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The Turkish government has increased the frequency of its drone strikes against the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Syria and Iraq since 2019. Turkeys strategy is easy to understand. Ankara is using low-cost, persistent airpower to strike PKK leaders and lower-ranking cadres in areas that it could not previously reach. Following a series of Turkish military offensives, the strikes have further intensified pressure on the PKK and its affiliates and have pushed them further from Turkeys southeast border.

In the coming years, these drone strikes are likely to remain a persistent feature of Turkeys counter-terrorism campaign. Ankara has no incentive to stop them. At the same time, these strikes will not incapacitate the PKK or end its four-decade-long fight, despite the strikes showing clear signs of degrading the groups capabilities. As a result, Turkeys drone strikes will create more tension in the U.S.-Turkish relationship and more tensions between Washington and its counter-Islamic State partners in Syria.

Washington almost certainly will not apply sufficient pressure on Ankara to stop these strikes. For the United States, there is no Kurdistan, so Kurdish issues are subordinated to the relations with countries in which Kurds reside. This reasonable approach means that Washington will almost certainly favor Ankara over a non-state actor, outside the pressing national security concerns created by the war against the Islamic State. Rather than engage in a futile debate about whether the United States can or should stop Turkish drone strikes, policymakers should focus on managing the fallout across the region.

Turkey has been fighting the PKK since the 1980s. The latest round of the conflict began in July 2015, with the end of a troubled but promising peace process. But Turkeys own forever war retains a high level of support from the government and the broader population. In this context, Ankara has prioritized the development of indigenous drones. Their deployment has proved valuable in decreasing risks to Turkish soldiers and striking PKK lines of communication inside northern Iraq and northern Syria. In short, the use of low-cost airpower is not a significant drain on Turkish resources and has had positive military outcomes.

As Turkish drone use has expanded, so have the number of drone strikes, marrying drone technology with Ankaras cross-border operations in Syria and Iraq. This has increased Turkish presence in traditional PKK strongholds in eastern Iraq. Ankara has managed to leverage its dominant economic position to carve out tighter ties with the Kurdistan Democratic Party, which controls Erbil and is the most powerful Iraqi Kurdish political party. Iraqi Kurds, in general, are riven by division and the Kurdistan Democratic Party benefits from its close relationship with Ankara. As a result, while drone strikes have generated popular protest in northern Iraq, there is little political cost for Ankara.

The PKK, in response, has grown more diffuse, attacking Turkish military targets inside Iraq and using proxies to conduct a persistent insurgency in Turkish-occupied Syria. These tactics, for Ankara, are indicative of PKK weakness. The group has been pushed from its traditional strongholds inside Turkey, and the main areas of contact are now inside Iraq. This position is advantageous to Ankara, even if it does little to politically address the drivers of Kurdish anger toward the state or the appeal of the PKK to a minority of Turkish citizens.

Turkeys drone strikes pose a political problem for the United States. The Syrian Democratic Forces, a Syrian-Kurdish militia with which Washington partnered to defeat the Islamic State, has direct links to the PKK, and Turkeys strikes have repeatedly targeted its officials. These strikes are occurring while U.S. forces are on the ground in Syria working alongside the group. The Turkish strikes in Syria began after Turkish talks with Washington to establish a permanent presence in northeastern Syria failed and then led to the start of Operation Peace Spring, the name Ankara gave to its October 2019 invasion. In Iraq, the drone strikes have increased in frequency during this same time period, mirroring the countrys technological advances with drones and munitions.

In the Middle East, there is a pervasive belief that Washington is omnipotent and, if properly motivated, can force countries to do its bidding. For this reason, the Syrian Kurdish leadership is convinced that Washington has the power to stop Turkish strikes if it wanted to, but that the U.S. government simply chooses not to. The U.S. military, therefore, is facing a situation where its partner forces will come under attack, despite the presence of U.S. forces in the area.

This reality demonstrates the importance of the deconfliction mechanisms that Washington and Ankara already have in place. But it also clearly shows that these mechanisms cannot do anything more than provide notification for Turkish air operations in places the United States is also present. Indeed, the instruments that Washington uses to deconflict with Turkey do not hinder Turkish air operations. In Syria, the United States has ceded much of the border to Turkey, giving Ankara a clear cut deconfliction box from which to fly and strike in support of its goals.

Making matters more complicated, the United States actually supports Turkeys airstrikes against PKK targets in Iraqi Kurdistan. When Washington made the decision to deepen support for the Syrian Kurds before the assault on Raqqa, it sought to overcome Turkish objections by providing Turkey assistance with its kinetic strikes in Iraq. But, even were Washington to stop, Turkish capabilities have grown considerably in recent years and now account for the vast majority of intelligence in the area.

