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(July 6, 2023 / JNS)

The abduction of Elizabeth Tsurkov is an achievement that Iran and its proxies can claim against Israel after a long streak of failures. Just recently its plot to target Israelis was thwarted in Cyprus. Israels security agencies even managed to have the would-be perpetrator interrogated on Iranian soil.

But in Iraq, which has become Irans backyard, such a plot was easier to carry out. Tsurkov, a Princeton scholar, was captured by the Shiite militia Kataib Hezbollah, which was formed by Irans Quds Force. Now Iran has a bargaining chip for which it can demand a heavy Israel price.

For quite some time now, the Iranians have been warning that they will avenge a string of assassinations attributed to Israel by foreign sources, including ofseveral figures linked to its nuclear project. The most high-ranking of those officials was Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the chief of Irans military nuclear endeavors.

There is one ray of hope: The United States could use its clout with Iraqs government to secure the scholars release. After all, she was there just so she could conduct research as part of her PhD dissertation. The United States still has troops in the country and, more importantly, leverage.

One example that attests to its influence was the United States issuing a waiver that would let Iraq hand over some $2.7 billion to Iran for various utility and gas bills.

But the Iraqi government is clearly pro-Iranian today. It is composed of a Shiite bloc that supports Tehran, and thus, it is unlikely that Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani would be keen to resolve this situation at the behest of Jerusalem.

Moreover, it is doubtful that Kataib Hezbollah would obey Iraqs central government in defiance of Iran. It was set up by Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, who was assassinated in 2020 together with then-Quds Force Commander Qassem Suleimani.

The militias stated goal is to rid the country of American forces. Striking a deal with the Americansand over an Israeli womanwould create problematic optics for the group holding her. Thus ultimately, the ball lies in the Iranian court. The release could hinge on what Iran gets in return.

The fact that Tsurkov has been missing for several months is not a good omen. Kataib Hezbollahs track record is also not encouraging. Only three years ago, Hisham al-Hashimi, a leading researcher on pro-Iranian militias, was shot to death by two armed men. Lets hope Tsurkov is spared a similar fate.

Originally published in Israel Hayom.

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Tsurkov's fate will ultimately depend on Iran - JNS.org

The US regularly updates its military options for threats from Irans evolving nuclear facilities, US Lt. Gen. and CENTCOM Air Force Chief Alexus Grynkewich told The Jerusalem Post in an exclusive interview.

Israel also seeks regularly to gauge how much of a threat Irans nuclear program presents and how much backing Jerusalem would have from the US if it needed to confront that threat with preemptive strikes. The Post asked the AFCENT chief whether the US military would continue to be able to potentially handle the threat from the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite the construction of a new, deep, underground nuclear facility at Natanz.

You can assume we are keeping a very close eye on Iranian facilities out there, continuing our evaluation of what it means, what Iran is using it for, what options we might have for those facilities, Grynkewich said.

His comments were some of the most detailed to date in terms of the US regularly working on and updating military options including with respect to new Iranian moves.

Despite the impressive capabilities of the US military, Grynkewich was queried about the possibility that deterrence from Washington was not working. For example, in spite of US threats and capabilities, Tehran in the last two years has managed to move its nuclear program forward to enriching significant quantities of uranium to the very high 60% level, as well as having sufficient quantities of enriched uranium for around seven nuclear bombs if Iran chose to cross the nuclear threshold.

Grynkewich answered, When I talk about the deterrence of Iran, there are several different things we are attempting to deter, as a matter of the US position in the region. Were certainly trying to deter attacks on ourselves or any of our regional partnersThere is an interplay of a couple of different things with respect to Iranian attacks on us.

When I talk about the deterrence of Iran, there are several different things we are attempting to deter, as a matter of the US position in the region. Were certainly trying to deter attacks on ourselves or any of our regional partners, he said.

He added that There is an interplay of a couple of different things with respect to Iranian attacks on us, clarifying that now the US is trying to ensure that the Iranians understand that even though the US doesnt have the same amount of forces in the region as it had previously, we can still bring those forces back very rapidly.

