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BAGHDAD - Iraq's Parliament swore in new lawmakers on Thursday, replacing 73 legislators who resigned collectively earlier this month amid a prolonged political impasse over the formation of the country's next government.

The walkout by followers of Iraq's most influential Shiite politician, Muqtada al-Sadr, threw Iraq into further uncertainty, reshuffling the deck following the Oct. 10 elections, which gave the cleric the biggest bloc in Parliament.

Although he emerged as a winner, al-Sadr was unable to cobble together a coalition that can form a majority government. He has been locked in a power struggle with internal Shiite rivals backed by Iran, preventing the formation of a new government.

Two weeks ago, he ordered lawmakers from his parliamentary bloc to resign in a bid to break the eight-month impasse. The unprecedented move threw Iraq's political landscape into disarray.

According to Iraqi laws, if any seat in parliament becomes vacant, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in their electoral district would replace them. In this case, it made al-Sadr's opponents from the so-called Coordination Framework, a coalition led by Iran-backed Shiite parties and their allies, the majority with around 122 seats.

It puts al-Sadr out of parliament for the first time since 2005, and allows pro-Iranian factions to determine the makeup of the next government.

"Today, the first step has been completed, which is the replacement deputies taking the oath," said Lawmaker Muhammad Saadoun Sayhod, from the Rule of Law coalition represented in the Framework.

"We will now start the process of electing the president and naming the prime minister from the Coordination Framework," he said, adding he expected the formation of a new government to begin soon.

There was no immediate reaction from al-Sadr to the swearing in of new lawmakers. The political deadlock has led to concerns of renewed protests and street clashes between supporters of al-Sadr and their Shiite rivals.

Even though Parliament is in recess, lawmakers mostly from the Framework alliance called for an extraordinary session Thursday to vote on the new lawmakers.

Sixty-four lawmakers were sworn in Thursday, while nine other replacements did not attend.

On Wednesday, al-Sadr accused Iranian proxies of political meddling. He also accused them of applying pressure against newly elected political independents and allies of his Sadrist bloc.

He called on parliamentarians not to succumb to pressure.

"I call on blocs to stand bravely for the sake of reform and saving the nation, and not to give in to sectarian pressures, as they are bubbles which will disappear," he said in a statement.

Munaf Al-Musawi, a political analyst and director of the Baghdad Center for Strategic Studies, said that the statement by al-Sadr against Iran's proxies also sends a message to his former allies Massoud Barzani of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, and Speaker of Parliament Mohammed Al-Halbusi to avoid holding a parliament session.

He said if a session is held, the Coordination Framework and its allies would control parliament and Sadr's allies would pay the price.

Iraq's election was held several months earlier than expected, in response to mass protests that broke out in late 2019 and saw tens of thousands rally against endemic corruption, poor services and unemployment.

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Iraq Parliament Swears in New Members After Walkout of 73

BAGHDAD (AP) Iraqs Parliament swore in dozens of new lawmakers on Thursday, replacing 73 legislators loyal to powerful Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, strengthening the power of rival Iran-backed Shiite factions in the assembly.

The 73 had resigned collectively earlier this month amid a prolonged political impasse over the formation of the country's next government. The unprecedented walkout, based on a request from al-Sadr, threw Iraq into further uncertainty, reshuffling the deck following the Oct. 10 elections, which gave him the biggest bloc in Parliament.

Although he emerged as a winner, al-Sadr has been locked in a power struggle with internal Shiite rivals backed by Iran and was unable to cobble together a coalition that can form a majority government.

Two weeks ago, he ordered lawmakers from his parliamentary bloc to resign in a bid to break the eight-month impasse. The move threw Iraqs political landscape into disarray.

According to Iraqi laws, if any seat in parliament becomes vacant, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes in their electoral district would replace them. In this case, it made al-Sadrs opponents from the so-called Coordination Framework, a coalition led by Iran-backed Shiite parties and their allies, the majority with around 122 seats.

It puts al-Sadr out of parliament for the first time since 2005, and allows pro-Iranian factions to determine the makeup of the next government.

Today, the first step has been completed, which is the replacement deputies taking the oath," said Lawmaker Muhammad Saadoun Sayhod, from the Rule of Law coalition represented in the Framework.