Turkish-American Deconfliction

Put simply, the United States has no true solution to this new reality, nor does it have a clear policy regarding Turkish drone strikes.

The United States and Turkey have historically cooperated on aerial surveillance. This cooperation has been fraught and marred by distrust. The Turkish Air Force has operated consistently in northern Iraq for close to three decades. The United States and Turkey have a deconfliction agreement there that Washington manages in coordination with the Iraqi government. According to my interviews with U.S. military officials, there is deconfliction line drawn across northern Iraq. Ankara has control over areas to the north of the line. The United States has control to the south. The areas of control are subdivided into boxes dubbed keypads that correspond to a place on a map, with a pre-notification mechanism to manage flights inside keypads to the north and south of the line. Before most flights, Ankara informs the United States of where it intends to fly, if the flight is armed or not, and whether a strike is planned. The United States can non-concur with planned strikes, but Turkey is not obligated to listen to Washington.

In parallel, the United States also devoted its own surveillance assets to assist Turkey. This intelligence relationship increased during the Syrian civil war, particularly since 2017 when the United States began devoting more Reaper drone orbits and allowing for the resulting intelligence to be used for lethal strikes. However, U.S. officials familiar with the program have told me that the Turkish side was unwilling to share sensitive data about the PKK with the United States, and that the United States did not share all of the data needed to conduct an airstrike. Instead, Washington shared coordinates and information that have allowed Turkish drones to get very close to suspected targets, where they could then conduct the strike on its own. Therefore, U.S. assets do not often yield much usable intelligence for Ankara but have led to strikes on numerous occasions. In any case, this cooperation was reportedly halted after Turkeys October 2019 invasion, ending a program that had begun in 2007 and was expanded during the nadir of the relationship.

The proliferation of indigenous Turkish drones has extended Ankaras reach, which has undermined any coercive effect from the programs suspension. The United States, according to my interviews, has little understanding of Turkish targeting methodology or how strikes are planned or carried out. Regardless, it is clear that Ankara is striking more targets than ever before and striking more high value targets and mid-tier PKK commanders throughout Iraq and Syria.

Ankaras Deconfliction Box in Syria

The United States and Turkey have a similar deconfliction agreement in Syria. Turkey can now operate freely on the ground and in the air within a box stretching roughly 20 kilometers into Syrian territory along the border between the towns of Tel Afar to Tel Abyad. The agreement on Turkeys box stemmed from Ankaras escalatory actions and repeated threats to invade U.S.-held territory in northeastern Syria. In August 2019, Turkish threats became more credible, prompting U.S. diplomatic action to try and manage the threat from the Turkish military. This approach resulted in the formation of a Combined Joint Operations Center, or CJOC, based in Sanliurfa, Turkey, where the two countries coordinated joint ground and helicopter patrols. This diplomatic approach allowed for the Turkish Air Force to overfly Syria, necessitating participation in the Air Tasking Order the mechanism used to control all coalition airstrikes and activity during Operation Inherent Resolve. This initially involved unmanned surveillance platforms but, with the start of joint ground patrols, grew to include armed Turkish F-16s on-call for troops in potential contact situations.

This arrangement did not prevent a Turkish invasion. In October 2019, the Turkish army occupied a stretch of Syrian territory across the border. The Turkish Air Force does have the option to strike targets in Syria from inside its own airspace. However, the flight time for most weapons Ankara uses to strike inside Syria is somewhere between five and 10 minutes from weapons release to impact. This means that fleeting targets cannot really be struck from positions inside Turkey, thereby requiring overflight to hit moving targets. As a result, Turkey has dramatically increased the number of drone strikes within its box. Outside of this area, however, the situation is more chaotic. During Ankaras October 2019 invasion, for example, Air Force pilots I interviewed explained how U.S. jets, Turkish drones, and Russian jets were all operating in close proximity with one another with no coordination or deconfliction. The situation has stabilized, somewhat, because the United States has less overhead presence in areas Turkey controls. It is unclear if Russia and Turkey have a similar deconfliction arrangement, but anecdotal evidence from Idlib suggests the two sides have an agreement to not directly target each others platforms.

Turkish strikes against Syrian Democratic Forces officials have led to widespread protests and calls for Washington to take action. For Ankara, of course, the fact that its drone strikes disrupt U.S.-Kurdish ties is a net positive. The United States is seeking to simultaneously support its NATO ally with counter-terrorism assistance and work with Ankaras enemy to defeat the Islamic State. Ankara has objected to this arrangement, and its drone campaign takes advantage of American incoherence on the topic.