That, I do think, contributes to the deterrent effect against Iran, he said.

Next, Grynkewich said the US deters Iran by ensuring the strength of its partnerships in the region.

The partnership with Israel is of course extremely important to us, he said. We have an ironclad commitment to Israeli security.

He also said that there are a lot of our Arab partners in the region as well, where we intend to maintain a true partnership and not just a transactional relationship and stitch the region together in a more integrated fashion. The more we can do that, the more of a deterrent effect that has on Iran because they see that they are facing a unified front.

With respect to the nuclear program, Grynkewich was adamant: Every recent president has said we will not allow Iran to get a nuclear weapon.

Our job is to ensure that Iran does understand we can bring forces in here quickly to respond to any provocation. There are plenty of options on the table with respect to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Our job is to ensure that the military options are well thought out and robust, the US general said.

One element that Grynkewich has emphasized in multiple public comments is Task Force 99s contribution to stability in the region, including confronting Iran. He discussed the role Task Force 99 could have in confronting Iran and other adversaries in the region. The AFCENT chief said that the use of drones had grown exponentially over the past several years, particularly one-way attack drones. He suggested that if there were one-way attack drones or something else of which we could have a fleet of a very large number of unmanned platforms, which are relatively inexpensive, it is possible that they could be used to impose dilemmas on our adversaries.

Questioned about which kind of drones he was contemplating tactically, including kamikaze drones, Grynkewich responded, It could be a kamikaze version or it could be a non-kamikaze version. You know if you send a swarm of several hundred intelligence surveillance drones and reconnaissance drones somewhere, your adversary is going to have to react to it in some way, either to prevent the collection youre doing or to prevent an attack.

GRYNKEWICH HONED in on regional air defense, which Israel has publicly said it now has with Abraham Accords countries, and even some countries who have not yet joined the accords without naming names.

There is a requirement to share information, to share threat intelligence, to give point-outs if something is approaching from some axis. If there is a country that sees that, it should be willing to pick up the phone and call the country that its a threat to.

Regarding different kinds of threats and communications between the regional air defense countries, he explained, So, for a one-way attack UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle], that kind of sharing is really important. That works for UAVs, but it doesnt necessarily work for other kinds of threats that might be out there, like ballistic missiles, he said. With missiles you have seconds of reaction time, as opposed to what could be minutes or even hours, depending on the length of a UAV flight.

And somewhere in between those two scenarios, he said, there is an air threat, but, he said, thats not a major concern.

Although recently we have seen reporting on Iran potentially getting SU-35s [aircraft] from Russia. If that happens, that would become a larger concern for us as well. But all those kinds of threats are out there.

In fact, he said, if Tehran got SU-35s from Russia, it could alter the entire regional dynamics, though some of that would also depend on what armaments Moscow would provide and how long it would take the Iranians to train with the new aircraft.

Cruise missiles are another one, he added, noting that information about the cruise missiles that Iran has in their own inventory, and some of their partners and proxies, was widely reported. And the aim was to be able to detect those and respond more quickly than phone calls.

That is where were trying to go, he said, and that is where we require some sort of a digital connection. It can be something which enables human-to-human contact, just at a faster speed than a phone call using a chat function or classified versions of that where we can share information quickly with a broad group of people.

He explained that There are IP-based systems, which are not datalinks kind of like using a signal on your phone, but think of that on a secret computer system. Such a system enables communication to remain flat and faster, he said.

But really, if you get to Link 16 [a military communications network], if I can pass an actual threat track from one country to another, it enables nations to provide mutual defense of each other, if they have that understanding that they will defend each other in response to that threat, explained the air force commander.

What we bring at AFCENT to this, is a way that information comes into one location, it can be fused, and then different countries are willing to share different qualities of information or different speeds of information, he said.

As to the various countries potentially involved in such information-sharing, Grynkewich said that some might not be willing to share information if the US was not in the middle. He called the US a very useful place for information to come together.

