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As Irans conservatives face an uphill task in next years elections, they also debate whether the regime should be a republic, or based on full clerical rule.

The sorrow state of Irans economy has put the conservative-hardliner forces in charge of both the parliament and the president on the back foot prior to parliamentary election next March.

Conservative politician Hossein Kanaani Moghaddam believes that parliament speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf and his allies will be among the most serious contestants within the conservative camp in the next election.

Asked how he would describe the configuration of conservative parties in the competition now that there is an all conservative government in Iran, Moghaddam said: The competition dates back to the fundamental difference in Iran's conservative camp between an "Islamic Republic" and an "Islamic government." He said each one of those ideas have their own supporters among conservatives. However, he said that without an Islamic Republic, it is impossible to create an Islamic government.

The Islamic Republic, as it exists and operates today, is based on the idea of the people's rule. However, in practice the Supreme Leader has absolute power. The interventions by Ali Khamenei and his Guardian Council and other centers of power under his control have left very little of the regime's democratic faade.

The idea of Islamic government, on the other hand, which was outlined by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini the founder of the Islamic regime in Iran, is based on the idea of the holy Koran being the Constitutional Law of the government. When he came to power, Khomeini spoke very little about his book, The Islamic Government, in which Shiite clerics rather than the members of the parliament should make key decisions.

Conservative politician, Hossein Kanaani Moghaddam

Moghaddam said that a part of the conservative camp in Iran believes in establishing an Islamic government albeit based on their own definition and interests. Another part, he said, maintain that an Islamic government is impossible without an Islamic Republic. In other words, the two groups differ on the role of the people in the government.

In Iran, the late founding father of the ultraconservative Paydari party, Ayatollah Mohammad Taqi Mesbah Yazdi said on many occasions that the people should have no part in the government and it is God who appoints the country's leaders. He even insisted that the leader's aides are also chosen by God rather than the people.

Moghaddam said that the Paydari Party is following the idea of establishing an Islamic government. He added that the two opposing conservative groups need to come to some sort of accord, otherwise, none of them can survive in Iran's political landscape. He also maintained that prejudiced support for the idea of Islamic government can deter the people and put an end to their support for the government.

Moghaddam himself is one those who believes in the Islamic Republic rather than an Islamic government. By warning about loss of popular support, he distanced himself from Paydari party which holds the majority both in the Majles and in Raisi's government. He further stressed that "talking about an Islamic government in Iran would be a mistake."

Asked how the two conservative groups can resolve this dichotomy, Kanani Moghaddam said: "They need to follow the Supreme Leader, otherwise, insisting on one of the two ideas will intensify factional infighting."

Regarding the status of Ghalibaf's "neo-con" group, he said that it is also one group among many other conservatives including traditional conservatives, moderate conservatives, conservative critics of the government, revolutionary groups and several conservative coalitions.

That degree of diversity among conservatives is healthy, but if their competition leads to conflicts and confrontations, then none of them can claim to represent the conservatives.

Originally posted here:
Irans Conservatives Divided Over Nature Of Islamic Regime -

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Defiant youths carried out thirteen courageous campaigns on April 17 in response to Ali Khameneis oppressive actions, including compulsory hijab and chemical attacks on girls schools. The campaigns targeted two IRGC Basij bases in Robat Karim and Tonekabon, one seminary affiliated with the regime in Amol, two judicial centers of the regime in Isfahan and Koohdasht, and the Coordinating Council for the Propaganda in Shahriar with Molotov cocktails.

In addition, they set fire to the sign of the Ministry of Intelligences spying headquarters in Borujerd and Nowshahr, the sign of compulsory hijab in Kalar Abad, Mazandaran, banners of Quds Day in Isfahan and Minab, and pictures of Ali Khamenei and Khomeini in Naziabad of Tehran, and Rafsanjan.