The United States may have little leverage to stop Turkish action, but the split policy means that Washington is riven by division and cannot agree on pushing for de-escalation between the two groups. The provision of lethal support, for example, was intended to sooth Turkish concerns about the rise of the Syrian Democratic Forces. Instead, the lethal support has indirectly helped increase the frequency of drone strikes, which leads to Kurdish reprisal attacks and a continued cycle of violence. The ideal off-ramp, of course, is a return to peace talks, but Washington has few good options to pressure Turkey to return to a peace process. More importantly, the politics in Turkey do not support such a move. Until this political reality changes, Turkish drone strikes will be a constant irritant to U.S. interests that have to be managed.

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The American Deconfliction Disadvantage: Ankara's Drone Campaign in Syria and Iraq - War on the Rocks

Who calls the shots in Iraq the government or the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)? Some observers think it is the latter, especially in light of recent events. On May 26, 2021, Iraqi police arrested Qassem Musleh the commander of the PMF in Anbar province in connection with the assassination of a prominent Iraqi activist. Immediately after, PMF militias circulated videos purportedly showing their fighters driving heavily armed trucks around Baghdads Green Zone in a show of force designed to compel Muslehs release. When he was set free two weeks later, some analysts interpreted it as another exhibit of state weakness vis--vis the PMF, an umbrella organization of mostly Shiite, pro-Iran paramilitary groups that have fought the Islamic State.

In reality, the PMF has some pronounced weaknesses and faces growing challenges. Instead of viewing Muslehs arrest and release as a victory for the PMF in a trial of strength against the Iraqi state, what actually occurred was a scramble by different PMF elements to maintain a united front against the prime minister when faced with the detention of one of their own. During Muslehs two weeks in custody, it became clear that the PMF which was incorporated into the Iraqi armed forces in 2016 is more divided and weaker than it used to be, even though the shared interests of its main armed factions keep it afloat.

The PMFs major organizational challenges are competition between the various networks of forces, as they each seek to maintain their privileges and enhance their status, and limited central restraint on their actions. That reality generates the risk that further destabilization and provocation of the PMF by the Iraqi state might trigger more serious bouts of violence. The Iraqi government should, therefore, consider adopting a policy of non-confrontation toward the PMF, provided its constituent groups are willing to reciprocate.

Roots of the PMFs Weakness: The Assassination of Mr. PMF in 2020

Abu Mahdi al Muhandis was a charismatic, father-like figure and as commander of the PMF he was a major source of the groups strength. When U.S. forces killed him in a drone strike in January 2020 in the same attack that killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani it dealt a major blow to the PMF. Even though sentiments about him among the Iraqi Shiite leadership were mixed, he exercised a substantial level of control over the paramilitary groups. In part he did so through the PMF Commission a state-sponsored umbrella organization under the office of the Iraqi prime minister and also on the basis of his own personal history, militant credentials, and leadership skills.

Muhandis was also a major power broker among Iraqs political elites as well as a linchpin in Irans regional networks of armed groups and political parties. He was the proverbial glue that kept different PMF networks together Sunni, Shiite, and other ethno-sectarian factions, local and transnational PMF elements, as well as groups loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, Muqtada al Sadr, and the supreme leader of Iran, Ali Khamenei. While the PMF has never taken the form of a single hierarchical organization, under Muhandis it comprised an interlocking series of networks with interdependent interests and subject to a measure of central command.

The assassination of Mr. PMF shook those networks to their core in two ways. His removal left them relatively leaderless and weakened by a protracted struggle for control between different factions. Muhandis wielded more power than his fellow commanders Falih al Fayyadh, Hadi al Ameri, or Qais al Khazali and his death left the PMF leadership disputed and without a single unifying figure. Without Muhandis, individual groups also became subject to weaker constraints on their local autonomy. Together, these developments halted a process that had been underway in which a set of fairly loose, and sometimes competing, PMF networks were moving toward becoming a more integrated organization. Admittedly this remained a work in progress under Muhandis, but the PMF has found it impossible to continue this trajectory without him.

The result has been growing fragmentation within the PMF and stresses on its collective organizational structure. Pressure from protestors, political factions not linked to the PMF, and Prime Minister Mustafa al Kadhimi have intensified these challenges. Since October 2019, protestors have condemned Irans increasing intervention in Iraqs internal affairs and some PMF groups have used violence against their critics. In response, Kadhimi set the ambitious goal of holding the perpetrators accountable and imposing the governments command over all armed groups.

The arrest and release of Musleh was a vivid illustration of the PMFs fragmentation and weakening. To begin with, the seemingly integrated and much-touted PMF response of occupying the Green Zone on May 26 and 27 was misrepresented by the paramilitary groups. There was no substantial incursion by PMF groups into the Green Zone beyond their usual presence. The temporary handover of a number of checkpoints by security forces to the PMF was relatively peaceful and resulted from a decision by Kadhimi to avoid direct confrontation. In addition, the media spin that PMF pressure on the Green Zone secured Muslehs swift release turned out to be largely spurious. He was only released about 14 days later, after the charges against him were officially dropped due to insufficient evidence. Behind the scenes, prominent Shiite leaders and commanders had rushed to negotiate the release with Kadhimi in order to avoid further escalation.