The US can be the middleman he said, between two or more countries. If countries are willing to share, if there are three countries, we can help triangulate and correlate the data from say the radars that are picking up from whatever threat it is. And then send out one authoritative location of that threat entity to whichever the threatened country is.

ASKED ABOUT views that Iran had succeeded in moving advanced weapons to Lebanon and Gaza, while much of the world was distracted by the Iranian nuclear threat, Grynkewich answered by referring to the IDF. He said that he had a tremendous amount of respect for the Israeli air force, and the Israeli defense forces. He told the Post that Some of the best work I have seen is the interdiction work that your countrys forces are able to execute when they stop the flow of those weapons. Its a very difficult problem to stop all of them, but I have a ton of respect for what they are able to do.

Regarding the broader picture of the nature of the Iranian threat, he answered: All of the above.

We are all very concerned about an Iran nuclear weapon, he said.

Yet, On the military side, we are equally concerned about other asymmetric capabilities which the Iranians have The first are their air threats, including ballistic missiles, UAVs and cruise missiles. Thats a very complex combination of capabilities.

And if Iran would have the will to use those kinds of weapons and use them against an undefended location, then Tehran could meticulously pick off wherever is least defended, since not all things can be equally defended.

It is an asymmetric threat that we have to think about deterring, he said. The other asymmetric capability that they have are their partners and proxies, which now when you pair that with the UAVs and ballistic missiles, and the proliferation of those to proxy groups, you end up having a 360-degree threat to almost every country in the region, where those partners and proxies operating in other countries besides Iran can come at you from different axes.

Many of the countries here in the region have been attacked by the Iranians or by their proxies over the last three to four years, he said.

Grynkewich agreed with Israeli intelligence views that it was very plausible that Iran has used human catastrophes, like earthquake aid, to smuggle weapons to Syria.

DISCUSSING US-ISRAEL military relations and his personal connection to IDF Air Force Chief Maj. Gen.Tomer Bar, Grynkewich said: We were just talking yesterday, exchanging text messages. Tomer and I are very close.

They have been working on building their relationship since July 2022, shortly after he took over. I came a little after him. I tell you, I have got a lot of respect for him. He is a really good friend, a very serious, thoughtful leader.

Bar and Grynkewich enjoy flying together when the occasion permits. I got to fly with Tomer in Israel. Asked who the main pilot in their joint flight was, he laughed, He was the main pilot. But I would have gladly taken control of it We are trying to find the time to fly together again, maybe in separate aircrafts and a formation together I hope to do it in the coming months.

Of course, he said in private, there are a lot of smiles around airplanes... He has a good sense of humor very much like mine, being a little dry. Grynkewich said he had enjoyed hosting [Bar] in the US for a Red Flag [military drill] event.

In his previous job at US CENTCOM in Tampa, he said, he was fortunate to already have a very good relationship with IDF Maj. Gen. [Operations Command Chief] Oded Basiuk.

In the course of my engagements over the two years, Grynkewich said, I built up a fairly strong mutual understanding, with the key senior Israeli defense officials.

Looking back, he said, he first started visiting Israel when I was at [the USs] European command, in the 2010s, around 2010-2012. I had seven or eight trips to Israel. At the time, we were working on defensive plans.

During flights with Israeli civilians at Ben-Gurion Airport, he said that he found Israelis are extremely talkative, they want to know what you are doing and they are very interested in America and generally supportive of the US military.

On the subject of how the ups and downs between the Israel-US political leadership and in this case the tense relations between the Netanyahu and Biden administrations have impacted military relations, the AFCENT commander responded with some insight into how militaries work with each other.

Political relationships between nations do go up and down, between the US and all of our friends and partners, in this region and in other regions. Theyll go up and down, as nations interests clash with each other or as they have different perspectives on issues of policy.

Yet, At the military level, what our overall objective is and this is irrespective of the region of the world the military-to-military remains relatively steady.

The general explained that although policy guidance could come down which constrains things that we do, typically even our policymakers keep that isolated across the board, so they allow strong military-to-military relationships to continue.