We will now start the process of electing the president and naming the prime minister from the Coordination Framework, he said, adding he expected the formation of a new government to begin soon.

There was no immediate reaction from al-Sadr to the swearing in of new lawmakers. There remain concerns the political deadlock could lead to renewed protests and street clashes between supporters of al-Sadr and their Shiite rivals.

Even though Parliament is in recess, lawmakers mostly from the Framework alliance called for an extraordinary session Thursday to vote on the new lawmakers. Sixty-four lawmakers were sworn in, while nine other replacements did not attend.

On Wednesday, al-Sadr accused Iranian proxies of political meddling. He also accused them of applying pressure against newly elected political independents and allies of his Sadrist bloc.

He called on parliamentarians not to succumb to pressure.

I call on blocs to stand bravely for the sake of reform and saving the nation, and not to give in to sectarian pressures, as they are bubbles which will disappear, he said in a statement.

Munaf Al-Musawi, a political analyst and director of the Baghdad Center for Strategic Studies, said the fight for government posts will now begin. Once a government is formed, he said al-Sadr's supporters could take to the streets, leading to clashes with Shiite rivals.

What comes next is more difficult, he said. With Coordination Framework and its allies now in control of Parliament, al-Sadr and his allies will pay the price for their walkout, he added.

Iraqs election was held several months earlier than expected, in response to mass protests that broke out in late 2019 and saw tens of thousands rally against endemic corruption, poor services and unemployment.

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Tension in Iraq as cleric accuses Iran's allies of meddling

Iraq has in recent weeks stepped up counterterrorism operations in its western desert and other areas amid risks of an imminent flare-up of conflict in eastern Syria, with potential repercussions in the regional fight against the Islamic State (IS).

On June 19, the government-linked Iraqi Security Media Cell announced that an operation in coordination with the Joint Operations Command and intelligence services had killed the IS "wali," or governor, for the Anbar region and three of his companions.

The wali, who the statement said went by the name Abu Mansour, was killed in the Rutba desert after multiple operations in recent months by Iraqs Counterterrorism Services (CTS) in that part of Iraqs largest but sparsely populated province.

Al-Monitor accompanied the CTS last March on one of these operations into the Rutba desert. The forces stopped in shepherds encampments and requested information, searched caves identified via coordinates that had signs of the recent presence of alleged IS fighters, and destroyed motorcycles and other things that seemed to have been used by the fighters in the apparent hideouts found.

These operations typically start at dawn from the Ain al-Asad base near the town of Baghdadi and can last several days, with the forces spending the nights in the desert. They attempt to gather intelligence as well as make their presence known, serving as a deterrent for IS cells and increasing a sense of security for locals under potential threat from IS.

A surge in dust storms in recent months severely reducing the visibility and operational capacity of Iraqi forces for days at a time has been exploited by IS cells in the area. The Ain al-Asad base has been attacked multiple times in recent years, mainly by shadowy Iraqi militias believed to be close to Iran as well as Iran itself via ballistic missiles in early 2020.

Western Anbar is largely desert land with the exception of the fertile Euphrates River Valley, which enters Iraq from Syria at the border city of Qaim. Qaim has seen a marked improvement in the fight against IS in recent years but suffers from continuing dissatisfaction among the local population with the presence of Iran-linked armed groups operating in the area and growing drug smuggling, according to multiple local civilian and security sources.

High unemployment and land grabs by these "muqawama,"or Iran-led "resistance," factions have prevented scores of locals from making use of their farmland and forced some to leave the area again after returning following the defeat of IS in the area in late 2017.

Anbar has seen less IS activity in recent years than areas disputed between the central government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). However, its desert terrain coupled with a history of being a stronghold of multiple jihadist groups and social problems linked to joblessness and cross-border smuggling make it a potential breeding ground.

The Rutba desert south of Qaim where the IS wali was announced killed this month has long been a problem, however. In April 2021, for example, orders were given to arrest three Iraqi border guard commanders after positions were abandoned and equipment and weaponry were left to alleged IS fighters.

