iran's nuclear program has included several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants.[7]
Iran's first nuclear power plant, BushehrI reactor was complete with major assistance of Russian government agency Rosatom and officially opened on 12 September 2011.[8] Iran has announced that it is working on a new 360 MW nuclear power plant to be located in Darkhovin. The Russian engineering contractor Atomenergoprom said the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant would reach full capacity by the end of 2012.[9] Iran has also indicated that it will seek more medium-sized nuclear power plants and uranium mines in the future.[10]
In a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the United States Intelligence Community assessed that Iran had ended all "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work" in 2003.[11] In 2012, U.S. intelligence agencies reported that Iran was pursuing research that could enable it to produce nuclear weapons, but was not attempting to do so.[12]
In November 2011, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors criticized Iran after an IAEA report concluded that before 2003 Iran likely had undertaken research and experiments geared to developing a nuclear weapons capability.[13] The IAEA report details allegations that Iran conducted studies related to nuclear weapons design, including detonator development, the multiple-point initiation of high explosives, and experiments involving nuclear payload integration into a missile delivery vehicle.[14] A number of Western nuclear experts have stated there was very little new in the report, that it primarily concerned Iranian activities prior to 2003,[15] and that media reports exaggerated its significance.[16] Iran threatened to reduce its cooperation with the IAEA.[17][18]
In 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) first reported that Iran had not declared sensitive enrichment and reprocessing activities.[19] Enrichment can be used to produce uranium for reactor fuel or (at higher enrichment levels) for weapons.[20] Iran says its nuclear program is peaceful,[21] and has enriched uranium to less than 5%, consistent with fuel for a civilian nuclear power plant.[22] Iran also claims that it was forced to resort to secrecy after US pressure caused several of its nuclear contracts with foreign governments to fall through.[23] After the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the UN Security Council, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities[24] while Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has argued that the sanctions are "illegal," imposed by "arrogant powers," and that Iran has decided to pursue the monitoring of its self-described peaceful nuclear program through "its appropriate legal path," the International Atomic Energy Agency.[25]
After public allegations about Iran's previously undeclared nuclear activities, the IAEA launched an investigation that concluded in November 2003 that Iran had systematically failed to meet its obligations under its NPT safeguards agreement to report those activities to the IAEA, although it also reported no evidence of links to a nuclear weapons program. The IAEA Board of Governors delayed a formal finding of non-compliance until September 2005, and reported that non-compliance to the UN Security Council in February 2006. After the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's noncompliance with its safeguards agreement to the United Nations Security Council, the Council demanded that Iran suspend its enrichment programs. The Council imposed sanctions after Iran refused to do so. A May 2009 U.S. Congressional Report suggested "the United States, and later the Europeans, argued that Iran's deception meant it should forfeit its right to enrich, a position likely to be up for negotiation in talks with Iran."[26]
In exchange for suspending its enrichment program, Iran has been offered "a long-term comprehensive arrangement which would allow for the development of relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program."[27] However, Iran has consistently refused to give up its enrichment program, arguing that the program is necessary for its energy security, that such "long term arrangements" are inherently unreliable, and would deprive it of its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology. In June 2009, in the immediate wake of the disputed Iranian presidential election, Iran initially agreed to a deal to relinquish its stockpile of low-enriched uranium in return for fuel for a medical research reactor, but then backed out of the deal.[28] Currently, thirteen states possess operational enrichment or reprocessing facilities,[29] and several others have expressed an interest in developing indigenous enrichment programs.[30] Iran's position was endorsed by the Non-Aligned Movement, which expressed concern about the potential monopolization of nuclear fuel production.[31]