They know that that relationship is foundational to long-term success. So we end up having a longer view on the military side of things.

Additionally, liaison teams carry out a lot of exchanges for intelligence purposes and that battle rhythm has endured over the years. It was the same back in 2010-2012. It certainly goes at a faster pace sometimes or at a slower pace at other times.

He cited common values and experiences between the countries as keeping the military relationship solid, even when there may be friction at the political level. The military connection Grynkewich said, is driven by other things in the operational environment, threats that we see, rather than any type of political guidance.

And that relationship is not just me with Tomer Bar. It is repeated up and down the chain of command, including top commanders above and wing commanders below.

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US has military options for Iran nuclear threat - CENTCOM air force ... - The Jerusalem Post

UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL ROSEMARY A. DICARLOS

REMARKS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON

NON-PROLIFERATION

(IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 2231 (2015))

New York, 6 July 2023

Thank you, Madam President, for the opportunity to brief the Council on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the implementation of resolution 2231 (2015).

The conclusion of the Plan and its endorsement by the Council eight years ago were the result of intensive negotiations to achieve the common objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and regional security, in a manner that delivers tangible economic benefits for the Iranian people.

When I last briefed the Council on this issue in December 2022, all participants to the Plan and the United States had reaffirmed that a return to the full and effective implementation of the Plan was the only viable option to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Six months later, negotiations to restore the Plan remain stalled.

Diplomacy is the only way to effectively address the Iranian nuclear issue. It is essential that all parties renew the dialogue as quickly as possibleand reach an agreement on the outstanding issues.

In this context, I reiterate the Secretary-Generals appeal to the United States to lift or waive its sanctions as outlined in the Plan and to extend waivers with regard to the trade in oil with the Islamic Republic of Iran.

And I echo his call on Iran to reverse the steps it has taken that are not consistent with its nuclear related commitments under the Plan. It is also important for Iran to address concerns raised by participants in the Plan and by other Member States in relation to annex B of resolution 2231 (2015).

In a welcome development, in March of this year, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Iran issued a joint statement to expedite the resolution of outstanding safeguards issues and to allow the IAEA to implement further appropriate verification and monitoring and reporting activities.

In its report of May 2023, the IAEA reported that, in line with this joint statement, it had installed surveillance cameras at workshops where centrifuge parts are manufactured. The Agency added that it had no further questions regarding the presence of high enriched uranium detected at one location.

This encouraging step notwithstanding, we are alarmed that the Agency remains unable to verify the stockpile of enriched uranium in the country.

It estimates that Iran now has a total enriched uranium stockpile of more than twenty times the allowable amount under the (JCPOA). This includes increased quantities of uranium enriched to 20% and 60%. Such a stockpile of enriched uranium is of serious concern.

Madam President,

I will now turn to the restrictive measures set out in annex B, as outlined in the Secretary-Generals fifteenth report on resolution 2231 (S/2023/473).

First, on the nuclear-related provisions, no new proposals were submitted to the procurement channel in the last six months.

The Council, however, received ten notifications, submitted pursuant to paragraph 2 of annex B, for certain nuclear-related activities consistent with the Plan.

The renewal by the United States of waivers with respect to certain nuclear non-proliferation projects foreseen in the Plan and the nuclear-related provisions in annex B to resolution 2231 for another 180-day period was an important step.

Second, regarding the ballistic missile-related provisions, France, Germany, Iran, Israel, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom provided information to the Secretary-General and the Council concerning a test flight of a space launch vehicle conducted by Iran in March of this year.

We also received information from these same Member States about the testing and unveiling of two new ballistic missiles by Iran in May and June, respectively.

The letters received from Member States continue to reflect the divergent views as to whether this launch and missile developments are inconsistent with the resolution.

Third, we examined information related to paragraph 4 of annex B.

This paragraph pertains to the supply, sale or transfer to or from Iran of all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology as set out in Council document S/2015/546 which require prior approval of the Council. It includes the list of complete delivery systems and subsystems, as well as the associated components and equipment, including ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and other Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) systems with a range of 300 km or more.