Clashes occurred between the police and IS near Rutba along a road used to arrive at the Trebil border crossing with Jordan in late January of that year. Local security forces at that time claimed such clashes happened almost daily and drug smuggling occurring in the area between Qaim and Rutba was behind the festering presence of IS cells and instability in that area.

Further north and across the border in northeastern Syria, US-backed, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have long threatened that any attack from Turkey on their territory would result in halting of operations against IS to focus on the fight against Turkey.

Turkey has said in recent weeks that it will conduct another operation soon against the SDF in northern Syria.

Amid an already chaotic situation as concerns IS cells in SDF territory, SDF leaders have in recent weeks also declared their willingness to work with the Syrian government under Bashar al-Assad against Turkey.

Despite receiving funding and various other forms of support from the US-led coalition, the SDF and its dominant component, the Peoples Protection Units (YPG), have long collaborated with the Syrian government when it seemed expedient to do so. The YPG is closely linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), designated a terrorist group by Turkey, the United States, the EU and other states.

The Syrian government holds pockets of territory within SDF-controlled areas of eastern Syria.

Following a massive jailbreak from an SDF-guarded prison in northeastern Syria across the border from Iraqs Ninevah province north of Anbar in January, alocal source told Al-Monitor that some of the IS fighters who broke out had arrived in the nearby Raqqa region and taken control of areas that Syrian government forces have left, claiming that at least four areas are now controlled by IS in Raqqa without explaining how big these areas were.

The prison had housed thousands of former IS fighters. Hundreds escaped, though exact numbers are unknown.

Recent IS attacks in eastern Syria have attracted little media attention but continue, such as one that killed 13 Syrian soldiers along a road running from the Raqqa region to Deir ez-Zor. The Deir ez-Zor region is on the Syrian side of Iraqs western border.

A June 16 US-led international coalition operation captured Hani Ahmed al-Kurdi. Al-Kurdi was an experienced bomb maker and operational facilitator who became one of the top leaders in the Syrian branch of ISIS, according to a statement.

He was captured in a part of the Aleppo province of northern Syria under Turkish-backed Syrian opposition forces, west of the area of the country held by the SDF.

A coalition source contacted by Al-Monitor for further information about the capture of Kurdi said that the other occupants of the compound complied with directions and were not deemed a threat and that Kurdi remains in US Forces custody.

A question for further information about the detained mans background and whether as the name al-Kurdi would suggest he was of Kurdish origins went unanswered.

The coalition source added that the operation was deconflicted with Turkish military via existing deconfliction channels prior to launch.

In regards to whether Turkey coordinated with the coalition for the operation or provided intelligence key to locating the man, the source stated that coalition forces used several sources of intelligence collection to assess the role of Kurdi and enable positive identification before the operation. For the purpose of operational security, we can't talk about the specifics of intelligence collecting.

On the Russian targeting of outposts held by the US-supported Syrian Arab opposition group Maghawir al-Thawra near the Tanf garrison near Jordan earlier this month, a coalition source told Al-Monitor that the US seeks to avoid conflict with Russia in Syria. We seek to avoid miscalculation or a set of actions that could lead to unnecessary conflict. That remains our goal. However, Russia's recent behavior has been provocative and escalatory.

Russia is a close ally of the Syrian government, as is Iran. Both Russian and US forces are deployed to areas of eastern Syria under SDF control along Iraqs western border.

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Iraq targets desert 'wali' and braces for impact of possible conflict

Observers of Iraq were shocked this week by the most tectonic shift in the countrys politics since the defeat of the self-proclaimed Islamic State. Muqtada al-Sadr, the mercurial, firebrand cleric, in the wake of his electoral victory in Iraqs October elections, suddenly directed all the members of his political movement to resign from the Iraqi parliament.

To say this action was stunning would be an understatement. Iraq watchers immediately began to wonder if this was just a threat and was reversible (it appears not though few things are ever final in Iraqi politics), or whether Sadr genuinely intends to go to the street and watch as the Iraqi political system collapses (perhaps with a push from his cadres).

Analysts have been unsuccessfully trying to determine Sadrs motivations for almost two decades now, and getting into the rationale for this decision is difficult. But in general, there appear to be two theories, though mostly still whispered Sadr is either making a very clever play to increase his legitimacy as there is no way to redeem the current system, or he has made a huge political mistake, ceding the initiative to his rivals.