Secretariat of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)

April 19, 2023

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Iran: Defiant Youths Target Regime's Centers and Billboards - NCRI - National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)

Implications for the Enforcement of Investor-state Arbitration Awards Arising From the Application of International Sanctions Against Russia

On 30 March 2023, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its judgment in Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America (Certain Iranian Assets), a dispute arising from the United States imposition of various legislative and judicial measures against Iran that were alleged to have resulted in the breach of the United States obligations under the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (1955) (the Treaty of Amity). While Certain Iranian Assets has been heralded as a win by both Iran and the United States, its greater impact may be on the evolving landscape of investor-State arbitration claims resulting from the application of sanctions on persons or entities, including most notably in relation to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Interested host states and foreign investors alike should be keenly aware that this decision is anticipated to have important implications for states that have imposed international sanctions on Russia (or are developing legal mechanisms to provide for the enforcement of foreign judgments or arbitral awards against Russian assets in their jurisdictions) as well as for related disputes. As discussed below, both host states and foreign investors should take proactive action to assess potential risks and protect available rights implicated by the quickly evolving landscape of international investment law amid the current climate of international sanctions against Russia.

As indicated in the Preamble of the Treaty of Amity, Iran and the United States signed this treaty, inter alia, to promote friendly relations and to encourage mutually beneficial trade and investments and closer economic intercourse generally between their peoples as well as to regulate consular relations.1 To this end, the Treaty of Amity featured certain substantive obligations for the state parties, including that Iran and the United States:

The Treaty of Amity entered into force on 16 June 1957 and remained in force when the United States and Iran cut diplomatic ties in 1980 following the 1979 Iranian Revolution that resulted in the seizure of the US Embassy in Tehran. The Treaty of Amity then continued in force during the following:

Many default judgments and significant damages judgments against Iran and Iranian state-owned entities followed these legislative and executive measures, and certain assets of Iran and Iranian entities (e.g., the assets of Bank Markazi) either are subject to enforcement proceedings or have been distributed to judgment creditors.11 Iran applied to institute ICJ proceedings on 14 June 2016 seeking,12 inter alia, declarations that the United States had breached the Treaty of Amity and that Iran and Iranian State-owned companies are entitled to immunity from the jurisdiction of the US courts and in respect of enforcement proceedings in the United States as well as orders for the United States to comply with its obligations under the Treaty of Amity and to pay reparations to Iran for past violation of the United States international legal obligations.13 The United States announced that it was withdrawing from the Treaty of Amity on 3 October 2018.14

One key holding from the ICJs March 2023 Judgment in Certain Iranian Assets is that, since Bank Markazi did not constitute a company as that term is defined for the purposes of protection under the Treaty of Amity, the ICJ did not have jurisdiction to consider Irans claim in relation to what is reportedly over [US]$1.75bn in frozen assets from Irans central bank held in a Citibank account in New York, by far the largest amount claimed back by Tehran.15 The ICJ did find, however, as follows:

The ICJ concluded that Iran is entitled to compensation for the injury caused by violations by the United States that have been ascertained by the Court and that the ICJ will determine the amount due on the basis of further written pleadings limited to this issue absent agreement between the United States and Iran on the amount of compensation due within 24 months of the issuance of the judgment.23

Interestingly, Certain Iranian Assets has been hailed as a victory for both sides. The US Department of State highlights the case as a rejection of the vast majority of Irans case under the now-terminated Treaty of Amity in a major victory for the United States and victims of Irans State-sponsored terrorism.24 Irans Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the other hand, cites the judgment as another proof of the Islamic Republic of Irans righteousness and the violations by the US government.25 What is clear for other interested states and foreign investors, however, is that international investment law can be a double-edged sword for states imposing sanctions that may be considered to be contrary to their preexisting obligations in public international law.

The recent legal conversation about Russias invasion of Ukraine is understandably centered on such aspects as the proposed creation of an international claims commission to adjudicate claims for compensation26 and the International Criminal Courts recent issuance of arrest warrants for alleged war crimes against Russian President Vladimir Putin and Commissioner for Childrens Rights in the Office of the President of the Russian Federation Maria Lvova-Belova.27 In time, however, the legal focus will likely broaden to consider related disputes arising in international investment law, whether in the state-to-state or investor-state context. As explained in our alert published last year shortly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the targeted economic measures Russia has imposed on foreign investors are likely in the near future to give rise to a number of investor-state disputes against Russia as a host state for foreign investment.