In the reporting period, we received information from the United Kingdom about ballistic missile parts seized by the British Royal Navy in February 2023, in international waters in the Gulf of Iran.

The United Kingdom shared imagery of the seized components and its analysis that the components were of Iranian origin and transferred in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231.

The Permanent Representatives of France, Germany and the United Kingdom conveyed their view that some of the seized components are controlled items listed in the Document S/2015/546 and that their transfer without prior approval of the Council was therefore inconsistent with the resolution.

In their responses, Iran and the Russian Federation stated that there was no evidence linking the intercepted vessel and its cargo to Iran, and no clear indication that the seized components were of Iranian origin.We continue to analyze the available information.

We also received letters from Ukraine, France, Germany and the United Kingdom concerning alleged transfers of unmanned aerial vehiclesfrom Iran to the Russian Federation, in a manner inconsistent with paragraph 4 of annex B.

The United Kingdom and Ukraine also provided photographs and their analyses of the UAVs recovered in Ukraine. The two countries assessed the devices to be of Iranian types Shahed-131, Shahed-136 and Mohajer-6, and that they had been transferred by the Islamic Republic of Iran in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231.

Their assessment was based on comparison with debris of other UAV attacks in the Middle East and with imagery of Iranian UAVs available via open sources.

France, Germany, Ukraine, the United Kingdom and the United States also reiterated their request for the Secretariat to examine the debris of these UAVS in Kyiv or any other suitable location in letters to the Secretary-General and President of the Security Council and in statements to the Council and media.

The Permanent Representatives of Iran and the Russian Federation disputed the imagery and evidence provided by the United Kingdom and Ukraine of the UAVs, as well as the claim by France, Germany, Ukraine and the United Kingdom that Iran had transferred UAVs to the Russian Federation in a manner inconsistent with resolution 2231, noting that the accusations were not substantiated by evidence.

The Secretariat continues to examine the available information.

The Secretariat also received an invitation from the Government of Yemen to examine the debris of a cruise missile used in an attack by the Houthis on the Al-Dhaaba oil terminal last November. The Secretariat is still analyzing the available information.

Finally, the Secretariat did not receive any official information alleging actions inconsistent with the assets freeze provisions of the resolution.

Madam President,

Eight years since the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and its endorsement by the Council, we remain convinced that the plan is the best available option for ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Irans nuclear programme, as well as for allowing Iran to reach its full economic potential.

In closing, I would like to thank Her Excellency, Ms. Vanessa Frazier for her leadership as Facilitator for resolution 2231, as well as the Coordinator of the Procurement Working Group of the Joint Commission for our continued cooperation.

Thank you, Madam President.

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The JCPOA remains the best available option for ensuring a ... - Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

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Iran's protesters are in retreat, but for how long? - Financial Times

By David Daoud

The Blue Line has been relatively calm since the 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollahthe deceptive quiet obscuring obsessive preparations for a future conflict both sides believe is inevitable. In furtherance of Irans regional strategy, the Shia organization has been establishing several frontlinesin south Lebanon, the Gaza Strip, and Syriafrom which to fight the Jewish state directly and through allies. But with Israels attention seemingly focused exclusively on the groups activities across its borders, Hezbollah appears to be establishing another front behind Israeli linesboth within the countrys official boundaries and the West Bank.

Prompted by Hezbollahs recent brazen behavior, the Israeli security establishment seems fixated on detecting signals that indicate whether the group is readying for another direct war or security escalation with Israel. In March, Hezbollah deployed a thousand seemingly unarmed personnel along the border (four hundred were Hamas-affiliated Palestinians). Shortly afterward, the Shia organization facilitated two attacks against Israel but maintained a sufficient distance from their execution to avoid an Israeli reprisal or escalation. In late March, a Palestinian militant infiltrated from Lebanon and planted an explosive bearing the hallmark of Hezbollah manufacturing in Megiddo. Then, in early April, Hamas fired a barrage of thirty-four rockets from Lebanon into Israel.