The immediate effect is to tear apart the Tripartite Alliance between the (more or less) unified Sunni block, the Barzanis Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and Sadrs Sairoon Party. Iraqs election law dictates that in the event of a resignation, the seat goes to the candidate who came closest to winning. Since the Sadrist strength is in the Shia regions, these seats should all go to various Shia-based parties the Hashd-aligned Fatah, former Prime Minister Nouri al-Malikis State of Law, and a unified list between former Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi and the Hikma party of Ammar al-Hakim. Smaller parties and independents will also take some of the seats. As the first three of these have unified into a block known as the Coordinating Framework (or just the Framework or even the Frame), they should now have a somewhat overwhelming 120-ish seats or about a full third of the total parliament. The government is clearly theirs to form.

Assuming that the new parliamentarians take their oaths without incident, the Iraqi parliament should then move quickly to form its long-delayed government. Muhammad Halboosi was already elected as the speaker months ago, but the deputy speaker (a position informally but forcefully reserved for a Shia politician) is one of the resigned Sadrists, so that position will need to be filled immediately, almost certainly by a member of Fatah.

The next task will then be to elect a president. This will remain the bottleneck in government formation, for two reasons. First, unlike all the other offices, which require mere majority votes, election of the president requires a two-thirds majority and a two-thirds quorum. The inability to put together a quorum for a presidential vote has been the stumbling block for the past months as Sadr attempted to form his government. Second, the two major Kurdish parties, the KDP and the Talabani-led Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, are at odds over the presidency. The office is currently held by a stalwart of the latter, Barham Salih, perhaps Iraqs most notable figure on the international stage. And the Framework is deeply indebted to Talabanis party, as it stood by them in helping to block the formation of the Sadrist government. However, the KDP remains particularly with the Sadrists having gone to the wilderness the most unified large party in Iraq. Forming a government without the approval, however grudging, of their patriarch Masoud Barzani, former president of Iraqi Kurdistan, will be very difficult. So all eyes will be on the Kurdish north as interlocutors attempt to broker a deal between the two parties to gain consensus as to whether Salih remains in the presidency, or the KDP nominee Rebar Ahmed Khalid Barzani takes the post. It is possible (though it would be legally tricky) that a third compromise candidate could emerge.

Once the presidency is resolved, the rest of the process should move quickly. The division of ministries between the three ethno-sectarian groups is well understood by precedent (13 to Shia, six to Sunni, three to Kurds, and one each to Turkmen and Christians) and no attempt to change the traditional distribution is expected. The Shia (meaning the Framework) will control the Ministries of Oil, Electricity, Health, and Interior. The Sunni will control the Ministries of Defense, Planning, and Industry. The only question will be whether the Kurds have as their major prize the Finance Ministry or the Foreign Affairs Ministry (the Kurdish share has flipped between the two ministries in the past two governments, with the Shia taking the other), but that decision has been relatively amicably made in past formations and should not be a major issue.

The first-order question asked is who will be the prime minister. It is too soon to name names, though plenty are circulating. But most sources agree that the Framework has decided on three primary qualifications that he (almost certainly a he) should be a politician, not a technocrat, a strong enough figure to effectively lead, and acceptable to the international community (meaning Washington, London, and Brussels as well as Tehran, Ankara, and the Gulf Cooperation Council). This test excludes figures such as Nouri al Maliki, Hadi al-Ameri, Falah Fayyad, and Adnan Zurfi, as well as the current prime minister, Mustafa Kadhimi, all of whom are otherwise serious aspirants.

Initial indicators are that the Framework realizes the challenge that Sadrs action presents to them, and that taking actions to shore up international legitimacy and integration will be high on the agenda. Of course, reform attempts have been often promised and seldom delivered by past governments, so a strong measure of skepticism even cynicism is certainly understandable. And the large amounts of money involved the Iraqi government is flush with unexpected billions of petrodollars, thanks to current high oil prices certainly raises the suspicion based on past experience that the winning parties will be unable to keep themselves from looting the treasury for private gain.