Widening Cracks in the PMF

There are several significant cracks in the PMFs organizational structure. The most profound is the schism between the Atabat or shrine groups, which are loyal to Sistani, and the rest of the PMF. The Atabat groups split from the PMF in April 2020 to join the Iraqi Army and Ministry of Defense structures. They were followed by several smaller groups. Their departure caused a serious loss of legitimacy for the PMF as a whole among its Shiite and non-Shiite followers because the organization and its networks are grounded in Sistanis fatwa of 2014 and he is the very person to whom the Atabat groups pledge their loyalty. While the differences between the Atabat groups and the rest of the PMF predated their actual split, it was largely the influence and control of Muhandis that had prevented it from occurring sooner. So far, leaders from the Badr and Asaib ahl al-Haq armed groups have failed to salvage the relationship between the PMF and Sistani, depriving those groups of some of their religious legitimacy. Notably, Sistani recently condemned PMF actions in several statements. Atabat groups also recently commemorated the fatwas anniversary without inviting other groups, triggering hateful reactions from some of them toward the representative of Sistani who spoke at the event.

Another divide in the PMF has opened up between groups such as Kataib Hizballah, on the one hand, and Badr, Asaib ahl al-Haq, and Saraya al-Salam on the other, due to poor relationship management by Kataib Hizballah in the PMF Commission after Muhandis death. While it is unsurprising that a number of critical PMF functions like internal affairs and intelligence are controlled by Kataib Hizballah given that Muhandis founded the group before assuming the PMFs leadership, he managed to exercise control in a manner that kept other factions onboard. But Kataib Hizballahs imposition, in February 2020, of another one of its commanders Abu Fadak al Mohammadawi to succeed Muhandis on the PMF Commission alienated key groups such as Badr and Asaib.

Since then, opposing camps have formed in the commission that are in dispute about strategic matters, such as the allocation of the additional funds obtained through the 2020 state budget, but also about tactical issues, such as the framing of the response to Muslehs arrest. In essence, this is a competition for domestic power. Khazali, the leader of Asaib ahl al-Haq, has for example made barbed comments over the past few weeks toward Badrs leader Ameri and Kataib Hizballah that express his dissatisfaction with their monopolization of power within the PMF. In response, Kataib Hizballah and Harakat al-Nujaba excluded Asaib ahl al-Haq from the Tansiqiya, a loose confederation of resistance groups, muqawama, that pursue the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.

A third divide relates to the nature of the relationship between key PMF groups and Iran. While this association was always contentious for some groups, like the Sadrists, and not in dispute for others, like Kataib Hizballah, the real battle is for the middle of the PMF that consists of Badr and Asaib. Both are shifting their discourse toward a more patriotic stance, indicating there is space for prioritizing domestic interests with associated strategies and efforts a development that was accelerated ahead of the 2018 parliamentary elections and more recently by the need to adopt a less Iran-oriented profile in the wake of the 2019 protests calling for limited foreign intervention and reform of the political system. While Khazali continues to call Iran a strategic ally, he oscillates between pro-Iran and pro-Iraq positions with the intention of having the best of both worlds, positioning himself as moderate heir to Muhandis for the PMF leadership. Such prevarication and distancing from Iran have caused other groups, such as Harakat al-Nujaba, to double down on their pro-Iran stance and seek more direct confrontation with U.S.-led coalition forces through drone attacks.

A final divide results from the PMF Commissions neglect, after the killing of Muhandis, of local groups in areas liberated from the Islamic State. Their diminished connection with the commission has caused groups like the Shabak 30th Brigade in Nineveh to join Iraqs network of Iran-linked resistance groups as an alternative way to secure their local interests, position, and autonomy. Attacks on coalition and U.S. forces in new places have been a side effect of such local power calculations. For example, the attack on Erbil airport in October 2020 in which six missiles were launched from an area in the Nineveh Plains controlled by the PMF was unprecedented.

The Risk of Violence in Response to Pressure on the PMF

The fact that the PMF Commission, an organization that was created to manage a number of armed group networks, suffers from reduced legitimacy, increased internal competition, and divided loyalties creates risks. These developments reduce central control, halt professionalization efforts, and enable groups to pursue their narrow self-interests with greater autonomy. Also, when they are confronted, PMF groups have more latitude to respond with the threat or actual use of violence because the constraints on doing so have decreased. From this perspective, the response to Muslehs arrest was a harbinger of how PMF groups might react when they feel cornered. The assassination of an intelligence officer in Baghdad on June 7 provides another example of what can happen when pressure is brought to bear on the PMF, considering that the assassination was a response to Kadhimi dispatching hundreds of intelligence officers to border crossings to curb smuggling facilitated by armed groups. As the planned October 2021 parliamentary elections approach, the risk of violence will increase.