Following this, Hezbollah staged a massive but relatively routine war game to commemorate Israels withdrawal from south Lebanon. On a smaller scale, it echoed Hezbollahs ten thousand-man simulated invasion of the Galilee in August 2012, which commemorated its 2006 victory over Israel. This time, the group invited reporters to witness masked fighters training to destroy Israel by jumping through flaming hoops, firing from the backs of motorcycles, emerging through plumes of smoke, and blowing up Israeli flags posted on hills. The exhibitionuseless as a battlefield exercisewas pure military theater intended to make headlines, produce images for Hezbollahs martial music videos, and reinforce its supporters belief that Hezbollah can deter, defeat, and destroy Israel. It may also have covered Hezbollahs infiltration of Israeli territory and installation of two outposts in Har Dov/Shebaa Farmstesting the limits of Israeli patience and gradually attempting to adjust the rules of engagement without incurring retaliation.

Critical as some developments may prove, they obscure a more dangerous Hezbollah initiative to establish a proxy foothold behind Israeli lines. Hezbollah has coveted such an option for decades, beginningat leastafter Israel expelled four hundred Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) fighters to south Lebanon in 1992 and readmitted them a year later. These returnees served as a nucleus for Hezbollah and Iran to fight Israel from withinan effort that continued with direct armed assistance to Palestinian Leader Yasser Arafats Fatah (beginning in 1998), and then to several armed groups during the Second Intifada and afterward.

Since then, Hezbollahworking with Irans Islamic Revolution Guard Corps (IRGC) or separatelyhas spent considerable efforts to enlist Arab Israelis, Lebanese, nationals of Arab countries with foreign passports, and Palestinians to gather intelligence, recruit additional assets, or establish sleeper cells within Israel to plan terror attacks. To that end, the connections between Lebanese and Arab Israeli criminal networks have proven invaluable.

Statements from Hezbollah and Iranian officialsin addition to the groups past and current behaviorbetray a three-fold and ambitious objective that goes far beyond periodically igniting scattered chaos within Israel.

Part of Irans regional strategy is to develop its proxies domestic weapons production capabilities. The IRGC has achieved this outcome with Hezbollah in south Lebanonrelying on their Lebanese proxyand with Yemens Houthis, as well as in the Gaza Strip. Sometime after the 2005 Israeli withdrawal and before his assassination in 2008, Hezbollahs then-military commander Imad Mughniyeh spent months in the coastal enclave training Palestinian militants in rocket and launching pad production and tunnel and rocket warfare.

In line with that, Hezbollah and Iran appear set on replicating that outcome in the West Bank. IRGC Commander-in-Chief Hossein Salami admitted as much in 2022, saying Irans goal was to arm the West Bank the same way that Gaza is armed. As he told Fars News, When something is homegrown, it cannot be stopped. Recent attempts to fire rockets from Jenin on June 26claimed by a Hamas-affiliated group calling itself the [Yahya] Ayyash Detachment West of Jeninand the discovery of a launch pad in June in east Jerusalem, as well as weapons laboratories on July 3 in Jenin, indicate these efforts may have begun producing results.

A second and corollary objective, per Salami in 2014, is to imminently transform the West Bank into an unbearable inferno and hell for Israel. Iran outsourced the task to Hezbollah, whose Unit 133 had been recruiting and funding cells in the West Bank through Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallahs son, Jawad. According to Israeli police and the Shin Bet, Hezbollahs continuous weapons smuggling into Israel and the West Bank has intensified significantly since 2021. This boost immediately preceded the ongoing upsurge of West Bank violence, which began in June 2021, with unrest spreading to cities long considered tranquil, such as Jericho.

As a result of these efforts, groups once thought defunct in the West Bank (ex. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) or all across the region (ex. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (AAMB)) have experienced a resurgence. New armed groups have also sprung up, particularly in Jenin and Nablus. Fueled by coherent ideologies, some are affiliated with major organizations, like the PIJ Quds Brigades-linked Jenin Detachment and Nablus Detachment, and AAMBs Hezam Al-Nar and Liwa al-Shuhada.