As arbitral awards are issued in the coming years, greater attention will likely shift to the legal mechanisms for enforcement of such arbitral awards against Russia (including perhaps in relation to the assets of Russian state-owned entities). In reality, this conversation has already begun as the European Parliament has recently declared Russia a state sponsor of terrorism and called on the EU and its member states to put in place the proper legal framework and consider adding Russia to such a list of state sponsors of terrorism.28 Similarly, last summer, the US Senate introduced Senate Resolution 623, [a] resolution calling on the Secretary of State to designate the Russian Federation as a state sponsor of terrorism (although the Biden administration reportedly opposes taking such an action).29

For states that have imposed international sanctions on Russia or are beginning to consider legal mechanisms to provide for the enforcement of foreign judgments or arbitral awards against Russian assets in their jurisdictions, the ICJs judgment in Certain Iranian Assets will serve as a reminder that state-to-state or investor-state disputes may be anticipated to arise where the imposition of sanctions regimes could be seen as breaching state obligations under public international law. Accordingly, host states considering amendments to their regimes for the enforcement of arbitral awards should engage proactively, beginning with a review of their current international investment agreements and applicable obligations in public international law. Such a review may identify critical issues to inform the crafting of appropriate domestic law in this space.

Similarly, foreign investors considering pursuing investor-State disputes arising from the imposition of sanctions in connection with the Russian invasion of Ukraine should evaluate both the current legal landscape and the evolving context for the enforcement of arbitral awards to inform their decision-making processes. Ultimately, the implications of Certain Iranian Sanctions require both host states and foreign investors alike to address potential risks and available rights implicated by the quickly evolving landscape of international investment law at this time of widespread international sanctions against Russia.

1 Treaty of Amity, Preamble.

2 Treaty of Amity, Article IV(1).

3 Id.

4 Id.

5 Treaty of Amity, Article IV(2).

6 U.S. DEPT OF STATE, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2021: IRAN (2021), https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2021/iran/ (last accessed Apr. 3, 2023).

7 See Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 U.S.C. ch. 97, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title28/part4/chapter97&edition=prelim.

8 See U.S. DEPT OF THE TREASURY, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/federal-insurance-office/terrorism-risk-insurance-program (last accessed Apr. 4, 2023).

9 Exec. Order No. 13599, 77 Fed. Reg. 6657 (Feb. 8, 2012), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2012/02/08/2012-3097/blocking-property-of-the-government-of-iran-and-iranian-financial-institutions.

10 Bank Markazi v Peterson, 578 U.S. 212 (2016).

11 Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Judgment of 30 March 2023, [30].

12 Id., [1].

13 Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Application Instituting Proceedings of 14 June 2016, [33].

14 Edward Wong & David E. Sanger, U.S. Withdraws From 1955 Treaty Normalizing Relations With Iran, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/world/middleeast/us-withdraws-treaty-iran.html. According to the specific terms of the Treaty, termination is effective only after one years prior notice. As a result, the formal United Stated termination date was one year after this announcement.

15 ICJ orders US to pay compensation for freezing Iranian assets, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 30, 2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2023/3/30/icj-orders-us-to-pay-compensation-for-freezing-iranian-assets.

16 Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Judgment of 30 March 2023, [76] to [84].

17 Id., [85] to [93].

18 Id., [99] to [103]

19 Id., [104] to [109].

20 Treaty of Amity, Article IV(1). See also Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Judgment of 30 March 2023, [159].

21 Certain Iranian Assets, ICJ Judgment of 30 March 2023, [159].

22 Id., [223].

23 Id., [231].

24 Press Release, U.S. Dept of State, Judgment in Certain Iranian Assets Case (Mar. 30, 2023), https://www.state.gov/judgment-in-certain-iranian-assets-case/.

25 Islamic Republic of Iran Ministry of Foreign Affs., Iranian Foreign Ministrys statement about the ruling of the International Court of Justice (Mar. 30, 2023), https://en.mfa.ir/portal/newsview/715766.

26 See, e.g., Chiara Giorgetti, Markiyan Kliuchkovsky & Patrick Pearsall, Launching an International Claims Commission for Ukraine, JUSTSECURITY.ORG (May 20, 2022), https://www.justsecurity.org/81558/launching-an-international-claims-commission-for-ukraine/.