Despite the weakening of the PMF as an organizational entity, most factions understand that their strength lies in unity and that not standing up for one another might be fatal in the long run. For example, major Shiite political figures linked to the PMF, like Ameri and Maliki, jointly lobbied behind the scenes on behalf of Musleh, facilitating his release. Despite the growing divisions between factions, the urgency of expediting Muslehs release reflected their continuing shared interests.

Whether the result of a quid pro quo or an attempt to deescalate violent confrontations, Shiite political leaders have protected the PMF, as happened in Muslehs case. For example, Kataib Hizballah relies on the Fateh parliamentary bloc for political benefits. In exchange Fateh, particularly Badrs political bloc, depends on voters from across PMF factions to maintain its parliamentary majority. Hence, artificial PMF unity will likely be maintained for some time to come.

Yet, the prime minister might seek to test and puncture that unity, given that he has little to lose and much to gain from doing so. His popularity is limited, his political future uncertain, and he understands that the PMF suffers reputational losses in all public incidents of the Musleh variety, irrespective of their precise outcome. But such actions by the Iraqi state do not lead to changes in PMF behavior, as the kidnapping and physical abuse of Ali al Mikdam an Iraqi activist critical of armed factions role in suppressing protests illustrated in early July, just one month after Muslehs release.

Bringing further pressure to bear on the PMF carries three major risks for Iraq as a whole. First, Iran might revert entirely to a strategy based on small, loyal, and well-equipped forces rather than on mass-based paramilitary mobilization that is more susceptible to popular and political pressure Harakat al-Nujaba instead of Badr, in a sense. Iran successfully used such an approach during the height of the U.S. occupation of Iraq between 2005 and 2007 when its Special Groups developed a fearsome reputation for their ability to pierce U.S. armor with explosive devices specifically developed for that purpose. If this happens, it would likely make security coordination and political compromise across Iraqs security sector more difficult.

Second, Kataib Hizballah, in particular, is well placed to expand its regional reach. Development of its capabilities over the past few years has given it a fairly sophisticated platform from which it can easily grow further. Just a few years ago, the group was limited to engaging U.S. forces in guerilla warfare. But today it controls major assets like a key Iraqi-Syrian bordercrossing and plays a major role in running the so-called Iranian land corridor. Kataib Hizballahs agenda does not prioritize Iraqi national interests and its further growth would complicate U.S.-Iraqi relations.

Third, should greater pressure on the PMF translate into substantial electoral losses for PMF-linked, pro-Iran political parties while the Sadrists become more influential due to a high turnout of their reliable constituency, Iran-linked PMF groups will command less political clout to defend their interests against their primary competitor. In turn, this would likely cause these groups to resort to violence as a primary response mechanism against any prime minister who seeks to curtail their power with the backing of Sadrs political and military wings.

What Should Be Done?

It might have been feasible to promote greater integration of the PMF into the Iraqi Security Forces through a pressure- and incentive-based strategy when the PMF was largely under the control of Muhandis. There was an integrated command in place with sufficient authority to make any course corrections or changes that were agreed with Iraqs political factions. Today, greater pressure on the PMF risks creating more contestation and fragmentation among the paramilitary groups, which might respond with more violence. PMF leaders like Ameri and Khazali have publicly complained about such pressure in recent weeks. Ameri also emphasized that the future of the PMF is under threat in a recent electoral rally as a way to mobilize constituents. It has been a long time since a PMF leader issued such warnings, which indicate that the groups feel themselves to be under pressure.

Regardless of the PMFs nefarious activities and the abuse of power by a number of its armed factions, the months leading up to the national elections are not a good time to increase pressure on the groups in the form of Musleh-type measures. It is wiser for Iraqi politicians to wait for the electoral results, work to appoint a stronger prime minister, and secure a measure of collaboration with the newly elected Iranian president, Ebrahim Raisi.

A feasible interim strategy to keep the situation manageable is for the Iraqi government to negotiate with all armed groups, large and small, via Shiite political leaders in order to develop a temporary deal that de-escalates existing tensions. For example, armed groups could commit to stopping the targeting of protestors and assassination of activists, as well as to reducing their attacks on coalition forces. In turn, the government could commit to further harmonization of PMF and Iraqi Security Forces salaries, allow the temporary re-integration of a number of dismissed PMF members into the security forces, and permit the PMF to investigate their own members first before any arrests are made. A mutual policy of non-confrontation would likely serve both the Iraqi government and the PMF well for the months ahead.