Others are motivated more by frustration, like the so-called Lions Dena shadowy and diffuse entity centered in Nablus. This group emerged independently in August 2022, drawing on the disaffection of Palestinian youths through both the efficacy of the Palestinian Authority and negotiations with Israel. Here too, however, Iran has been fanning the flames. Shin Bet Director Ronen Bar recently noted that Tehran has been using online platforms to encourage recruitment, demonstrating the Islamic Republics exploitation of any available vectorideological motivation or disillusionmentto stir up violence.

Finally, and perhaps most dangerously, Iran and Hezbollah have sought to exploit tensions between Arab and Jewish Israelis to establish what, in Resistance Axis jargon, has been called the unification of the fronts. To that end, Hezbollahs Deputy Secretary-General Naim Qassem described Israels May 2021 inter-ethnic riots, which overlapped with the clash with Gaza-based Palestinian militants, as a strategic change and historical inflection point. West Bank, Gazan, and Jerusalemite Palestinians had become united with 48 Arabs in purpose, he said, whereby all Palestiniansnot just the segment directly affectedwould now collectively respond to any Israeli attack or encroachment.

Like Qassem, Hezbollahs Executive Council Chairman Hashem Safieddine recently suggested that this development would allow the group to strike Israel from within. Fantasizing about the united fronts giving Hezbollah the ability to almost sow chaos at will within Israel, he said, The day will come when the Resistance takes part in operations within [Israels] 1948 borders, something that Israel couldnt imagine this will cause the [Zionist] regime to crumble from within. Imagine what would happen if the Resistance enters the 48 territories.

Establishing a front within Israel and the West Bank has immense utility for Hezbollahnow and during the groups promised comprehensive war against the Jewish state. For now, it allows the group to continue bleeding Israel through proxies while maintaining plausible deniability. At a minimum, this will keep the IDF mired in combating low-level, albeit sustained, violence. At worst, Israels ongoing clashes with Palestinian militants increase the possibility of miscalculation or overreaction by one or both parties, potentially igniting a new intifada. Such an outcome appears increasingly plausible as a younger Palestinian generationdisillusioned both with their leadership and negotiations with Israel, and with no memory of the bloodiness of the Second Intifadais increasingly skewing Palestinian society in support of returning to armed confrontation.

The future utility of Hezbollahs frontline within Israel would come into effect during a war. Years into the future, Hezbollah could ignite that war during one of the religiously or nationalistically sensitive anniversaries cluttering the Israeli-Palestinian calendar. By timing a conflict to coincide with a period of heightened religious or nationalistic sentiment (on either or both the Palestinian and Jewish side), the group could activate the cells it has cultivated in the West Bank.

It could also tap affiliates among Arab Israeli criminal networks to carry out a nationalistically motivated attack on a Jewish targeta synagogue in a mixed Arab-Jewish Israeli city, for example. With this simple act, Hezbollah could exploit independently heightened inter-ethnic tensions to initiate a cycle of actions and reactions by Jewish and Arab extremists, just like in May 2021, which could spread to the rest of those communities and throughout the country. By creating disturbances on both sides of the Green Line, Hezbollah will force Israel to divert the attention of its government and security forces from other active fronts, includingmost critically to the groups survivalLebanon, to confront a lethal threat behind its lines.

David Daoudis a nonresident fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Thu, Apr 30, 2020

IranSource By David Daoud

The Open Letter, Hezbollah's manifesto, reserves its highest level of opprobrium for America, labeling it the main root of evil and declaring the confrontation with America as the yardstick for all of Hezbollahs other activities.

Image: Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian gestures as he stands next to Hezbollah officials during his visit to Maroun Al-Ras village near the border between Lebanon and Israel, Lebanon April 28, 2023. REUTERS/Aziz Taher

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Hezbollah and Iran have opened a fourth battlefront: Inside Israel - Atlantic Council