So expect to see a government in relatively short order, within about two months. But the West should watch carefully with really one question in mind. Is this a government that intends to turn in on itself, refuse to take necessary reforms, and isolate itself from the international system? Or will Iraqs elites finally realize that change is required, and implement the necessary reforms for integration into the world system, beginning with infrastructure physical and regulatory at home?

This is of course a big and complex question. But some indicators will be fairly simple. Will Iraq use its bounty to remedy the states inability to provide sufficient electricity and clean water to its citizens? Will the presence of the United States and NATO training missions be regularized and legitimized? Will capturing of flare gas be a priority? Will Iraq make serious attempts to court international business, beyond oil and electricity?

Finally, what of Sadr and the Sadrists? Though out of government, they remain serious actors. Sadr has at least two primary weapons: the ability to mass large groups of unarmed demonstrators, using nonviolent resistance, and his militia, the Peace Brigades of Saraya al-Salam. Either or both could metastasize Iraqs instability, and the impoverished underclasses from which Sadr draws his followers may believe they have little to lose. Countering Sadrs likely attempts to undermine the already weak system will further challenge the Framework-headed government.

Iraq remains fragile. Climate change has buffeted the country already this summer with record heat and sandstorms and the Tigris is flowing at near-record lows. Voter cynicism resulted in low turnout last fall. Demographics bring one million new Iraqi citizens who need jobs into the adult ranks each year. And now a major social current the Sadrist trend will be outside the government openly waiting for (and perhaps attempting to accelerate) the total collapse of the system. The challenges remain huge, but even small steps that acknowledge the scope of the problem would be encouraging. Whether this still unformed government can take them will be their test.

Douglas Ollivant is a former NSC Director for Iraq. He is a senior fellow at New America and managing partner at Mantid International, which has U.S. and Western clients in Federal Iraq. Follow on Twitter at @DouglasOllivant.

Image: Iraqi government

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A Post-Sadr Iraq? - War on the Rocks

ByMuhammad Baqir Muhyedeen

Although not a new phenomenon in the region, Iraq has faced an unprecedented number of dust and sandstorms since the beginning of this millennium. A few decades ago, Iraq would experience a storm or two a year during the winter season. However, this year, Iraq has already surpassed ten sandstorms during the past two months alone.

These meteorological events, which typically last three to five hours and can reach heights up to five thousand feet, are a hindrance to the average Iraqi civilian. These storms cause many to stay indoors for the duration of the event, followed by countless hours of cleaning as the grains of sand travel into even garment drawers. At times, the settling of the dust and sand particles can last for days. However, these dust and sandstorms have a more dire effect on the nation as a whole, including government and military operations. This piece will examine what is causing the increase of dust and sandstorms in Iraq, the socio-economic costs, and what actions can be taken to mitigate and potentially eliminate them.

Storms on the horizon

The storms cause fatalities around the country and long-term respiratory illnesses by inhaling sand and dust. This year, over ten thousand people were hospitalized, with at least five recorded deaths from the sandstorms that swept through Iraq. As a result of these dire conditions, this year, the Iraqi government shut down for many ministerial and provincial workers. The sandstorms even temporarily suspended all flights into the affected regions in Iraq, including the capital, Baghdad. These sandstorms are viewed as an aviation nightmare, as they drastically decrease the visibility for commercial and military pilots, often grounding all flights as the storm passes.

There appear to be no studies on the economic cost of dust and sandstorms in Iraq; however, a few have been conducted on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region that put a dollar figure on the cost. The World Bank did the most comprehensive study in 2019, which found that the economic cost of premature deaths caused by sand and dust inhalation increased by 123 percent between 1990 and 2013 to $141 billion. The report explains that, in 2013, Iraq suffered 10,400 premature deaths due to dust in the air, which cost the economy almost $15 billion, or 3 percent of the years gross domestic product. The 2019 World Bank study estimates direct costs from grounded flights, lost crops, and production halted by government-ordered holidays at $13 billion, bringing the MENA regions total economic cost from dust and sandstorms to over $154 billion annually.