Nancy Ezzeddine is a research fellow at Clingendaels Conflict Research Unit. In this role she contributes to the Middle East research program, exploring identity politics and the use of religion as means of political mobilization in the Middle East.

Erwin van Veen is a senior research fellow at Clingendaels Conflict Research Unit where he leads a team that analyses the political economy of conflict in the Middle East. His own work examines the political use of armed groups in processes of state development and geopolitical conflict.

Image: Tasnim News Agency (Photo by Ahmad Shamloo Fard)

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Warning Signs: Qassem Musleh and Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces - War on the Rocks

Since the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, tens of thousands of ancient artifacts and pieces of art have been looted and smuggled out of the country.

This week, the US agreed to return more than 17,000 treasures to Iraq, including an ancient clay tablet containing a portion of the Epic of Gilgamesh.

Related:Germany to returnlootedBenin Bronzes to Nigeria

The majority of the artifacts date back 4,000 years to ancient Mesopotamia and were recovered from the USin a recent trip by Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi. Other pieces were also returned from Japan, Netherlands and Italy, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein said in a joint press conference with Culture Minister Hasan Nadhim.

Theres still a lot of work ahead in this matter. There are still thousands of Iraqi artifacts smuggled outside the country," Nadhim said.

Iraq's government has been slowly recovering the plundered antiquities for decades but archaeological sites across the country continue to suffer from neglect due to a lack of funds.

Related:Benin negotiates with France to return precious objects taken during colonial war

Nada Shabout, a professor of art history and coordinator of the Contemporary Arab and Muslim Cultural Studies Initiative at the University of North Texas, joined The World's host Marco Werman to discuss Iraq's stolen cultural heritage.

Marco Werman:First of all, Nada, how did these pieces get to the US in the first place? Where have they been?

Nada Shabout:Since 2003, and all the looting that had happened [much] of which was very organized and people knew exactly what they were taking out it sort of was smuggled through the region, through the UAE, through Jordan at times, and found its way to where it wound up to be.

What was your reaction when you heard the US will be returning these artifacts and this art to Iraq?

To be honest, it was a refreshing piece of news. Returning them is great. But also, this is just a little drop in a bucket full of water. So, this is a good step, but neither resolves the problem of all the looted works, nor does it really actually establish a system for stopping or returning.

So, if it's a drop in the bucket, let's pull back. What has the US war in Iraq done to the country's cultural heritage? And is it just the 2003 invasion and occupation, or do we have to go back to Operation Desert Storm in 1991 to understand the full impact of the looting?

Have you ever brought this up with the directors of museums when you see these artifacts?

Yes. And in fact, even one time I wrote to Interpol, who were very appreciative of the information, because I know of two works that were being sold [on] the black market in Amman. And their response was that "We appreciate your word[s], but we really need an official intervention. We need the Iraqi government to acknowledge that these works are looted."

So, the 17,000 artifacts and treasures will return to Iraq. But you've written, Nada, that looting and smuggling continues in Iraq. Explain what's going on.

Yes, as a matter of fact, looting does continue and the state of the cultural heritage is not any better than it was in 2003. I'm writing the same things that I wrote in 2003. I am making the same pleas of 2003. The archeological sites are not really well protected. The looting continues. Much of the lost artifacts are not returned. There's no money for restoration. There [has] been no interest in helping the Museum of Modern Art pick up where it is. What I try to do with the Modern Art Iraq Archive website, which was about documenting, was to try to trace. And no one knows, or no one wants to say, where are the works, what were the works. Only the artists who were alive were identifying their own works. And so, there's no sort of organized effort to identify archive documents, as well as, then, try to find these works. And by not returning, or by not even knowing what was looted, the country is deprived of its history. The Iraqi people need to know their whole history Mesopotamia, the Islamic and the modern. You know, this is a living culture. In Iraq, if you go to Iraq, you'll be treated to a famous way of cooking fish: masgouf fish. That's actually how Iraqis cooked it with the same recipes since the Mesopotamian times.

Wow. So, professor, I mean, to that point, you're from Baghdad. Your career is devoted to art and Iraq's own rich history. Tell us a bit more about what Iraqis have been deprived of in recent years. Like, what is the one thing that the Iraq museum has sadly been missing that Iraqis should have seen?

So, you know, since the protests that were started in 2019, when we see on TV, the protesters, and their art represented as the contemporary Iraqi art, which is graffiti and reactionary and protest art, which is great, but that's by no means contemporary Iraqi art. That actually denies the heritage of their modernism. If those artists, themselves, are not able to see the heritage in the museum, then they don't really know how they got to where they are now. And what they're doing, and what they're learning, they think it's all new. The sad thing about it is that those artists would have been able to pick up where the modernists, and the other Iraqi artists [left off]. Because Iraqi art, in the region, was quite progressive and recognizable. And in fact, many of the artists of the Arab world studied in the academy in Baghdad. So, this is the heritage that Iraqis are deprived of. How will they know how to move forward if they don't know what their past [was]?