27 Press Release, Intl Crim. Ct., Situation in Ukraine: ICC judges issue arrest warrants against Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin and Maria Alekseyevna Lvova-Belova (March 17, 2023), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/situation-ukraine-icc-judges-issue-arrest-warrants-against-vladimir-vladimirovich-putin-and.

28 Press Release, Eur. Parliament, European Parliament declares Russia to be a state sponsor of terrorism, (Nov. 23, 2022), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IPR55707/european-parliament-declares-russia-to-be-a-state-sponsor-of-terrorism.

29 Alexander Ward, Andrew Desiderio &Lawrence Ukenye, New Senate bill ramps up fight over Russia terrorism label, POLITICO.COM (Sept. 14, 2022), https://www.politico.com/newsletters/national-security-daily/2022/09/14/new-senate-bill-ramps-up-fight-over-russia-terrorism-label-00056600.

Original post:
The Decision of the International Court of Justice in Certain Iranian ... - JD Supra

Since the September 2022 death of Kurdish woman Mahsa Amini in police custody for wearing an "inappropriate" hijab, the slogan "woman, life, freedom" has become a rallying cry for Iranians protesting against extensive state violence and repression of civil liberties.

So, when the daughter-in-law of Iran's former monarch posted #zanzendegiazadi (the slogan in Persian) on Instagram over the image of a female Israeli soldier, it produced more than a few baffled reactions.

Yasmine Pahlavi posted the image on Tuesday while accompanying her husband Reza on his trip to Israel, where the son of the former Iranian shah met with numerous officials, including Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Reza Pahlavi has for many years sought to present himself as one of the main leaders of the Iranian opposition in exile, and since the beginning of the anti-government protests he has been a regular figure in international media and political circles.

However, many other opposition groups have been fiercely critical of him and his supporters, warning that Iranians would not accept removing the Islamic Republic only for a return to monarchy, citing the widespread human rights abuses and repression of dissent that occurred under his father, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi.

Although Reza Pahlavi has called for a "secular, democratic" Iran to replace the Islamic Republic, both he and his wife have publicly defended his father's legacy.

Seamus Malekafzali, an Iranian-American freelance journalist who writes on Middle East issues, told Middle East Eye that it was grimly ironic to see the heirs to the Pahlavi dynasty using a slogan founded by the Kurdish leftists, which they crushed so ruthlessly, and applying it positively to the Israeli army.

"[It is ironic] that a slogan, which has found newfound popularity in Iran as a message not just against patriarchal impositions but against structural violence from the government, finds its way into a post supporting one of the most obvious and visible examples of structural violence from a government, the [Israeli army]," he said.

A number of commentators have also noted the irony of Yasmine Pahlavi using a phrase that originated with a Kurdish political movement linked to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) armed group in reference to an Israeli soldier.

During the early 1980s, many PKK fighters were based in Lebanon, where they received training from fellow Marxist-Leninists in the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and other Palestinian armed groups.

In 1982, Israel invaded Lebanon and the PKK aided Palestinian groups in fighting the Israeli army. At least 11 PKK fighters died during the conflict.

'Pahlavi's trip to Israel occurs as monarchists in the Iranian opposition increasingly butt heads with other factions'

- Matthew Petti, researcher

Matthew Petti, a Jordan-based researcher who has specialised in the Kurdish role in the Lebanese civil war, said associating the phrase with the Israeli army was bizarre considering it originated with a movement founded by "Kurdish exiles in Lebanon, where they were trained by Palestinian guerrillas and saw some of their first serious combat fighting against Israeli forces".

While the PKK itself was not formed until 1978 - during the dying days of the Pahlavi dynasty - the shah was a fierce opponent of Kurdish autonomy within Iran and regularly fought with other Kurdish separatist groups.

Perhaps the most prominent Kurdish opponent of the shah was the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDK-I), which supported the revolution that eventually ousted him.

The group has since become an opponent of the Islamic Republic, and its bases were targeted by Iranian air strikes during the anti-government protests.

During his visit to Israel, Reza Pahlavi visited the Western Wall Jewish holy site and was photographed wearing a kippah and praying.

He did not meet, however, with Palestinian representatives or officials of the Palestinian Authority during the trip.