To address concerns that its enrichment program may be diverted to non-peaceful uses,[32] Iran has offered to place additional restrictions on its enrichment program including, for example, ratifying the Additional Protocol to allow more stringent inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency, operating the uranium enrichment facility at Natanz as a multinational fuel center with the participation of foreign representatives, renouncing plutonium reprocessing and immediately fabricating all enriched uranium into reactor fuel rods.[33] Iran's offer to open its uranium enrichment program to foreign private and public participation mirrors suggestions of an IAEA expert committee which was formed to investigate the methods to reduce the risk that sensitive fuel cycle activities could contribute to national nuclear weapons capabilities.[34] Some non-governmental U.S. experts have endorsed this approach.[35][36] The United States has insisted that Iran must meet the demands of the UN Security Council to suspend its enrichment program.[citation needed] In every other case in which the IAEA Board of Governors made a finding of safeguards non-compliance involving clandestine enrichment or reprocessing, the resolution has involved (in the cases of Iraq[37] and Libya[38][39][40]) or is expected to involve (in the case of North Korea[41][42]) at a minimum ending sensitive fuel cycle activities. According to Pierre Goldschmidt, former deputy director general and head of the department of safeguards at the IAEA, and Henry D. Sokolski, Executive Director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, some other instances of safeguards noncompliance reported by the IAEA Secretariat (South Korea, Egypt) were never reported to the Security Council because the IAEA Board of Governors never made a formal finding of non-compliance.[43][44] Though South Korea's case involved enriching uranium to levels near weapons grade,[45] the country itself voluntarily reported the isolated activity[46] and Goldschmidt has argued "political considerations also played a dominant role in the board's decision" to not make a formal finding of non-compliance.[47]
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Nuclear program of Iran - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
February 8 at 5:35 PM
Here is a full transcript of the session at the Munich Security Conference on Sunday in which David Ignatius of The Washington Post interviewed Mohammad Javad Zarif, Irans foreign minister:
David Ignatius: Its my pleasure to moderate this discussion today with Mohammad Javad Zarif, who is Irans foreign minister, chief negotiator in the nuclear talks with the group variously known as the EU3+3 or the P5+1. But, by whatever name, one of the most important diplomatic negotiations of my lifetime.
So, lets get down to business. Dr. Zarif, its been written in the newspapers that you met yesterday with Secretary [John F.] Kerry here. Theres talk that you may actually be meeting again today for another meeting. And so I want to ask you in the way that Americans like to say, hows it going?
Mohammad Javad Zarif: First of all, let me say hello to everybody and its a great pleasure to be here. And, David, its good to have to share this podium with you today.
Actually we already met. Were both early birds, so we met from 7 to 9 this morning. It indicates how much importance we attach to this process. We already met once as I arrived on Friday. And we met once today, and in the course of yesterday I had meetings with other members of E3+3 Germany, U.K. and Russia. And Ill meet [French Foreign Minister] Laurent Fabius after this meeting. We are engaged in a very serious discussion.
The objective as [EU foreign affairs chief] Federica Mogherini just pointed out is rather clear. We set it out in the plan of action that we adopted historic in my view in Geneva in November of 2013 and that is the two objectives, which, in my view, is a singular objective, to make sure that Irans nuclear program remains exclusively peaceful. That means that Iran should, in fact, be able to exercise its right to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, because without it exercising that right, its impossible to make sure that its peaceful.
And secondly, to make sure that its peaceful. And by that it means that all the restrictions that have been imposed on Iran through sanctions, which we consider unacceptable, to be lifted. And it is important to recognize the fact that we need to move in this direction simultaneously. That is, as Iran takes steps to reassure the international community that its program remains peaceful and the reason I use the word reassure is that over the last 10 years or more, Iran has been the subject of more IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections than probably any other country on the face of the Earth, and the IAEA has yet to find a single evidence that Irans program is anything but peaceful. So, we are prepared to reassure the international community it seems that quite a bit of reassurance is needed for some of our negotiating partners, at least. But, at the same time, it is important that restrictions that have been imposed on the Iranian people be lifted. These restrictions did not achieve their intended result.
You know that once, when the sanctions were imposed on Iran, Iran had less than 200 centrifuges. If the objective of the sanctions was to prevent Iran from developing its nuclear technology, they utterly failed because now we have 20,000 centrifuges. So we need to find another way, and I believe the E3+3 have come to realize that the only way to resolve this issue is through negotiations. And we have made quite a bit of success, and we make progress over the past many months.
DI: So, so let me ask you. Knowing now that you got up early and had breakfast with Secretary Kerry for yet another round of discussions. Come back to that. How its going, and let me rephrase that. What would you say, as of this morning, after the latest, meeting are the principal remaining obstacles to completing the comprehensive agreement that was outlined in the JPOA [joint plan of action]?
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Transcript: Iran foreign ministers remarks at Munich Security Conference