Due to the inaction of the Iraqi government and civil society, the Environment Ministry stated in April that, over the past two decades, dusty days in Iraq have increased from 243 to 272 days per year, and warned that they are expected to reach three hundred days per year by 2050. Iraq is currently experiencing dust and sandstorms throughout all seasons of the year due to climate change, regional drought, desertification, and a decrease in water reservesall factors that have led to dust accumulation. Studies have found that as much as 71 percent of agricultural land in the once Fertile Crescent is threatened by desertification due to climate change, which is decreasing the vegetation coverthe main factor for soil stabilization. According to a 2019 report by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Iraq is the fifth-most vulnerable nation in the world to the effects of climate change.

Additionally, Iraqi officials claim that water reserves in Iraq have decreased over 50 percent over the past year due to poor rainfall and the water levels of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which account for 98 percent of Iraqs water reserves combined. The rivers are currently expected to dry up by 2040 if no actions are taken due to lower water levels and climate change.

The Tigris and Euphrates Rivers originate in Turkey and flow to the Shatt al-Arab Basin in Iraq, while the Euphrates crosses through Syria before flowing to Iraq. Due to the Iraqi governments inaction, plans by Turkey that alter river flows are major contributing factors to the drying up in Iraq. The Turkish government, which is constructing hydropower plants on the banks of the rivers, boasts that their plans are an abundant source of carbon-free electricity. However, experts warn that the dam is taking a human and environmental toll. This, alongside the lack of rainfall, which is decreasing vegetation cover, makes Iraq vulnerable to the microbursts of winds, expanding dust and sandstorms.

What can be done?

First and foremost, its crucial to reiterate the importance that Iraq takes expedited measures to address all factors contributing to the increase in dust and sandstorms. The Iraqi government must adopt a cultural and legislative overhaul that is more eco-conscious, so that every citizen is self-aware of how they contribute to the demise of an inhabitable Iraq.

Possible solutions include legislation that re-cultivates desertified lands by increasing agriculture and encouraging farmers to plant orchards and other crops around cities, towns, and villages. In the 1980s, an estimated thirty million date palm trees were growing in Iraq. However, due to actions taken by the Baathist regime under Iraqi Dictator Saddam Hussein and a chaotic post-2003 invasion, Iraq currently has less than twelve million palm trees. In 1995, Iraq had some of the worlds most productive soils, with agriculture representing more than 18 percent of the nations economy. Today, however, it accounts for less than 2 percent. Modern irrigation techniquessuch as drip and spray irrigationneed to also become the norm in Iraq, for these techniques significantly reduce water loss by farmers.

Other solutions include the Iraqi government creating environmental reserves with diverse plants and animals far from population centers. These reserves will serve as more vital vegetation cover and will also serve as a catalyst for new ecosystems to prosper in Iraq. The Iraqi government should also adopt legislation that eliminates the unauthorized exploitation of natural resources, including sand, which is used for building materials as the encroachment of sand destabilizes the ground, allowing microbursts of wind to carry more sand during the storms.

This phenomenon threatening life in Iraq isnt unprecedented, as many of Iraqs neighboring nations have already commenced addressing the threat of climate change. Iraq can benefit from the experiences of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and others, and utilize published studies to see what methods may be more effective in addressing climate change within its borders. To effectively combat the threat of climate change in the MENA region, it is imperative that all neighboring nations work together to devise a climate change plan that considers the safeguarding of all inhabitants of the region.

The truth is that, in order to combat climate change effectively and in a timely matter, Iraq cannot combat it alone. Upon becoming a party to the Paris Agreement at COP26, the United Nations called on the international community to stand in solidarity with Iraq as it combats climate change. This can be done through funding from the international community, coming with expert-set stipulations and tracked through international bodies like UNEP.

Through some of the above-proposed methods and more research, the Iraqi government and population can take the necessary steps to protect their country from the changing climate and safeguard Iraq for future generations.

Muhammad Baqir Muhyedeen is the policy program manager at the Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC) and an expert on Iraqi affairs. Follow him on Twitter: @mbmdeen.

Image: A man walks on a bridge during a sandstorm in Baghdad, Iraq, May 23, 2022. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Sudani

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Iraq's sandstorms are threatening life in the Fertile Crescent. It's time the Iraqi government takes a stance. - Atlantic Council