So, what do you think needs to be done to help restore and better protect Iraq's cultural heritage? And, are Iraqi officials active in making this happen?

Some Iraqi officials are. I think things are improving to some point. The problem is, they may be overwhelmed with what they have to be doing. But I know that they have not really put enough resources in documentation and archiving, let alone finding. But, there needs to be a more coordinated effort worldwide. At this moment, it's us, academics, scholars, archeologists, historians who are [making] these efforts.

This interview has beenlightlyeditedand condensed for clarity. AP contributed to this report.

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Iraq needs to reclaim its cultural past to develop its future, art historian says - The World

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As the United States draws troops from Afghanistan and Iraq, a source of injury and death will cease. But research by the Veterans Health Administration will continue. Two years ago we checked in with one of VAs top researchers into brain injury and neuropathology. The chief of neuropathology at the VA Boston Healthcare System, Dr. Ann McKee returned to Federal Drive with Tom Temin for an update.

Tom Temin: And good to have you back.

Dr. Ann McKee: Well, thank you. Its a pleasure to be here.

Tom Temin: And I think of you as the brain slice library lady, which is kind of an odd way to put it, but, you are known for the samples and the pathological pieces of brain that you keep and learn from. What has been some of the latest findings?

Dr. Ann McKee: Well, the war in Afghanistan might be ending, but the veterans and the other individuals who are exposed to these repetitive concussive events, the repetitive blast exposures, that problem doesnt go away. There were over 300,000 that were exposed, and they continue to live with some difficulties. And, our research, I am the brain donor lady, I run a big brain bank on trauma over 1,100 brains who are in that bank. And weve only been doing that for the last 13 years. But we also run the ALS and PTSD brain bank. So yes, I do see a lot of brains. And what weve learned from those is that theres injuries after those exposures, and theyre not all the same. Veterans are different. And I dont need to tell you that, but a lot of them play sports football, hockey and that makes them at risk for chronic traumatic encephalopathy, which we clearly see in some of the veterans whove been exposed to blast or concussive injury. And rarely we see CTE in people that have not been both, athletes and military service people. So, its much less common if they werent an athlete of some sort. But we do see CTE, the disease that weve described. So, I think clearly, in football players, we do see that in military veterans too. But almost all of them have some sports history, it doesnt have to be a lot, but most of them have a dual exposure. Were continuing to try to understand those symptoms that become so disabling and the vets the sleep disorder, the depression, the anxiety, the changes in their behavior, and personality. Those are such difficult issues difficult for them difficult for their loved ones those are multifactorial, and theyre hard to pinpoint. We still dont have a good way to diagnose them during life, how to pick up the real issue at hand for each person. But were getting closer. We get closer every day. So the work continues.

Tom Temin: And is it possible to know whether if someone has a brain injury of this severity, once that occurs, now we know that there is a cumulative effect if you keep getting hit, for example, or keep getting a blast shockwave, but once those events are over, does the brain stay in a given state, or does it continue to possibly deteriorate?

Dr. Ann McKee: Thats the thing. Sometimes it stabilizes, which is awesome, or, and even improves. So the person is learning adaptive neural mechanisms different brain pathways to overcome the injury or theyre repairing the injury because the brain is capable of a certain degree of repair. But unfortunately, some individuals continue to progress. And those are the individuals that we really need to keep a close eye on. Because they become so despondent. They feel like no one can validate what theyre experiencing. Theyre experiencing things that are difficult to diagnose we dont have a great way to detect brain injury except with a multitude of research techniques. And then they are at risk, because these guys develop suicidal thoughts, this disabling depression, terrific anxiety, sleep disorder, substance use, because theyre trying to cope as best they can. Those are the guys we really need to keep in our care system, evaluate, and as best as the medical system can, hug them and keep them feeling as well as possible.

Tom Temin: Were speaking with Dr. Ann McKee, chief of neuropathology at the VA Boston Healthcare System. And speaking of giving people the high touch type of treatment and the hug and so on, I imagine the last year and a half of separation among people has really been tough on that particular population.

Dr. Ann McKee: Oh, absolutely. Feelings of isolation, feelings of Im the only one in the universe thats going through this, theres something deeply wrong with me. It just exacerbates all of these issues. So the person thinks theyre somehow responsible for these issues. And that cant be further from the truth. That they are all valiant warriors. Dealing with a brain injury, it takes a tremendous amount of perseverance, tremendous resilience, and just sort of, youre coping, to really try to get through these dark days. And its not easy. And we dont have great answers. But we keep pushing the envelope. I think were a lot further along than we were six years ago. Six years ago, we knew nothing. Now we have a better idea, but we still dont have great treatments. In the next six years, Im hoping that we have treatment.