The Pahlavi monarchy, which ruled Iran between 1925 and 1979, had been a close ally of Israel.

The Islamic Republic, formed following the overthrow of the Shah in 1979, has by contrast become Israel's archenemy and has regularly referenced the shah's alliance with Israel in its propaganda.

Petti said the trip appeared to be an attempt by Pahlavi to shore up support for the monarchist movement.

"Pahlavi's trip to Israel occurs as monarchists in the Iranian opposition increasingly butt heads with other factions, and as Saudi Arabia withdraws its support from the movement," he said, referring to Saudi Arabia's recent detente with Iran.

"It seems to be a gambit to portray Pahlavi as a leader who can secure renewed foreign support and make weighty decisions on the direction of the movement."

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Wife of Reza Pahlavi posts 'woman, life, freedom' over image of ... - Middle East Eye

(Bloomberg) -- The final wave of the Permian Basin oil boom is expected to add the equivalent of Irans total output to global production. That growth, however, will look more like a trickle than a gusher taking years to ramp up and underscoring OPEC+s grip on the market for now.

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Americas largest oil basin, covering swaths of West Texas and southeast New Mexico, will expand output by 40% until hitting its peak of 7.86 million barrels a day in 2030, according to a Bloomberg survey of four major forecasters. While that would be bigger than all OPEC nations except for Saudi Arabia, the outlook comes with a lot of caveats.

First, theres the slow pace of expansion: Theres no huge increase expected this year or next, so the Permian wont do much to ease the worlds current problems with energy-driven inflation.

Second, producers, who enjoyed record profits last year, have little incentive to quickly pump their remaining acreage because investors have consistently rewarded discipline. And third, shortages of everything from labor to steel pipes and drilling equipment will also restrain growth if and when companies decide to boost supplies. Lastly, while President Joe Biden has recently implored the industry to keep pushing output, his agenda also includes the fight against climate change, which means the political picture could easily swing against shale.

Public companies are making the conscious choice to limit capital spending for new wells in favor of boosting returns to shareholders, said Raoul LeBlanc, vice president for North American upstream oil and gas at S&P Global. Accelerating output despite a shortage of labor and equipment would be difficult and erode profitability, he said.

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The go-go days of shale growth turned a 4 million barrel-a-day system into a 12 million barrel a day system, but it lost a lot of money, he said. Now, theyre looking for payoff.

Slow growth in the Permian is likely to create problems for consumers. A surprise oil-production cut from OPEC+ earlier this month jolted global economies and effectively set a floor for crude prices. It also leaves the century-old field, famous for its pancaked layers of oil-soaked rock, with a new identity after leading the world in crude growth.

The Permians not dead, said Chet Sharma, a senior associate at Enverus. Its kind of entering the next phase of its growth, which is much smaller compared to the shale boom era.

Read more: Fracturing US-Saudi Oil Pact Adds to Feds Inflation Stress

Output in 2030

The surveyed forecasters S&P Global, Rystad Energy, Wood Mackenzie and Enverus on average expect the Permian to add 2.4 million barrels of daily output by 2030 from 2022 levels. Thats nearly equivalent to the total amount of production from Iran, the fifth-biggest member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and its allies.

Once the Permian is past its 2030 peak, the basins decline will be slow. becoming a reliable pillar of global oil markets for decades. In 2035, Rystad and S&P Global see Permian production 1 million barrels a day higher than this years output. With this growth, US government forecasts show American production hovering between 12.3 million and 13.3 million barrels a day higher than Saudi Arabias record annual output in 2022 all the way out to 2050.

Other US oil regions like the Eagle Ford in south Texas and the Gulf of Mexico are stable or declining. So its up to the Permian to drive overall US production.

We have not seen yet peak production from Permian, Vicki Hollub, CEO for Occidental Petroleum Corp. said April 12 during Columbia Universitys Global Energy Summit in New York.

While other basins in the US may be plateauing, the Permian will continue to increase and will be able to overtime offset the declines from the other basins, she said.

--With assistance from Sheela Tobben.

(Updates with comment from analyst beginning in fifth paragraph.)

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Permians Slow Burn to Iran-Sized Growth Shows OPECs Grip - Yahoo Finance