Tom Temin: And do you have a system for reviewing, say, a sample that you might have put in the library, as you mentioned, 13 years ago, or 10 years ago? And do you ever go back to them and take a fresh look, based on some new learnings that might have come in from a new case?

Dr. Ann McKee: Absolutely. We dont throw anything away, we keep everything in what we consider the optimal condition. Every brain is very, very precious to us. We, of course, maintain a very high level of privacy and no ones private information is released. But, we use those brains continually. We never stop, we keep going back. The science advances by highly qualified individuals all over the world, certainly all over the country, studying these disorders from all their different points of expertise. And yes, we go back constantly, and every brain I just want to emphasize is treated with such the utmost care and consideration.

Tom Temin: And what is the process to convince someone that is perhaps in distress, and also perhaps at the end of their life? Its a difficult ask, I imagine to donate that organ when theyre gone, because it does raise the question that, yes, youre going to die eventually, and perhaps not unhappy circumstances. How do you go about that? How do you convince people in a humane way that this is really something thats helpful to those that come after?

Dr. Ann McKee: Well, if someone has a suspicion, if they have a chronic condition, they realize the end is near, the ask is different. But in every case, this is a way to give back to advance the science, advanced knowledge so that your fellow service people can hopefully reduce their suffering in the future. This is a way to help your colleagues, your peers, the people that were with you on all these tours and are suffering some of the same symptoms. We may not have been quick enough to help you, but this is a way that you can help them. I think that resonates with a great deal of military service people. Theres a great esprit de corps, theres comradeship, that feeling of helping those who come after is really part of the psyche, I think of most veterans.

Tom Temin: And you get the sense that the military has become more receptive to the idea of preventing brain injury in training and in exercises outside of combat?

Dr. Ann McKee: I think they have but we have a long way to go, because their goal is to produce the most valiant warrior, but at the same time, they need to protect the most precious organ in your body, which is your brain. Your brain actually is responsible for your identity who you think of as yourself. Its your way of thinking, your memory, your emotions, your personality. It is such a precious thing. And I think its slowly where organizations like the military, like major sports leagues are adopting safer policies. But its a long, long haul, because in the short run, its difficult for them.

Tom Temin: Well I think some of the sports leagues look at the dollar signs before they look at the human side. And thats a pretty hard culture to crack.

Dr. Ann McKee: Id say youre absolutely right. And unfortunate because the athlete and the military personnel, theyre our most precious commodity. Those sports wouldnt be so popular if the athletes themselves werent so gifted. And certainly our military cant run without incredible people. So I just want to keep the people, the importance of that human being alive for these major entities.

Tom Temin: Dr. Ann McKee is chief of neuropathology at the VA Boston Healthcare System. As always, thanks so much for joining me.

Dr. Ann McKee: Well thank you. Its been a pleasure.

More:
Even after troops leave Afghanistan, Iraq, resulting brain injury research continuing for VHA - Federal News Network

VILNIUS Lithuanian Foreign Minister Gabrielius Landsbergis says he's been assured by his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein that a plane that took off from his country for Minsk on Friday is empty and is meant for collecting Iraqi nationals willing to go home.

"In the minister's words, it's an empty plane sent to collect people who have asked to come back. Several sources have confirmed that information," the minister told BNS on Friday.

The Iraqi Airways plane landed in Minsk before noon.

Based on unverified information, some 300 Iraqis have expressed their wish to go home, Landsbergis said.

Iraqi Airways announced on Thursday it was suspending flights to Minsk for a week. Landsbergis says he's been assured that flights suspended for ten days. The minister also said he asked Hussein for flights from Iraq to Minsk not to be resumed at all.

Landsbergis also says he's not received information on whether Iraq will send more planes to the Belarusian capital to collect its nationals.

"We agreed with the minister that we from the Foreign Affairs Ministry, with other institutions, will record people who want to go back. We have already asked documents of part of people from Iraq, and I have asked for them to be sent immediately so that these people dont change their mind," the minister said.

Lithuania wants flights from Iraq to Minsk to be suspended as part of people who arrive on these planed later attempt to illegally cross its border with Belarus.

Over 4,000 irregular migrants mostly Iraqi citizens have walked into Lithuania from Belarus illegally so far this year.

Lithuania has a state-level extreme situation declared over the migration influx which it says is being orchestrated by the Belarusian regime.

More here:
Plane arrives in Minsk from Iraq to collect those willing to go back Lithuanian formin - Baltic Times